ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL OF NATIONAL ACTION PLANS TO ADVANCE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325

Aisling Swaine

1. INTRODUCTION

Adopted by the UN Security Council ten years ago, Resolution 1325 (SCR 1325) introduced a new dialogue into the discourse of the most powerful multilateral security institution in the world. The concept of gender equality and the role of women in peace and security were rarely methodically incorporated in the narrative of the Security Council prior to the first debate on ‘women, peace and security’ that took place in 2000. The debate and its resulting resolution have firmly placed the issue of gender equality within the remit of efforts to address issues of conflict, peace and human and international security. The resolution has also informed an advanced rhetoric on gender equality within the UN political bodies, a rhetoric that is easily employed and may in fact obscure the structural obstacles that in reality impede progress on the resolution. The international debate has more recently focused on how to advance implementation of the resolution. The primary stakeholders charged with the responsibility for implementation, including states, multilateral security institutions and the Security Council itself, are however still grappling with the thrust of the resolution and more specifically on how to make meaningful headway on its implementation through pertinent policy application. Slow to start, and still generating traction, momentum is being created by international bodies and civil society organisations to overcome the challenges and invent creative solutions to the slow record of implementation.

The focus in recent years has been on the potential that ‘National Action Plans’ may offer as a means of advancing implementation of the resolution. Action plans, and the development of much needed indicators and monitoring mechanisms, are lauded as possible ‘solutions’ to the current deficit. Further expectations are pinned

2. A. Swaine is a PhD Affiliate at the Transitional Justice Institute at the University of Ulster, Northern Ireland.
on the three related resolutions, SCR 1820 (2008), SCR 1888 (2009) and SCR 1889 (2009), adopted subsequently, under the banner of the ‘women, peace and security’ agenda. These resolutions are seen as complementing Resolution 1325 to the extent that they address some of its identified gaps. While individual flaws within all resolutions have been noted by women’s rights activists and feminist academics alike, there is hope, particularly among the activists, that these additional resolutions and the increasing attention to their implementation will lend itself to expanded notions of the women, peace and security agenda. This hoped-for expansion rests however on the adoption of more holistic and transformative approaches to implementing the resolution(s) by those responsible. Regrettably, these critical reformist approaches are currently absent from institutional praxis and conventional approaches to implementation are often lacking a basis in the broader transformative gender equality and rights frameworks necessary to promote real change.

This article presents an overview of current debates and the strategies promoted at the international level to advance the ‘women, peace and security’ agenda. The article focuses specifically on SCR 1325 as the over-arching instrument that has set the benchmark for this international agenda. Section two provides a background to SCR 1325 followed by a cursory analysis of SCR 1820, SCR 1888 and SCR 1889 within the context of the ‘women, peace and security’ debate. Section three examines the implementation of SCR 1325 and outlines the steps taken by states to develop action plans as a means of meeting their obligations and commitments encapsulated under the resolution. A snap-shot of the ways in which ‘National Action Plans for the implementation of SCR 1325’ are being developed and the increasing role they are playing in international debate on the theme of ‘women, peace and security’ is outlined. The discussion focuses on steps taken by states individually and collectively through multilateral fora. In section four I consider some of the drawbacks of action plans as well as the inherent problems associated with translating theory into practice. In the penultimate section I consider some emerging trends that may facilitate implementation and conclude with some suggestions on possible avenues for the way ahead.

2. BACKGROUND TO SCR 1325

The UN Secretary General’s Special Adviser on Gender and the Advancement of Women, Angela King, has observed that it took the Security Council fifty-five years to hold its first debate on issues relating to women, peace and security.\(^5\) The debates around the resolution are of huge significance, not least because the final text of SCR 1325 emerged from a tireless and sustained lobby by international women’s rights advocates working to situate gender equality at the heart of the international

\(^5\) Ibid.
peace and security discourse. SCR 1325 remains one of the only resolutions that is openly debated and celebrated on an annual basis at the UN and is perhaps one of the better known resolutions to emerge from the Security Council.

The intention of the lobbyists was to produce a resolution that would reform the ways in which issues of international peace and security were understood and addressed. It was envisaged that the resolution would provide a framework to illuminate the gender discriminations inherent in international policy and action on conflict resolution and peace building, and set out a way forward to facilitate changes that would redress these discriminations. It would promote a different way of doing business to which UN Member States, the Security Council, and a range of other stakeholders would subscribe.

While not all concerns, objectives and aspirations raised by the lobbyists were included in the final version of the resolution, that the most powerful international multilateral security institution has formally recognised the centrality of gender in its approaches to international peace and security is of fundamental significance. SCR 1325 has moved international discourse and debate on women’s role in international security forward in the last decade in that it has redefined the position of women in the context of conflict. It has made visible women’s agency and political activism and promoted an expanded acceptance of the various roles women may play in conflict.

The resolution comprises eighteen operational paragraphs that broadly call for the increased participation of women in decision-making in the prevention, management and resolution of conflict; the protection of women from human rights abuses such as gender based violence; and the integration of gender mainstreaming and gender perspectives in all responses to conflict, including the training of all personnel within peace keeping missions as well as the staff members of UN missions. It promotes women as equal participants in all aspects of international peace and security and emphasises the need to integrate gendered and inclusive approaches to sustainable peace and development, while highlighting the continued targeting of women for egregious abuses in conflict situations.

Although the resolution has the potential to reform the structures and systems on which current peace-making and peace-building rests, doubts persist as to whether the reforms provided for in SCR 1325 are in practice being addressed, let alone implemented. A recent study by UNIFEM has revealed that of a sample of twenty-one peace agreements established since 1992, only 2.4% included women as signatories. The International Crisis Group has highlighted that there were no women present as negotiators, mediators, signatories or witnesses in more recent peace negotiations in Indonesia, Nepal, Somalia, Côte d’Ivoire, the Philippines and Cen-

8. UNIFEM (2009), Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections between Presence and Influence.
UNIFEM also estimates that less than six percent of funds allocated by donors to the implementation of peace agreements are earmarked in any way for women or their specific interests. Reports of rampant and horrific sexual violence against women continue to emanate from conflict zones, including Darfur and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Evidence of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peace keepers deployed contexts such as in Burundi, Haiti, Liberia, Sudan persist. While targeted violence directed at women continues with impunity, women are still marginalised from peace-building and security processes. SCR 1325 therefore remains a significant and hugely relevant instrument in the evolution of adequate and appropriate international political and legal responses to issues of peace and security. Moreover, the resolution has also proven to be an invaluable practical tool to women as demonstrated by an incident involving a women’s network based in Kosovo which was denied access to a meeting with a visiting Security Council delegation. When the mission was confronted with the text of their own resolution – paragraph 15 of which requires the Security Council to consult with women’s organisations during ‘missions’ – the women’s network were given time to meet with the delegates. This particular incident also underscores the vital role that activists can play in securing the implementation of the resolution.

2.1 The latest ‘Women, Peace and Security’ resolutions

Increased political attention to address the shortfalls in SCR 1325 prompted a clamour among Member States of the UN to become the next to table a resolution to remedy the gaps in the women, peace and security agenda. This has resulted in a wave of new Security Council resolutions over the last two years. These resolutions do address some of the gaps identified in SCR 1325 and are a reflection of current thinking on moving the ‘women, peace and security’ agenda forward.

