How and when has Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security impacted negotiations outside the Security Council?

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Abstract

Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security was unanimously adopted in October 2000 under the Presidency of Namibia. This thesis examines how and when norms contained in that resolution have been diffused from the Security Council to other security arenas, using negotiations on landmines, small arms and nuclear weapons as case studies.

Opening with ten preambular paragraphs covering a broad range of principles, the resolution’s eighteen operational paragraphs address the narrower set of issues on the Security Council agenda. Despite this fact, the resolution has had a broad impact outside the Security Council, largely due to the advocacy of civil society actors working in cooperation with sympathetic governments and UN agencies. Holding governments accountable to their own rhetoric, NGOs have played a leading role in generating awareness and linkages between this Security Council resolution and other international and national policy making arenas through their persistent presence, research and advocacy.

Weapons negotiations have been more resistant to gender equality norms and mainstreaming efforts than policy arenas focused on peace agreements, post-conflict peace-building, reconstruction or elections. Feminist IR theory has illuminated why this resistance is not surprising; what requires explanation is the fact that inroads have been made. Using regime theory, feminist IR theory and analysis of the increasing role and impact of NGOs, working collaboratively with UN agencies and sympathetic governments in international negotiation, this thesis examines the limited but significant diffusion of gender norms in these more hostile policy environments to determine the conditions under which norms are diffused.

The dependent variable for this paper is disarmament negotiating fora, the independent variable is resolution 1325, and the intervening variables are the strategies and impacts of NGOs working with sympathetic governments and UN agencies.
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Acronyms

CCW – Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CD – Conference on Disarmament
CHR – United Nations Commission on Human Rights
CSW – United Nations Commission on the Status of Women
DDA – United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs
DPI – United Nations Department for Public Information
DPKO – Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPRK – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
ECOSOC – United Nations Economic and Social Council
IANSA – International Action Network on Small Arms
ICBL – International Campaign to Ban Landmines
NPT – nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
OCHA – UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PoA – Programme of Action adopted at the UN 2001 conference on small arms
RCW – Reaching Critical Will, WILPF’s Disarmament Project
SALW – Small Arms and Light Weapons
UNIDIR- United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNIFEM – United Nations Development Fund for Women
WILPF – Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom
WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction
1. Introduction

Disarmament and gender equality “are global public goods whose benefits are shared by all and monopolized by no one. In the UN system, both are cross cutting issues, for what office or department of the United Nations does not stand to gain by progress in gender equality or disarmament? When women move forward, and when disarmament moves forward, the world moves forward. Unfortunately, the same applies in reverse: setbacks in these areas impose costs for all.”

Jayantha Dhanapala, UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs

In October 2000 the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. While the title of this Security Council resolution is Women, Peace and Security, the text makes several references to gender perspectives and gender. This resolution establishes the security legitimacy of women’s and gender issues, for the first time placing them both within the Council’s mandate of maintaining international peace and security. Two Independent Experts appointed to make a follow-up assessment for the Security Council described the resolution as a “watershed political framework that makes women – and a gender perspective – relevant to negotiating peace agreements, planning refugee camps, peacekeeping operations and reconstructing war-torn societies. It makes the pursuit of gender equality relevant to every single Council action, ranging from mine clearance to elections to security sector reform.”

The resolution opens with ten preambular paragraphs that cite various normative standards and goals embraced by the international community in legal principles and political agreements, including those found in international humanitarian and human rights law, and those contained in the Beijing Platform for Action. In addition to reinforcing the norms from this global process, the preamble also a) expresses concern that civilians, particularly women and children, as “the vast majority” of those affected by conflict, b) reaffirms the important role women play in conflict prevention, resolution, and peace-building, and c) emphasizes the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations.

Despite the broad scope of the normative principles cited in the preambular paragraphs, it should be emphasized that the operational paragraphs of the resolution pertain quite strictly to the

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1 Jayantha Dhanapala, Under Secretary-General, Department for Disarmament Affairs, statement to the Women Waging Peace annual research consortium, Nov. 8, 2002.
2 Security Council Resolution 1325 is hereinafter called “resolution 1325”. For the full text of this Resolution see Appendix 1.
4 The Beijing Platform for Action, a document negotiated by 183 governments was adopted on 15 September 1995 after a five-year negotiating process. It is organized around 12 Critical Areas of Concern, each of which introduce the theme and identify strategic objectives and actions to be taken by governments, the UN system and civil society toward their realization. It contains an entire chapter on Women and Armed Conflict.
mandate of the Security Council. While resolution 1325 is the broadest political interpretation of women’s and gender issues reflected in the Security Council, it does not by any means cover the spectrum of issues relating to women, gender and conflict (particularly the development and human rights aspects), but its actionable items are “as specific and narrow as the Security Council’s mandate.” The language that opens the resolution’s eighteen operational paragraphs acknowledges the Security Council’s lack of knowledge about the issue noting, “the need to consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls.” The text then:

- encourages the Secretary-General to ensure increased representation of women;
- expresses the Council’s willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations;
- requests gender training guidelines and materials for Member States and calls for more funding for such training efforts;
- calls for gender perspective to be incorporated into peace agreements;
- calls on all parties to armed conflict to adhere to international law, end impunity and take special measures to protect women;
- emphasizes the need to respect the civilian nature of refugee camps;
- encourages those involved with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts to consider the different needs of female combatants and dependents;
- refers to the impact of sanctions on women quite vaguely;
- expresses a willingness to ensure Security Council missions take gender into account and meet with local and international women’s groups, and
- requests the Secretary-General to carry out a study and a report on the impact of armed conflict on women and the role of women in peace-building.

Resolution 1325 is typical of the Council’s first resolution on a theme. The first resolution of a thematic nature generally sketch out the scope of the Council’s concern in a broad normative sense, and usually call on the Secretary-General to generate a report to detail the linkage between

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5 Operational paragraphs are numbered and list actionable items binding on the Council, and in the case of resolutions passed under Chapter 7 of the Charter, are binding on all UN Member States.


7 United Nations Secretary-General: “Women, Peace and Security: Study submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1325 (2000)”. United Nations Secretary-General (2002) “Report of the Secretary-General on women, peace and security” (UN Doc S/2002/1154). The Secretary General’s study had 76 recommendations and the Independent Expert Assessment had 64. The Council has never formally debated or considered these recommendations, although its 2002 Presidential Statement indicated that it would. In an early draft of the resolution it stated: “Requests the Secretary-General to establish a panel to work with UN agencies and relevant departments to look at ways and means of implementing this resolution.”
the theme and the Council’s mandate. Benefiting from analysis generated by the UN system and transmitted by the Secretary-General, subsequent resolutions usually reflect a deeper understanding of the substantive issues and the potential for Security Council engagement, directing parts of the UN, Member States and civil society to undertake specific actions. In 2002, the Council received several reports on Women, Peace and Security including an Independent Experts’ Assessment, a Report and a Study from the Secretary-General (it unusual to have both a study and a report from the Secretary-General) that provided over one hundred recommendations on implementing the agenda on women, gender, peace and security. While these reports have been welcomed, their substantive content and recommendations have not prompted the Council to mandate further action through a resolution. Resolution 1325 has not enjoyed the follow up that, for example, the agenda item on Children and Armed Conflict has, with six resolutions in total, the latest on in July 2005. Women, Peace and Security has been the subject of three documents of lesser standing – Presidential Statements – which in 2002 requested an additional report from the Secretary-General about the status of implementation.

Despite the disappointing follow up by the Security Council itself, the resolution has aroused a large amount of interest among governments and civil society, in conferences, newspapers, on websites and in speeches. It has captured attention like few other Security Council resolutions, and some even claim it is the only Council resolution with an active global constituency monitoring implementation. Michele Landsberg, a former columnist for the Toronto Star, states in Ms. Magazine that, “Resolution 1325 is virtual consciousness-raising on a global scale.” Even NATO is convening workshops on gender and resolution 1325, reviewing gender training modules with a view to adaptation by Member States. Within the United Nations the resolution and its contents have been taken up in intergovernmental fora such as General Assembly, the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), the Economic and Social Council

8 For example, the resolutions on Children and Armed Conflict passed by the Council (resolution 1261 of 1999, resolution 1314 of 2000 and resolution 1379 of 2001) each become one pager longer than the former, address a broader range of actors and issues, and progressively make more resources available, with a commitment to staff resources for monitoring progress (the Child Protection Advisers in peacekeeping operations).
9 Security Council resolution 1612 (2005) was passed on 26 July 2005.
12 Michelle Landsberg (2003), “Resolution 1325- Use It or Lose It”. Ms. Magazine, Summer.
13 Women In NATO Conference, Oslo June 12-17 2005, theme: Women – an integral part of NATO operations: integrating the Gender Perspective. Workshops at the event include titles such as, “Given that the majority of affected populations in Mission areas are female – what factors should be considered as part of the NATO-Operational Planning Process?”
14 Several statements made by Heads of State or Foreign Ministers at the opening of the General Assembly each September have mentioned resolution 1325, most regularly, Sweden, Canada, UK and the Netherlands. Reports of the Secretary-General, reports of the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and UNIFEM to the General Assembly Third Committee, and several resolutions of the Committee have included reference to resolution 1325. They are all listed http://www.peacewomen.org/un/genass/gaindex.html
and the Commission on Human Rights (CHR). This is notable because there is usually objection to the Security Council encroaching on other parts of the UN house through its thematic debates, however in the case of resolution 1325 the response has been overwhelmingly positive. Twenty-three countries initiated by Canada have formed a “Friends of Women, Peace and Security” group to specifically monitor implementation of resolution 1325 at the United Nations.

Several UN departments have also sought to increase their efforts to better mainstream women, peace and security issues within their mandate and daily work, with the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) linking the development of their departmental Gender Action Plans to the adoption of resolution 1325. Several governments are developing National Action Plans for implementation of resolution 1325, a handful of governments have altered their training modules for military personnel, especially those sent to peacekeeping missions, and a number have altered their development aid packages to post-conflict countries, instructing senior representatives to address gender issues, encourage women’s representation and reach out to women in conflict and post-conflict zones. As the abridged list of initiatives above indicates, the adoption of resolution 1325 has multiplied action and diffused

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15 Numerous references to resolution 1325 have been made in the CSW context since the adoption of 1325 in statements, resolutions and reports of the Secretary-General, with the most examples to be found in 2004 when the Commission specifically addressed ‘Women's equal participation in conflict prevention, management and conflict resolution and in post-conflict peace-building’ http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/csw48/ac-wp-auv.pdf
16 The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) coordinates the work of fourteen UN specialized agencies, ten functional commissions and five regional commissions; receives reports from eleven UN funds and programmes; and issues policy recommendations to the UN system and to Member States. During its Coordination Segment 2 - 6 July 2004, the governments of New Zealand, Canada and South Africa among others emphasized resolution 1325 in the debate on the implementation of its agreed conclusions (1997/2) on mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and programmes in the United Nations system, http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/coordination.htm
17 Several reports of Yakin Erturk, the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women to the Human Rights Commission have discussed 1325, as have several resolutions of the Commission such as the April 2004 Elimination of Violence Against Women, E/CN.4/2004/L.63 (operational paragraph 17) and Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons: Internally Displaced Persons, E/CN.4/2004/L.77 (operational paragraph 3). http://www.peacewomen.org/un/ecosoc/hrcommission60.html
18 The Italian government was the only one to object to the Council moving into General Assembly Affairs in its statement to the General Assembly in September 2001.
21 Canada, the Netherlands, the UK and Sweden all claim to be developing National Action Plans in their responses to the Secretary-General’s request for information in 2004. All government responses to the Secretary-General’s Aide Memoir can be found on the UN’s WomenWatch site, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/responses1325.htm
22 See training package jointly developed by Canada and the UK, http://www.genderandpeacekeeping.org
23 For example, in 2001, with the technical support of Women Waging Peace, an NGO led by former US Ambassador Swannee Hunt, Secretary of State Colin Powell sent a code cable to all US Ambassadors on the globe informing them about resolution1325 and suggesting various ways US representatives could better include and inform women leaders on security matters.
norms, collective understandings and expectations of what constitutes proper and consistent behavior and practice of actors on gender and security.24

While the research question implies that norms have been transmitted one way—from the Security Council to other arenas—the fact is that the Council was the last part of the United Nations to accept the relevance of gender issues. The Security Council’s recognition of gender and women’s issues is a product of the evolution of norms and standards in other fora;25 this paper concurs with others that gender norms have been enhanced through the legitimacy and authority bestowed by Security Council deliberation.26

If the Security Council’s own advocacy and follow-up of resolution 1325 has been weak, if the very source of this legitimacy is slow to realize its own potential in implementation, what accounts for the diffusion of the norms enshrined in the resolution? In part, this is due to some governments and UN departments starting to act. Civil society advocates have strenuously lobbied for and monitored these developments in the UN system and within governments, creating websites, new networks and structures that in addition to playing a watchdog role in monitoring governments and the UN system, have sought to raise the standard of NGOs efforts on gender issues in their work in the field of peace and security.27 Various methods have been utilized by NGOs to persuade states to act, including publicizing and praising the Security Council’s actions, forging collaborative relationships with UN departments and between NGOs, and particular norm driving governments to apply pressure to the Council and UN system more broadly. Another powerful response is protesting when governments do not live up to their own resolutions, when peacekeepers rape with impunity or when the UN system leadership is negligent. It will be argued below that civil society actors have used the strategy termed “rhetorical entrapment,”28 a strategy of holding governments accountable to their own rhetoric, triggering a shaming process to impel the putting of words into action.29

This paper will examine how this norm enhancement has occurred from the Security Council to disarmament negotiations where gender issues have occupied a very marginal position.

27 The NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security brings together key international umbrella and issue specific organizations focused implementation of the resolution. A web-ring of organizations have joined forces with the www.PeaceWomen.org website of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.
Although rather minimal, steps towards gender-balance and gender mainstreaming into weapons negotiations are notable especially considering the analysis and documentation provided by feminist scholarship, which has revealed the ubiquity of gender while describing IR theory and practice as a ‘womanless world’.  

2. Research Design

2.1 Purpose and Question
The purpose of examining how and when this particular Security Council resolution has impacted negotiations outside the Security Council is to understand and explain the conditions under which norms are diffused. Under what conditions does the authority of resolution 1325 cross over into other negotiations on international security? Does regime theory, feminist IR theory or analysis of the increasing role of civil society explain the phenomenon of norm diffusion in this instance?

Disarmament negotiations on landmines, small arms and nuclear weapons are useful case studies for measuring the diffusion of gender norms for several reasons.

First, the theoretical and policy divide between weapons and gender discourse is particularly wide, and is therefore a rigorous test of the capacity of norms to leap large conceptual and cultural distances. It is possible to argue that actors in regimes on gender and weapons occupy rather different “life worlds”, which according to Habermas includes a shared culture, social identity and a common sense of what constitutes legitimate norms and rules that enable communication and action. Considering the different conceptual frameworks, assumptions and experiences of these two sets of experts and policy actors, how has dialogue and norm diffusion been possible? This question is particularly relevant given that weapons negotiations are dominated by a rationalist or realist discourse characterized by the power optimizing seeking behaviour of states, whereas the theoretical and policy debate on gender might more easily be equated with truth or knowledge seeking policy processes and constructivist theoretical approaches focused on individual rights. These different discourses and frameworks have different starting points, on the one hand feminists and gender equality advocates begin with gender, bodies, sexuality, difference, voice, patriarchy, subjectivity, representation, and on the other hand, security/weapons actors focus on states, war, trade, power, decision and threat.

While these categorizations are crude and therefore automatically suggest numerous exceptions,

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30 Ann Tickner, “Feminist Theory and Gender Studies: Reflections for the Millennium”, in Frank P. Harvey & Michael Brecher, Critical Perspectives in International Studies: Millennial reflections on International Studies, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, p. 193. Tickner argued that although Peggy McIntosh (in “Interactive phases of Curriculum Re-Vision: A Feminist Perspective”, Wellesley College Centre for Research on Women, Wellesley, Mass 1983)was using history has her example in describing a “womanless world”, this applied also to IR.


32 Jan Jindy Pettman, “Progress” as Feminist International Relations”, in Frank P. Harvey & Michael Brecher, Critical Perspectives in International Studies: Millennial reflections on International Studies, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, p. 181
(not the least being the use of women’s human rights as a tool for power optimization by the Bush Administration) the point being emphasized is that the traditions, attitudes and shared beliefs of gender and weapons negotiators, advocates and theorists are demonstrably different, which makes the conditions under which they have reached mutual understanding on norms all the more interesting.

The second reason for seeing utility in focusing on the impact of resolution 1325 in disarmament fora relates to the role of civil society actors in negotiations. Governments continue to jealously guard decision-making about weapons and weapons reduction. Disarmament negotiations follow the most restrictive path when it comes to acknowledging NGOs as actors, partners and participants in the negotiating process, with the notable exception of landmines. Perhaps it is because of the relatively small spaces traditionally occupied by civil society in disarmament negotiation that Rebecca Johnson notes that, “…studies of civil society have tended to leave out arms control and studies of arms control have tended to leave out civil society.” Is the simple fact that resolution 1325 referred to gender and landmines, or the impact of small arms on women enough for these issues to be taken up in related fora? Or has additional intervention on the part of civil society actors been necessary to bridge the divide between the Security Council and disarmament negotiations? In other words, do governments feel “rhetorically entrapped” into norm-conforming behaviour, simply from uttering words or has the prompting and shaming of non-governmental actors been necessary to induce the sense of entrapment and thereby diffuse the norms of resolution 1325 to disarmament regimes? If the latter is a more likely explanation, as this thesis will argue, under what conditions have non-governmental and UN actors been successful in using resolution 1325 to affect the disarmament agenda? What kinds of arguments and strategies have worked in their efforts to promote the norms of resolution 1325 in disarmament negotiations?

The third purpose of analyzing the diffusion of gender norms to weapons and disarmament negotiations is that this issue has been under-analyzed by feminist scholars. Feminist IR scholars have almost never taken up weapons issues specifically in their theorizing, beyond problematizing a military conception of security as a point of departure en route to exploring other sites and aspects of women’s in/security. While studies have been conducted on gender and small arms issues for some decades, there is little research of feminist analysis weapons of mass destruction,

the exception to this general rule is Dr. Carol Cohn, whose work will be discussed below. These silences are notable considering the extent to which feminist IR projects have sought to make women’s work and gender issues visible, as women have been extremely active in disarmament movements, although quite often not organizing as women around gender demands or substantive analysis. Although under-theorized, efforts have been made to argue for a gender analysis in disarmament negotiations by NGOs, UN personnel and even some governments. Therefore, the third purpose of the research question is to reflect on feminist IR explanations for the impact of gender analysis on security fora, which are perhaps more helpful in explaining the obstacles rather than the successes, (or are perhaps more justifiable about the meaning of those successes).

The dependent variable for this thesis is disarmament negotiating fora, the independent variable is resolution 1325, and the intervening variables are the strategies and impacts of NGOs.

2.2 Scope or Limitation

It is necessary to explain a number of caveats before proceeding in order to guide the reader’s expectations of the scope and limitations of this paper.

With regards to theory, this paper will rather utilize three theoretical frameworks that together help to answer the research question. While it is ambitious to take up three bodies of theory – regime theory, feminist IR theory and analysis of the increasing role of civil society in international affairs – each provides much of the necessary framing, while standing alone lack the necessary information to answer the research question. Regime theory helps to explain how governments can entertain and advocate different norms at different times in different fora, displaying amnesia about one set of norms in one fora, and not another. Explicit and implicit rules, procedures and the clustering of issues by the Security Council precluded gender as relevant for fifty years, even though a number of permanent and non-permanent members strongly advocated for gender equality and women’s rights in other regimes. Using regime theory it is possible to understand the compartmentalization of norms, and to postulate the conditions under which norms and standards agreed in one regime are diffused to infect and affect another. The theory provides an explanation about how norms cumulatively gather support, lead to explicit articulation, formalization and the creation of single regimes. Feminist IR theory has been useful in elucidating a hierarchy of regimes, which is one explanation for the compartmentalization of norms, and the valuing of some norms over others in particular regimes by specific actors. Feminist IR theory has explained the conceptual, cultural and linguistic barriers and practices that have segregated gender equality norms from security discourses. They have also offered warning

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37 The activism of feminists at Greenham Common and other US bases around the world in women-only camps during the 1980’s is a notable exception, although it does not constitute theorizing.
regarding the cynical adoption of gender language for politically expedient ends, an issue explored by regime theorists as governments adding “cheap” legitimacy to their position.\textsuperscript{38} In the case of resolution 1325, civil society actors have assumed much of the burden of bridging the gaps between regimes to carry norms between them. They do this by making the case to diplomats and other government and UN officials as to the relevance of gender to disarmament negotiations, often using tools identified by regime theorists such as rhetorical self-entrapment, which entails holding governments accountable to their own rhetoric through shaming and encouragement. This summary discussion of the inter-linkages between the theoretical frameworks taken up will be expanded below, but is presented here briefly to justify the scope of the theoretical terrain covered by this paper.

