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LOSING HEARTS AND MINDS: IT'S EASY WHEN YOU USE LAWS LIKE
THE AFSPA
July 29, 2004 - (Asia-Pacific Human Rights Network) Defenders
of extrajudicial killings clearly suffer from acute nostalgia
for the Stone Age when a man with a club was a law unto himself.
It is unpardonable when such excesses are condoned - and often,
even wished upon their fellow citizens.
It is therefore incumbent on those who believe they
live in a democratic, civilized society to reflect on what happened
to Thangjam Manorama in
Manipur. Here was a woman who was "picked up" from her
home by the Assam Rifles and summarily executed, reportedly after
being tortured.
Whether she was a terrorist or an activist or a homemaker is not
the point. A civilized society does not allow police or paramilitary
personnel to judge whether a person deserves to be shot. Not in
peacetime, not in a "warlike situation", not during
an Emergency.
Perhaps, we must re-evaluate the state of Indian civilization
and democracy. Because the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA)
allows precisely for the kind of acts described above. In effect
in Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, and parts of Tripura,
the Act gives the Central Government the power to declare any
State or Union Territory a disturbed area and allows security
forces to fire at any person if it is considered "necessary
for maintenance of law and order." Security personnel can
also arrest any person "against whom reasonable suspicion
exists" with no obligation to inform the detainee of the
grounds for arrest. These powers are also granted to non-commissioned
officers, such as Lance Naiks and Subedars, the Indian terms for
corporals and sergeants.
Finally, security forces are given immunity from prosecution for
any acts committed by them in relation to the Act.
The case for the AFSPA, even legally speaking, is not cut and
dried. The declaration that an area is disturbed essentially amounts
to declaring a
state of emergency but bypasses the Constitutional safeguards.
The point that this act invokes a state of emergency was raised
by Mr Mahanty (Dhenkanal) in the 1958 Lok Sabha debates. He said
the Assembly could not proceed if Section 352(1) of the Constitution
was not fulfilled.
In response, Mr G B Pant, then Home Minister, attempted to argue
that the powers granted under the AFSPA do not resemble a state
of emergency. He said that in an emergency, fundamental rights
can be abrogated and that the AFSPA does not abrogate those rights.
But under Section 4(a) the right to life is clearly violated.
An officer shooting to kill, because he is of the opinion that
it is necessary, does not conform, even
prima facie, with the Article 21 Constitutional requirement that
the right to life cannot be abridged except according to procedure
established by law. The Home Minister said the AFSPA powers stem
rather from Article 355 of the Constitution, which gives the Central
Government authority to protect the States against external aggression.
However, India is also obligated to comply with international
human rights law. India is a party to the International Convention
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and any derogation from
its provisions is only permissible under three conditions. Firstly,
it is only "in time of public emergency which threatens the
life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed"
that states may derogate from their obligations under the ICCPR.
Also, such derogation must be "strictly required by the exigencies
of the situation" and cannot be inconsistent with other international
law
obligations. The AFSPA, for example, was enacted without such
an official proclamation of emergency and goes beyond the requirements
of the
situation.
According to Section 4 of the Act, the army can shoot to kill,
under the powers of section 4(a), for the commission or suspicion
of the commission
of the following offenses: acting in contravention of any law
or order prohibiting the assembly of five or more persons, carrying
weapons, or carrying anything which is capable of being used as
a fire-arm or ammunition. To justify the invocation of this provision,
the officer need only be "of the opinion that it is necessary
to do so for the maintenance of public order" and only give
"such due warning as he may consider necessary".
Those in favour of retaining the AFSPA maintain that even if mistakes
are made or excesses carried out in the implementation of the
Act, it is no reason for the Act to be repealed. 'Security analysts'
claim that errant members of the security corps are punished whenever
excesses occur. They fail of course to mention the key clause
in the Act that effectively grants immunity to security forces.
Section 6 of the AFSPA establishes that no legal proceedings can
be brought against any member of the armed forces acting under
the AFSPA, without the permission of the Central Government. This
section leaves the victims of the armed forces abuses without
an effective remedy.
In a report on the AFSPA to the UN Human Rights Committee in 1991,
Nandita Haksar, a lawyer who has often petitioned the Guwahati
High Court in cases related to the AFSPA, explained how in practice
this leaves the military's victims without a remedy. Firstly,
there has not been a single case of any one seeking such permission
to file a case in the North East. Given that the armed forces
personnel conduct themselves as being above the law and the people
are alienated from the state government, it is hardly surprising
that no one would approach Delhi for such permission. Secondly,
when the armed forces are tried in army courts, the public is
not informed of the proceedings and the court martial judgments
are not published.
Section 6 of the AFSPA was also reviewed in Indrajit Barua v.
State of Assam. The High Court justified this provision on the
grounds that it prevents the filing of "frivolous claims".
The court even said that this provision provides more safeguards,
obviously confusing safeguards for the military with safeguards
for the victims of the military's abuses.
Instances of human rights abuses by the army have shown that unless
there is public accountability there is no incentive for the army
to change its
conduct. This was exemplified in Burundi when security forces
killed 1,000 people in October 1991. Amnesty International reported,
"The failure to identify those responsible for human rights
violations and bring them to justice has meant that members of
the security forces continue to believe that they are above the
law and can violate human rights with impunity." Without
the transparency of the public accounting, it is impossible to
be sure that perpetrators are actually punished.
Habeas corpus cases have been the only remedy available for those
arrested under the AFSPA. A habeas corpus case forces the military
or police
to hand the person over to the court. This gives the arrested
person some protection and it is in these cases that legal counsel
has been able to
make arguments challenging the AFSPA. However, a habeas corpus
case will not lead to the repeal of the Act nor will it punish
particular officers
who committed the abuses. Also, only people who have access to
lawyers will be able to file such a case.
Section 6 of the AFSPA thus suspends the Constitutional right
to file suit. Mr Mahanty raised this crucial argument in the first
Lok Sabha debate on the AFSPA in 1958. He said that Section 6
of the AFSPA "immediately takes away, abrogates, pinches,
frustrates the right to constitutional remedy which has been given
in article 32(1) of the Constitution." This further shows
that the AFSPA is more than an emergency provision because it
is only in states of emergency that these rights can be constitutionally
suspended.
Section 32(1) of the Constitution states that "the right
to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement
of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed." In the
Constitutional Assembly debates, Dr B R Ambedkar said, "If
I was asked to name any particular article of the Constitution
as the most important - an article without which this Constitution
would be a nullity. I would not refer to any other article except
this one (Article 32). It is the very soul of the Constitution
and the very heart of it."
During the emergency in 1975 the right to file for writs of habeas
corpus was suspended as ruled by the Supreme Court in A.D.M. v.
Shivakant
Shukla, (1976) 2 SCC 521. The Emergency had been declared under
Section 359 of the Constitution. This section has now been amended,
stating that the fundamental rights of section 20 and 21 cannot
be suspended, even in a state of emergency. Therefore, should
an emergency be
declared today, the right to file habeas corpus on the grounds
that the fundamental right to life has been denied should be allowed.
Nevertheless,
the 1975 case exemplifies the court's deference to the Executive,
even if it means a total suspension of individual liberty.
In the circumstances, the AFSPA remains a stranglehold, a power
unleashed - often arbitrarily and unlawfully - on India's population.
From: groups.yahoo.com/group/IPARMW/message/156
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