2.1.1 SCR 1820

While SCR 1325 highlights the need for protection of women from gender-based
abuses, SCR 1820\textsuperscript{14} expands on this, firmly placing sexual violence as a matter for the Security Council’s attention. It is however notable that this resolution highlights women’s victimisation through such violations. Nonetheless, the important role this resolution plays in drawing formal attention to the issue of sexual violence against women cannot be underestimated; moreover, the recognition it affords to the issue is valued by those women who are directly affected by such abuses.\textsuperscript{14a}

The approach taken to sexual violence in conflict under Resolution 1820 has prompted criticism of the Security Council for claiming a traditional role ‘as a protector of women, rather than as a supporter of women’s emancipation’.\textsuperscript{15} Unlike SCR 1325, SCR 1820 was perceived by campaigners and those involved in the drafting of SCR 1325 to have been developed behind closed doors. Tabled by the United States the resolution did not originate from women activists and nor were women affected by conflict consulted as had been the case when drafting SCR 1325.\textsuperscript{16} Consequently, support from the women’s movement was less forthcoming compared with SCR 1325. Albeit recognising its value in bringing recognition to the scale of sexual violence in conflict, for some feminists the resolution was perceived to have undermined the progressive notions of women’s agency advanced through SCR 1325.\textsuperscript{17}

2.1.2 SCR 1888 and SCR 1889

In 2009, the Security Council adopted SCR 1888\textsuperscript{18} (under the presidency of the United States) and SCR 1889\textsuperscript{19} (under the presidency of Vietnam) as part of the agenda of ‘women, peace and security’. These resolutions go some way to respond to the lack of accountability mechanisms in both the previous two main resolutions.

\textsuperscript{14a} See letter written to UN Security Council by 71 women’s groups from the DRC, at <www.stoprapenow.org> and further reference to the resolution at <www.rdcviolencesexuelle.org/site/en/node/35>.
\textsuperscript{16} Interestingly, the UK attempted to table a similar resolution on sexual violence in conflict in 2006 but during consultations with civil society were discouraged from doing so as they feared a regression in language and that this kind of resolution would ‘diminish[ed] the political importance of 1325’. From ‘Doing More Harm than Good: US-sponsored Security Council Resolution on Sexual Violence in War by Cora Weiss and Sanam Anderlini (email circular).
Resolution 1888 is regarded as complementing Resolution 1820 on sexual violence in conflict and responds to some of its shortfalls. The resolution sets in place stipulations for a number of measures to address sexual violence in conflict. It calls for the appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary General to represent and advance the UN’s work on addressing sexual violence in conflict. It sets in place a provision for the creation of ‘women protection officers’ and teams of experts to be deployed to strengthen national responses to sexual violence during times of conflict. It calls for increased attention to sexual violence through all stages of peace processes and requests the Secretary General to produce improved ways for monitoring and reporting on the protection of women and girls in conflict.

As with SCR 1820, Resolution 1888, calls for the ‘protection’ of women and girls from systematic abuses. While it also calls for women’s increased representation in mediation processes and for the inclusion of the issue of sexual violence at all stages of peace negotiations, there is a danger that this approach sustains the idea of ‘women as victims’. Although activists have recognised that Resolution 1888 uses far more progressive language than that contained in SCR 1820, the proposals on increasing accountability through monitoring and reporting on sexual violence, continues to utilize the language of ‘protection’ from sexual violence. The issue of ‘protection’ and what it means continues to be debated within the UN system. Combined with viewing the category of ‘women and children’ as a homogeneous victim-group and the lack of attention to the actual prevention of sexual violence, there is not much room created for the advancement of more fundamental steps towards addressing the inequalities that underpin the perpetration of sexual violence against women.

Resolution 1889, by contrast, builds on the theme of increased implementation measures and is therefore seen as complementing Resolution 1325. Steps to be taken under this resolution include a request to the Secretary-General to develop (by early April 2010) a set of global indicators to track the implementation of Resolution 1325. These will then serve as a basis for reporting on implementation by stakeholders. The Secretary General is also requested to develop a strategy to increase the numbers of women that ‘pursue good offices on his behalf’. Focusing on the post-conflict context, Resolution 1889 addresses the need for women’s participation in peace-building initiatives from the outset to avoid their exclusion in the post-conflict period.

Resolution 1889 picks up on some of the more progressive notions contained within SCR 1325. Of particular note is the inclusion of the concept of ‘women’s empowerment’ within an operational paragraph. While it is only referred to as an

23. Ibid., OP 9.
issue ‘to be taken into account during post-conflict needs assessments and planning’ and not as an objective in itself, it is heartening nonetheless, especially as it is coupled with the need for addressing the funding needs of women’s organisations. If this is interpreted as encouraging the mobilisation of resources for women’s empowerment strategies by women’s organisations, it represents a renewed potential for achieving the aspirations set out in Resolution 1325.

Given the very recent adoption of Resolutions 1820, 1888 and 1889, progress towards implementing the ‘women, peace and security’ agenda by states has thus far largely focused on Resolution 1325. The following discussion will consider the implementation of SCR 1325 although reference will be made to instances where states have taken measures to implement any of the subsequent resolutions.

3. IMPLEMENTING SCR 1325 AND THE ADVENT OF THE ‘ACTION PLAN’

Efforts to implement Resolution 1325 have been disappointing with supporters bemoaning the lack of progress made at both international and domestic levels. While the resolution has been translated into over one hundred languages, there is less than satisfactory evidence that it has been used to revitalise international policy. This is compounded by the absence of any means for measuring how or whether implementation has been progressing.

Under the UN Charter, Member States accept to carry out decisions of the Security Council and accept that ‘the Council alone has the power to take decisions which Member States are obligated under the Charter to carry out’. Feminist scholars such as D. Otto have highlighted that because the resolution was not adopted under the Security Council’s Chapter VII mandate, it has been relegated to the realm of ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard’ law. As Otto suggests, the Security Council’s ‘enforcement powers are [therefore] insulated from the (feminising) influence of Resolution 1325’ (square brackets inserted by author). Opinions differ among academics, practitioners and lobbyists as to the utility of international law and whether and to what extent such ‘soft-law’ instruments advance feminist ideals.

The widely acknowledged weakness of this resolution is that there is no component that compels states to act. The lack of monitoring and reporting mechanisms

24. See for example the ‘NGO Working Group on Women Peace and Security’ that originally formed to advocate for adoption of the resolution which now focuses on its implementation, at <http://womenpeacesecurity.org/about/>.


and the absence of clearly identified targets that would need to be attained within pre-determined time frames are also problematic. The resolution has been contrasted unfavourably to other Security Council resolutions such as SCR 1612 on Children and Armed Conflict which established a Security Council Working Group, monitoring and reporting mechanisms, and the post of a Special Representative.28

Similarly, when compared to what are considered to be ‘hard’ issues such as ‘counter-terrorism’, the women, peace and security resolutions fare badly. SCR 1372 on Counter-Terrorism uses terminology such as ‘decides’, ‘directs’, ‘declares’ while SCR 1325 uses terms such as ‘express’, ‘emphasizes’, ‘requests’.29 It has been argued that because the language of the resolution appears weak, it fails to be taken seriously by the military.30 This is regrettable since the support of the armed forces is vital to the implementation of the resolution. Whether syntax should determine whether and how organisations engage with SCR 1325 is another debate. That military organizations have paid little regard to the resolution given its ‘soft’ law quality is however evidenced by the minimal effort that has been made to operationalise the provisions of SCR 1325. The deficient syntax is therefore only part of the problem.31 The ‘business as usual’ approach adopted by states may also account for the weakness of the text and underlines the concerns of feminists that opportunities to create resolutions with the teeth to transform ways of working are simply ignored. The reticence demonstrated by the Security Council in its choice of language, and the positioning of the resolution outside of the more robust Chapter VII mandate, is a challenge to advocates seeking implementation. While peace keeping operations may now accept (oftentimes begrudgingly) that ‘gender mainstreaming’ is integral to military operations and their success, there is little evidence to indicate that measures are being taken to contribute to the overall essence of the resolution, which is ultimately to promote gender equality. It underlines an artificial divorce that is being created by such entities between the concepts of ‘gender mainstreaming’ and the achievement of equality. A deeper consideration of this chasm and why some issues like counter-terrorism attract attention and political leadership while others, including gender equality do not, is much overdue. Be that as it may, the current debates around SCR 1325 have focussed on how best to encourage, promote and advance implementation. The slow and ad-hoc measures adopted by the international community to implement SCR 1325 has prompted the development of ‘action plans’ as a possible way forward.