With regards to the methods used in this paper, it is important to acknowledge that the author was involved in the development of 1325 and the monitoring of disarmament fora at the UN, both as an NGO and as a member of the UN secretariat. This experience of being a participant observer has offered insights into the culture of diplomacy and the synergies of government and NGO efforts around these issues, as well as access to individuals for interviews. Of course, there are ethical and political challenges related to bias that might occur when reflecting on developments in which one has played an active role. Therefore when the author is the source of primary documents or initiatives cited, it will be noted in order to avoid a feedback loop.

Robert Cox has argued that “all theories have a perspective,”\textsuperscript{39} and feminist researchers have advanced similar ideas when questioning assumptions about objectivity, ‘and methodologies that claim the neutrality of their facts and the universality of their conclusions.’\textsuperscript{40} Feminist researchers have found that when a researcher’s biases and interests are assumed to be non-existent, the work is far less trustworthy than that of a researcher who explains their position, perspective and involvement.\textsuperscript{41} Rather than an opportunity to simply repackage or reformulate preconceived notions and data, David Atwood has explained the primary reasons for the author utilizing an opportunity such as writing a thesis when he states, “…as someone toiling every day in the sparse vineyard of disarmament action, there is little time available to do the broader analysis…let alone the cross field perspective which would be useful – a dilemma shared by most

\textsuperscript{38} Frank Schimmelfenning, ibid. p. 63
NGO activists and a factor which itself limits the potential of our work.”\textsuperscript{42} It is the author’s contention that such analysis not only provides lessons learned for activists but also contributes to scholarly theorizing about these areas, in which there are gaps and insufficiently explained linkages.

\textbf{2.3 Data Collection Method}

This study has utilized interviews with diplomats, UN and NGO personnel. One trip was taken to Geneva in March 2005 to conduct interviews with six persons, four of which were diplomats working around the Conference on Disarmament, and two of which were former diplomats and current UN personnel. One of these persons started her work in a prominent disarmament NGO, was recruited by her government and now works for the UN. Ten interviews were also conducted in New York on the margins of the seventh Review Conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in May 2005. Due to limitations posed both by time and financial restrictions, speaking to people directly wasn’t always possible and was supplemented with the use of surveys to sixty individuals involved with disarmament negotiations – both diplomats and NGOs – by email, and sometimes with follow up telephone conversations.\textsuperscript{43} There were seventeen such responses. The questions asked can be found in Annex 2.

The interviews and surveys led to several sources of relevant materials, which have been used to analyze and structure the data presented in the case studies.

\textbf{First}, although sparse, the specific language on gender agreed in negotiations and outcome documents on landmines, small arms and nuclear weapons has been cited as an indicator of the extent to which consensus has been possible, and offers useful insights about how women and gender issues are currently conceived and when these issues have been considered relevant.

\textbf{Second}, the written materials prepared by NGOs, UN departments or governments to affect those negotiations have provided the arguments and statistics utilized by these actors in the form of official statements, background or lobbying documents and ‘talking points’.

\textbf{Third}, it has been necessary to supplement these written NGO materials with interviews with NGO leaders information to learn about where such documents fitted into the overall strategies of gender advocates.

\textbf{Fourth}, interviews with diplomats provided first hand accounts of perceptions of the utility and usefulness of the strategies and materials used by the NGOs.


\textsuperscript{43} It is important to note that many individuals spoke with me, or answered the questionnaire on the explicit understanding that there would be no attribution, although transcripts with names and incriminating material removed are available upon request.
2.4 Selection of Case/Cases

Three reasons are outlined above for why case studies focused on weapons and gender help explain the conditions under which norms are diffused. This section will consider the specificities of the case studies on landmines, small arms and nuclear weapons.

The three case studies were selected because the norms and treaties governing these three weapons systems are very different, even though they are considered and described as part of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime that generally seeks to limit and control weapons, and to eliminate some categories of weapons entirely. The differences between landmines, small arms and nuclear weapons offers a basis for comparison for how resolution 1325 has impacted, and the different strategies civil society has taken up in advocating for norm diffusion. These categories of weapons are not considered to have the same political or symbolic power as each other. For example, landmines are not considered to have the same political or symbolic power as nuclear weapons, even though the point is repeatedly made that small arms and landmines are essentially weapons of mass destruction considering the scale of damage and fatalities they inflict.

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction, also known as the Ottawa Treaty or Landmines Convention was negotiated in 1997, and entered into force in 1999, before the adoption of resolution 1325. Negotiations under this regime relevant to this paper occurred in 2001 in Nicaragua, in 2002 in Geneva and the first Review Conference held in 2004 in Nairobi, Kenya. The author attended none of these meetings.

The Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons has been the subject of two international conferences at the United Nations, the first was held in 2001, one year after the passage of 1325, at which efforts were made by NGOs and UN officials to integrate gender perspectives. The first Biennial Meeting of States Parties to follow up the Programme of Action agreed in 2001 was held in 2003 with increased emphasis on gender issues by NGOs, UN agencies and governments. The author attended both of these meetings, the first as an NGO representative, and the second as a representative of the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM).

The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty process is one which women’s NGOs and analysts play a leading role in the field of nuclear weapons policy. The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) taking up a particularly active in a coordinating among NGOs and between NGOs and delegations.44 This organization and others working to include

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44 Edith Ballantyne, WILPF’s representative at the UN since 1969 has attended more meetings of the NPT than any NGO, governmental or UN representative.
gender issues into nuclear weapon negotiations have had very little success in raising gender issues, even among NGO colleagues. The NPT States Parties meet almost annually in Preparatory Committees and for five-yearly Review Conferences and met in 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005. The author has attended all of these meetings, the 2000 Review Conference as an NGO delegate representing and leading WILPF,\textsuperscript{45} and the 2002-2004 Preparatory Committees (PrepComs) as a UNIFEM staff, attending the 2005 meeting registered as a WILPF delegate to interview delegates and NGOs for this thesis.

The fora relevant to this paper include the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (2001) and follow up meetings, and the General Assembly First Committee. These meetings generally take place in Geneva, the focal point for disarmament negotiation, and New York where the General Assembly convenes. Specific mine-affected locations are chosen for meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty (created as a direct response to dissatisfaction with the CCW process), and generally held outside the United Nations.

Civil society actors have been active in formulating and influencing policies on landmines, small arms and nuclear weapons, with the latter weapon system receiving attention since 1945 and the former becoming the focus of NGO efforts more recently. Since 2000 gender advocates have had an addition tool in resolution 1325 to use in their engagements with governments. The meetings of the treaty bodies under consideration in this thesis are therefore those that have taken place since the adoption of 1325, with NGOs and diplomats interviewed about opportunities that were used to increase awareness of women’s and gender issues since 2000.

When analyzing the actors in the case studies, it is extremely important to note that diplomats working in the field of disarmament generally cover all of these issue areas which stands in stark contrast to the NGO disarmament community, which is very much compartmentalized along areas of specialization. Only a few NGOs cover all three issues, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), being one of them, the Quaker United Nations Office is another, whereas a core group of diplomats with expertise on disarmament represent their governments across the spectrum of weapons systems under discussion in this paper.

\textbf{2.5 Definitions, Concepts, Terminology}

The most important concept to clarify in this thesis is the distinction between gender and women, as well as gender balance and gender mainstreaming. A discussion of these terms will be

\textsuperscript{45} The author worked for WILPF between 1996-2002 in both Geneva and New York.

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The difference between Women and Gender: While the title of Security Council resolution 1325 is Women, Peace and Security, the text makes several references to gender ‘perspectives’ and gender. Gender is not a word that translates in certain languages, and is a very misunderstood and misused term. Gender questions are so often equated with women in part because it is most often women who bring attention to gender issues. This can be explained by the unequal ordering of gender power that systematically and routinely disadvantages women. As the disadvantaged sector, the incentives for women to take up gender issues are obvious, and help explain the predominance of women gender equality advocates, which in turn substantiates the related perception that “gender issues” are referring to women only. This perception is also substantiated by inappropriate use of the word; a discussion about gender very often becomes, or is only a discussion about women.

This paper will distinguish between efforts to promote women’s participation and inclusion, which will be referred to as efforts to promote gender balance, and those that seek to incorporate gender issues into peace and security deliberations, which will be referred to as gender mainstreaming. According to Jaqui True, gender mainstreaming is not a liberal project to include more women in decision-making but rather, “a strategy to re-invent the processes of policy design, implementation and evaluation”. Gender mainstreaming was accepted as a global strategy for achieving gender equality in the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action agreed by 183 UN Member States. In 1997 the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) defined gender mainstream as ensuring that the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of peace and security policies and programmes benefit men and women equally. The goal of gender mainstreaming is gender equality. Using gender mainstreaming as a strategy towards reaching the normative goal of gender mainstreaming has the support of the European Union, the Nordic Council of Ministers, the Organization of American States, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the Council of Europe.

Gender: Rather than an oversimplified simile for women, questions about gender relate to the assumptions made about people with male or female bodies, the roles attached to these bodies that prescribe what people are like and should be like in any given culture, and, in particular, the value placed on those roles. In other words, gender refers to the political and

46 The UNDP Human Development Reports has reported in its Gender Development Index annually since 1996 that no country on earth accords women the same status and rights as men.
49 This definition of gender draws directly from the paper by Dr. Carol Cohn with the author and Sara Ruddick, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: Is Gender Relevant?”, prepared for the WMD Commission headed by Hans Blix.
cultural meaning given to biological differences between men and women, boys and girls. People in every culture have biologically male or female bodies, but what it means to be “masculine” or “feminine” in any particular culture is different and changes over time. A focus on gender not only reveals information about women and men’s different experiences, it also sheds light on ingrained assumptions and stereotypes about men and women, the values and qualities associated with each and the ways power relationships can change. Masculinity and femininity are also defined in relation to each other – gender is about femininity or women’s status as much as it is about masculinity and the status of men. “Masculinity” and “femininity” are dependent upon each other for their meaning; masculinities do not exist except in contrast to femininities, and vice versa. The Secretary-General defines the term in his report on Women, Peace and Security as, “…the socially constructed roles as ascribed to women and men, as opposed to biological and physical characteristics. Gender roles vary according to socio-economic, political and cultural contexts, and are affected by other factors, including age, race, class and ethnicity. Gender roles are learned and are changeable. Gender equality is a goal to ensure equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities for women and men, and girls and boys, which has been accepted by Governments.”

Given this definition of gender, the term gender balance outlined above should actually be referred to as sex balance or sex ratio. This term tends to be avoided, presumably due to connotations to the sex act, although it does compound confusion by linking the concept of gender to the number of male or female bodies represented. This is particularly so when the project of deepening an understanding about gender is to divorce concepts of masculinity and femininity from bodies, and rather insist that the origin of these concepts is social and cultural rather than physical. This dilemma can only be acknowledged here; careful attention will be paid in this paper to distinguishing between gender issues, women’s issues, gender-balance and gender mainstreaming.

Women: Since the 1970’s feminist scholars and activists have ceased to claim a common identity or experience of the category ‘women’ largely thanks to the challenges posed by women of colour and the global south who objected to the ‘totalizing gestures of feminism’ and asked, “Which women are you talking about?”, noting that women are not only affected by gender stereotypes, but also by their race and class status. In the field of peace and conflict, researchers, activists, policy-makers and theorists have asked, “Where are the women?” and have identified

52 Enloe organized her now classic text, around this question: “Where are the women?” to reveal that rather than simply absent from international politics, women are “relied upon as feminized workers, respectable and loyal wives, ‘civilizing influences’, as sex objects, obedient daughters, unpaid farmers, as coffee serving campaigns, as consumers
the diverse roles women play as victims of conflict, as fighters, participants and enablers of conflict, as peace advocates and activists, as community leaders and practical peace-builders, as sources and multipliers of information, as civilian police and peacekeepers, as decision-makers, et cetera. Through this work, it has become apparent that while women have been simply absent from many decision-making bodies on peace and security, the category of ‘women’ is not simple, and women cannot be simply unified or addressed by a single resolution, strategy or approach, particularly one that would equate them automatically with peace and disarmament.53

**Peace:** Each of the UN World Conferences on Women has linked women’s equality with development and peace. These three overarching themes served as the working title or slogan for all four UN conferences, each of which produced outcome documents that included reference to peace and disarmament. Feminists have problematized the linkage made between women and peace, while documenting that the planning and execution of war have been masculine enterprises. It wasn’t until International Women’s Day in 2000 that the Security Council recognized that ‘peace was inextricably linked with equality between women and men.’54 Through this statement, the Security Council was building on the cliché that “peace is more than the absence of war”, indicating that societies are not truly at peace if women and men are not equal. In other words, ‘peace’ isn’t simply when the shooting has stopped, when the peace agreement has been signed between two or more warring factions, or when the peacekeepers withdraw, but is when women and men enjoy authentic citizenship, where they are free to participate without violence, threats or coercion.

**Security:** After many years of constant use, the terms “peace and security” often automatically flow together in documents and speeches, particularly in the UN context due to numerous references in the Charter to “international peace and security”, almost as though they mean the same thing. They do not. Security is a contested concept, but has traditionally been understood in military terms as protection of the boundaries and integrity of states, and as something guaranteed by states to citizens. The concept of security has been the site of struggle between realist, liberal and other schools regarding a narrowing or widening of the scope of security. Threat or use of military force and utilization of these threats and capacities dominated Cold War security thinking, and were criticized by feminist theorists as over-valourizing and overestimating the use of state violence for domestic and international purposes, while

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underestimating the cost, and importantly, while ignoring how human beings experienced and perceived security differently along gender, race or class lines.

**Human Security**: Resolution 1325 occurred after the end of the Cold War and before the events of 11 September 2001, when ideas about security were changing and broadening from a strictly military focus to a nascent human security concept. Resolution 1325 was passed while Canada was on the Council, (January 1999-December 2000) throughout which it consistently raised human security into debate. Some analysts of this period of the Security Councils work assert that human security entered the Security Council’s work and, “without that step, the thematic resolutions (children and armed conflict; civilians and armed conflict; and 1325) could not have happened.” There is no internationally accepted definition of the term, but the 2003 Report of the Commission on Human Security describes human security as “protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations, building on their strengths and aspirations.” States participating in the Human Security Network assert that, “[H]uman security means freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, their safety or even their lives.” Betty Reardon asserts that human security is derived from the expectation of the fulfillment of four fundamental conditions: first, that the environment can sustain human life; second, that basic physical survival needs are met; third, that human dignity, integrity, personal and cultural identities will be respected; and fourth, that protection from avoidable harm is secured. Feminists have found fault with the human security discourse. In women’s daily lives the threat of violence is perhaps the most prominent insecurity. If human security is to be a means to address insecurity as it affects women and society as a whole, those using the concept must deal with violence against women as a fundamental cause of human insecurity in and of itself, and so far have not.

**Small Arms and Light Weapons**: An individual can carry small arms for personal use, such as revolvers and self-loading pistols; rifles and carbines; sub-machine-guns; assault rifles, light machine-guns. Light weapons can be handled by two or more people serving as a crew, a pack animal or a light vehicle, and include heavy machine-guns; hand held, under-barrel

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and mounted grenade launchers; portal anti-aircraft guns; portable anti-tank guns and recoilless rifles; portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems; portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems; mortars of calibers of less than 100mm. Small arms and light weapons are low cost, require little maintenance, they can be hidden and they can be used with very little training.\textsuperscript{61}

**Disarmament and Arms Control:** Arms control and disarmament are different things. Arms control is more generally understood to encompass controls, limitations and reductions of armaments. Disarmament is focused on steps, some of which include arms control measures, towards the complete elimination and prohibition of types of weapons. Among NGOs working on nuclear weapons in the USA in particular, there is a sharp division between those advocating for arms control or disarmament, which impacts the work and divides NGOs working in the NPT context. The distinction affects the other categories of weapons under discussion much less.

### 3. Theoretical Discussion

Three bodies of theory will be used in analyzing the case studies and answering the research question about how and when resolution 1325 has impacted disarmament negotiations, a) regime theory, b) literature on actors civil society actors in international negotiation, and c) feminist IR theory. The section on regime theory will introduce the main concepts in regime theory such as interest-based regimes and knowledge-based regimes, discussing the merits of classifying the disarmament and gender equality regimes along these lines. It will also test arguments for and against considering resolution 1325 a regime. The section on civil society will discuss the increased role of civil society actors despite the asymmetrical power relationship enjoyed with governments, and will develop some of the concepts utilized by regime theorists to explain how and when NGOs successfully apply pressure on governments to implement the norms to which they have declared support. The section on feminist IR theory will explain the distance between the disarmament and gender equality regimes, and some of the obstacles actors need to overcome in order to bridge to find common language and terms for discussion, the basis for norm diffusion.

### 3.1 Resolution 1325: A bridge between gender and security regimes or a nascent regime itself?

The following section will outline the definitions offered in the academic literature of what constitutes a regime, and will then detail the elements and characteristics of the two regimes under discussion in this thesis, the gender equality regime and the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The discussion will then explore what prompted the creation of these regimes, and what are the assumptions and motivations for their continued development. Is it fair to characterize the

\textsuperscript{61} Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, 1997, UN Doc A/52/298
gender equality regime as a knowledge-based regime and the disarmament regime as a power or interest-based regime? Arguments for and against viewing resolution 1325 as a nascent regime will conclude the section.

Academic literature offers various criteria and definitions for what constitutes a regime. According to Robert Keohane, regimes aid in the “construction of mutually beneficial bargains” by creating frameworks for cooperation, and the clustering of issues and treaties together that allows for linkages. Krasner describes regimes as “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area,” with self-interest as first in his list of causal factors for regime formation. Jervis stipulates that regimes are conceived of historically unique arrangements that arise only “under exceptional circumstances and always after hegemonic war.” In her thesis exploring the role of civil society in building the Comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty regime, Rebecca Johnson notes that, “a single treaty or agreement can help found and promote regime formation, but should not be assumed to constitute the regime. Indeed, one of the original claims of regime theory was that regimes embedded patterns of cooperative behaviour that were broader than either a particular international organization or formal legal rules and requirements”. Robert Crawford reinforces the idea that treaties do not qualify as regimes, even the NPT, which he describes as “a virtual showcase for the idea of international security cooperation.” Although he does describe a “voluntarist, benevolent and collaborative spirit” implied in the notion of regimes, Crawford is generally cynical about the utility of the word regime if it is “taken as a synonym for strategic relationships that include cooperative as well as competitive motives and outcomes, [as] then regimes can be said to pervade international relations and to extend to every level of interaction.” Susan Strange would agree that definitions of the regime concept that aim to encompass too much renders the term “wooly.”

For the purpose of this thesis and drawing from the above definitions, regimes will be generally viewed as frameworks of rules, norms or expectations created by states to regulate their interactions that do not require a formal agreement or a binding treaty. More specifically, the

thesis discusses two regimes. The gender equality regime comprises consensus agreements and standards negotiated by the international community and enshrined in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, the deliberations of the Commission on the Status of Women, the consensus outcomes of four major UN World Conferences on Women, the 1966 General Assembly resolution on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict, the 1975 General Assembly resolution on Women's Participation in the strengthening of International Peace & Security, as well as relevant sections of the Geneva Conventions, and the Statute of the International Criminal Court. Since 2000, resolution 1325 is an element of this regime, and includes text and standards elucidated in the abovementioned fora.

What is referred to as the disarmament and non-proliferation regime includes the network of bi-lateral, pluri-lateral and multilateral treaties, agreements and processes that have cumulated since the first Hague Conference of 1899 that attempted to establish international norms for the conduct of states use of weapons and warfare. The disarmament and non-proliferation regime includes multilateral treaties such as the UN Charter, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), as well as bi-lateral agreements such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT I & II), regional treaties such as the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the resolutions and reports of the General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security. It also includes non-treaty elements, such as the outcomes of the inter-governmental process on small arms and light weapons, which is considered politically and not legally binding.

In his recently published book on Multilateral Diplomacy and the NPT, Jayantha Dhanapala states that both disarmament and non-proliferation regimes are “works in progress” that have grown unevenly, are subject to erratic and inadequate funding, have weak enforcement mechanisms, and need to adapt to new challenges, among them being recent attacks on multilateralism. Dhanapala’s focus is what is often called “the cornerstone of the international disarmament regime”, the NPT, but he also refers to small arms and landmines, underlining the fact that, “regimes are not static arrangements, but dynamic, living systems. They even have their own life-cycles – with evolutionary stages that range from genesis, growth, decline and collapse – in addition, of course, to the stage of steady maintenance.” Dhanapala is asserting that all regimes are essentially in flux and under development, but he does not account for the linkages between regimes, the meeting (or indeed clashing) of what he would call “living systems”, which might best describe the coming together of the regimes on gender equality, security and 

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68 Jayantha Dhanapala with Randy Rydell, (2005), Multilateral Diplomacy and the NPT: An Insider’s Account, UNIDIR & SIPRI, p. 107
disarmament. Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger have asserted that, “regimes are issue-specific institutions by definition,” implying a compartmentalization of normative ideas, rules and procedures,\(^69\) that do not necessarily easily import or export.

Before continuing to explore how and when norms might be diffused between regimes generally, and between the two regimes under discussion in particular, further exploration of the different characteristics of regimes is required.

Hasenclever et al have identified behavioural models as the basis on which realists, neoliberals and constructivists have analyzed the assumptions and motivations of actors in regimes. They distinguish between power-based, interest-based and knowledge-based regimes. *Power-based* explanations for regimes, more or less aligned with a realist framework, assert that the distribution of power among states, “strongly affects both the prospects for effective regimes to emerge and persist in an issue area and the nature of the regimes that result.”\(^70\) In this school of thought norms are imposed through coercion by a state or group of states on others. The *interest-based* school aligns more or less with the neoliberal framework, emphasizing the role of regimes in helping states realize their common interests. Although interest-based explanations are less cynical about the utility and effectiveness of regimes than those subscribing to the power-based model, they concur with realist assumptions about states as ‘rational egoists who care only for their own (absolute) gains.”\(^71\) However, in this school of thought the need to coerce states into norm adoption is reduced because according to this theoretical framework states perceive that it is in their own interests to behave in accordance the rules and standards. In contrast, *knowledge-based* theories of regimes correspond to the constructivist school, and have emphasized how states are interested in advancing normative standards to enhance their preferences, but also to enhance their identity as perceived by self and others. By valuing the process through which states understand themselves and their interests as relevant to options considered and actions taken, knowledge-based theories have asserted that states learn together on the basis of receiving and sharing knowledge, and through collective processes that generate responses to that knowledge. Hasenclever et al divide this school of thought into two strands, with weak cognitivists providing a complement to the neoliberal project by simply adding identity as another interest component to the neoliberal framework, and with strong cognitivists advocating an alternative theory rather than a supplement. Strong cognitivists argue that there is an international society based on ideas, norms and socialization processes that underpin and affect rationalizations and the development of interests. They argue that the legitimacy of norms in the international society affects actors’


\(^70\) Ibid p. 4.

\(^71\) Ibid p. 4.
perceptions of what is rational, what is in their interest and the very meaning of power. For knowledge-based theorists, norms are followed because states have internalized knowledge and want to exhibit appropriate and legitimate behaviour, the logic of is not necessarily conscious or on the basis of calculation.\textsuperscript{72}

How does the above classification of regimes relate to the disarmament and gender equality regimes? Is it appropriate to classify the disarmament regime as rooted in power-based realist preoccupations with geostrategic relations, military resources and experience, and the gender equality regime as rooted in knowledge-based foundations and motivations? While authoritative academics have identified and affirmed these general trends or tendencies,\textsuperscript{73} many have disputed a one-dimensional classification. As outlined above, part of the constructivist project is to expose what Crawford eloquently described as the, “alleged intellectual totalitarianism of positivist science, as manifested in the unreflective presuppositions of the discipline of international relations.” In other words, different theorists apply very different frameworks to the same world event or process, indicating that classifying regimes as either/or is problematic and it is possible to identify exceptions, where motivations and behaviour associated with knowledge-based regimes can be seen operating in the disarmament discourse, and qualities associated with power-based regimes can be seen operating in gender equality discourse. For example, one could argue that an increased knowledge about the impact of landmines on civilians helped to forge a consensus among states, who were less motivated by a calculation about the security utility of landmines than they were motivated by a desire to avoid stigmatization as a state prepared to mutilate private citizens. Some theorists explain that landmines didn’t suddenly become indiscriminate, they were always indiscriminate and they have always caused civilian casualties; what explains the Ottawa treaty banning landmines is that states ceased to find that honourable and justified,\textsuperscript{74} but rather shameful and therefore a “regime of abhorrence” formed.\textsuperscript{75} It is also possible to identify occasions in which gender issues have been utilized in power-based regimes and discourse, in particular by the Bush Administration, which has used the oppression of women as a pretext for bombing them, stigmatizing states that systematically oppress women as less than civilized in a broader campaign against ‘rogue’ states that are immoral, dangerous, unprincipled and unscrupulous. In these examples we see the utilization of gender norms for

\textsuperscript{72} These three classifications of regime are taken from Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, \textit{Theories of International Regimes}, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

\textsuperscript{73} For example, relating to the academic theory see Ann Tickner, (2001) \textit{Gendering World Politics}, Columbia University Press, p.48, who suggests that, “Reluctant to be associated with either side of the realist/idealist debate …and generally skeptical of rationalist, scientific claims to universality and objectivity, most feminist scholarship on security is compatible with the critical side of the third debate.” … “IR feminists have … identified with postpositivist epistemologies in IR, which they feel can provide better ways to understand the gendered structures and practices of world politics.


\textsuperscript{75} Robert M. A. Crawford (1996), op. cit.
power and interest, and the use of knowledge to challenge and change previously held
assumptions about security and power.

While it is useful to point out these anomalies, they occur whenever a theoretical
framework is placed over events in the world. There is a sufficient body of academic writing, and
examples of speech acts by government representatives to assume and assert that the disarmament
discourse and regime, since the end of WWII and throughout the Cold War is predicated on
documented assumptions about states as unitary actors that define security threats and postures
around such theories as nuclear deterrence, and the right to resort to military threat or action as a
defining feature of being a sovereign state. Debates on this subject have preoccupied the United
Nations.

Now that regimes have been defined, and theoretical frameworks have been applied to
classify the differences and establish the distance between gender equality and security regimes,
the question of how norms are diffused will be taken up.

It is extremely difficult to empirically demonstrate the influence of norms, and to pinpoint
when and how they are exported and then internalized by another regime, state or institution.
Various theories have put forward ideas about when norms are diffused, three of which are
particularly relevant when examining the diffusion of norms from resolution 1325 to disarmament
fora. Boli and Thomas write that norms diffuse when they align with core principles of modernity
such as equality and progress; Keck and Sikkink believe that norms diffuse when they appeal
for physical protection of vulnerable groups; and Kane emphasizes the power of norm
articulation by transformational leaders with moral capital. Each will be taken up in turn.

Obviously resolution 1325 directly appeals to the idea of equality between the sexes when
it comes to peace and security decision-making, calling for recognition of the different impact of
conflict on women and men, correcting an historical backwardness and blindness when it comes
to utilizing women’s capacities in leadership, conflict prevention and rebuilding war-torn
societies. This norm is transmitted to the disarmament context through the recognition that men
and women experience the impact of landmines, small arms and the testing of nuclear weapons
differently, and through identification of a severe gender imbalance in disarmament decision-
making.

ibid Keith Krause R. ed. (1998). The human security project is directly addressing this phenomenon of security
discourse being habitually limited to a narrow conception of state based security, which is the framework within
which discourse on nuclear weapons and armaments has occurred.
77 John Boli and Thomas George (1999), Constructing World Culture, Stanford University Press, Stanford, p. 18.
78 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders (1998), Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY and
London.
(2004), Human Rights and Private Wrongs: Constructing Norms in Global Civil Society, accessed online on 10 June
The second explanation acknowledges that norms diffuse when vulnerable groups are involved. The reduction of women to a one-dimensional status as victims and vulnerable groups is the subject of a great deal of writing and academic literature, and was certainly a feature of the initial debates on women peace and security in the Council. When the resolution was passed the identification of women as victims and agents in conflict was just dawning on UN Member States, this being the main point repeated over and over in the first Open Debate in the Security Council on Women, Peace and Security, which will be shown later was due to NGO contributions to the debate. All speakers demonstrated a greater understanding of women as victims of violence rather than agents in peace-building.80 As will be detailed below, this victim theme has been transmitted to the disarmament fora, one example being that an inaccurate statistic is constantly repeated by Member States and inserted into final documents in the small arms process that assert that women and children comprise 80% of small arms related fatalities when the greatest victims are actually young, urban men.81

Regarding the third explanation offered, while transformational leaders and moral capital are not the hallmarks of the Security Council, several charismatic individuals were on the Council at the time the resolution was negotiated and adopted (Ambassador Anwral Chowdhury of Bangladesh and Ambassador Patricia Durrant of Jamaica), and several countries with moral capital that are perceived as norm and standard setters were actively engaged (Namibia, Sweden, Canada and the Netherlands) and had support from one Permanent Member (the UK). Individual Ambassadors and the relationships between them matter. This feature of norm diffusion will also be taken up below in the case studies that demonstrate the role of other individual leaders such as Jayantha Dhanapala who led the Department for Disarmament Affairs and promoted a series of publications and public addresses dealing with gender and weapons, and of course Nobel Prize winning Jodie Williams on landmines and Nelson Mandela’s stance on nuclear weapons.

The remainder of this section will consider whether resolution 1325 might be considered a nascent regime in its own right.

Dhanapala characterizes the growth stage of a regime by a) the increasing number of states becoming members, b) the rate at which new states are joining, c) the track record of compliance and d) the extent to which members are integrating international commitments into domestic laws. Given that resolution 1325 now occupies terrain in two regimes, does resolution 1325 itself qualify as a discrete growing regime on women, peace and security under Dhanapala’s criterion? Resolution 1325 isn’t a treaty, and therefore is not something that can be formally joined, precluding it from Dhanapala’s first criteria. The rate that more states are joining in the

80 A list of all the speakers, with links to every statement can be found on the PeaceWomen.org website, which was established and managed by the author, http://www.peacewomen.org/un/UN1325/SCOpenSession2000.html
81 Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, ‘Missing Pieces Directions for reducing gun violence through the UN process on small arms control’, (2005), Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, p. 68
discussion and process is in part measurable by the incidence of 1325 being taken up in other
inter-governmental fora and referenced in negotiated consensus texts. The number of
governments participating in the Security Council discussions is another indicator; the first Open
Debate in the Security Council in 2000 heard from forty Member States, the resolution was
discussed in two open debates in 2002, with sixty interventions in total. In 2003 thirty-three
interventions were heard, including two on behalf of large regional groupings, as well as three UN
departments. In 2004 forty-two governments spoke, five UN representatives and for the second
time in UN history, an NGO spoke to the Council in the Council chamber.82

Regarding compliance, Dhanapala’s third criteria, another way governments are joining in
the 1325 effort is through indicating their compliance with the resolution in national reports in
response to the request for information to feed into the Secretary-General’s report, with 25
governments submitting national reports in 2004.83 Finally, regarding the integration of the
regime’s standards in national law and standards, some states are developing National Action
Plans to coordinate their domestic policies, development aid and implementation activities, with
Sweden issuing the most comprehensive report thus far based on a comparison of what the UK,
Canada and the Netherlands have achieved, indicating that it wishes to galvanize other countries,
particularly donor, countries to action, and its intention to generate a national report by October
2005.84 Given these activities related to Dhanapala’s criteria, resolution 1325 might still be at the
agenda setting or “growth” stage because it is capturing a growing number of states attention, and
an increasing number of measures are being taken to ground it in national policy. The above
arguments lead to the conclusion that rather than a nascent regime, resolution 1325 is an example
of the diffusion of norms between regimes. In fact most actors do not see much utility in starting a
new regime but rather, related to the strategic goals of gender mainstreaming, seek fundamental
change. In that sense resolution 1325 bridges and forms part of two regimes, perhaps it might
become considered as the start of a peace and security pillar in the gender equality regime, and a
gender equality pillar of the security regime.

3.2 The Role of Civil Society and NGOs in Norm Diffusion

After defining civil society more broadly and exploring the academic literature on its increasing
role in international negotiation, this section will describe a particular set of civil society actors—
NGOs with status at the UN. Theories will be applied to argue that NGOs play a crucial role in

82 Pierre Sane, in his capacity as the Secretary-General of Amnesty International was the first NGO to speak in the
Council chamber.
83 The reports can be found http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/responses1325.htm
on Women, Peace and Security: Experiences from Canada, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands with
recommendations for Sweden’s work: A Study commissioned by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Sweden”,
Collegium for Development Studies, Uppsala University,
http://www.kus.uu.se/pdf/publications/KUS%20Bok%20nr%2024%20(n%404t).pdf. The author assisted in the
preparation of this study.
how and when norms are diffused; through use of knowledge creation, persuasion, shaming and the abovementioned strategy of ‘rhetorical entrapment’.

Theorizing on the activities, strategies and impact of independent experts, non-governmental actors and the broader civil society has increased since the end of the Cold War, with a particular focus on the widening influence of non-state actors in resetting agendas, reframing issues and norms, coordinating international actions, and mobilizing public opinion to capture the attention of political decision-makers.85

First used by Aristotle, the term ‘civil society’ now broadly refers to groups that act autonomously from the state. Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor of the London School of Economics see civil society as global, with ethical and normative attributes: “the existence of a social sphere… above and beyond national, regional or local societies… something to do with the infrastructure that is needed for the spread of democracy and development: the growth of professional organizations, consumer organizations, and interest groups that span many countries…”86 The term civil society is sometimes used synonymously with the term non-governmental organizations (NGO) which is incorrect. While NGOs are part, civil society is a much broader term and has been used to incorporate all kinds of groups from churches to for-profit entities, parliamentarians and armed groups (although they are understood to be ‘uncivil’, technically these groups are autonomous from the government). Ann Florini’s definition and use of “transnational civil society” includes NGOs, informal associations and loose coalitions, “forming… connections across national borders and inserting themselves into a wide range of decision-making processes on issues from international security to human rights to the environment.”87 Civil society can be both progressive and retrogressive, seeking change as well as outcomes that would preserve the status quo.

For the purposes of this thesis, the activities of the broader civil society will not be examined. This study will limit itself to NGOs that participate in, or on the margins of, negotiations at the UN around the Security Council and disarmament fora, while recognizing that much of their effectiveness is due to the activities of their affiliates and members working on the national and grassroots levels. The main NGO efforts that will be discussed are: The NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines

(ICBL), the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) and Reaching Critical Will, a project of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom to coordinate NGO activity, each of which enjoy recognition by the UN and are coalition building or network efforts that will be further elaborated in the case study section.

The architects of the Charter conceded that NGOs were relevant to the workings of the new international body, but decided that NGOs did not need a relationship to the bodies responsible for peace and security, the General Assembly or Security Council, but rather should exercise their capacities only on those issues dealt with under Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). There are two levels of status for NGOs at the UN - Consultative Status NGOs and DPI NGOs - and both are accredited through the Economic and Social Council under Article 71 of the Charter. Those organizations with consultative status (2531 of them currently) are viewed as having expertise to contribute to the UN. Those organizations with DPI status (over 1500) are seen as organizations that can communicate news and information from the UN to their constituency and the public. In order to secure "consultative status" with the UN, NGOs have to go through a rather grueling examination by a Committee of governments, which can and sometimes do reject the application if the organization fails to demonstrate that its goals and commitments are in harmony with the goals of the United Nations. Every four years such NGOs have to submit a report to demonstrate that they are still living up to these commitments and standards.

While NGOs have no formal standing with the Security Council or any of the disarmament and arms control regimes under discussion in this study (but rather, as indicated above, through ECOSOC), informal mechanisms and general standards and expectations have evolved over time. An informal practice has developed whereby NGOs can brief Security Council members, the Arria Formula is also used, but generally any interaction takes place in off the record private meetings, mostly between one delegation and one NGO. A controversial informal practice has developed around the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the world’s sole multilateral disarmament negotiation forum, wherein one single opportunity for NGO input has occurred each International Women’s Day since 1984. Noteworthy is the fact that NGOs are not permitted to read their own statement, rather the most senior (male) UN official, however for the first time in 2005 the President of the CD, read the statement.

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88 See the Department for Economic and Social Affairs NGO Section website http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/

89 Interactions between the NGOs and Council members take place outside the Council chamber in what are known as Arria Formula meetings. Ambassador Arria of Venezuela, through inviting Council members to gather over coffee in the Delegates Lounge to hear the views of a Bosnian priest in 1993, created what has become known as the Arria Formula, an informal exchange between NGOs and the Council, which must be chaired by a country other than the country presiding over the Council, and held outside the Council chamber.

90 A fact that the NGOs invariably protest by opening the statement with the words, “We, the women of the world.” For a list of the NGO statements to the CD see the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, http://www.wilpf.int.ch/statements/sindex.htm
The lack of formal standing for NGOs in the General Assembly and Disarmament fora requires that modalities be negotiated for each and every session. The First Special Session on Disarmament actually established modalities that have been the benchmark of standard practice since 1978, and have included a) one dedicated session for NGO statements to be read and distributed to governments, b) tables to display materials outside the conference room, c) access to open sessions and d) minimal meeting facilities within the UN such as a small conference room for side events in which there is sometimes a photocopier from the dawn of time and computers with viruses. While arguing for the right and opportunity to participate, and strengthened legitimacy of inclusive and consultative institutions and decisions taken, Farer raises some of the logistical problems that can arise when the sheer numbers of NGOs seeking standing can strain the system’s capacity to coherently address the issues at hand, which has affected both gender and disarmament regimes in recent years.

There is some debate in the academic literature about the significance of NGO activities, with realists continuing to hold that territorially sovereign states remain the significant actors in international relations, with non-state actors such as NGOs playing a secondary or peripheral role at best. George Bush referring to the biggest demonstrations ever occurring on the planet as, “a focus group” is consistent with this attitude. Observations about the power of anti-globalization protests to physically disrupt and politically influence meetings of the World Trade Organization or G8 summits might be persuaded to admit a more than peripheral role. At the UN, NGO representatives have often pointed out that the UN Charter says, “we the people”, not “we the states”, with governments retorting that Article 71 described above provides for quite enough legitimate engagement. However, as Tom Farer has noted, expectations about who has standing in negotiations on primal military security issues have broadened. Powerful states have to accept the presence of less powerful states as equals under the UN Charter. In this regard he also notes the, “proliferation, professionalization, enhanced financing and networking of international NGOs.” Despite perception of their standing as second or third class actors, NGOs do exercise influence on the margins of negotiations when they provide independent information, ideas and draft language to governments, either in direct one-on-one meetings in which relationships are built.

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91 NGOs attending the Beijing + 5 event at the UN in 2000 were so numerous that each NGO circulated a limited number of passes among their delegation. A precedent was set at this meeting because so many new organizations had formed as a result of the UN conference, therefore NGOs that did not exist prior to the 1995 Beijing Women’s Conference were able to attend.
92 Tom Farer, op. cit p 840.
93 The 2004 Guinness Book of World Records lists the global demonstrations on 15 February 2003 as the largest mass protest movement in history, with 11 million marching in nearly 800 cities. The protests were an attempt to stop the US led war against Iraq and to question the dubious pretext for war, Saddam Hussein’s possession of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The second largest recorded demonstration was also inspired by nuclear weapons issues and occurred in 1982 simultaneous to the 3rd Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament (SSOD 3) when an estimated one million people marched in New York City.
over time, or by lingering outside closed doors and at the gates of buildings to lobby and interact with delegates. NGOs also exercise influence through organizing side events and media spectacles that increase public pressure on decision makers.

There is repeated recognition of these roles of civil society at the UN, even when the doors are closed, although it is a contested norm and a handful of governments are adamant that NGOs are already too powerful and do much to block their access.\(^{95}\) Other governments and actors describe a “new democratic diplomacy” in which governments working with the UN and international institutions like the UN or regional organizations can actually affect change.\(^ {96}\) A more recent development in the ‘new democratic diplomacy’ is that some governments are willing to include NGOs on official delegations, to have them officially inside the room. This practice is more popular in the environmental field, and while it occurs less in security related fora, Canada and Ireland routinely include NGO advisers on their delegations to the NPT and Small Arms, and Kyrgyzstan has appointed a well-known US academic to sit behind their name plate at the NPT for the last five years.\(^ {97}\)

The 2000 meeting of the annual UN Department of Public Information conference was called “The New Democratic Diplomacy: Civil Society as Partner with the United Nations and Governments”, with the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs stating that,

> “Genuine progress in achieving disarmament goals, including the elimination of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as reducing stocks of small arms, must rest upon a solid foundation of an informed public. One of the greatest hurdles in any effort to make the process of disarmament more democratic was the unwillingness of governments to provide relevant information, ostensibly for national security reasons. Consequently, attempts to improve transparency would require persistent efforts by and on behalf of civil society.”

At the same event Alejandro Bendana cautioned against elements of this growing relationship between NGOs and governments, indicating that NGOs were being co-opted by Governments and international institutions.

> “Yes, they are working -- but under whose terms? The NGOs need to make up their minds about whose side they are on and who would stands with them. Some have been seduced, and others were being seduced. Many NGOs are donor-dependent and supply-driven. Others think more of supporting rural development projects rather than rural workers. The "new diplomacy" had to be rooted in the principle of social alliances. Included in that are issues such as support for land reform, ending military intervention and debt forgiveness.”

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\(^{95}\) Egypt, India, Cuba and the United States are leading countries in closing down opportunities for NGO observation. In a recent hearing on his appointment as Ambassador of the US, John Bolton said that access for NGOs from democratic countries should be reduced as they are “doubling up” on representation as their governments represent them.

\(^{96}\) This phrase was coined at the Hague Appeal for Peace, an international gathering of 10,000 people in 1999 organized by NGOs to fill the gap of no UN World Conference on peace in the 1990’s.

\(^{97}\) Bill Potter of the Monterey Institute for International Studies, California represents Kyrgyzstan.

This section has so far defined civil society and has described the conditions and modalities for NGOs to engage with governments and operate at the UN, including some of the issues raised on the policy level. The following will explore what academic literature has to say about the role NGOs have in diffusing norms.