Supported by the Security Council and the Office of the Secretary-General, ‘action plans’ represent a relatively new approach to the challenge of ensuring the

30. Ibid.
31. Militarised masculine and patriarchal attitudes, behaviours and cultures may also, in part, account for this trend.
implementation of resolutions and are regarded as a practical means through which states can demonstrate the steps they have taken to satisfy their obligations under the resolution.  

3.1 **The rationale for the development of national action plans**

Resolution 1325 may be implemented through aspects of most countries foreign as well as national policy. It thus corresponds with a range of national strategies and policies already in place across a wide range of government departments. A debate over the utility of developing distinct action plans or, alternatively, of incorporating the principles of the resolution into established policy has since ensued, with the 1325 lobbyists and advocates favouring the former. The latter approach, or ‘gender mainstreaming’ is a concept that is at the heart of much of this debate. According to one view, if true gender mainstreaming is undertaken, then SCR 1325 should be ‘mainstreamed’ throughout national and international policies, negating the need for separate actions or action plans. The argument goes that by developing specific action plans there is a risk of divorcing women’s concerns into separate arenas for separate treatment, thus doing little to reform the already established structures and systems which women are seeking to access and reform. However, the track record on mainstreaming across the UN system and within international institutions strongly suggests that measures adopted under mainstreaming programmes are far from adequate and diluted efforts are often seen to be doing more harm than good. The advocates for action plans argue that without these separate measures, there is a risk that gender mainstreaming and the possibilities encapsulated in SCR 1325 will be lost at implementation level.

Some states have argued that a separate action plan is unnecessary and have chosen to integrate the elements of SCR 1325 into already existing domestic policy frameworks. For example, in Fiji, government obligations under Resolution 1325 have been incorporated into the national ‘Women’s Plan of Action’ which has included the establishment of a ‘Coordinating Committee on 1325’ involving government and non-governmental actors. In Israel, women’s lobby groups have succeeded in influencing the adoption of a new law mandating the inclusion of

---


33. See section 4.1 for a full discussion on ‘gender mainstreaming’.

women in government peace negotiations and so SCR 1325 was for the first time, integrated into national law.\textsuperscript{35}

Most states as well as the UN and non-governmental organisations concerned with SCR 1325 are generally agreed that separate actions plan are essential if the resolution is to be comprehensively and successfully implemented. ‘Mainstreaming’, in its purest form, is considered by some to present too many inherent risks and cannot be guaranteed to deliver the desired outcomes. A study by Canada, the UK and the Netherlands found that government staff members felt that the implementation of SCR 1325 would be improved through the development of a specific action plan.\textsuperscript{36} The Uganda action plan notes that the plan presents the opportunity to coordinate all aspects of government action related to Resolution 1325. Uganda’s action plan notes that the process served to educate staff on issues of women, peace and security and to hold individuals accountable for their actions, or inactions, in respect of SCR 1325.\textsuperscript{37} The political will garnered and demonstrated through the development of an action plan is recognised to be of great value.\textsuperscript{38}

A combined approach involving the development of an action plan that supports specialised interventions as well gender mainstreaming across all aspects of institutional policy is currently being advocated.\textsuperscript{39} There has been a swell in support for this approach as evidenced by the emergence of a proliferation of guidelines and policy briefs to support the development of national and institutional action plans.\textsuperscript{40} While initiatives under SCR 1325 may take the form of separate policies, guidelines, and strategic plans,\textsuperscript{41} the emerging trend has been to develop


an action plan matrix by which the operational aspects of Resolution 1325 are laid out and addressed through stated and listed actions.

The main purpose of action plans for the private sector and not-for-profit organisations is to develop, in detail, an outline of the relevant actors, their responsibilities, and how, within clearly delineated timelines, to best achieve a specific outcome. The United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (UNINSTRAW) was the first organisation to publish and provide specific guidance to governments in developing action plans on SCR 1325. The report emphasises the importance of action plans in that they provide a comprehensive approach to the implementation of 1325; enhance coordination among the relevant actors; raise awareness among stakeholders; create ownership among those responsible for its implementation; and instil a culture and system of accountability. As a tool, an action plan is now seen as a concrete step towards addressing the accountability deficits in SCR 1325 and a measure by which to ensure states fulfil their obligations.

3.2 Different categories of action plans

SCR 1325 directly implicates a range of international actors including the UN and its entities, Member States, multilateral organizations and parties to armed conflict. To date, eighteen action plans have been developed by individual states. The UN as an entity has also developed an action plan and policy responses have also been developed by additional multilateral institutions such as the EU and NATO.

3.2.1 National action plans

In his 2007 annual report on SCR 1325, the UN Secretary General stressed that ‘governments have the primary responsibility for implementing the resolution.’ The first action plan was developed by Denmark in 2005 with momentum towards the production of action plans increasing in 2007, 2008 and 2009. That the majority of action plans produced to date have been by European Member States is welcomed by many given their role as donors and the potential this offers to improve support to SCR 1325-related actions internationally. Nonetheless, the slow response

---

42. Ibid.
National action plans to advance implementation of UN Res. 1325

by conflict-affected countries to implement Resolution 1325 is notable. The first action plan developed by a conflict-affected country was by Côte d’Ivoire in 2007, followed by Uganda in 2008 and Liberia in 2009. There has been some criticism of governments which have adopted a ‘fast-track’ process particularly where the production and launch of an ‘action plan’ becomes the end in itself.46

3.2.2 Institutional action plans

As the caretaker of SCR 1325, that it took the UN five years after the adoption of the resolution to develop its action plan was disappointing. Moreover, that the UN failed to set a benchmark for states, whether in terms of process, structure or content, was to miss a vital opportunity. The first UN System-wide action plan for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2005-2007), included all relevant entities across the UN system detailing actions that each was pursuing. The plan was reviewed in 2007 and among the weaknesses identified, were the lack of baseline data, performance indicators, and time-lines.47 The plan was also described as a ‘compendium of activities’48 rather than a forward-looking, action-oriented document that would function to challenge stakeholders, to reform their way of doing business, and address the implementation gaps. Steps have since been taken to update the action plan.49

The European Union (EU) has also taken measures to advance its commitments under SCR 1325 and a number are mentioned here. Following the adoption of the resolution, the European Parliament passed a resolution on the Participation of Women in Peaceful Conflict Resolution50 and in 2006 adopted an additional resolution Women in armed conflicts and their role in post-conflict reconstruction.51 In 2005 the Secretariat of the Council of Europe produced a document entitled Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the context of ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy, now referred to as the Common Security Defence Policy or CSDP).52 A May 2007 meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council and the Representatives of the governments of the Member States adopted Council Con-