Annika Björkdahl observes that much of the constructivist literature on norms makes the case for why norms matter, not necessarily when norms matter. She also criticizes the fact that the literature that develops the ideas of epistemic communities or the role of transnational advocacy networks is actually about policy outcomes and not norm based understanding which “depicts a transition made between ideational phenomena to those who handle them.”99 Rebecca Johnson has succinctly summarized why evaluating the impact of civil society activities on security and arms control decision-making can be difficult, which also applies to efforts around women, peace and security issues:

There may be vested interests in ignoring or downplaying the intentionality and influence of civil society actors, either because governments want to dishearten their opponents and discourage nongovernmental challenges to state authority, or because to admit that players without formal power may substantially shape state interests contradicts dominant theories of how the world works. For alternative political reasons, there may also be vested interests in inflating the role of pressure groups. As norms are shaped and embedded, governments themselves will adapt, adopt and internalize those norms, perceptions and arguments. Civil society is at its most successful when the norms or policies it has been advocating cease to appear controversial or challenging. Once a tipping point has been reached or norms have become embedded, political shifts or policy changes take on a quality of inevitability, generally obscuring the shaping role of non-state actors. How, then, can the political influence of civil society be measured?” 100

As Johnson suggests, NGOs that pushed for resolution 1325 very much downplayed certain of their crucial roles in diffusing the norms from the gender equality regime to the security regime. NGOs initiated the process, starting by forming an alliance with sympathetic states (Namibia, Bangladesh, Jamaica and Canada) to first secure support for an Open Debate. In order for it to succeed, it was vital that Namibia did not appear to be NGO led, and the NGOs involved understood this.101 Through a series of meetings and papers, NGOs supplied this core group of states with arguments about the utility and advantages of a Council debate on this subject, with talking points and recommendations to use in their discussion with other delegates. Only after they knew that states had begun the discussion between them, the NGO Working Group on 99 Annika Björkdahl, Normative influence in world politics. Towards a theoretical framework of norm export and import. Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions, University of Uppsala, April 13-18 2004, Workshop No. 7: “New Roles for the European Union in International Politics”, p. 6.
101 The reader should be reminded at this juncture that the author was a founder and the coordinator of the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security during the build up phase, therefore these assertions are made from observation and can be verified through dated internal email communications that show the anticipatory role of NGOs.
Women, Peace and Security undertook a number of initiatives such as meeting with each remaining member of the Security Council, utilizing different arguments with each to advocate for a thematic debate and resolution on Women, Peace and Security. This process corresponds with what Risse identifies as the process of introducing or transforming a norm through persuasion, rooted in a dynamic of communicative action.\(^{102}\)

Providing knowledge and serving as an alternative source of technical information, facts and testimony is identified by Keck and Sikkink as a key contribution of civil society,\(^{103}\) another strategy used by the NGOs working on 1325. The NGO Working Group quickly collected copies of 10-15 recent publications for each of the fifteen Security Council delegations. NGOs saw the costs of this pile of quite expensive, recent literature as an investment in demonstrating that the issue was credible and established in the research and academic community. Knowing full well that these would never be read, the NGOs summarized the facts and arguments in each. This exercise was useful to some delegations that picked up facts and themes emphasized in the NGO literature in their statements, particularly the observation that women were not simply victims of armed conflict as noted above, which was the starting point of the NGO summary paper, and repeated throughout.

Based on their knowledge of the substantive issues, the NGO Working Group provided Namibia with language for a draft resolution as soon as they agreed to host the Open Session during their Presidency of the Council. This draft was in the typical form that Council resolutions take, recalling all the relevant past documents, and covered all the policy issues that the NGOs wished to see included. Elements of this text were used by Namibia, after some editing, and input from a broad range of relevant experts by Namibia who consulted thoroughly. While significant areas were lost from the NGO perspective, the resolution resembles this draft, with the preambular language virtually identical. The reason for listing the above initiatives is because each one played a part in building towards the resolution, and each are examples of initiatives NGOs undertook but did not seek to make public. NGOs participating in this effort realized that if their interactions with delegates became publicly known the likelihood of the session or resolution would be greatly diminished.\(^{104}\)

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\(^{103}\) Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders (1998), Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY and London, p. 2. Haas has also noted that government decision-makers can be significantly influenced by how an issue is presented to them by experts. Peter M. Haas (ed.) (1992), Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia.

\(^{104}\) The author led the NGO Working Groups efforts during this period. The list of documents distributed, literature summary and draft resolution is available upon request.
Atwood states are as resistant to *formal* NGO input as the Security Council, have similar incidents of NGO invisibility. 105

This is not to over-estimate the power of NGOs; power to act is primarily in the hands of governments, they determined whether a debate occurs, and the content of the resolution or documents in question. However, tangible outputs in each case were built upon a great many intangible and necessarily invisible NGO efforts, particularly knowledge that the delegates did not possess. It is also dangerous to overemphasize the significance of NGO efforts during this small time period, and to not acknowledge the cumulative impact of decades of interaction between governments and NGOs around negotiation in almost all other UN fora on gender or nuclear disarmament issues. However, the strategic decisions on the part of NGOs to be silent about many of their contributions concurs with Johnson’s statement about NGOs maintaining a fictitious traditional perception of ‘how the world works,’ in order to get governments to act. Although this kind of strategy is to some extent self-effacing and makes it extremely difficult to measure the work and effectiveness of particular actors, it nevertheless achieves what Keohane and Nye describe as power, “the ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do (and at an acceptable cost to the actor)”, 106 and which Barry Buzan also discusses as “control power” one of three aspects in his understanding of power which also includes attributive and relational power. 107

In their work on the power and impact of civil society Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink discuss the multiple roles of NGOs in bringing attention, framing issues and ideas and promoting change in the policy arena through formal and informal means. They describe how NGO campaigns can develop a common frame of meaning and use information, symbols, leverage and incentives to hold powerful actors to principles, polices or standards. They reject the idea that NGO successes are attributable to a diffusion of liberal practices, but rather, that actors are engaged in reshaping contested meaning, and sometimes are transformed through their interactions with each other. Keck and Sikkink claim that networks are vehicles for communication and political exchange with the potential for mutual transformation of participants. 108 Some studies on the resolution 1325 process have commented on the

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105 David Atwood did his doctoral work on NGO effectiveness in disarmament negotiations, particularly around the 1978 first UN Special Session on Disarmament, yet still in 2002 he states, “Despite this long history of engagement, it is perhaps not too much of a generalization to argue that disarmament and security policy systems remain among the least penetrated by NGOs.”, David Atwood, (2002) “NGOs and disarmament: views from the coalface”, *Disarmament Forum*, 1:2002, p.6.


transformation of NGO participants, both positive and negative change. Sheri Gibbings has
analyzed the work of the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, and the
willingness of its members to set aside issues that the Security Council found less palatable, in
particular, issues such as militarism, military spending and disarmament.109 This analysis concurs
somewhat with Tom Farer’s when he notes that, “As long as they labor to assist states in
enforcing agreements they want enforced, NGOs will be perceived by the authorities as assets.”110
Gibbings views the NGO Working Group as exercising power due to the access and proximity of
professional paid personnel to decision-makers in New York at the UN as well as the adaptation
to terms and definitions of women and security that were acceptable to the political constraints of
the Security Council rather than the broader constituency of women’s organizations they claim to
represent. She also asserts that this power rested in political decisions about thematic focus taken
by NGOs, in particular the dropping or under-emphasizing of weapons and militarism issues.
While Keck and Sikkink conceded that NGOs are constrained by their action context, Gibbings
asserts that in addition to creating positive change, well-established and recognized insider NGOs
can contribute to maintaining conservative structures and discursive practices of an action
context.

After resolution 1325 was passed, subsequent NGO activity has very much utilized what
Frank Schimmelfenning has called ‘rhetorical action’, or the strategic use of norm-based
arguments.111 Schimmelfenning introduces the idea of rhetorical entrapment as a causal mechanism
needed to explain how values and norms triumph over self-interested national preferences. He
uses the example of EU expansion and asserts that it expanded not as the result of egoistic cost-
benefit calculations, that instead a rational outcome based on egoistic preferences and bargaining
power was turned into a normative one. He asserts that the rhetoric used by States about a
European identity and the values of Europe provided moral appeal, which was necessary to alter
the uncooperative behaviour of dominant actors. Caught by their own words and policy
platforms, the “speech acts” of the past, uncooperative states were silenced. In a very similar
way, NGOs involved in the build-up to 1325 held governments to the standards they had agreed
in the gender equality regime and questioned the gender-blind nature of security deliberations.
The NGO Working Group collated a large amount of relevant language from 45 agreed treaties,
resolutions and consensus government documents to make the case.112 Since the adoption of
1325 a similar process of forcing governments to begin the process of implementation has

109 Sheri Gibbings, (2004)’Governing Women, Governing Security: Governmentality, Gender Mainstreaming and
Women’s Activism at the UN’, MA Thesis, York University, p. 87.
110 Ibid Farer, “New Players in the Old Game” p. 855
112 This document was created by WILPF by the author and an intern and can be found here
http://www.peacewomen.org/un/women/unwomenpeacedocs.html
employed rhetorical entrapment, shaming governments and UN processes at certain times, encouraging them to go further to realize the spirit and letter of what was agreed in October 2000. Each year since the adoption of resolution 1325 NGOs have brought out a report called One Year On, Two Years On, Three Years On etc, detailing the initiatives of governments, the UN system and NGOs in implementing 1325 as a device of rhetorical entrapment.\(^{113}\) In disarmament fora, NGOs and gender advocates attempt to entrap other governments in the standard set by the Security Council, which will be clear in the case study section.

Thus far it has been shown how NGOs aid in the diffusion of norms through a) working in partnership with some sympathetic governments, b) utilizing persuasion, c) providing knowledge and language d) generating public support and e) utilizing rhetorical entrapment to hold government accountable to the standards and agreements they have made. Ideas about when NGOs can be successful have included two more negative elements, a) when they are prepared to render much of their work invisible and b) when they are prepared to work within or maintain conservative structures and discursive practices, accepting limits imposed by governments in a calculation that policy gains made will be worth the political sacrifice.

3.3 Absent or Irrelevant?: The Women or the Weapons?
Recalling the definitions provided above of gender and gender mainstreaming, this section will further discuss gender in IR discourse, introducing the small body of feminist IR work specifically on weapons issues which explains the distance between the gender and disarmament regimes.

Security Council resolution 1325 is in part premised upon the findings of feminist academicians and activists who for several decades prior to its passage, demonstrated that gender is a necessary and relevant analytic category for the discipline and practice of IR and peace research. Cynthia Enloe’s groundbreaking work shed light on the type of masculinity promoted and required by militaries, as well as the corresponding economic and social roles prescribed to women in militarized settings.\(^{114}\) Carol Cohn documented the ways that sexual metaphors make it easier for defense intellectuals to distance themselves from the mass destruction they theorize,\(^{115}\) Carol Pateman revealed how the liberal ‘social contract’ is, in fact, a particular conception of male citizenship,\(^{116}\) Catherine MacKinnon put forward a feminist theory of the state,\(^{117}\) Christine

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\(^{113}\) The NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security have issued these reports, which are available here [http://www.peacewomen.org/un/UN1325/1325index.html](http://www.peacewomen.org/un/UN1325/1325index.html) The author coordinated the production of the first issue of this document.


\(^{115}\) Carol Cohn, (1987), ‘Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defence Intellectuals’, *Signs*, vol.12, No. 4, pp. 687-718


Sylvester linked the three debates of IR with three feminist epistemologies while trying to find a ‘home’ at the intersection point between these ‘noncommunicating camps’, while Ann Tickner has worked to build bridges between feminist and IR scholars.

As previously mentioned, feminist IR scholars haven’t often explicitly theorized about weapons or disarmament negotiations, more often they have problematized the limitations of militarized security notions as a point of departure en route to exploring or explaining other issues of interest. Particularly useful for answering the research question about gender in disarmament negotiation is the theorizing cited earlier by Carol Cohn on language and the gendered coding that weapons negotiators and intellectuals employ in using words and behaviour replete with gendered assumptions and attitudes. Prior to discussing Cohn’s work on the gender content and assumptions upon which security and disarmament negotiations are grounded, it is first necessary to briefly discuss the absence of women and gender in security debates and theory more generally.

Feminist literature has consistently observed and objected to the absence of women or engagement with gender issues by IR scholars and practitioners, and has provided explanations about structural and discursive limitations, demonstrating that ‘gender is visible but mostly unseen’, an observation that can be applied to disarmament fora. The absence of women – or gender imbalance – in disarmament negotiations is easily seen and counted. Cynthia Cockburn has observed that when it comes to gender, it both is and is not a question of quantifiable sex distributions, which even when extreme, always reveal exceptions. Cockburn is alluding to the fact that numbers and the entire gender balance project don’t tell the whole story and are often not the point of feminist intervention. Often the substance and terminology of the discourse are very illustrative of gender issues no matter who is at the table. However, with these caveats, and while there are exceptions, the ratio of women to men is extremely imbalanced in security and disarmament negotiations, which is increasingly considered relevant. The absence of

121 Of the 6,602 people representing their countries between 1992 and 2002 at the General Assembly First Committee discussions on Disarmament and International Security, only 13% of the delegates were women. Between 1992-2002 women occupied 2.7% of the seats at the table of the Security Council, which is a depository of some disarmament treaties and responds to proliferation issues, and represented 15.2% of those in support roles to Ambassadors. At the six Review Conferences of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (held every five years since 1970), only 11% of the delegates have been women, The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, United Nations Office 2002, ‘You do the Math: Counting the Participation of Women in Leadership Roles at the United Nations since 1992.’ [www.peacewomen.org]. The author prepared this document by reviewing each of the ‘blue books’ brought out by the UN each year that lists each governments delegation. While careful attention was paid, due to some names being difficult to distinguish as male or female by the author, the likelihood of error was indicated.
122 Cynthia Cockburn, ibid, p. 4. Feminists working in the security realm understand this only too well through the routine, relentless and sanity compromising repetition of the names of Margaret Thatcher, Golda Meir and Benazir Bhutto, as though this list constitutes an argument that disproves the virtual gender segregation in decision-making about war, observable for the past several thousand years.
women is emphasized in resolution 1325, which calls for increased representation of women in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 and in the preambular paragraphs reaffirms, “…the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution,” adding that, “… their full participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security…”

A preoccupation in the reports and study of the Secretary-General, and in debates in the Council on implementing resolution 1325 has been limited to the noting the absence of women at senior levels, in the field, and in traditional security decision-making fora and processes.\(^{123}\) Quite often noted by NGOs is the fact that not one member of the Security Council has seen fit to appoint only two women to Ambassadorial level from 2001-2005,\(^{124}\) and the Secretary-General repeatedly states that he is unable to appoint women to senior positions within the UN if states do not nominate women.\(^{125}\) When faced with this very real challenge, governments have cited difficulties in finding willing and suitable candidates, feeding into a relentless call for the training of women, which is seen as a panacea for all ills and presupposes that women are unqualified rather than unavailable or unwilling for particular reasons.\(^ {126\,127}\) In other words, the relevance and significance of the absence of women, which feminists have noticed for decades, is being noticed by others and problematized in the Security Council and elsewhere.

In her critique of the current security regime in the United States, Iris Marion Young describes the work of women peace activists in the 1980s, and notes that, “Many feminists were embarrassed by what they perceived as a simple minded essentialism animating the feminist peace movement’s accounts of the behavioural propensities of men that linked them to violence and those of women that supposedly made them more peaceful.”\(^ {128}\) While full of medical and scientific facts about nuclear weapons, the title and gender analysis of Helen Caldicott’s Missile

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\(^{123}\) For a listing of all statements made in the Council, including summaries of the debates see UNIFEM’s 1325 toolbox, a website which the author designed and managed, http://www.womenwarpeace.org/toolbox.htm

\(^{124}\) While the international community held its breath on the decision about John Bolton’s appointment as the US Ambassador to the UN, Anne Patterson held the post of US interim Ambassador at the UN, a temporary arrangement. The first woman at the Council since Patricia Durrant of Jamaica left in 2000 was Ellen Margrethe Løj of Denmark.


\(^{126}\) ibid, Louise Olsson (ed) (2003) Gender and Peace Processes – an Impossible Match? Jennifer Klot states, “Although training is seen as a panacea, we have to go into the discussion knowing it is not. Training courses are not integrated fully and do not reflect gender issues adequately. Not enough trainers exist. Those of us working at policy and program levels are called in to carry out training as though it were instinctive; but training is in itself a profession.”, p. 37.

\(^{127}\) One Canadian government study made an effort to explain the absence of women in contingents of civilian police prepared to be deployed to peace operations, which revealed a high level of interest among women officers, but noted that family obligations, domestic career interests and health and safety were limiting factors., Royal Canadian Mounted Police, International Training and Peacekeeping Branch, (2001), Women in Peacekeeping – A Study, Ottawa. Ontario, p. 7-8.

Envy is surely one source of the embarrassment to which Young refers. In her call to action Caldicott states, “A typical woman is very much in touch with her feelings. She cries when necessary and has a strong and reliable intuition… She innately understands the basic principles of conflict resolution… The positive feminine principles must become the guiding moral principle in world politics.”\textsuperscript{129} Such myth-confirming and simplistic statements from the 1980’s might partly explain the feminist retreat from theorizing on weapons per se, or not going beyond observations of the absence of women.

To summarize this section on gender balance, many feminist academics and activists have protested the absence of women in security decision- and theory-making as something to be explained. Numbers and gender imbalance matter, however, much time and paper has been spent in rejecting the notion that women are inherently more peaceful than men, or that a simple reshuffling of numbers will address the problem. While exploring the significance of virtual gender segregation in security theorizing and decision making, and arguing for greater representation from the diversity of women, feminists have rejected essentialist claims about women’s contribution and qualified that women are possibly freer to formulate a transformative non-violent vision of security having escaped masculine socialization,\textsuperscript{130} while coneding the exceptions. Some have indicated that this project of qualifying women’s contribution to security and disarmament debates, and rejecting the notion that women are only victims, was fueled particularly by an unashamed essentialism associated with the women’s peace and anti-nuclear movements of the 1980s.\textsuperscript{131}

After discussing the absence of women, feminist theory has often noted the presence of gender in security and weapons-related discourse.

In a recent presentation to the WMD Commission headed by Hans Blix,\textsuperscript{132} Dr. Cohn argued that gender matters when dealing with WMD for two reasons: Firstly, ideas about gender serve to shape, limit and distort the professional and political discourses that have been developed to think about WMD. Secondly, ideas about gender also shape, limit and distort the national and international political processes through which decisions about WMD are made. Rather than arguing that men like weapons, Cohn argued that ideas about strength, protection, rationality, security and control have a crucial impact on governmental and intergovernmental policy, as well as function at a large-scale societal level. These ideas are developed in Cohn’s academic work, which describes how gender is also part of a symbolic system, which shapes more than just how

\textsuperscript{129} Dr. Helen Caldicott, (1984), \textit{Missile Envy}, Bantam Books, New York, p. 236-241
\textsuperscript{132} Carol Cohn and the author briefed the WMD Commission on “Weapons of Mass Destruction: Is Gender Relevant?” on 12 June 2005, a paper of this title is forthcoming in the WMD Commission series and will appear here, www.wmdcommission.org
we see men and women. In this system many of our foundational concepts are divided into pairs of supposedly polar opposites which are mutually exclusive, strength/weakness, rationality/irrationality, protector/protected, controlled and uncontrollable, but also mind versus body, culture versus nature, abstraction versus concreteness, public versus private, political versus personal. In each case the first half of that dichotomy is associated with masculinity even though these concepts are not connected to bodies at all, and furthermore in each case, the first is valued and the second is devalued. Cohn takes this feminist analysis of gender and applies it to some of the implicit meanings and values in the words and behaviour of defence intellectuals. She asserts that there is this gendered symbolic system marks certain ideas, concerns, interests, information, feelings and meanings are marked in national security discourse as feminine and soft, devalued as weak, as wimpish, as insufficiently masculine. In her presentation to the Blix Commission, Cohn recounted the words of one defence intellectual,

“"At one point, we remodelled a particular attack, using slightly different assumptions, and found that instead of there being thirty-six million immediate fatalities, there would only be thirty million, and everyone was sitting around nodding saying, “oh yeah, that’s great, only thirty million,” when all of a sudden, I heard what we were saying. And I blurted out, “Wait, I’ve just heard how we’re talking – Only thirty million! Only thirty million human beings killed instantly?” Silence fell upon the room. Nobody said a word. They didn’t even look at me. It was awful. I felt like a woman.’  The physicist added that henceforth he was careful to never blurt out anything like that again.”133

Cohn explained this story as not simply about one individual, his feelings and actions; rather that this story is about the role and meaning of gender discourse in the defense community. The statement, "I felt like a woman," and the subsequent silence in that and other settings, are completely understandable as few have the strength of character and courage to transgress the strictures of both professional and gender codes, and to associate themselves with a lower status. The impact of gender discourse in that room (and countless others like it) is that certain ideas, concerns, interests, information, feelings and meanings are marked in national security discourse as feminine, and devalued and are excluded. They are therefore, first, very difficult to speak, as exemplified by the physicist who felt like a woman. And second, they are very difficult to hear, to take in and work with seriously, even if they are said. For the others in the room, the way in which the physicist's comments were marked as feminine and devalued served to delegitimate them. Cohn continued to explain,

What is it that cannot be spoken? First, any words that express an emotional awareness of the desperate human reality behind the sanitized abstractions of death and destruction. Similarly, weapons' effects may only be spoken of in the most clinical and abstract terms. What gets left out, then, is the emotional, the concrete, the particular, human bodies and their vulnerability, human lives and their subjectivity -- all of which are marked as feminine.

133 ibid, Carol Cohn, 'Wars Wimps and Women", p. 227
in the binary dichotomies of gender discourse. In other words, gender discourse informs and shapes nuclear and national security discourse, and in so doing creates silences and absences. It keeps things out of the room, unsaid, and keeps them ignored if they manage to get in. As such, it degrades our ability to think well and fully about nuclear weapons and national security, and shapes and limits the possible outcomes of our deliberations. What becomes clear, then, is that defense intellectuals’ standards of what constitutes "good thinking" about weapons and security have not simply evolved out of trial and error; it is not that the history of nuclear discourse has been filled with exploration of other ideas, concerns, interests, information, questions, feelings, meanings and stances which were then found to create distorted or poor thought. It is that these options have been preempted by their gender coding, and by the feelings evoked by living up to or transgressing normative gender codes. To borrow a term from defense intellectuals, you might say that gender coding serves as a "preemptive deterrent" to certain kinds of thought, including thoughts about disarmament.

Cohn gives numerous examples of the gendered language and metaphors which, prior to the inclusion of women or explicit attention to gender perspectives, make it difficult to ensure that value and legitimacy are given to gender issues, or that serious consideration be given to women as subject and agents in security decision-making. This barrier to considering gender issues is very strong in disarmament fora. Once devaluation of ideas and words coded as feminine has occurred, it makes it very difficult for anyone one (female or male) to use those arguments and words across a whole range of interlocking institutions – economic, political, familial, technological and ideological – across which weapons of violence, and representations of those weapons, travel. This is one measure of the distance between gender and security discourses and the disadvantaged position from which gender advocates speak in weapons fora, where the conceptual chasm described above automatically positions them as idealistic activists’, emotional, effeminate, regressive and not modern, inexpert, unprofessional, irrelevant to the business at hand. Significant for this thesis, Cohn also finds an association between the ideas of disarmament and emasculation, noting that “Amoung treaties, arms control negotiations, which extrapolate weapons from their context of injury and pain, may be the least amenable to the perspectives attributed to, and claimed by, women.”

When Cohn started this field of research she expected to encounter some difficulty in surfacing the gendered assumptions and metaphors, that defence intellectuals would be “slightly embarrassed to be caught in such blatant confirmation of feminist analyses. I was wrong. There was no evidence that such critiques had ever reached the ears, much less the minds of these men.”

134 Since 1987 significant strides forward have been made in both the theoretical and policy worlds, with some theorists noting the irony of academe being outpaced by bureaucracy

135 Andrew Mack recounts similar evidence of lack of self-reflexivity in the late 1990’s, “I was at a conference once where an America General asked to explain the principles of AirLand Battle 2000 said, 'It is essentially about deep, penetrating thrusts into the enemy's rear.' He seemed puzzled by the laughter...” author’s email correspondence with Andrew Mack, 4 March 2005.
thought the adoption of resolution 1325.\textsuperscript{136} Although sexist attitudes are ingrained as some of the interviews conducted for this thesis reveal, and while some of the fathers of IR and realism continue to be dismissive of the contribution of feminist theory,\textsuperscript{137} thanks to resolution 1325 there actually is a stronger taboo and awareness than Cohn found in 1987. This implies that attitudes are slowly changing, and that such attitudes still exist but have been buried deeper with the spade of political correctness. Perhaps the Cohn’s initial fears would be realized today, particularly in the negotiation setting. Cohn herself acknowledges that negotiations are more ritualistic displays than action, and that while women are intimidated or bored of ‘putting up with it’, that women in increasing numbers are resisting ridicule and discrimination to make their views known. One interviewee, a diplomat noted, “Yes, I’ve seen changes, some changes in the last five years. I’ve seen some more acceptance and less laughter. I haven’t heard laughter when the gender issue is raised for some long time. It’s now considered in bad taste, that is a change, it is being taken more seriously, and I think that is thanks to measures like the resolution and the ownership [by states].”

4. Case Studies

Each of the disarmament areas under question is the result of large, complex political processes, therefore it will not be possible to thoroughly describe or analyze the history or development of these parts of the disarmament regime. However, the focus of this study is the impact of resolution 1325, so will be focused on interventions made over the last five years only, with relevant background limited to this discrete focus provided when necessary.

Each case study will a) very briefly describe the disarmament treaty or process in question to assess what part of the evolutionary life-cycle identified by Dhanapala it currently occupies in the disarmament regime (genesis, growth, steady maintenance, decline or collapse), b) analyze the specific language on gender agreed in negotiations and outcome documents as an the main indicator identified by all those interviewed as the true test of gender mainstreaming c) examine the written materials prepared by gender advocates – NGOs, UN departments or governments – to affect those negotiations. The above three categories are based on information, attitudes and opinions offered by those who were interviewed on gender and disarmament, both the NGOs interviewed on their reflections of the obstacles and successes, as well as interviews with diplomats on the effectiveness of NGOs specifically on diffusing gender norms.


\textsuperscript{137} Such as Kenneth Waltz’s response to Fred Halliday’s question, “What is the feminist contribution to IR theory? Feminists offer not a new or revised theory of international-political theory but a sometimes interesting interpretation of what goes on internationally.” Interview with Ken Waltz conducted by Fred Halliday and Justin Rosenberg (1998), \textit{Review of International Studies}, 24, 371–386, p. 386.
The first precedent in diplomatic history of non-governmental organizations addressing governmental delegates was at the League of Nations Disarmament Conference (1932-33). It was calculated that the entire panel of speakers and their organizations represented more than a thousand million members, a constituency in 1932 of almost half the human race, and more than half the adults. The first speakers were women. The 15 Women’s Organizations had a Joint Consultative Committee and a membership of forty-five million. The words of one observer, Phillip Noel-Baker reveals that recognition of women’s involvement can still underestimate its significance,

“Pride of place in this opening Conference session was given to the women, whose organizations had brought a monster petition…women representatives of their various movements entered in pairs, carrying between them large baskets containing the sheets of signatures from their respective countries. Many of the women were in national dress, and they made an attractive and a picturesque group as they lined up in front of the President’s platform. Altogether their petitions bore the signatures of more than twelve million adult citizens who demanded that the Conference should disarm the world and so establish peace...Miss Mary Dingham, Chairman of the Geneva Coordinating Committee explained the many different activities they had undertaken in their long-term educational campaign…Then came the speakers on policy.”

This snapshot of history and this particular historical precedent are relevant to this study. Today, with the exception of the landmines negotiations, rather like the spectacle described in 1932, NGOs are tolerated in separate, colourful segments, interruptions to the business of negotiation. Today rooms of state actors negotiating disarmament look fairly very similar to the conference rooms of 1932, although admittedly the decolonization process has ensured that dark-suited older black men join the dark-suited older white men. The representation of women as state officials in security negotiations has increased from 1% in 1932 to 15% at best, but hovers around the 10% mark. In 1932 and today, the gender-imbalance in the NGO community swings in the opposite direction than the state actors imbalance, that is, toward a large presence and sometimes a majority of women participants. Dwelling on the gender balance issues and the marginalized role of NGOs in disarmament discussions introduces relevant contextual factors that should be

139 Ibid p. 74.
141 In 1932 the group might have been two or three persons, but today that group is slightly larger. Because of the very small numbers of women involved in decision-making positions at the international level, organizing among them has been useful and necessary. Madeline Albright formed an informal group when she was Ambassador in New York, which met occasionally, agreed to take each other’s calls, and placed pressure on the Secretary-General to appoint more women. (see Madeline Albright, (2003), *Madame Secretary: A Memoir*, Pan Books, London, p. 195). In Geneva a very informal group of diplomats has formed called Women Doing Disarmament to provide support for female diplomats, with one of my informants stating, “We formed the group just to get together to network among ourselves, it includes ambassadors, and it is not just for social reasons that we formed it. … I am lucky enough to come from a country that is very active and quite respected and so one is never sure. Gender issues become less of a problem for me that for some of my colleagues in the G21 [Non-Aligned Movement states in the Conference on Disarmament], for example, where there is a lot more prejudices.”
firmly kept in mind as the case studies are explored; these have invariably been discussions between men, and between states.

4.1 Landmines

This section will: a) describe landmines in the disarmament regime as in the growth and maintenance phase; b) present the language on gender agreed in landmines negotiations and related policy documents; and c) analyze the materials prepared by gender advocates to affect those negotiations and processes that were referred to in interviews with NGO leaders and diplomats.

   a) Landmine Convention in the Context of the Disarmament Regime

A great deal has been written about the process leading to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction, which entered into force in March 1999, just nine months after it was first signed. The fact that this treaty eliminating an entire category of weapons became operational more quickly than any other major international convention is even more striking when one considers that states must join this convention unconditionally. As such a new addition to the disarmament regime, with steadily increasing membership (145 states, with the newest member Latvia ratifying 1 July 2005), the Convention must be considered in its growth phase, however, because it has entered into force and is working through mechanisms institutionalized to implement the treaty, it is also maintaining a norm that has been established.

A unique feature of this part of the disarmament regime is the role of NGOs in creating the norms it enshrines. In his study of the Convention, Richard Price states that, “… the measures taken even by many resistant states demonstrates that transnational civil society has precipitated a rapid and widespread acceptance of the legitimacy of a new norm. This was recognized when the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) was included as part of the ‘Core Group’ of governments working toward the negotiations in Oslo in September 1997 where the ICBL

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143 Article 19 disallows a common practice wherein states ratify a treaty while placing reservations on certain clauses, which excuses their lack of compliance on those elements.
144 NGOs, the UN and donors have established several mechanisms, such as the Level One Surveys to facilitate resources where they are most needed. The ICBL is on the UN Steering Committee on Mine Action, and the Advisory Board of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, a Swiss Government Initiative, includes NGOs.
146 According to Stefen Kongstad, former Ambassador of Norway to the Conference on Disarmament, the Core Group started meeting in late 1996 and included Austria, Belgium, Canada, Ireland, the Philippines, Mexico, the
was an ‘Observer Delegation’, and also when the Nobel Prize was awarded to Judy Williams and
the International Campaign to Ban Landmines in 1997. Indeed the Convention itself takes note of
the important partnership role played by NGOs alongside governments and the UN system, with
Article 6, paragraphs 2, 3 and 7 specifying the role of NGOs in mine awareness, mine clearance
and in the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of mine victims. One NGO interviewee based in
Geneva was instrumental in the Canadian decision to lead a process outside the CCW for a ban.
Despite the visibility of NGOs in the landmine work, he concurred with analysis presented in the
theory section on why NGOs deliberately make their work invisible,

“If you have an insider role, that is, if you are prepared to invest in the place, and the setting,
spending time and money and resources being here, then you can play are role even though
officially no one would want to acknowledge that you have one. We have always known this,
but it’s happening even more. Many of the willing governments will play this behind the
scenes game also.”147

The informant proceeded to recount instances when delegates were not telling their own capitals
what was going on in the landmines process, or when NGOs directly precipitated government
action, adding, “But it’s actually important that those stories are not known, that they don’t come
out and there is across the board understanding of why.”148

Considerable emphasis has been placed on the ICBL’s success as attributable to their
ability to reframe landmines as a humanitarian issue rather than an arms control or disarmament
debate.149 The face of victims presented in building landmines as a humanitarian issues included
depictions of women, men, girls and boys as victims. One interviewee emphasized the
importance of research and practical know how in the humanitarian field to counter claims of
military personnel and political spokespersons.

Look at the importance of the medical fraternity to the anti-personnel landmine convention.
It’s often forgotten that one of the first people presenting data on this issue in the Lancet, the
British Medical Journal and elsewhere was Robin Coupland, an ICRC war surgeon. … In the
case of the mine ban convention the crucial factor was the field humanitarian community and
I think that is because if you don’t bring in the perspectives of people with practical
experience, you are not in a position to refute the claims of military people and others who
have their own agendas. So I think it’s important that NGOs be intellectually coherent, and
that hasn’t always been the case in small arms or nuclear disarmament.150

Another interviewee, a current disarmament diplomat described the landmines process as an
easier one to integrate gender issues due to the experience of the humanitarian community and a
longer standing tradition of including gender perspectives,

References:

147 Interview telephone 28 April 2005.
Studies, 2000, and Nicola Short, “A New Model for Arms Control? The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Ottawa
150 Interview, Geneva 18 March 2005

Netherlands, Norway, South Africa and Switzerland. By February/March 1997 it had expanded with Colombia and
Germany, and in June 1997 it was joined by Brazil, France, Malaysia, New Zealand, Portugal, Slovenia, the UK and

Telephone interview 28 April 2005.
You can see that parts of our field closest to the humanitarian discipline is where you see the reasons for focusing on gender at all, that is landmines and small arms. That is also where you have most immediate focus on the gender dimension; because we know how to do that from the humanitarian work. We have spent 30-40 years trying to work out how to integrate a gender perspective, and now I would say that in the humanitarian action field, it is a reaction that comes from the spine. It has become more or less automatic to ask where is the gender perspective? \[151\]

After describing it as an automatic reflex, the same interviewee also described the way in which even in the humanitarian setting gender issue are forgotten, and sometimes only make it into the second or third round of discussion.

Sometimes if you talk about victim assistance for landmine victims, you can talk about it for a while before somebody comes up with the idea of how do we secure the gender perspective here? How do we see to the female victims, of which there are many and in a different situation? How do we see to their needs? Who are articulating their needs? Is it the people from the government ministries from affected countries who are men? We have been through that, and that is what springs to my mind. We have a general focus on the issues, we are working on how to cooperate better on the landmine convention, but gender comes into the second or third round.

David Atwood describes the ICBL as both a “prophet” and “pragmatist” that have become the “consciences of the Convention … testing each proposal against its likely impact on reducing civilian casualties” rather than analyzing landmines in security or strategic terms. \[152\] Price builds on this idea of NGOs as the conscience of the treaty, using the term “norm entrepreneurs” to describe how NGO experts and organizers become influential by using their ability to “engage the policy process and engage in moral proselytizing through persuasion”. \[153\] Atwood describes the success of the persuasion partly through the broad reach of the NGOs involved, including humanitarian, peace, disability, medical, de-mining, arms control, religious, environmental, development, and women’s organizations from over seventy-five countries. \[154\] Another interviewee, a former diplomat, characterized the landmines campaign as follows, “There you had a pretty straightforward issue that NGOs could unite behind, which governments understood even if they didn’t agree with and there was a very clear goal.” \[155\]

b) Language on gender agreed in significant landmines documents

The Convention itself does not mention gender issues, but acknowledges in the first preambular paragraph that hundreds of “people” and “civilians” are maimed and killed every week, “particularly children.” Prior to the Ottawa Treaty or adoption of resolution 1325, landmines had been included in the gender equality regime as a relevant issue. The 1995 Beijing Platform for Action includes a proportionally large amount of text on the issue, which recognized

\[153\] Price op. cit p. 620
\[154\] Atwood op. cit p. 21
\[155\] Interview, Geneva 19 March 2005.
that women and children are “particularly affected” by the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines before listing six measures states can take that have no reference to gender issues whatsoever. 156 Clearly governmental and non-governmental advocates on landmines saw the Beijing conference as another important forum for education and norm building for their issue. The 1998 Commission on the Status of Women had also dealt with landmines, with the consensus outcome document noting the need to “eliminate the suffering of women and children,” and for landmines awareness campaigns to be accessible to women in afflicted areas and for support, rehabilitation and social integration to be provided to women victims. 157 It should be noted that these references are to women as victims as suffering social isolation and economic loss; women are not survivors of landmines or mine clearers. It should also be noted that these documents are specifically focused on women and not gender issues – they stop at recognition that women are victims.

In its preamble Resolution 1325 emphasizes, “the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls.” The Secretary-General’s follow up report in 2002 notes that women are injured by landmines, have social and economic roles that expose them to risks and that they have a role to play in disseminating information about landmines. 158 The Secretary-General’s follow up study in 2002 makes one recommendation pertinent to landmines, focusing on education. 159 The United Nations Mine Action Strategy for 2001-2005 reveals real progress as it includes a guiding principle and an explicit objective to ensure gender mainstreaming in mine action.

“Just as women, men, girls and boys tend to do different work, have differing mobility patterns and contribute to family and community life in diverse ways, their possible exposure to—and needs stemming from—landmines and UXO will vary considerably. The quality and quantity of information available to women, men, girls and boys about the threats and effects of landmines and UXO is likely to vary, as will the their perspectives on priorities for mine action. Therefore, the unique needs and distinct perspectives of women and men, girls and boys must be taken into consideration in the design, implementation and evaluation of mine-action programmes. All aspects of mine-action programming must include gender considerations.”

156 Beijing Platform for Action, paragraph 143 e.
157 Commission on the Status of Women: Agreed Conclusions on the Critical Areas of Concern of the Beijing Platform for Action
158 “Civilian women and girls, like men and boys, die during armed conflict, are forcibly displaced, are injured by landmines and other weapons and lose their livelihoods...” and that, “The role of women in relation to ensuring food security, the provision of water and energy for household use and their responsibility for health care — in both urban and rural contexts — may also put them at risk of being injured by landmines, in cross-fire and by sexual abuse.” The report also notes that women’s groups have, “...advocated for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, campaigned against small arms, participated in weapons collection programmes and disseminated information on landmines. Because of their active interest in and support of disarmament processes, consultations with women’s groups and networks can provide important information regarding perceptions of the dangers posed by the number or types of weapons, the identification of weapons caches and the transborder weapons trade.”
159 “Restore and strengthen safe access to education for girls and adolescent girls as a priority component of all humanitarian assistance, ensuring that the core curriculum includes gender-sensitive training on life skills, family life education, landmine awareness, HIV/AIDS and other STI prevention, human rights, peace education as well as psychological support.”
The objective states: “Guidelines developed to support the integration of a gender perspective in mine action programmes, based on an assessment of existing practice in mine action and other sectors, by 2004.” (Objective 4.7) Here we see an explicit shift from simple recognition that women are affected by mines, to the need for including consideration of gender differences between women, men, girls and boys.

In November 2004 the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Ottawa Treaty was held in Nairobi, Kenya. One of my informants from a developing country indicated that the female Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs from his country was eager to discuss gender issues at this meeting and raised them several times. Four references are made to gender in the final document; one related to mine risk education and the need to take gender into account, along with several other elements. States Parties recognized that victim assistance is more than a medical or rehabilitation issue, but is also a human rights issue that should take gender into consideration, again with gender being part of a list of relevant aspects. Two actions (numbers 21 and 35) are agreed that address these two issues of mine risk education and victim assistance, reiterating the inclusion of gender.

c) Materials presented by gender advocates using resolution 1325

The above materials demonstrate that since 2000 there has been an increase in the number of references and the depth of their understanding of gender issues, rather than women. Notably these have come from UN advocates and not from civil society. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines has been rather light on gender analysis and advocacy, with one of my informants from the UN noting that, “Surprisingly the group least interested in gender in landmines was the ICBL internationally in Washington, they did not see gender as a key issue in this area.” This is confirmed by the main documents interviewees noted, which were UN documents rather than NGO sources, of which there have been very few.

In 2001 the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs generated a “Briefing Note on Gender Perspectives and Landmines” as part of its package on Gender and Disarmament, and as part of its follow up on resolution 1325, which was reviewed and improved by the ICBL. Rather than discussing women only, the Briefing Notes pay more attention to gender analysis, comparing women and men’s experience to show that due to perception and performance of

\[\text{http://disarmament.un.org:8080/gender/note5.htm}\] The author was consulted on the content of these notes and asked to provide a list of disarmament and gender experts in the NGO community to review the text, and was also a speaker on the panel launching the package.  

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160 UN Doc A/58/260/Add.1
162 Don Hubert notes one in his study on the Landmine Ban that testimony by the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children to a U.S. congressional committee January 1991 was influential in increasing awareness about the scale of the crisis. Don Hubert op. cit, p. 7.
163 http://disarmament.un.org:8080/gender/note5.htm The author was consulted on the content of these notes and asked to provide a list of disarmament and gender experts in the NGO community to review the text, and was also a speaker on the panel launching the package.
gender roles women are routinely left out of decision-making about demining activities. The note draws attention to different studies that indicate different attention paid by women and men to the danger of landmines. Evidence from Cambodia is cited that illustrates the gender dimensions of disability, with disabled men reliant on their wives for support, while disabled women were abandoned by their partners or had difficulty in finding one, which also acknowledged that women are providing the unpaid burden of caring for those injured. The Briefing Note encourages mine awareness advocates to consider the role of women’s organizations as multipliers of information, and encourages de-miners to consult with both women and men, as consultation with women on landmine clearance may reveal different areas for priority around water points, schools, farms and transportation routes used by civilians.

The 2001 report of the Secretary-General on Mine on Assistance in Mine Strategy is silent on gender, however in the August 2003 report on the UN’s mine action strategy, the Secretary-General stated, “All aspects of mine-action programming must include gender considerations.” The most significant document to emerge since 2000 results directly from the resolution as gender-focused United Nations entities were invited into an Inter-Agency structure on landmines. Since the adoption of resolution 1325 in 2000 the Office of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Gender Issues has been invited into the Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action, and was instrumental in pushing for the development of Gender Guidelines on Mine Action, published in February 2005 after a two year process of consultation, field visits and research. These comprehensive Guidelines were launched in March 2005 at the Commission on the Status of Women, and focus on gender and mine clearance, mine risk education, victim assistance and advocacy. They form the basis of a year-long consultation and testing phase and will be used in the training of UN personnel working on landmine action, after which they will be formally adopted as Standard Operating Procedure. If rigorously applied, these guidelines would ensure gender mainstreaming through the UN’s mine action efforts, through which the bulk of donor funds and programmes are channeled.