46. With the added bonus and publicity in launching them on International Women’s Day.
47. R. Mayanja, (August 2009), Statement by Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advance-
48. Ibid.
clusions which included a call to EU Member States to develop action plans for the implementation of SCR 1325. So far, just nine of the twenty-seven Member States have developed action plans. In December 2008, to take account of the adoption of SCR 1820, the Council of the European Union set out in its operational paper, *Comprehensive Approach to the EU implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security*, measures to be taken by Member States to implement both resolutions, particularly in respect of political support, training, and exchange of information. Annual meetings for the purpose of assessing implementation and to share different approaches and lessons learned was introduced, the first of which took place in October 2009. In addition, in 2007, the European Peace and Liaison Office (EPLO) launched the ‘1325 EU Partnership’ bringing together representatives of the European Parliament, the European Commission, European Council, Member States and NGOs to advance gender mainstreaming and implementation across the EU. The EU is increasingly taking a pro-active role in respect of SCR 1325 evidenced by, for example, the hosting of a high-level meeting with the African Union in September 2009 that called for enhanced cooperation between international organisations to advance the implementation of SCR 1325 and for a review conference to be held to mark its tenth anniversary.

Other multilateral institutions demonstrating interest in SCR 1325 include NATO which launched its policy on SCR 1325 in September 2009 entitled *Integrating SCR 1325 and Gender Perspectives in the NATO Command Structure Including Measures for Protection During Armed Conflict*. In May 2009, the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives was mandated to support the integration of a gender perspective into NATO’s military operations to implement SCR 1325 and 1820.

In 2005, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) adopted a Ministerial Council Decision on *Women in Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation* effectively integrating the UN

---


56. Ibid.


commitments into the Organisations’ work. The OSCE has also pro-actively supported initiatives to implement Resolution 1325 by Member States as exemplified by its work with Serbia to develop a national action plan.

Finally, a number of UN Member States have created an informal body ‘The Group of Friends of 1325’ which meet on an ad-hoc basis in New York with the purpose of generating further momentum for the implementation of SCR 1325.

3.3 **A holistic approach to planning**

Decisions taken at the planning and development stages of action plans impact directly on the quality of the end product. The methods employed in developing action plans thus far have been dictated by the nature and needs of individual organizations/states rather than by an established standard and system of accountability to which institutions are required to aspire. There is no standard template for the development of action plans and therefore no established expectations as to the minimum standards that should be met. Consequently, all current plans differ widely in terms of 1) method of development; 2) content; and 3) the structures and frameworks established to facilitate their implementation. Lessons learned from the processes completed to date are available from the UN and civil society organisations, each of which offer comprehensive guidelines for the development of action plans.

Decisions on whether to adopt a holistic or limited approach to planning, has often been contingent on time, resources and government commitment and much has depended on who is leading the process and whether the overriding purpose has been to advance gender equality or merely to satisfy international expectations.

Irrespective of the approach adopted – progressive or conservative – what is clear is that the basic planning and steps followed at the early stages lays the basis for future direction. For example, in Europe, the government department that typically leads on action-planning processes has been the department responsible for foreign affairs, and the objectives embodied in SCR 1325 have been generally regarded as most relevant to ministries dealing with development cooperation, defence and justice. By contrast, in Africa, it has been the ministries responsible for

---


62. OSCE (2009), ‘Event to promote implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Serbia’, at <www.osce.org/item/37551.html>


gender equality that have taken the lead. These decisions have implications for the plan itself. Its positioning within government will determine its focus (domestic or foreign-policy focused) and its level of influence (national women’s machineries are typically lacking the resources and political status in many conflict-affected countries to strongly attract genuine political interest and funding). In most cases, a cross-department working group has been used to ensure that the relevant multi-sectoral government departments are involved and available to deal with the breadth of the resolution. While cross-departmental structures pose a particular set of problems (commitment to the process may be purely political and thus impinge on the quality of contributions and overall ownership over the plan) there are also concurrent benefits associated with this type of arrangement (generating political support and raising awareness across government is generally more effective).

UN entities have extended political and technical support in developing action plans for conflict-affected countries, as in the case of Liberia. Caution is required, however, since there is the possibility that an external organisation, such as the UN, may drive the process based on its own agenda in an attempt to keep up with its own international obligations rather than reflect the national interests of the specific state. Moreover, UN leadership may also inadvertently result in the usurping of ownership over the process from both government and the local women’s constituency.

Opinion divides among governments on how best to facilitate the inclusion of civil society actors and at what stage they should become involved. While countries such as Finland, Norway and Denmark opted to consult on iterative drafts of the plan the Dutch government chose to establish a contractual relationship with its civil society partners from the very outset. The Dutch model has been commended for enabling civil society actors to play an integral part in the planning process; nevertheless, there are potential risks with this approach since civil society also plays a critical monitoring role that is often better achieved with distance. In some cases, ‘experts’ on women, peace and security, such as academics and practitioners have been consulted while opportunities may have been missed by overlooking ‘experts’ such as members of refugee and immigrant communities coming from conflict-affected contexts. A shared concern among some commentators is that in the rush to develop action plans, the possibility of incorporating a diversity of views will be squandered.

3.4 A normative basis in rights and gender equality

The principles and progressive concepts of gender equality and gender mainstreaming have not always been used to inform the development of action

65. The Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development in Uganda and the Ministry of Gender and Development in Liberia for example.
plans. The recognition and identification of the inter-linkages of Resolution 1325 with other international instruments on gender equality such as the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Beijing Platform for Action, often functions to locate the action plan within sectors that are pre-determined by prior international commitments on gender equality. Importantly, this usually identifies the action plan with a government’s international legal commitments to human rights and establishes a rights-based approach as underpinning the plan.

Action plans vary in length and density. While brevity is generally the more effective option for promoting practical application, the integration of a robust analysis offers an opportunity to disseminate government commitments on broader gender equality mandates. The Belgian action plan, developed in 2009, sets out the ‘Normative Framework’ of the action plan in its opening pages. It sets out up front that the action plan is linked to national laws related to conflict, violence against women, gender mainstreaming and to international commitments such as the Beijing Platform for Action within existing government policy. It also details Belgium’s own progress on gender parity in governance and its related areas of priority in development cooperation. Each themed area of the action plan also entails informative background information. The Ugandan plan includes a section on ‘A Historical Perspective of Women, Gender and GBV in Armed Conflict in Uganda’ followed by an outline of the gendered dimensions of conflict situations and a chapter on Uganda’s international, regional and national legal obligations, policies, and related national action plans. The Iceland action plan on the other hand contains little analysis and simply provides a list of actions, as does the Swiss plan although the latter also includes a set of objectives.

There is continued debate on the appropriate scope of an action plan and whether it should address all aspects of the resolution or restrict itself to thematic areas. Some action plans have been structured thematically or on what are considered to be the ‘three Ps’ of SCR 1325 – participation of women in decision-making, protection in times of armed conflict, and gender perspectives in all aspects of peacekeeping and peace building. The Swiss action plan is one such example. Spain too has adopted a comparable structure although its plan is supplemented by specific reference to the sub-categories of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegra-

72. Ibid.
tion and to strategies for increasing Spanish civil society engagement. The Belgian plan is structured on areas of government work streams as well as substantive issues and addresses violence against women, peace building and conflict prevention, development cooperation and peacekeeping missions. The Côte d’Ivoire action plan has been noted for its focus on four ‘priority axes’ including the protection of women and girls from sexual violence; gender mainstreaming in policies and development programmes; reinforcement of women’s access to basic social infrastructures and participation in reconstruction and reintegration processes; and strengthening the participation of women in political decision-making. In its analysis section, the Dutch plan sets out five categories around which action points are formulated.