4.2 Small Arms and Light Weapons


The full text reads “Just as women, men, girls and boys tend to do different work, have differing mobility patterns and contribute to family and community life in diverse ways, their possible exposure to landmines and unexploded ordnance and the impact upon them will vary considerably. The quality and quantity of information available to women, men, girls and boys about the threats and effects of landmines and unexploded ordnance is likely to vary, as will their perspectives on priorities for mine action. Therefore, the unique needs and distinct perspectives of women and men, girls and boys must be taken into consideration in the design, implementation and evaluation of mine-action programmes. All aspects of mine-action programming must include gender considerations.” UN Doc A/58/260/Add.1, paragraph 15

This section will: a) describe small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the disarmament regime as in a preliminary phase; b) present the language on gender agreed in SALW negotiations and related policy documents that were referred to in interviews with leaders in the process; and c) analyze the materials prepared by gender advocates to affect those negotiations and processes.

a) Small Arms and Light Weapons in the disarmament regime

An average of ninety states participate in the Conventional Arms Register which was set up by the United Nations in 1992 to document the global trade in conventional weapons. In 1995, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s paper to mark the 50th anniversary of the United Nations called for “microdisarmament” to reduce the impact on small arms on the security of people. As a result of this call the General Assembly created a Panel of Experts whose 1999 report sparked a number of regional processes to control the trafficking in firearms, and an international Convention Against Trans-National Organized Crime that includes a protocol on firearms and ammunition, which was finalized in 2001. A key recommendation of the Panel of Experts was that, “the United Nations should consider the possibility of convening an international conference,” which the General Assembly took up in deciding to convene the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All It’s Aspects in July 2001.

This conference produced the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, (hereafter referred to as the Programme for Action or PoA), which is not a legally binding instrument. States imposed a time limit on this political process which will conclude with a Review Conference in 2006, at which point governments may or may not decide to make the international small arms conversation a permanent one. Indications from the 2003 and 2006 Biennial Meeting of States Parties about the longevity of the process are inconclusive. This political process has inspired regional and national activities of states to curb the proliferation of small arms. Several related developments are underway to strengthen the principles in the PoA in binding instruments such as the negotiations that are close to concluding a Convention on Marking and Tracing weapons so that a universal standard could better monitor the flow of weapons from licit to illicit transfers. A group of Nobel Laureates and NGOs has drafted an Arms Transfer Treaty, which would apply strict legal standards and limitations to the right of states to supply arms.

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170 For example the Organization of American States (OAS) Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and other related materials (1997), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Moratorium on the Import, Export and Manufacture of Small Arms (1998), the Declaration Concerning Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials in the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
The 2001 conference generated a large amount of NGO activity, which was greatly inspired by the success of the landmines campaign. Donors, including private foundations and governments, contributed large funds towards the creation of an NGO Coalition called IANSA – the International Action Network on Small Arms that worked towards coordinating the NGO community and reframing the issue of gun violence in humanitarian terms.\(^{171}\) Due to its economic strength and the explicit governmental support from the Bush Administration for the National Rifle Association, delegates of which were included on the US delegation to the 2001 Conference, the gun lobby is particularly strong. The polar positions adopted by the NGO community in this process are mirrored in the governmental community. The norms around small arms are very much contested, particularly around the issue of civilian possession of these weapons, with some states refusing to accept legally binding international standards on domestic possession or restrictions that would curtail the profits made from the weapons industry, another particularly strong lobby concentrated in the western countries. Because of the non-binding nature of the instruments created on small arms, and the extent to which the norms are contested, this part of the disarmament regime can only be classified as having preliminary status, as the norms are not yet established.

While there is not consensus on the norms, there is consensus on the fact that the small arms issue is much more complicated than landmines was, making it much more difficult to cast this purely as a humanitarian issue. One interviewee, an NGO involved in both landmines and small arms issues indicated that the landmine issue had been used as a role model, but the people driving the issue were not sufficiently focused on humanitarian issues, and nor did they have the commitment to the grassroots social movement tactics the landmines campaigned relied on for maximum national success. He said, “the small arms movement doesn’t behave like a movement; it behaves like a bunch of technical experts. Initially the people pushing it were disarmament experts, despite standing around saying this is not an arms control, nevertheless we play it that way.”\(^{172}\) This lack of coherence around one identity or a simple slogan or solution to the small arms issue has sometimes aroused inappropriate comparisons and rather harsh criticism of NGO efforts, some of which are justified due to internal divisions and squabbles among NGOs. One interviewee commented on the NGO effort around the 2001 meeting, “I can’t remember what their coherent messages were – the NGOs in general and the Women’s Caucus more specifically. It’s difficult, if you are a consensus based loose network of NGOs. I think that means that you are not really going to be taken that seriously, until you can say what you want.”\(^{173}\)

b) Language on gender agreed in small arms focused documents

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\(^{171}\) The IANSA presence in New York operated out of the author’s office at WILPF in the build up to the 2001 conference.

\(^{172}\) Telephone interview 28 April 2005.

\(^{173}\) Interview 18 March 2005.
While references to women are rare, references to men and gender are virtually non-existent in documents arising from the inter-governmental process on small arms. This presumes that men's experience is self-evident, and serves to inaccurately equate women with gender analysis. The 1999 Panel of Experts described above makes two references to women which inaccurately state that, “women and children account[ing] for nearly 80% of the casualties.”\(^\text{174}\) Two references to women as victims were made in the 1999 report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, that small arms “expose[ing] women and children to violence”. In a subsequent report also in 1999 the Secretary-General called on the UN to include “women’s organizations” to participate in civil society’s efforts to combat the illicit trade in small arms.\(^\text{175}\) All nine resolutions and decisions adopted by the GA between 1995-2000 did not include language on gender issues, and nor did the 2000 Report of the Secretary General on the “Illicit Traffic in Small Arms”.\(^\text{176}\)

The word 'women' appears once in the 2001 Programme for Action, sandwiched between two references to children and one to the elderly. Preambular paragraph 6 reads: "Gravely concerned about [its] devastating consequences on children, many of whom are victims of armed conflict or are forced to become child soldiers, as well as the negative impact on women and the elderly, and in this context, taking into account the special session of the United Nations General Assembly on children,"\(^\text{177}\) As a recent IANSA publication notes,

“It is somewhat surprising that Resolution 1325 was not referenced in the text of the PoA when it first appeared, as its principle of recognizing the need to mainstream gender across the UN system is highly relevant to the implementation of the PoA. This is especially so, considering that Article 13 specifically encourages those involved in planning for DDR ‘to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants’."\(^\text{178}\)

One interview, a former diplomat, commented on the lack of reference to resolution 1325 in the PoA stating,

“It is amazing that there isn’t a paragraph. I think there are some very compelling things to say about small arms and gender, it is an incredibly gendered issue, but I don’t feel like I’ve got that much that lays it out on a plate. I think policy makers have an instinctive understanding, that instinctively they know, but that isn’t based on a factual premise, and it isn’t converted into a proposed policy response. How do you actually deal with it? Other than saying, Yes we know it’s a gendered issue, the next thing is what do you want to do

\(^{174}\) The Report of the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on small arms in pursuance of GA resolution 50/70 B, A/52/298. Although very often repeated, this statistic is wrong. Men are the vast majority of perpetrators and victims of small arms-related deaths.


\(^{177}\) A/CONF.192/15

about it and I don’t think that has been made very clear.179

Two years after the initial UN conference, two references to women can be found in the 2003 outcome document of the first Biennial Meeting of States parties, the first of which repeats the inaccurate statistic that "90 per cent of those killed were civilians, and 80 per cent of those were women and children, mostly victims of the misuse of small arms and light weapons...". Although very often repeated, this is simply wrong and is illustrative of a reflex to see gender perspectives as being about women and women as victims, and masks the gendered nature of the problem which is profoundly rooted in masculinity, with men as the vast majority of perpetrators and victims of small arms-related deaths. Professor Wendy Cuckier an expert on small arms issues from Ryserson Polytechnic University has asserted that, “The single largest predictor of gun possession or misuse is masculinity, in most countries more than 85% are in the hands of men, who are the vast majority of those who misuse them.”180 However this is not the statistic that features in small arms documents.

The 2003 document also notes "the direct involvement of those sectors of civil society that were hitherto seen only as primary victims of violence by small arms and light weapons: children, women and the elderly." It is indeed appropriate for States Parties to note the emergence of women, children and the elderly as actors, and not merely as victims, and to characterize this deepened understanding as a contribution of civil society. As IANSA emphasized in its statement to the delegates in 2003, “Women cannot simply be seen as the victims of conflicts: they also participate as combatants, and in support roles providing information, food, clothing and shelter.” In addition to carrying and smuggling arms as well as being perpetrators of gun violence, women are also community leaders, caretakers of victims and peace-builders who are part of the solution.

Emily Schroeder and Lauren Newhouse analyzed gender indicators in inter-governmental debate since the 2001 PoA was negotiated181 and found that 17% of statements the 2001 General Assembly session made a reference to gender; with only three of those (or 1.6%) referring to gender and small arms and light weapons. They found a decrease in 2002’s General Assembly debate with only 14% referring to gender and armed conflict, and 1.1% of those (two statements, one referring to women as a “vulnerable group” and the other to the “exploitation of women”) referencing women and small arms, which is surprising given that the timing of the 2001 Conference on small Arms. The improvement noted in 2003 was that the two Secretary-General’s reports on small arms made seven references to gender, only one referring to women as victims. The other references were to gender equality, women’s rights as human rights, mainstreaming gender in peacekeeping and in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, Security Council

180 Telephone interview, 24 April 2005.
181 Emily Schroeder and Lauren Newhouse, op cit.
Resolution 1325, and one reference to the negative impact the violation of women’s rights had on development.

c) Materials presented by gender advocates using resolution 1325

The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom devoted it’s annual International Women’s Day Disarmament Seminar in Geneva to Small Arms in March 2001, which was the focus of the NGO statement to the Conference on Disarmament, the only NGO contribution to that body. The text of the statement included prominent and repeated reference to resolution 1325, which was widely distributed among the delegates going to the 2001 conference. The timing of this NGO conference was particularly important for delegates in Geneva, as one of the many preparatory activities occurring there, where the bulk of governmental disarmament experts are based. However, the report, “In the Line of Fire” that contains a great deal of information and analysis that would have greatly benefited a broader audience was not generated by WILPF until 2002 which was a lost opportunity to improve the data set available to delegates attending the 2001 conference, but remains a useful resource that emphasizes that women are not the principle victims, and are more than victims of gun violence, but have a much broader variety of roles and capacities.182

Some IANSA members established a Women’s Caucus prior to the 2001 conference183 with the objectives of a) building and strengthening IANSA member’s sensitivity and capacity to address women’s concerns on the small arms issue, b) educating and outreaching to women’s organization about small arms in order to attract their active participation in IANSA, c) ensuring regional concerns are heard and realized at the July Conference through emphasizing women and gender concerns, and d) raising public awareness about the linkage between SALW and the negative impacts on women.184 This caucus decided to focus on women rather than gender, as is clear in the one reference to “gender concerns”, and the multiple references to women in the objectives of the group. Despite the main focus of the Women’s Caucus being devoted to influencing IANSA members, two male interviewees representing organizations in IANSA didn’t feel affected by its work, rather that it was a support network to help the women participants, with one saying, “I’ve noticed it, and I know that certain things can be done through that mechanism. I know it’s important that it exists, it helps to pull the women together; it’s useful for solidarity purposes as well among the women who are driving everything else in other settings. What I tend to see is the women doing things – but I don’t see it as an activity of the IANSA women’s network, its not labeled as that. It’s probably a good thing. If the

183 The author was involved in initiating the formation of the Women’s Caucus.
184 ‘Gender Perspectives on Small Arms: Papers from the launch of the IANSA Women’s Caucus”, 22 March 2001, p. 18.
women’s network is helping to create better analysis in terms of approach, that’s good, also if it’s helping the women part of the network in being more effective.”

The IANSA Women’s Caucus Statement issued several months before the July 2001 conference elaborates on the significance of resolution 1325 and urged Member States to include references to women and gender in the outcome documents. The twenty-paragraph statement circulated among NGOs received 120 signatures and includes facts and arguments about the impact of small arms specifically on women, and there is also gender content in citing studies that conclude that women and men perceive security differently. The statement is not only focused on women or gender issues, but covers the issues and functions of the July conference quite broadly, perhaps an attempt to educate women’s groups about the small arms issue more generally, one of the goals of the caucus.

The launch of this statement and the Women’s Caucus occurred at the United Nations with a panel of experts from Kenya, Colombia, Australia, the US and the United Nations. The papers from the launch emphasize resolution 1325 and the role of women in the movement against gun violence, but are equally interested in gender identities and gender mainstreaming, with strong references to machismo as a core obstacle in halting gun violence in Colombia and Australia, in particular the perception that gun ownership assists the male identity as protector of property and family.185

The IANSA Women’s Caucus issued a collection of testimonies, “The Devastating Impact of Small arms and Light Weapons on the Lives of Women” immediately prior to the July 2001 Conference. The publication lives up to its promise to be devastating; out of seventeen particularly graphic and shocking accounts of women as victims of small arms, five are stories of empowerment and action taken on the part of women to organize against gun violence, to collect and destroy arms and to support survivors.

Another gender related product to emerge at the conference was a series of postcards depicting the use of guns in advertising, four featuring images of men and three with images of women. These cards were presented as part of an effort to prohibit small arms advertisements but offered no analysis, assuming that the images of Iranian women in black robes carrying rifles, or half-naked women from computer games, or women in suspenders and bras holding guns were self-evidently abhorrent. One of my informants commented that in the absence of explicit messages “These seemed to miss the point of educating people. People asked, ‘what are you trying to tell me, that guns are quite sexy?’”186

After the 2001 Conference, the IANSA Women’s Caucus became the Women’s Network and generated an entire web portal and three information fact sheets, and an ongoing information

email list, all of which include reference to resolution 1325. IANSA has joined with Amnesty International and Oxfam in a campaign called Control Arms, and have issued a substantive report on small arms and women, that references resolution 1325 several times.

Interviews undertaken with several women activists in the small arms effort articulated a sense of discomfort in being perceived as gender advocates, and recognize the potential marginalization they may experience as a result, “I worry about being defined in this way, as a gender advocate, in the small arms scene. This is a hard enough game to play; the last thing I want to be stuck in is the women’s box, as well. Despite all the talk about gender mainstreaming, it ain’t mainstream.”

Gender advocates have been much more active in utilizing resolution 1325 as leverage in the small arms debate when compared to the landmines focused efforts. This is largely attributable to the timing of these processes. The agenda setting work of the landmines campaign occurred before resolution 1325 became available as tool, and major developments in the small arms effort occurred after the resolution was adopted. The establishment of the IANSA Women’s Caucus is attributable to several actors that were part of the effort to establish resolution 1325 and were also members of the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, which is another explanation for the increased activity of NGOs who transferred their experience and knowledge from one regime to another. Another possible explanation is the predominance of women in the campaign. One governmental observer said, “The interesting thing about small arms there are a lot of women. It is quite striking, the amount of women, at least, or really over 50% of the advocates are women, that’s pretty unusual, I don’t know why it is. It seems like an unusual thing for women to be drawn to, export controls, weapons.”

4.3 Nuclear Weapons
This section will: a) describe nuclear weapons in the disarmament regime as in a maintenance and potential decline phase; b) present the language on gender agreed in nuclear weapons negotiations and related policy documents that were referred to in interviews with leaders in the process; and c) analyze the materials prepared by gender advocates to affect those negotiations and processes.

a) Nuclear Weapons in the disarmament regime
The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is described as the cornerstone of the global arms control and disarmament regime at every meeting on the subject of nuclear weapons. This treaty grew out of resolutions put forward by Ireland and Sweden to the General Assembly in

187 See the web portal http://www.iansa.org/women/index.htm
189 Telephone interview, 24 April 2005.
190 Interview 18 March 2005
First signed after negotiations on the treaty text concluded in 1968, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force in 1970 and is the most popular arms control treaty with 188 Member States, which is why it is characterized as a regime in a maintenance phase. However, the failure of the May 2005 Review Conference to reach consensus, while not an uncommon occurrence in the treaty’s history, is significant due to the recent withdrawal of one member state (DPRK), and threats from others to withdraw if the five Nuclear Weapon States recognized by the treaty do not fulfill their disarmament obligations. Three states with nuclear weapons that continue to stand outside the treaty, (Israel, Pakistan and India) also threaten the treaty’s credibility. While threats to withdraw and the three non-signatories are not new developments, the treaty is being characterized as “in crisis” after being unable to address the withdrawal of North Korea and proliferation fears in Iran, and thus might also be characterized as in a potential decline phase.192

Women’s organizations have played a prominent role in the life of this treaty, with a WILPF leader being the only person to attend every review conference of the treaty,193 and the organization registering the highest number of delegates at both the 2000 and 2005 Review Conference of any of the two thousand NGOs registered. Individual women analysts and activists are prominent in the discussion on nuclear weapons194 with one of my informants observing that, “outside of Washington DC, where the boys really dominate, women have led the nuclear disarmament movement for the last twenty years that I’ve been active.”195

b) Language on gender agreed in nuclear weapons focused documents

There are absolutely no references to gender in agreed language text generated by the NPT. At the 2005 Review Conference after some agitation from a women’s organization, a reference to “mankind” was changed to “humankind” in the final document.196 The only other

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191 The Irish resolution, A/Res/1665, was adopted unanimously and the Swedish resolution A/Res/1664 by 58 votes to 10, with 23 abstentions, (December 4, 1961)
193 Edith Ballantyne
194 Dr. Rebecca Johnson’s Acronym Institute that publishes Disarmament Diplomacy is considered the leading NGO expert and is consulted regularly by governments. Dr. Patricia Lewis, established the leading NGO in verification matter, VERTIC before becoming the Director of the UN’s Institute for Disarmament Research. Alyson Bailes is the Executive Director of SIPRI. Women representatives of NGOs on the Abolition 2000 Global Council outnumber the male colleagues.
195 Interview, New York, 6 May 2005.
196 1. Nuclear weapons are suicidal, genocidal and ecocidal; 2. Women were, and are, excluded from nuclear science and the institutions and practices it has inspired; 3. Nuclear weapons were created under conditions of absolute secrecy; 4. Nuclear weapons epitomize a most extreme form of militarism and the erroneous concept of security as the ability to destroy others; 5. Nuclear weapons, due to the absolute nature of their destructive capacity, make conventional or "lesser wars" seem less horrific and therefore more justifiable; 6. Nuclear Weapon States, due to their permanent war economies, are responsible for 80% of the trade in conventional arms; 7. Nuclear weapons violate international law and the cannon of values the United Nations has evolved and enshrined through environmental, women's rights and human rights, labor as well as humanitarian conventions; 8. Nuclear weapons have cost trillions of dollars and have caused massive contamination of our environment, the food we eat and the genes we pass on to
instances of gender issues being raised in the NPT, CD or General Assembly First Committee are statements by several governments recognizing the role of women’s organizations in protesting nuclear weapons since the USA first used nuclear weapons in 1945.

**c) Materials presented by gender advocates using resolution 1325**

On the very day the Security Council first recognized gender issues, (International Women’s Day 2000), a group of women’s organizations presented a letter, “We The Women of the World” that was an attempt to use the 8 March celebration to focus the attention on the nuclear weapons issue, and the upcoming NPT Review Conference starting three weeks later. Despite the universalizing or essentialist position implied by a statement that would purport to speak on behalf of half of humanity, the letter was signed by almost one thousand individuals and organizations and was distributed at the official gathering of the UN celebrating 8 March, which was devoted to the theme of peace. The letter gave nine reasons why women call for the implementation of the first General Assembly resolution to abolish atomic weapons, placing Secretary General Annan and all member states on notice that, “the women of the world approach the World Conference on Nuclear Weapons that will bring together 187 governments in April of 2000, with a determination that this meeting will be the turning point in the Nuclear Age.”

Just months before resolution 1325 was passed in 2000, WILPF launched a project on nuclear disarmament that contained a gender component, specifically focused on the different biological affects of nuclear testing on women and men, efforts to expose the gender imbalance in decision-making on nuclear weapons and to bring more women’s organizations into the work on nuclear disarmament. The project is called Reaching Critical Will (RCW) and after 2000 included an explicit linkage with resolution 1325, with a section of the website devoted to providing facts and arguments on the gender perspectives on gender and nuclear weapons. The RCW website is an on-line repository that provides easy access to government statements, working papers and resolutions from the NPT Review Conferences and semi-annual Preparatory Meetings, the General Assembly First Committee and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The project works to enhance NGO preparation and participation and helps NGOs to organize panels, presentations and logistical arrangements for coming to New York or Geneva to monitor the debates. Diplomats also use this website, with one of those interviewed in Geneva stating, “For example in nuclear issues, and not only on nuclear issues, for example the Women’s League is doing half of the work that I was supposed to do. It’s really part of the reference, for the First Committee. I gave the Reaching Critical Will address to my Ministry, saying, ‘Listen, don’t bother me about the CD statements or the First Committee Statements or the future generations. 9. The nuclear weapon has become a symbol of power in the political structures and discourse of our world through the bestowing of prestige on those states that are capable of mass murder and environmental contamination.

197 [http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/social/genderdisarm/wewomen.html](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/social/genderdisarm/wewomen.html)
198 The author founded this project and continues as an adviser.
NPT statements, you just find that on the night or when you wake up the next day you have them on the website, so don’t bother me with sending requests.  

During the NPT Preparatory and Review Conferences, the WILPF project publishes a daily 6-8 page newsletter providing commentary and analysis of issues raised at the Conference. The daily News in Review contains contributions from NGOs, experts and analysis of the meetings status on the front page. During the NPT Preparatory and Review Conferences, the WILPF project publishes a daily 6-8 page newsletter providing commentary and analysis of issues raised at the Conference. The daily News in Review contains contributions from NGOs, experts and analysis of the meetings status on the front page. It also features cartoons, jokes and a Who’s Who section so that the motivations and background of NGOs and diplomats are shared. In 2000 one edition celebrating WILPF’s 80th birthday included several features on gender issues. Because the NPT meetings are held at the same time each year, the anniversary of WILPF is celebrated in the 2002, 2003 and 2004 editions, covering gender issues through the prism of the women’s organization rather than substantive gender issues. Of all the editions published in the month-long Review Conference in 2005 only one article appeared on gender issues, provided by the author.

The WILPF project has also generated a Nuclear Inventory, also known as the NGO Shadow Report that serves as a model for governments to fulfill the reporting they agreed to in 2000, the 12th point of the 13 point action plan roadmap towards nuclear disarmament. This substantial annual report that includes profiles of the 44 countries with nuclear power plants and the 5 Nuclear Weapon States is modeled on the Landmine Monitor, a compendium of information researched by NGOs. While containing no gender analysis, this is mentioned due to the ambitious nature of the project, and the fact that a women’s organization has taken on such a huge technical information and watchdog role.

Although the Reaching Critical Will project of WILPF specifically includes a gender component in the project and provides prominent space on the website on gender issues, considering that it has such a large outreach capacity and role in facilitating NGO collaboration, the efforts to consistently include gender into programmes and products generated by the project are disappointing. The staff described an acute lack of human and financial resources and the ambitious scope of the project in sheer practical terms as one explanation. The labour involved in providing the enormous information and reporting service is considerable, and leaves little time for reading and writing that is perceived to be needed to engage with the conceptual and substantive work of making the case for the relevance of gender to nuclear weapons negotiations. Some interviewees have concurred with feminist theoretical observations and hypotheses, specifically those articulated by Carol Cohn wherein raising gender issues is perceived as breaking a professional code and is dismissed, if not treated with outright hostility. One RCW staff described the unfortunate reaction to the only new product from the project on gender in

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201 All issues of the News In Review published since 2000 can be found here: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/nirindex.html
three years, a paper that specifically references resolution 1325 and elaborates on the linkages between gender and human security.202

Once I was asked by the UN to present a paper on gender and human security at a conference focused on the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. I was, predictably, thrown on the last panel alongside another presentation on "civil society"—again, more of a gesture than a real interest in the issue. When I presented the paper, the faces of the diplomats literally looked as if I was a babbling, nonsensical idiot. One delegate actually asked me, on the floor, why I was wasting their time with this. They were talking about SECURITY, and here I was talking about women and gender.203

Several of the interviewees—diplomats and NGOs alike—were adamant that gender was irrelevant when it came to these indiscriminate weapons of mass destruction. One diplomat from a leading country in this issue said, “I don’t think that it’s not necessarily relevant to nuclear weapons. When it comes to WMD there is not a gender impact, there is just a terrible impact of these weapons.”204 Another qualified the general rejection of the relevance of gender,

You have to define what WMD is about, is it about the politics of how to integrate these weapons into security doctrines. Is it about what we do with these weapons? Is it about utilization of these weapons? I think that is where you have to look for the gender perspective, because if you just say WMD and the Gender Perspective, you will get very many empty looks, including from my colleagues, and from myself.205

Given the crisis in the NPT and the disarmament machinery more generally, which the Secretary-General has described as going rusty from lack of use,206 the disarmament community is eagerly anticipating the report of the WMD Commission chaired by Dr. Blix, which could itself play a role similar to the Security Council’s in providing authoritative validation for gender mainstreaming for reasons other than women’s role as victims, and focus instead on the role of militarized masculinity in the policy arena. One development that may be significant is that Dr. Blix invited Dr. Cohn and the author to brief the Commissioners and publish a paper under its auspices on gender and weapons of mass destruction.207 If the WMD Commission accepts that addressing gendered assumptions will help to transform the intellectual and political processes that have so long failed to lead to WMD disarmament, resolution 1325 will have served to open political space for gender to be considered in nuclear weapons negotiations.

203 Email correspondence, 30 June 2005
204 Interview, Geneva 16 March 2005.
206 In April 2000, in his statement to the NPT Review Conference, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that "much of the established multilateral disarmament machinery has started to rust - a problem due not to the machinery itself but to the apparent lack of political will to use it."
The case studies analyzed above indicate that gender equality advocates have utilized a Security Council resolution to import norms of gender equality and mainstreaming to negotiations on weapons systems. The Landmines process occurred prior to resolution 1325 and it was therefore not utilized in the agenda setting part of the campaign or treaty negotiation process, however an increasing awareness and willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into landmine action, led by UN gender equality actors has emerged several years after resolution 1325 was passed, specifically based on the clause in resolution 1325 pertaining to landmines. The community focused on small arms issues has made the most use of resolution 1325, largely due to the fact that the resolution was adopted immediately prior to the commencement of an international political process on controlling the proliferation of small arms. Due to the small arms process being at a formative or agenda-setting stage, advocates have incentives to utilize resources and opportunities to articulate the problem on behalf of numerous constituencies as one crying out for resolve and action to assist in the formation of norms and standards on small arms proliferation. Attempts to raise gender issues in the context of nuclear weapons have been weak on the part of the NGO community in which women predominate, with academic work being far advanced in providing analysis and observation of the discourse on nuclear weapons.

5. Analysis

“I think this process is a very long one. It is a long haul. There are no revolutions, there are no big turn-arounds. There is no, “now we have it”, it’s not like we have found a vaccine against polio. The Security Council resolution is not like that at all, which is why it is so difficult to assess what the impact has been. But I’m sure that there has been an impact. Now is it because things evolve and would have evolved at any rate? No, this is one of the things that make things evolve. People say that there is no need for that kind of work, to get that focus, they seem to believe that there is universal justice and that things will just happen. There is some logic somewhere, that says, “oh don’t worry, the gender issue will be taken care of.” But it won’t. It won’t. And that work at the Security Council and the resolution is one of the big steps that contributed to placing the gender issue more on the table.208

What are the conditions under which gender equality advocates have successfully put the norms of resolution 1325 to work? The case studies above have given a sense of how gender equality advocates diffuse gender norms in disarmament fora.209 Through generating authoritative knowledge and information, advocates have shared analysis, research and facts with governments and UN entities to influence negotiations. They have conducted one-on-one exchanges of views with decision-makers and negotiators, they have also staged public events, conferences and panels

208 Interview with disarmament diplomat, Geneva 18 March 2005.
209 The reader is reminded that this thesis is focused on NGOs at the UN, and not civil society more broadly so has not dealt with public awareness and education activities, although in the landmines process this has obviously been an important element, and was referenced briefly.
of experts prior to and during negotiations as part of an attempt to persuade individuals and affect the language contained in statements and outcome documents. Securing a standard of rhetoric with which to hold governments accountable is considered an important vehicle for affecting change by NGO, government and UN actors, therefore emphasis is placed on affecting the language in documents agreed at the multilateral, bilateral and plurilateral levels. This is demonstrated by the quantity of materials generated to explain the relevance and linkages between gender, security and weapons issues.

Through the use of public campaigns, report writing, individual meetings and Arria Formula meetings with the entire Security Council membership, NGOs have been notably active in prompting the Security Council into a thematic direction, with those working in the field of children and armed conflict securing the most results, although NGO effort on civilian protection in 1999, conflict prevention in 2000, small arms in 2005, was also instrumental in the Council developing thematic expertise. A government was strongly in the leading role in placing HIV/AIDS on the Security Council agenda, one of five thematic events staged by Richard Holbrook during January 2000.

When has the tipping point been reached in the various disarmament fora under question? The theoretical framework offered by Finnemore and Sikkink on the tipping point for norm diffusion is useful in answering the research question of how and when have norms diffused between the gender equality and disarmament regimes.

Finnemore and Sikkink argue that the process of norm diffusion unfolds in four stages: 1) norm emergence, 2) a “tipping point” of acceptance by a critical mass of relevant actors, 3) a subsequent “norm cascade,” and 4) eventual institutionalization and internalization. The case studies have shown that gender has not yet reached a “norm cascade” in any disarmament sector. Gender equality advocates appear to have brought actors to a tipping point in the landmines and small arms fields; there is a minimal acceptance by a critical mass of relevant actors that gender is legitimate in these discussions. Inclusion of language on gender in negotiated outcome documents is the main indicator of this tipping point. However, has the tipping point been crossed when the inclusion of gender issues has not become a habit? Can the tipping point be said to be reached when there is still a strong need for ongoing prompting and lobbying pressure from the UN and NGOs before governments will remember to routinely consider the gendered effects and impacts of these weapons systems? The remainder of the analysis section of this paper will interrogate the research question through asking two questions: How and when has the tipping point diffusing norms from the gender equality regime to the security regime been reached? When has that tipping point failed to transport the norms from one regime to another?

5.1 How and when has the tipping point diffusing norms from the gender equality regime to the security regime been reached?

5.1.1 Norms diffuse when leading actors have taken up the issue

The tipping point described by Finnemore and Sikkink, stipulates a critical mass of "relevant actors". Several informants, including the diplomat quoted at the start of this section confirm the fact that the source of resolution 1325 matters, the Security Council actors are more relevant than others. The content of the resolution is not new, the norms and principles it contains have been declared, resolved and agreed before – what is new about resolution 1325 is the fact that the Security Council imported these elements agreed in the gender equality regime into the security regime, over which it is the senior arbiter. Informants from each sector and the academic literature on resolution 1325 have often noted the disproportionate power of the Security Council, and the increased weight or gravitas it lends to resolution 1325. An NGO informant stated, “I think the way the Security Council is not only a place of last resort, but is also now a place where initiative can happen means it can legitimize new ways of thinking about things. And in that context you hear about 1325. I think 1325 has helped people think differently even if you’re not familiar with the wording, because it’s there as a legitimizing element.”

Leading individual UN actors have initiated gender mainstreaming work of the UN since the adoption of resolution 1325. In the field of disarmament much can be attributed to initiatives taken by Jayantha Dhanapala in his capacity as Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Disarmament Affairs (DDA). USG Dhanapala was invited to participate in the launch of the Independent Experts’ Assessment on implementing resolution 1325 and other public events to discuss this subject, and also in an unprecedented all-male panel of heads of UN Departments on the first anniversary of resolution 1325. His was the first department to adopt a departmental gender mainstreaming action plan, and it was with his approval that the Gender and Disarmament Briefing Notes were distributed to all Member States attending the 2001 General Assembly First Committee and the 2002 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty meetings. As the Secretary-General’s study elaborated, commitment from the top rapidly enhances gender mainstreaming.

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211 Telephone interview 24 April 2005.
212 The United Nations Inter-agency Taskforce on Women, Security and Peace held a panel discussion on 30 October 2001 in the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Chamber. Included on the panel were Brian Cowan, the Irish Foreign Minister and President of the Security Council, Angela King, the Special Adviser on Gender Issues, Kieran Prendergast, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Jayantha Dhanapala, the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, and Sergio Vieira de Mello, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for East Timor.
213 The United Nations Inter-agency Taskforce on Women, Security and Peace held a panel discussion on 30 October 2001 in the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Chamber. Included on the panel were Brian Cowan, the Irish Foreign Minister and President of the Security Council, Angela King, the Special Adviser on Gender Issues, Kieran Prendergast, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Jayantha Dhanapala, the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, and Sergio Vieira de Mello, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for East Timor.
215 Op. Cit, United Nations Secretary-General: “Women, Peace and Security: Study submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1325 (2000).” The Secretary-General emphasized in his study the special role of heads of UN Missions, “The head of mission has the responsibility to promote and facilitate attention
The UN as leading actor in gender mainstreaming in landmines is an example of the explicit use of resolution 1325 to secure the required critical mass among NGOs and the landmine action community. After the adoption of resolution 1325, one UN office wielded the resolution as a ticket into the inter-agency forum focused on landmines, and has managed to persuade these actors to adopt a system-wide comprehensive policy and training programme. Due to the integrated working relationships between NGOs, governments and the UN system on landmines, this is a significant step forward. However, it took almost five years to achieve an expanded iteration of precisely what the gender issues referred to so fleetingly in the Security Council resolution might entail. This is an achievement, and the goals might be realized more thoroughly or faster if landmines-focused NGOs join the effort themselves and monitor implementation by the UN system and governments. It is significant that the launch of the UN’s Landmines Guidelines was at the Commission on the Status of Women session celebrating the 10th anniversary since the Beijing Women’s Conference, a particularly large gathering of gender equality NGOs.

In addition to NGOs taking up leadership roles, governments have also demonstrated leadership in advancing gender equality in disarmament and security for a, notably Canada, Norway, Sweden the UK and the African Union. In negotiations on humanitarian assistance delivery, and in articulating awareness of the different gender impacts of small arms Canada’s national action paper on implementing resolution 1325 demonstrates awareness of linkages between gender issues and disarmament issues. Going on the public record and stating linkages in exchanges of views with governments establishes relevance, which is stronger again when repeated by other governments. Norway, the UK and several African states have been prepared to take up the call or validate others statements in various negotiations.215

A critical mass of relevant actors prepared to articulate gender perspectives has not been reached in the field of nuclear weapons or WMD more generally.

5.1.2 Norms diffuse when there is cross-sector collaboration between leading actors

The potential success of collaboration between governments, the UN and NGOs has been called ‘the new democracy diplomacy’, and referred to throughout the academic and policy discourse, with the example of the mine ban convention offered repeatedly as a best practice. In the gender and development literature, scholars have stressed the importance of leading internal advocates – or policy entrepreneurs – of gender change in global governance institutions, who

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215 op cit. Emily Schroeder and Lauren Newhouse, “Gender and Small Arms Moving into the Mainstream” cite these countries and regional groupings as making the majority of interventions in statements at the UN on gender and small arms.
seek support from outside constituencies to generate political pressure and good information. After leading actors emerge within institutions, sectors or agencies, the next question concerns how and to what extent leading actors collaborate to generate momentum around the advancement of norms, which is shown in the case studies to depend on the status of the regime. At the agenda setting phase of the regime, collaboration between NGOs, governments and UN agencies occurs on the political and information levels, involving both public and private interactions between governments, NGOs and UN agencies, whereas the humanitarian implementation side of collaboration is largely one of financial support and information sharing. Attesting to this is the collaborative institutional arrangements whereby the UN or governments outsource many aspects of humanitarian relief to NGOs.

Small arms focused gender equality advocates particularly in the government and NGO sector have used resolution 1325 creatively in the politically contested norm and agenda-setting process among governments on controlling the misuse of small arms. The leading actors in gender mainstreaming in the small arms process include several governments, including Canada, Norway, the UK and various African states, that have a reputation for setting normative standards. The vast majority of these governments when interviewed attested to their reliance on NGO information sources, and particularly for authoritative policy-relevant research work, including the field-collection of data and testimony, in the advancing of the bridge between gender equality and disarmament regimes.

The large community of NGOs, UN and government bureaucrats focusing on gender equality and implementation of resolution 1325 has not tried to impact the policy environment of nuclear weapons negotiations, but are rather more focused on peacekeeping and peace negotiations. Nuclear weapons disarmament NGOs have not generated much research or analysis to advance gender as part of the policy agenda or conceptual discussion, although several papers have been recently written on these issues, which may or may not impact agenda-setting policy processes. One NGO representative from a medical association for the prevention of 216 Jacqui True, “Mainstreaming Gender in Global Public Policy”, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 5:3 November 2003, 368–396 p. 374.

217 Ian Brown, “This Fatal Compromise”, The Guardian, 19 November 2004, cites discusses the large budget of several humanitarian organizations, “Care International spent £250m this year. Oxfam and Save the Children’s budgets both exceed £100m. Donations by the public, however, have not kept pace with the growth of the NGOs. Increasingly, they depend on government funding. And, whereas in the past, NGOs set strict limits to government funding in order to maintain operational independence, those limits have quietly been removed: Care UK received 64% of this year's funds from the Department for International Development. Care USA, which is by far the wealthiest member of the Care International family, received 75% of its annual expenditure of £320m from the US government.”

218 The vast majority of information services and critique of resolution 1325 has focused on peacekeeping because it is under the direct control of the Security Council and is a site where the implementation of resolution 1325 could also affect the policies and training programmes of countries that contribute troops to peacekeeping operations. The bi-monthly 1325 E-news from WILPF’s PeaceWomen project feature numerous articles and a permanent section on peacekeeping, but very few on WMD, macro security or military spending or procurement issues. See http://www.peacewomen.org/news/1325News/1325ENewsindex.html
nuclear war when asked in an interview to consider the gender impact of nuclear war said, “this is something that we feel, but we can’t put our finger on it. Of course the male dominated scientific and political community is obvious, but how to describe the effects this numerical domination might have on weapons that could kill us all outright, well a gender-analysis under those conditions, of nuclear annihilation, kind of defies the imagination.” In interviews and policy documents, the devastatingly indiscriminate nature of nuclear weapons seems to exceed a threshold, beyond which gender ceases to be relevant.219

5.1.3 **Norms diffuse when the disarmament issue has been understood in humanitarian terms and women have been viewed as victims.** Recalling that Keck and Sikkink believe that norms diffuse when they appeal for physical protection of vulnerable groups, the short history of resolution 1325 has included a great deal of recognition of the vulnerability of women as victims of sexual violence, as refugees, and as carrying the burden of sustaining communities. From the start of the policy debate in the Security Council and the broader UN system from 2000, there has also been widespread recognition of the limitations of only viewing women as victims, with repeatedly reaffirmed acknowledgement of the fact that women have capacities and a demonstrated record of success in aspects of peace negotiation and peace building, as well as involvement in key roles in armed groups.

Establishing the specific vulnerabilities of men and women as they relate to the impact of weapons has been vital to advancing the diffusion of gender norms into disarmament regimes. It was the *impact* of landmines and small arms on women that established the policy relevance of the issues, and information generated that substantiated the different gender impact that caught the imaginations of actors with a tendency to support gender equality and disarmament norms. Addressing the ways in which women *are* victims when it comes to demining or prosthesis prioritization, or when it comes to addressing domestic violence fatalities through controlling domestic possession of firearms by civilians. Because the humanitarian sector provides concrete actionable tasks such as establishing designing refugee camps and services for displaced persons, or designing DDR programmes that cater to the needs of female ex-combatants, the issue has become more familiar and therefore comfortable to policy makers. Because the area of landmines and DDR were both specifically mentioned in resolution 1325, these have been the first in the security sector to realize a more nuanced gender perspective in policy responses.

219 According to Carol Cohn et al, (2005), “Given that there is now general agreement that there are clear gender dimensions to the possession of small arms and light weapons, we believe it would be naïve to assume that this association suddenly becomes meaningless when we are taking about larger, more massively destructive weapons. And more naïve still to think that it doesn’t matter. Given the problematic or dubious military value of most WMD, a focus on their symbolic dimensions *has to be* central to any effort at weapons reduction or disarmament. And any focus on the symbolic value and meaning of WMD would be badly incomplete without gender analysis.”
While some research has been done to suggest biological differences between women and men from the impact of nuclear weapons testing, the perception of women and men as vulnerable in different ways has not reached the policy audience. It is significant that recognition is given to the role of women’s organizations and advocates in generating social movements and political pressure of nuclear disarmament by both governments and UN agencies. However, it seems inconceivable that the gendered effects of nuclear weapons testing has not resonated more strongly, considering the shocking testimonies of Pacific Islander women about jelly babies, the boneless forms of flesh that emerge from the bodies of women and into the genetic and social context of islander populations. Women and men in some former-Soviet republics close to weapons testing are reporting widespread infertility, and the phenomena of cancers and deformities resultant from the Chernobyl disaster reveal deformities and ailments that, combined with poverty often serve to entrap women through placing an enormous unpaid burden of care on the shoulders of mothers, wives and daughters.