Regardless of its framework, each action plan generally correlates with the respective governments’ foreign and domestic policy priorities. From a political perspective if it the plan is to be successfully implemented, perhaps this is not to be resisted. However, the danger with adapting action plans to existing government policy is that the plan loses its potential to introduce radical reform and instead perpetuates the staid status quo. It will therefore have little impact on introducing change into systems that are inadequately mainstreaming gender to begin with and the more reformist elements of SCR 1325 are unlikely to take root.

4. ACTION PLANS: DRAWBACK AND CHALLENGES

While the lack of accountability mechanisms is lauded as the greatest challenge facing the successful implementation of SCR 1325, there is an equally pressing need to assess the extent to which action plans can serve as a means of holding states accountable for meeting the objectives contained in SCR 1325. Critical circumspection is required to avoid any impression that action plans represent the singular ‘antidote’ to the absence of progress in respect of implementation over the past ten years.

To determine whether ‘National Action Plans’ facilitate the implementation of the objectives set out in SCR 1325, an assessment of both process and outcome is required. There have been ‘flaws’ identified with these plans and more recent

models are beginning to address the shortcomings. That political considerations will function to overshadow the aims of the resolution as well as the action plan itself is always prevalent. Moreover, that states will, whether at the development and/or implementation stage, interpret the definitions of conflict, security and peace in such a way as to enable them to avoid their obligations is not unlikely. They may also simply serve as a political tool whereby the completion of an action plan is considered to be the end product, with little consideration of the impact of the plan or its substance.

It must be remembered that action plans are simply that – action plans. They offer a ‘framework’ through which to organise, co-ordinate and increase activities and have the potential to enhance accountability by making visible any progress (or lack thereof) by states towards their responsibilities to implement 1325. A reconsideration of the potential of action plans is necessitated to assess what factors will affect whether they have the potential achieve the results expected?

4.1 Gender mainstreaming – from theory to practice

A topic that demands greater critical engagement is the quality of the actions and initiatives that are pursued under state sponsored action plans. The overriding objective of SCR 1325 is to mainstream gender equality across all work related to peace and security. As such, actions taken under SCR 1325 should concern themselves with promoting gender equality as an analytical tool for rethinking key policy initiatives, goals, actions and ideas. The real challenge is to understand how attention to gender issues might require the wholesale reconfiguration of peacekeeping and peace building efforts, rather than to assume that the simple inclusion of women in the process would solve the ‘problem’ of gender inequality.

The concept of gender mainstreaming is at the heart of SCR 1325. The aim of the resolution was to make gender equality and gender issues a central part of the agenda of the Security Council and its Member States. Gender mainstreaming, which formally emerged under the guise of the Beijing Platform For Action (1995), has been adopted by the United Nations and its various entities and by Member States at national and international levels. There has been much debate about the utility of the concept of mainstreaming to promote gender equality and of the practicality of mainstreaming as a strategy. This is particularly so given the lack of a general understanding of both the concept of gender equality and the ‘how to’ of mainstreaming. The central concepts and principles underpinning Resolution 1325 are not yet fully understood by those charged with developing appropriate frameworks for their implementation. What does it mean to undertake gender

78. Cohn et al, supra n. 4, p. 131.
mainstreaming? And what does it mean to include women within peace building arenas, quantitatively and qualitatively?

At the international level, the rhetoric of equality and women’s rights is prolific particularly in debates on the implementation of SCR 1325. This has led some activists to question whether adequate attention has been paid to promoting an understanding of what is meant by the equal and meaningful inclusion of women in peace building. Assumptions are often made that equality is about the equal treatment of women and men or alternatively demands equal numbers of women and men in peace keeping negotiations for example. As Charlesworth and Chinkin have observed, there is often an assumption that ‘women’s inequality is removed once women participate equally in decision-making fora’. This, however, is only part of the problem since ‘this account of equality ignores the presence of the underlying structures and power relations that contribute to the oppression of women’. In other words, this view clearly fails to take into account the inherent structural biases that remain undisturbed by the mere ‘adding’ of women into the process. The rhetoric within arenas such as the UN continues to call for women’s increased participation but with little commentary on advancing what that actually means. The notion of women’s participation is often based on essentialised views of the homogeneity of women as a ‘group’. As some scholars suggest, women are often granted the right to participate based on biological precepts that leaves intact the gendered ways in which the arenas and business of international peace and security operate. As noted by Cohn, ‘simultaneously the power structures that we wish to dismantle are the very structures that set the terms of women’s entry’.

One of the problems feminists have identified with translating women’s empowerment and gender equality concerns into international policy is the dilution of these concepts in practice. The effective translation of the resolution into transformative policy and practice remains the greatest challenge. This challenge has been compounded by the increasing use of the term ‘gender’ as a synonym for ‘women’, that has all but eradicated the equality aspects of the gender debate. In other words, an understanding of the unequal power relations that inform women’s subordination has been omitted from the action plan narrative in favour of a more quantitative approach focusing on women as beneficiaries of these initiatives, rather than as political actors and promoters of the much needed change highlighted by SCR 1325.

There is increasing attention to the need for ‘gender equality’ concerns to engage more with men, a recognition that while gender equality has become synonymous with ‘women’, it is ultimately about relational connections between men and women. Charlesworth and Wood, and Otto in their respective commentaries on

82. Cohn et al., supra n. 4.
SCR 1325 highlight that the resolution fails to engage on the issue of ‘men’ – their role, interests and interactions with aspects of the resolutions’ implementation. Otto emphasises that ‘if ideas about women are to change, ideas about “men” must also change’. It is through implementation of the resolution that the potential offered through a more strategic and rights-based approach within the modus operandi of international peace and security must be explored. The steps that are being taken in the name of SCR 1325 to co-opt women into established processes rather than do what SCR 1325 envisioned – reform these processes – reveals the inadequacies of the ‘practical’ needs-based approaches. The conceptual difference between addressing women’s strategic versus practical needs has not yet been fully understood and realised.

In her critique of approaches adopted by development cooperation agencies to gender mainstreaming, M. Taylor reveals how gender issues are subsumed into policies through an integrationist approach. Thus, Taylor posits that rather than ‘being framed in terms of radical social change’, international policy may ‘depoliticise gender’. As a result, policy commitments fail to transform gender power relations. Approaching the implementation of the resolution simply by using the tools and frameworks established by the action plans may result in missing the unique relevance of this resolution and squander its potential to transform gender relations in such a way as to disrupt the continued exclusion of women from the peace and security agenda. If ‘the ultimate goal of gender mainstreaming is to achieve gender equality’ then a far more critical analysis of what the action plan promises, is needed.

In practice, most state sponsored action plans are constituted on the basis of a review or audit to gather information on what a government is already doing and the gaps that can and should be addressed through the development of a plan. Governments have taken different approaches, including the use of questionnaires across government departments, or through working group meetings to gather this information. There is, however, a tendency to collate information about what is being done, rather than to ‘audit’ or assess the quality of the actions and whether they are contributing towards the normative changes envisioned by Resolution 1325. A ‘results’ focus may assist in remedying the quantitative approach particularly if action plans are structured around the results and outcomes they intend to achieve rather than the actions they wish to frame.