5.2 When has that tipping point failed to transport the norms from one regime to another?

5.2.1 Norms are not diffused when the issues and linkages is misunderstood, devalued or held in contempt

It would be unwise to suggest that rhetorical references or administrative procedural change inspired by resolution 1325 by security actors are simply lip service, or to misinterpret the slow pace of substantive engagement as adopting a hostile policy position. It is similarly unwise to suggest that some hostility does not affect the intellectual traditions and cultural practices around security decision-making, which can preventively strike out the possibility of engagement with gender equality actors. One of the informants for this paper noted how long it had been since she’d heard contempt in the form of laughter at gender issues in formal or informal inter-governmental policy negotiations, indicating the normalization of gender-discriminatory humor with expressions ranging from indifference to hatred. Feminist IR theorists have shown how

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220 Scientists and researchers have found that women are more at risk of developing a fatal cancer than are men when exposed to the same ionizing radiation exposure. Dr. Rosalie Bertell attributes this to two factors: first, that women’s breast and uterine tissue is at high risk for cancer, and second, that women’s longevity provides for longer development time for tumors. Women’s reproductive health is especially susceptible to the effects of radiation released from nuclear testing, as a National Cancer Institute study has documented, radioactive isotopes from nuclear testing have been found in every single county of the US. Many babies of Pacific Islander women living “downwind” from nuclear testing are born boneless and with transparent skin – they’re known as jelly babies.

221 Jayantha Dhanapala, Under Secretary-General, Department for Disarmament Affairs, statement to the Women Waging Peace annual research consortium, Nov. 8, 2002, see also Gender Perspectives on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Gender and Disarmament Briefing note Number 1. http://disarmament2.un.org/gender.htm

222 The inability to conceive is another phenomena attributed to testing, occurring at alarming rates amongst women living near Chelyabinsk - where only 1 of every 10 pregnancies actually results in a healthy child.

security studies and fora have been dismissive of gender issues, due of the devalued nature of gender in a hierarchy of importance, what Carol Cohn would describe as preemptive deterrence to women’s voices and ideas coded as feminine.

Ole Elgstrom distinguishes between formal (ritualistic or superficial rhetorical commitment on paper) and real norm adoption (institutionalization of norms, support from the highest level and implementation),\(^{224}\) asserting that theorists have under-examined the resistance to norm internalization, and the ongoing process of negotiation. Elgstrom asserts that existing norms are often “change resistant” and that new norms have to “fight their way into institutional thinking.” Rather than always being a sign of deep-seated bigoted, misogynist or fundamentalist views on either gender equality or disarmament norms, it is arguable that resistance to norm internalization is sometimes simply due to lack of information and knowledge. The theories advanced by those academics describing regimes as building up a body of knowledge after gaps in knowledge are identified, or when the divides between theory and policy are seen as unacceptably large would explain the evolution of gender issues in disarmament fora as a process of knowledge creation, dissemination and validation.

Regarding indifference, one interviewee summarized sentiments that have been expressed my the majority of others, and which has also been taken up in feminist academic literature on resolution 1325, “I am concerned that what seems a fairly widespread recognition of the relevance of gender issues to peace and security is in fact rather superficial and tenuous.” One government representative spoke of bureaucratic measures designed to mainstream gender into security policies that are in fact meaningless,

> 'At the moment when we approve a project in a post-conflict zone we have to say whether it is environmentally sound - check - and whether it is benefiting women and men equally – check - people just tick that box. Has the conflict and human rights mainstreaming, really gained that much by getting a box on the programme form? [when] you just say yes, yes, yes, [without] really check those things enough. There were a lot of debates about mainstreaming but the real challenge is that everyone was trying to mainstream everything at that stage. Everything became a cross cutting issue, and gender was just perceived as getting in the way of people doing their jobs, a hurdle to leap through ticking a box, writing a paragraph. Done.'\(^{225}\)

Another informant concurred when describing laziness within the NGO community, stating, “One can support the implementation of 1325 without doing the homework on how gender and gender mainstreaming work or what they are. So while 1325 is a useful tool, it still needs to be coupled

\(^{224}\) Ole Elgstrom, “Norm Negotiations, the Construction of New Norms Regarding Gender and Development in EU Foreign Aid Policy”, Journal of European Public Policy 7:3, Special Issue: 457-76, p. 457.

\(^{225}\) Interview, Geneva, 18 March 2005.
with internal and external work on the issues instead of being used to legitimate male-dominated working methods through simple lip-service.\textsuperscript{226}

\textbf{5.2.2 Norms are not diffused when leading actors perceive that they will be punished or devalued for articulating norms from other regimes.}

Related to the issues of gender or weapons being misunderstood or held in contempt, many of the actors interviewed referred to silence and absences – the absence of gender perspectives on the part of security actors, the absence of disarmament and weapons perspectives on the part of those advocating or executing implementation of resolution 1325. Feminist interventions on security policy have tried to explain these silences in the weapons field as due to a tradition of dismissing anything associated with the feminine,\textsuperscript{227} and also due to conceptual/information gaps, which imply vastly different technical lexicons. Again the information and knowledge gap is worth emphasizing, as one former diplomat said, “Diplomats on the whole are fairly bright and fairly well educated. It’s like talking to a lawyer in the language of mathematical symbology, the lawyer may be intelligent but may not understand what you are talking about. Sometimes gender issues, like many others, get lost in translation.”\textsuperscript{228}

Turning to the limited attention by actors in the 1325 community on weapons and militarism issues, Sheri Gibbings focused her MA thesis on explaining the conditions under which NGOs alter their expectations, behaviour and language to conform to the standards set by the traditions and practices of the Security Council and the UN system’s notion of gender mainstreaming. Applying Foucault’s theoretical framework of governmentality,\textsuperscript{229} Gibbings found that her case study, WILPF had weakened its anti-war political position against militarism in certain contexts, particularly when espousing such opinions seemed “passé”\textsuperscript{230} or compromised opportunities to engage and affect Security Council actors. What Gibbings does not explain is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{226} Email respondent, New York-based NGO, April 2005.
\item \textsuperscript{227} The presentation of Dr. Cohn and the author to the WMD Commission elaborated, “In other professional settings, we have had the experience of feeling that something terribly important is being left out and must be spoken; and yet, it has felt almost physically impossible to utter the words, almost as though they could not be pushed out into the smooth, cool, opaque air of the room. What is it that cannot be spoken? First, any words that express an emotional awareness of the desperate human reality behind the sanitized abstractions of death and destruction. Weapons' effects may only be spoken of in the most clinical and abstract terms. What gets left out is the emotional, the concrete, the particular, human bodies and their vulnerability, human lives and their subjectivity -- all of which are marked as feminine in the binary dichotomies of gender discourse. In other words, gender discourse informs and shapes nuclear and national security discourse, and in so doing creates silences and absences. It keeps things out of the room, unsaid, and keeps them ignored if they manage to get in. As such, it degrades our ability to think well and fully about nuclear weapons and national security, and shapes and limits the possible outcomes of our deliberations.”
\item \textsuperscript{228} Interview, Geneva 19 March 2005.
\item \textsuperscript{230} Telephone interview with New York-based NGO, April 2005. The informant described the impulse of one NGO actor working on implementation of resolution 1325 who wished to cancel an event on women and militarism at the 2005 Beijing + 10 meeting in fear of “a bunch of grandmothers” attending. The cringe implicit in this comment is offensive, ageist, dismissive and equates the issue of militarism and weapons as distinctly passé, a bad political fashion statement from the 1980s, the unfortunate era in which this unfortunate person was born.
\end{itemize}
how this same women’s organization increased its activity in nuclear weapons negotiations to become the main information collection and distribution point. While WILPF has a gender and 1325 component to their RCW programme has been inconsistently asserted into the NPT context. A representative of that project described her own caution in raising gender issues,

“It makes me uncomfortable, as a woman, to be talking about these issues constantly. I think it can be seen, when you are constantly counting the number of men and women in the room, as a way of legitimizing your own presence and participation. I don’t want to be seen at the table as “the gender person”. I want to first and foremost be seen as somebody who GETS what they're talking about in the way that they're talking about; once I have their attention in that way, then I feel much more comfortable interjecting a gender analysis.”

5.2.3 Norms are not diffused when unity among a small minority of diverse women is required

As has been previously noted, there is disparity in the balance of men and women participating in security, weapons and gender regimes, with the NGO community in weapons issues coming much closer to gender balance than among governmental actors in which women make up less than 15% of participants. The pressure placed on the NGO community to act with one voice is often an unrealistic expectation, due to the number of actors involved and their competing policy interests and priorities. As the case studies revealed unity among gender advocates is often not realized, an example being the tension described around the formation of the IANSA Women’s Caucus in 2001, which was visible to governmental actors.232 Another instance is when conflict prevention was on the agenda of the Commission on the Status of Women in 2004, an opportune time to reaffirm resolution 1325 and advance references made in all documents to emerge from the four UN World Conferences on Women regarding reallocation of military expenditure, the need for disarmament and women’s participation in political decision-making. Due to fears that the 2004 Commission on the Status of Women would be negatively affected by the politically contentious conflict prevention agenda233 in its preparatory work towards the Being + 10 evaluation summit in 2005, a decision was taken by among governments on the bureau, as well as UN Secretariat personnel to emphasize other parts of the agenda, namely women’s participation in elections and peace-building. Lack of unanimity among NGOs on this subject is one cause for the hush around the issue at the meeting, with very little lobbying or draft language related to this theme in suggested language documents provided by NGO caucuses during the meeting.

It is not only NGOs that experience resistance to diffusing gender norms into disarmament

231 Email respondent, New York based NGO, April 2005.
232 One diplomat recalled being informed about the Women’s Caucus by an NGO, “____ talked about the women’s caucus negatively so I remember the establishment of it, and I think it’s an excellent idea. It is now moving. But what was or is the message of the Women’s Caucus?” Interview, Geneva 18 March 2005.
233 Note, it took the General Assembly three years to negotiate a resolution on conflict prevention. Resolution 57/337, 18 July 2003, paragraph 30. “Encourages the Security Council to give, as appropriate, greater attention to gender perspectives in all its activities aimed at the prevention of armed conflict”
discussions. One Ambassador from a government particularly supportive of the resolution 1325 agenda described difficulty encountered when wanting to organize thematic informal discussions on the linkages between gender and disarmament between delegations and NGOs in the General Assembly First Committee on International Security and Disarmament. In particular he described the polarization of women delegates, with some actively supporting the idea, while others objected,

“My intention was precisely to be able to invite experts to discuss the resolution of the Security Council on women and gender and the way it might affect the draft resolutions we were looking at in the First Committee. I had so much trouble selling the idea. Among the bigger delegations, the women diplomats were not so convinced that women were more victimized or so much actors. I didn’t get support from them. The problem is that gender perspectives are issues on which people understand different things. If we don’t have a lady delegate that takes care of this, we don’t get it.”

In the absence of a female delegate the issue is not discussed, and as this incident demonstrates, in the absence of unanimity among women delegates, male diplomats feel unable to tackle the gender implications of their negotiations and resolutions on disarmament and so the issue is dropped. Lack of leadership and lack of unity precludes conceptual clarity or the possibility collaboration between actors.

5.2.4 Norms are not diffused when gender advocates lack human and economic resources

Last but not least in the factors limiting success in the diffusion of norms is the lack of human and economic resources in the hands of disarmament and gender equality advocates. Resources devoted to implementing resolution 1325 have been noted as ‘woefully inadequate’, with national studies identifying lack of financial resources as a debilitating obstacle to implementation. Due to financial limitations the international community decided that just one individual placed within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations could mainstream gender throughout the field and headquarters activities.

Transnational networking requires human and economic resources, funds for paying staff, communication and transport costs, without which it is very difficult to generate political momentum. The NGO community in both gender equality and disarmament are not as successful in raising funds as their humanitarian counterparts, with funds available to disarmament focused NGOs being dramatically cut since 1996 when the seizing up of the disarmament machinery began in earnest. Due to the scarcity of resources, WILPF assumed the costs of organizing the events of the Women’s Caucus and duplicating the reports used by the IANSA Women’s Caucus,

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235 The collapse of just one family foundation, W. Alton Jones in 2003 cut the funds available to nuclear disarmament NGOs by one million dollars per annum, placing a lot of pressure on the programmes of the Ford Foundation and the Ploughshares Funds to take up the burden of support to NGOs efforts designed to affect disarmament negotiations. This issue was explored at the NGO Disarmament Strategy Summit held in October 2003, with a panel on NGO Roles and the Funding Environment, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/social/summit/summitindex.html
allocating one staff person and one intern working full time on preparations for the 2001 conference on small arms. While the organization has been able to help facilitate women’s voices and gender perspectives in the small arms field, the lack of input on gender and nuclear disarmament issues by the same organization is also due to the lack of staff and finances to support research, activities or publications. One diplomat quoted above observed that this women’s organization is doing half of the work he would ordinarily perform in transmitting information and statements to his capital. NGOs informants observed that on extremely limited resources236 WILPF is performing a “housekeeping role” in becoming an information clearing house and a facilitator of joint activities among NGOs.237 Leaders in the organization indicated that it was due to lack of adequate resources that the organization sometimes fails to articulate its own political position and make its own unique contribution of facilitating women’s voices to the security policy platform.238

Resources are also tight in the UN entities established to deliver gender equality and disarmament. The United Nations spends more on garbage disposal than it does on its smallest department, the Department for Disarmament Affairs.239 The lack of resources in DDA helps to explain why no delegates interviewed in Geneva had received the Disarmament and Gender Briefing Notes generated by DDA, nor had heard of the departments Gender Mainstreaming Action Plan, there have not been funds or dedicated staff to distribute these products. The United Nations Development Fund for Women has an assessed budget that is $USD 30 million compared to the $USD 1 billion budget of the UN Development Fund for Children,240 operating on a fraction of the annual budget of a large NGO. With a number of competing agendas to follow in working towards the implementation of resolution 1325, it is still significant that the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser made inroads into the landmines field, and that UNIFEM have significantly affected the articulation of gender issues in DDR.241

6. Conclusion

This thesis has examined how and when Security Council resolution 1325 has impacted disarmament negotiations to understand and explain the conditions under which norms are diffused between regimes.

236 The RCW project has one full time staff person and a publication and printing budget of $USD 20,000 per year.
238 Email from Geneva-based NGO respondent, April 2005.
241 UNIFEM has participated in the inter-agency process formulating a UN system wide coordinated response to requests for support in the execution of DDR, generating a Standard Operating Procedure and several case studies in Getting it Right, Doing it Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, UNIFEM, 2005.
The findings validate the initial assertion that regime theory, feminist IR theory and analysis of the increasing role of civil society together explain the phenomenon of norm diffusion in this instance. Without understanding the history of the regimes in question, or the gendered context of security discourse and political processes, or the relatively recent phenomena of engagement between the Security Council and NGOs it is not possible to explain how and when gender equality norms confirmed by the Security Council have affected disarmament negotiations.

The findings of feminist theorists have been confirmed by UN and NGO actors interviewed who described the ways that that cultural and linguistic barriers to linking gender equality norms to security discourses serves to restrict political space devoted to discussing these issues. Despite the barriers described by feminist theorists, the adoption of resolution 1325 and the diffusion of norms from the gender equality regime is proof that ideas originating in women’s movements and feminist theory are becoming part of the practices and institutions of global governance. It is at least clear that gender equality norms and standards are having political effects beyond academic disciplines and the western feminist community.\textsuperscript{242}

The case studies have also validated the work of regime theorists who assert that norms and standards agreed in one regime are adopted by another when a leading authority or institution validates the relevance and legitimacy of a given. Attention by the Security Council has renewed and heightened attention to the linkages between gender and security issues because of the importance of its role in overseeing international peace and security.

The case studies have also affirmed the findings of analysts emphasizing the increased role of NGOs as an important and relevant actor working in collaboration with governments. Those theorizing on the role of civil society actors have noted NGO influence as strongest when pressure is applied to mitigate the impact on vulnerable populations, due to the field presence and expertise affording NGOs opportunities to transmit their first-hand knowledge in powerful ways. These powerful methods include the many actions that will take place in hundreds of cities around the world on the 60th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima, the first nuclear weapons test that turned a city of people into ash and shadow. The bomb dropped on Nagasaki three days later will not be the last while nuclear weapons remain on this planet, while that first norm established by the United Nations is not universally upheld. Until this often-articulated normative standard and legal obligation of nuclear disarmament is realized, the evolution of any norms and standards occurs simultaneous, and in opposition to, a system that considers the height of politics and technical sophistication as enshrined in the capacity to threaten suicidal, genocidal and ecocidal weapons, a psychosis that is a product of race, class and gender relations.

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The Security Council,


Recalling also the commitments of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (A/52/231) as well as those contained in the outcome document of the twenty-third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly entitled “Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century” (A/S-23/10/Rev.1), in particular those concerning women and armed conflict,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the primary responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Expressing concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced persons, and increasingly are targeted by combatants and armed elements, and recognizing the consequent impact this has on durable peace and reconciliation,

Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and stressing the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution,

Reaffirming also the need to implement fully international humanitarian and human rights law that protects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts,

Emphasizing the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls,

Recognizing the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and in this regard noting the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (S/2000/693),

Recognizing also the importance of the recommendation contained in the statement of its President to the press of 8 March 2000 for specialized training for all peacekeeping personnel on the protection, special needs and human rights of women and children in conflict situations,

Recognizing that an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection and full participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security,

Noting the need to consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls,

1. Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict;
2. Encourages the Secretary-General to implement his strategic plan of action (A/49/587) calling for an increase in the participation of women at decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes;
3. Urges the Secretary-General to appoint more women as special representatives and envoys to pursue good offices on his behalf, and in this regard calls on Member States to provide candidates to the Secretary-General, for inclusion in a regularly updated centralized roster;
4. Further urges the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel;
5. Expresses its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and urges the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peace-building measures, invites Member States to incorporate these elements as well as HIV/AIDS awareness training into their national training programmes for military and civilian police personnel in preparation for deployment, and further requests the Secretary-General to ensure that civilian personnel of peacekeeping operations receive similar training;
7. Urges Member States to increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Fund for Women and United Nations Children’s Fund, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant bodies;

8. Calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia: (a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction; (b) Measures that support local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements; (c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary;


10. Calls on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict;

11. Emphasizes the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls, and in this regard stresses the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions;

12. Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls, including in their design, and recalls its resolutions 1208 (1998) of 19 November 1998 and 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000;

13. Encourages all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants;

14. Reaffirms its readiness, whenever measures are adopted under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to give consideration to their potential impact on the civilian population, bearing in mind the special needs of women and girls, in order to consider appropriate humanitarian exemptions;

15. Expresses its willingness to ensure that Security Council missions take into account gender considerations and the rights of women, including through consultation with local and international women’s groups;

16. Invites the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution, and further invites him to submit a report to the Security Council on the results of this study and to make this available to all Member States of the United Nations;

17. Requests the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to include in his reporting to the Security Council progress on gender mainstreaming throughout peacekeeping missions and all other aspects relating to women and girls;

18. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Annex II

QUESTIONS TO CURRENT AND FORMER DIPLOMATS & GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

1. What disarmament fora or negotiations have you participated in/monitored?
2. Have you ever received explicit instruction to include gender issues in the statements or negotiating strategies of your government?
3. Does your government have a position on Security Council resolution 1325? Did it participate in the Open Debates of the Security Council and has it submitted a report as requested by the UN Secretary-General to feed into his 2004 report to the Security Council?
4. Do you think that the passage of this Security Council resolution has made a difference in how these issues are taken up in disarmament fora?
5. Are you aware of the Department for Disarmament Affairs Gender Mainstreaming Action Plan? Have you received a copy of the Gender and Disarmament Briefing notes? Were the information and arguments provided convincing? Why? Why not?
6. How would you characterize your government's attitude to questions of NGO access to disarmament fora? Are the modalities established for NGO access adequate, in the CD, the General Assembly First Committee, the NPT, and conferences on landmines and small arms? Should they be changed? Why/Why not?
7. When have NGOs generally been useful to your work, or made negotiations on landmines/small arms/landmines more effective? When have women's NGOs in particular been useful to your work or made these same disarmament negotiations more effective?
8. Have you ever received information from, or attended an event of an NGO that emphasizes gender issues on landmines, small arms or nuclear weapons? Would you characterize that event to have been a success? Why? Why not?
9. Have you ever been approached by an NGO encouraging you to employ a gender lens and perspective in disarmament negotiations?
10. Were the information and arguments provided convincing? Why? Why not?
11. In your personal opinion what should NGOs do to advance the recognition of gender issues in disarmament negotiations? What should governments do?

QUESTIONS TO NGOS

1. In what disarmament fora is your NGO active?
2. How have the modalities established for NGO access improved or hindered your work?
3. Have you heard of the Security Council's resolution on Women, Peace and Security, resolution 1325 passed in 2000? When did you hear about it and from whom?
4. Does your NGO have an explicit mandate, focus, programme or policy statement on gender, or gender mainstreaming?
5. Has your organisation's efforts on gender issues increased since the adoption of Security Council resolution 1325 in 2000?
6. Has your NGO made an explicit effort to include gender in negotiations on landmines, small arms or nuclear weapons? Through what means?
7. Has your NGO collaborated with other NGOs in this area?
8. Have you observed other NGOs taking up a different approach on gender and disarmament? What kinds of efforts have you observed and how would you describe or classify them?
9. How would you explain or remember the times when women's NGOs and gender-equality advocates have secured recognition of gender issues?
10. What do you think needs to be done to realize the potential of the recognition given to gender issues in the area of peace, security and disarmament?
11. Do you have any other comments or anecdotes to share on this subject, or references that you think I should examine?