84. Otto, supra n. 81.
86. Ibid.
88. These were the processes adopted by both the UK and Dutch governments.
Advances in this regard will however need to ensure that the results proposed through action plans deliver more than a technical and practical approach and reflect the transformative aspirations of gender mainstreaming. Future assessments on progress may need to consider what some scholars view as a ‘selective’ approach to gender equality and an overall unwillingness by powerful institutions such as the Security Council to fully grasp the more feminist and transformative essence of SCR 1325.89

This analysis is particularly important in relation to actions taken towards the implementation of the sister resolutions to SCR 1325, in particular SCR 1820. As noted above, scholars have critiqued that the resolution brings the debate back to the biological notions pinned to women as ‘victims’90 where the risk of evaporation of analysis of structural inequalities and of power relations between men and women are even more at risk. It is essential that Resolution 1820 and Resolution 1888 are located within the theoretical umbrella provided through the more positivist Resolution 1325, albeit as legally and substantively weak as its transformative agenda may appear to be. A re-focused rather than simply a combined approach may ensure that an empowered version of women’s political and change roles are used to frame implementation measures on issues such as sexual violence.

Action plans must thus not be reduced to a means for integrating what a country is already doing on women, peace and security but a way of also drawing attention to the kinds and nature of the actions that each state is taking. An assessment of the quality and value of these actions may reveal whether they are supporting actions that are based on gender as a transformative analytical tool bringing about sustained change? The danger is that the rush to develop action plans will result in international commitments being met in a way that satisfies the need for state profile in the international arena with little real thought being invested into their impact. Civil society and tax payers will expect more than reports on specific activities that have been undertaken – rather will be interested in impacts and outcomes.

4.2 Action plans: monitoring, reviewing and evaluating progress

The effective implementation of any action plan is contingent on the integration of adequate monitoring, reporting and reviewing mechanisms. Current debate at the international level is dominated by how best to advance the inclusion of substantive indicators in action plans to monitor progress. Not all action plans include monitoring frameworks or provisions for review and evaluation. The Swiss plan sets out a very clear format for reviewing progress, and for assimilating supplementary stakeholder concerns by means of additional protocols to the action plan.91

89. Otto, supra n. 15.
90. Ibid.
Absent, however, is a monitoring framework and as with the majority of other action plans, it will prove difficult to measure progress or to hold governments to account in respect of delivery on stated commitments. Civil society actors in the UK have noted the lack of indicators with the UK’s action plan.92

The adoption of Resolution 1889 goes some way to providing a framework for addressing monitoring gaps. The resolution calls on the UN Secretary General to develop indicators for the implementation of Resolution 1325 with a view to enhancing international reporting on implementation. The Secretary-General’s report on progress towards this request is due in early 2010. Whether broad indicators can be developed to effectively track the wide range of programmes, activities and policy actions that are being pursued under Resolution 1325 worldwide, remains to be seen. The most challenging part of this exercise will be whether qualitative transformative changes can be captured by meaningful indicators that are capable of measurement.

Quantitative and qualitative monitoring indicators aside, that there is a need for periodic review and clearly defined timeframes within which to evaluate progress, is widely accepted. A report commissioned by the ‘Dutch Working Group 1325’ to evaluate the Dutch action plan one year after implementation, demonstrates the utility of periodic reviews to assess performance and review progress evidenced by the recommendations listed in the report to strengthen the Dutch plan.93 Similarly, the action plans of Côte d’Ivoire (2008-2012), Finland (2008-2011), the Netherlands (2008-2011), Sweden (2006-2008, 2009-2012), Switzerland (2007-2009), Belgium (2010-2012) have each incorporated specific time-frames within which actions must be achieved and reporting requirements satisfied.94 Without periodic review it is clearly impossible to tell what progress has been made and what revisions are needed to improve progress.

Two further considerations directly affect the success, or otherwise, of action plans: the first is the need to identify key actors who would be allocated specified responsibilities and the second, involves adequate resource allocation. The Austrian and the Dutch plans satisfy the former element while under Uganda’s action plan ‘key actors’ are expressly indicated. The inclusion into action plans of this element introduces a critical level of accountability against which pre-determined actors can be held responsible. Insofar as resource allocation is concerned, it is only the Côte d’Ivoire plan which includes a ‘resource framework’ where allocated budget lines are outlined. The argument that budgetary resources must be allocated to action plans strengthens when one considers the overall global picture regarding

the consistent and continuous shortfall in funding resources for programmes and initiatives related to gender equality. The lack of resources for funding women’s organisations in particular continues to be problematic. Exacerbated by the global financial crisis the ‘growing conservatism’ among donors to fund such projects has also been linked to bad gender mainstreaming practices. There has, however, been a parallel trend to channel greater resources towards programmes on ‘gender based violence’ particularly in the context of conflict. While increased resources are needed for these vital and indispensible projects, funding for the broader equality and women’s rights agenda is still much needed. The enthusiasm to support response-based initiatives on gender based violence may be drawing support away from the critical and fundamental work that addresses broad-based socio-cultural and structural inequalities.

Budgets are not clearly assigned to the majority of plans and consequently it is often difficult to assess where financial commitments lie. The cross-departmental nature of the plans makes this particularly difficult given that different departments will bear different responsibilities under the respective plans. As budgets are often allocated on a department by department basis, this introduces the risk that some departments may back out of specific commitments for lack of funding.

Action plans are volatile – subject to many factors such as global trends, changing ministerial priorities and staff turn-over, a factor which has been noted to negatively impact on practices such as gender mainstreaming which are largely reliant on individual interested staff members and are lacking concrete institutional commitments. Political will and institutional commitment is imperative where continued application of time and resources to the plan is expected. Plans are also not simply formulas for ‘doing things right’ – but in keeping with the notion of gender as an analytical and mobilising concept, must be kept alive and re-energised through reviews, evaluations and renewed political commitments.

4.3 The potential for narrowing towards a 1325 ‘Label’

There are places around the world where local women’s organisations may not have heard of SCR 1325, yet are undertaking activities that are effectively implementing the objectives of the resolution. Care is needed to ensure that existing projects are not re-labelled as ‘1325’ initiatives for the sole purpose of evidencing delivery of government commitments. There is a concurrent danger that some projects may be excluded from support and funding for failing to frame their work within the emerging discourse and language used by governments within their actions plans on SCR 1325. This could have serious implications for organisations that may not label their work as 1325 but are essentially implementing the resolu-

tion. It must be acknowledged, that while states may have been slow to act on the resolution, women’s organizations, before and after the inception of the resolution have been advancing the core principles of 1325 in a tireless and consistent fashion. Since its adoption, women’s organizations have used SCR 1325 as a tool to assert greater recognition of women’s role and participation in conflict management, resolution and peace building. Women’s organisations around the world have already been ‘doing 1325’ and governments are now catching up. Organisations in Timor-Leste, for example, have for some time been engaged in work that already implicates the objectives of SCR 1325, although not labelled as such. Despite their involvement in an Irish government project on SCR 1325, they nonetheless do not wish to simply re-label certain aspects of their work to fit with an international agenda.96

4.4 The scope of SCR 1325 and the impact of the politics of the ‘Other’

There is a tendency, particularly among Western states, to view SCR 1325 as primarily, if not exclusively, applicable in contexts outside their own territories, revealing a tendency not dissimilar to ‘the unwillingness of states to accept that the laws of war are applicable to conflicts taking place in their own jurisdiction’.97 Thus, it is often assumed that SCR 1325 applies in ‘other’ geographical locations and therefore properly situated under the remit of foreign policy where responsibility for mediating peace, promoting post-conflict recovery and security sector reform is deferred, albeit with financial support, to local actors. As leading scholars have observed, Resolution 1325 is applicable everywhere and is not just about ‘saving or protecting third world women.’98 The ‘othering’ of those women who are affected by conflict in distant places is often used to enable states to implement their obligations under Resolution 1325 within the ‘development’ and ‘international peace and security’ sectors. The Austrian action plan nonetheless evidences a more progressive approach in that it directs actions toward its own peacekeeping forces focussing on national responsibilities, albeit extraterritorially.

Greater critical examination of how states are interpreting their obligations under SCR 1325 is needed, particularly in light of the proclaimed potential of action plans to deliver on state obligations. An important consideration is whether action plans are delivering comprehensive rather than selective approaches as some states may only view their obligations as relevant in their external relations. The majority of plans developed by European states are led by and situated within ministries of foreign affairs which necessarily locates their actions on SCR 1325 predominantly within the arena of the international.

96. Based on author’s own involvement in this project and with women’s groups in Timor-Leste.  
98. Otto, supra n. 81, p. 144.
An example of the possible implications of differentiating action plans between the domestic and foreign policy arenas is most clearly evidenced in the case of the UK national action plan. Women activists in Northern Ireland have consistently highlighted the exclusion of Northern Ireland from the UK government’s work on ‘women, peace and security’.99 The development of the UK action plan in 2006 was preceded by a period of violence in Northern Ireland referred to as the ‘Troubles’ and/or the ‘conflict’ which began in August 1969.100 In March 1972, the Westminster government took full control over the administration of policy implementation in Northern Ireland from the local administration.101 From the outset, the violence was treated as an internal matter, subject to the law enforcement rather than the armed conflict paradigm, and therefore not subject to international scrutiny nor to international law. At the same time and throughout the period of direct rule, it was widely acknowledged that Northern Ireland was ‘different’ from the rest of the United Kingdom in respect to policy development and enforcement.102 In some respects, this situation continues to persist even under the devolved Northern Ireland administration which was established in the last decade under the terms of the ‘Belfast Agreement’.103

While the UK’s policy development on Resolution 1325 is situated within its foreign policy remit104 women’s groups in Northern Ireland have indicated that no efforts were made to promote SCR 1325 in Northern Ireland even though the action plan was developed after the Whitehall government had participated as a party to the peace process for Northern Ireland and despite the fact that it continues to be directly involved in related initiatives in the post-conflict phase.105 In a recent publication and in conferences addressing issues of women, peace and security, women’s organisations have emphasised that there was no policy on women, peace and security developed for Northern Ireland and the region was excluded from the UK national action plan.106 As highlighted by organisations in Northern Ireland, the UK has promoted Resolution 1325 and gender equality within peace building in their work in other countries around the world but ‘these positive actions have

99. GAPS (2009), Global Monitoring Checklist on Women, Peace and Security. London, Gender Action for Peace and Security (GAPS), and authors conversations with representatives of women’s organisations in Northern Ireland.
100. J. Darby, Northern Ireland: The Background to the Conflict (Belfast, Appletree Press 1983).
101. Ibid.
103. Also referred to as the ‘Good Friday Agreement’ – the peace agreement for Northern Ireland established in 1998.
104. The UK action plan was developed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development working collaboratively All three constituted the Whitehall 1325 Action Plan Working Group.
not been extended to women in Northern Ireland.\textsuperscript{107} A CEDAW (Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Violence Against Women) shadow report submitted by the Northern Ireland Women’s European Platform (NIWEP) to the most recent UK hearing at CEDAW (Committee) highlighted that the UK had failed to meet its obligations under SCR 1325 within Northern Ireland. Moreover, a recent report by the UK Gender Action for Peace and Security (GAPS) group on the implementation of Resolution 1325, noted that little ‘effort has been made by the UK to push for gender-sensitive peace-building and reconstruction in Northern Ireland’.\textsuperscript{108} The 2008 report of the CEDAW to the UK has recommended that SCR 1325 is fully implemented in Northern Ireland.\textsuperscript{109}

The Northern Ireland experience provides a host of lessons for the planning and development of action plans elsewhere. The failure on the part of the UK government to involve or consult with all government departments including the Northern Ireland Office and to limit the planning stage to include only three departments has had serious consequences on the final product.\textsuperscript{110} In addition, there was a clear failure to consult with its civil society constituency in Northern Ireland even though the development of the action plan was preceded by much activism and advocacy on SCR 1325 within Northern Ireland. In November 2004, NIWEP held a mock ‘trial’ of the implementation of SCR 1325 in Stormont, the parliament buildings of the Northern Ireland Assembly. It highlighted the profile of SCR 1325 and concluded that it was not being effectively implemented in Northern Ireland.\textsuperscript{111} Northern Ireland members of UK CSO delegations to the annual Commission on the Status of Women in New York have also drawn attention to the problem.\textsuperscript{112} This is in contrast to the approach adopted by the Irish government. As a party to the peace process, the Irish government has attempted to absorb lessons learnt and has consulted through a tri-partite cross-learning process (more below) with women’s groups from Northern Ireland even though Northern Ireland lies outside the jurisdiction of the Irish national plan (albeit within its foreign policy). As noted by organisations in Northern Ireland, the UK could have led by example if it had effectively integrated SCR 1325 within its national and foreign policies.\textsuperscript{113} In January 2010, the UK launched a review and public consultation process on its action plan; whether

\begin{itemize}
\item[107.] Ibid., p. 114.
\item[108.] Ibid.
\item[112.] Conversations with members of the women’s sector in Northern Ireland.
\end{itemize}
recognition of the Northern Ireland situation is incorporated into its revised draft remains to be seen. It also remains to be seen whether the UK, and others, are held to account regarding their ‘selective’ approaches to action planning. Where will the accountability on the quality of the action plans lie? There are little by way of mechanisms at UN level to hold individual states to account for the quality of their action plans – a next step forward perhaps?

5. EMERGING TRENDS

There has been an increasing call for action plans to be based on the voices and experiences of the women to whom SCR 1325 is directed and to be grounded in this reality rather than simply reflect the priorities of government policy. The unique approach taken by the Liberian government exemplifies this new thinking. Supported by International Alert, an unprecedented consultative process was undertaken across the country as the action plan was developed. The process served to generate dialogue on issues of women and security at the grass-roots level that lasted beyond the consultation period. The output collated as a result of this comprehensive consultative process was subsequently used to inform the action plan through the work of the 1325 National Steering Committee overseeing the development of the plan. While Liberia presents an exceptional example of what might be achieved within a country, there has been an emerging trend in recent years for far greater collaborative engagement – whether on a bilateral or multilateral basis – between states.

5.1 Twinning

The concept of ‘twinning’, or the concurrent development of action plans on a parallel basis between states was originally coined and conceived by Mary Robinson, former President of Ireland and current President of *Realizing Rights: The Ethical Globalization Initiative*. The idea stemmed from the recommendations of the Irish Joint Consortium on Gender Based Violence that action plans should be based on the real and lived experiences and interests of those women directly affected by conflict and insecurity. Mary Robinsons’ proposal was initially directed at the


Irish and Liberian governments, both of which had begun developing action plans around the same time. Given that the Liberian action plan process was ahead of Ireland’s, the Irish-led initiative evolved to a ‘cross-learning’ process ‘designed to inform the development of Ireland’s National Action Plan and to facilitate the sharing of experiences between women in conflict-affected areas’. The Irish government’s process, based on its learning on conflict resolution in Northern Ireland, also involved Timor-Leste, where its main work on conflict resolution was being piloted. A cross-learning process between the three countries (Liberia, Northern Ireland and Timor-Leste) began in 2008. For the Irish government the process is seen as a means through which lessons learned on the implementation of Resolution 1325 between three conflict-affected contexts can be shared and provides a substantive basis for the development of its action plan. The project was themed on the three P’s of SCR 1325 and structured around three conferences hosted by each country. The process will culminate in the compilation of a report for the UN and is expected to list recommendations based on the findings of the conferences and issues identified by women from each conflict situation in an attempt to further advance the implementation of SCR 1325. There is an expectation that this deeper engagement will raise the standard of future action plans. Ireland has also gone one step further and appointed the first Special Envoy for UNSCR 1325, an international political figure-head to lead Ireland’s process.

The idea of ‘twinning’ has also received attention within international multilateral fora where discussions on the development of action plans are increasingly taking place. Mary Robinson’s organisation Realizing Rights has become the unofficial driver of the process, creating a momentum to the ‘twinning’ partnership concept. In June 2009, Finland and Kenya formally entered into a ‘twinning’ partnership. This has resulted in two bi-lateral meetings, the first in Kenya, followed by a more recent one in Finland between a Kenyan delegation comprising government officials and civil society organizations and the Finnish 1325 National Action Plan Monitoring Group. Twinning initiatives have also been welcomed by civil society actors, demonstrated by the announcement of the Dutch NGO Working Group on 1325 that it ‘envisages further collaboration with the government, this time in jointly developing a Twinning on 1325 with partner countries’. The concept of ‘twinning’ or ‘cross-learning’ for the purposes of developing action plans on SCR 1325 is in very early stages of development and it remains to
be seen just how effective these strategies will become. Will twinning enhance and improve the kinds of activities included within action plans by donor governments who partner with their conflict-affected/developing country counterparts? Or is twinning just another ‘trend’ which governments embrace as a matter of form with little intention of investing in their transformational qualities? It is hard to tell at this point; however the concept has taken on significant momentum in a very short space of time and it is likely that more governments will engage in these types of initiatives. ‘Twinning’ has been described as having the potential to develop ‘partnership in the spirit of 1325’ and promote a more equitable relationship between donor and recipient countries.\textsuperscript{124} If this is the case, it is imperative that these partnerships are based on equality and not driven by donor country agendas. There is of course the potential that these initiatives will lead to the recognition on the part of donor countries that they may have a great deal to learn from partner countries in managing conflict and development. Equally, the capacity for donor countries to equip partner countries with the resources to develop action plans cannot be underestimated. With the approach of the tenth anniversary of SCR 1325, the ‘Twinning’ concept is being hailed as a way forward, evidenced by the recommendations made at the 2009 High-Level Meeting ‘Acting on 1325 and Climate Change’ and a European Commission meeting on 1325 which looked at ‘Twinning of 1325 (2000) Action Plans’ in late 2009.\textsuperscript{125}

5.2 \hspace{1cm} Regional action plans

In additional to twinning, there has been increased interest in the development of regional action plans as a new way of advancing implementation. In 2008, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) developed an action plan for the implementation of SCR 1325.\textsuperscript{126} An African Great Lakes regional meeting on ‘UNSCR 1325 National Action Plans’ is scheduled to take place in early 2010 to explore the potential for using 1325 action plan development as a tool for regional peace-building.\textsuperscript{127} These regional measures have been welcomed by United Nations as they are seen to ‘increase synergies and coherence as well as compliance’ on the implementation of the resolution.\textsuperscript{128}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{125} Brussels, 2 October 2009: Implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security – elaboration and implementation of UNSCR 1325 National Action Plans, details of which can be found at \textless http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/hr/news230.pdf\textgreater .
\item \textsuperscript{127} R. Mayanja (August 2009), Statement by Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, Regional Conference on the Implementation of the National Action Plans on Resolution 1325 (2000) in the Great Lakes Region Bujumbura.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
5.3 Incorporating the latest ‘Women, Peace and Security’ resolutions into approaches to SCR 1325

The adoption of the latest resolutions has prompted states and international organisations to revisit their action plans with a view to integrating the objectives embodied in these instruments. Debate has centred on how best to incorporate Resolutions 1820, 1888 and 1889 into action plans that were originally developed solely for Resolution 1325. Uganda has incorporated Resolution 1820 directly into its action plan, along with the Goma Declaration on Eradication of Sexual Violence and Ending Impunity in the Great Lakes Region. The Liberian National Action Plan also incorporates some of the components of Resolution 1820. The EU has also included Resolution 1820 as part of its approaches to women, peace and security.129

As noted before, the influence and impact of the new resolutions on implementation of obligations under the women, peace and security banner have still to be felt. It remains to be seen how far the practical measures outlined in these resolutions are taken. It also remains to be seen whether implementation of these obligations will bring about comprehensive and meaningful change. Much depends on how states interpret the recommendations contained in the resolutions.

6. CONCLUDING A FUTURE OF WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY

The ‘women, peace and security’ project is now firmly established as a distinct global initiative grounded in both law and policy. The adoption of four resolutions has placed the spotlight on the Security Council, increasing pressure on it to continue to invigorate and move the agenda forward. The same pressure applies to states and how they, as the major stakeholders of these resolutions, will ensure effective and meaningful implementation. Those now developing action plans face the option of incorporating Resolutions 1820, 1888 and 1889 into their frameworks. States which have developed national action plans since the adoption of Resolution 1820 have for the most part, opted to incorporate its provisions into their plans. Integrating the two additional resolutions may prove more challenging and therefore they may be treated as simply part of a ‘women, peace and security’ ‘package’.

A further five plans (Ghana, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya and Rwanda) are reportedly in the process of development. In early 2010, the UN appointed a Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict as mandated under Resolution 1888.130 There is evidence that in state and shadow reports under CEDAW, both Member

States and non-governmental organisations are regularly referencing Resolution 1325. Moreover, the frequent references to SCR 1325 in reports of the CEDAW Committee serves to strengthen the resolution’s ambit and is likely to create further avenues of accountability. The 2010 Report of the UN Secretary General outlining the proposal for the establishment of the Composite Gender Equality Entity sets out that ‘[s]upport to Member States in implementing and monitoring … Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820’ will be one of its eight core functions. This may provide a strengthened architecture to facilitate further innovative methods to hold states to account and support implementation of the resolutions.

Resolution 1325 is the product of the unprecedented work and campaigning by women at grass roots level. Their vision was to prompt radical change to the policies, programmes and systems that continue to oppress women and to invigorate the gender equality agenda related to peace and security. The implementation of Resolution 1325 and the three subsequent resolutions requires reformist and radical interventions that create fundamental change. The co-option of the women, peace and security agenda into the arena of official international discourse, while not quite as progressive as hoped, nonetheless presents a unique opportunity. In his 2008 Report, the UN Secretary General noted that ‘[a]lthough slower than desired, a culture of gender equality and women’s empowerment in peace and security areas is increasingly taking hold’. What this culture eventually encompasses and whether it will serve to de-politicise ‘gender equality’ as a concept remains to be seen. Action plans will continue to gain momentum as strategies that bring attention to the need to implement Resolution 1325 and, whatever their flaws, they will no doubt be used as tools to compel states to act. Key will be an evaluation of their performance and impact against credible, appropriate and qualitative indicators set by women during the next decade of the resolution’s existence.

---