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Peace as Disappointment : The
Reintegration of Female Soldiers in Post-Conflict Societies: A Comparative
Study from Africa
Elise Fredrikke Barth, International Peace Research Institute (PRIO),
August 2002
This report was written to produce documentation on post-conflict
demobilization and reintegration of female soldiers, with a special
focus on Africa. Most of the work on the report was conducted during
2001, although some of the work spilled over into 2002. I am very
grateful to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for financing
this project, and to individual representatives of the ministry
Knut Tøraasen, Fredrik Arthur and Unni Rambøll
in particular for encouraging me.
The report was written at the International Peace Research Institute,
Oslo (PRIO). I am grateful to my many colleagues there, especially
Inger Skjelsbæk and Henrik Syse, for invaluable help and support.
I am also grateful to my numerous informants and interviewees, not
least the many brave Afri-can women who spent many, many hours speaking
to me and relating their often painful stories. I would also like
to express my gratitude to Worku and Tzegga for helping me to arrange
inter-views in Eritrea and for otherwise assisting me in numerous
ways.
The recommendations in this report are the result of a long process
of study and deliberation, and they have been discussed with several
colleagues at PRIO. I hope they will be of use to aid workers and
diplomats alike, but I stress that they represent my views and not
those of PRIO or the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Chapter 1 : PROLOGUE
Introduction
This report has three objectives:
* to increase knowledge about the situation of women who have been
soldiers in various countries in Africa, and thereby understand
the mechanisms that sustain the separation between ex-soldiers and
civilians;
* to map and analyze the demobilization and reintegration process
of female soldiers in a post-conflict situation; and
* to suggest how demobilization and reintegration can be facilitated.
The project will compare the situation of female soldiers in various
African settings, focusing in particular on continuity/change and
socialization. The project aims to analyze the situation from the
perspectives of both the female fighters themselves and the surrounding
civil society.
[1]Method
The report is based on extensive fieldwork in Eritrea, where both
fighters and civilians were interviewed. In addition, information
has been gathered from fact-collecting trips to the Sudan and Northwestern
University, Chicago, as well as from reports, articles, and books
documenting the phenomenon of female soldiers.
Background
Female soldiers have existed in most parts of the world and at most
times. In Africa, for example, we read of cases where women have
served in guerrilla armies and liberation movements in Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, South Africa, and Algeria
(Kriger, 1992; Turschen, 1998; Arthur, 1998). In such cases, the
role of women has been both to increase the number of soldiers in
general and to serve in roles unique to women (see chapter 2).
Women become soldiers for many reasons, one being that the military
can provide them, and not just men, with an alternative career.
Indeed, sometimes the military is the only career available at a
particular time and place.
Africa is becoming more and more militarized (Volman, 1998; Schröder,
1999). Daniel Volman has documented the growing impact of war and
armed conflict on African societies. The enormous volume of the
flow of small arms, such as guns and mines, throughout the African
continent adds to the causation of violence and devastation. Womens
vital roles in maintaining their families and participating in farming
and activities that keep their societies functioning are particularly
affected by escalating levels of violence and social chaos.
With increased militarization, there is naturally an increase in
the total number of soldiers. This leads to a decline in other sectors
of society as many of the most able young men and women spend their
time fighting and perfecting their skills as soldiers instead of
receiving a civilian education and working towards the construction
of their respective countries. As legitimate economic activity declines,
warfare increasingly becomes the dominant mode of production and
a significant sector of the economy. Increased militarism leads
to more and more young people leaving their home communities to
take part in military service, never to return again (Kingma, 1999).
In a modern total war situation, there is often no clearly
defined frontline, and civilians can come directly under attack.
Consequently, the stereotyped image of men going off to war and
women staying at home, away from the conflict, has to be radically
revised. However, women are not merely victims in such conflicts.
They also actively work together with men in support of the war
effort.
Often, womens work has consisted in helping the men to be
the soldiers they want to be, or are expected to be. Women have
filled all kinds of auxiliary functions so that war can go on. Urdang
describes how women in Guinea-Bissau were the ones who made sure
that supplies reached the guerrilla soldiers. She argues that in
all guerrilla wars, it has been women who have provided the supply
line (Urdang, 1979). This is a very important and often undervalued
point. Indeed, Jan Jindy Pettmann, feminist and professor in international
politics, goes as far as to ask: Without womens activities,
would wars be possible? (1996: 127).
Women are often as central to the roots and perpetuation of an armed
conflict as men. The role of women as supporters of armed conflict,
however, has often been trivialized. Given womens instrumental
role in supporting or opposing violence (see, for example, Byrne,
1995 or Sørensen, 1998), important sides of a conflict may
be hidden when womens perspectives are lacking in an analysis.
Thus, conflict analyses cannot be considered complete if they are
based solely on information that fails to take account of womens
points of view.
Female soldiers challenge deeply anchored preconceptions of gender
identity (Enloe, 1990; Campbell, 1990; Segal, 1993; Cooke, 1996).
Cross-culturally and historically, combat has been reserved for
men as an arena in which they can test, prove, and be rewarded for
their virility. Judith Hicks Stiehm (1988), who has done extensive
research on women in the US armed forces, argues that the presence
of women alters the military when service can no longer be seen
as a way of demonstrating manhood. To allow women into a male bastion
threatens it as an arena for demonstrating masculinity and, among
other things, achieving the prestige of belonging to such an organization.
Female soldiers who have broken ties with their families and participated
in a war on terms similar to those of men have very often been socialized
out of their local settings. For many, the influence of military
life has lasted over several years. They may have been very young
at the time, and usually they have had experiences in the field
that will influence them in the future. The gap between socialization
in the home community and socialization within the narrow restrictions
of a military movement is great.
When male and female ex-soldiers return to civil society, they are
not received in the same way. While men are perceived to have strengthened
their gender role through military life and are considered even
more masculine than before, female fighters are increasingly marginalized.
When a war ends, the female soldiers from the winning party of the
conflict may at first receive gratitude from civil society. Gradually,
however, women are pushed in the direction of a gender role considered
more acceptable for women in that particular society. This is characteristic
of the situation of female soldiers all over the world: conduct
encouraged during the war is not encouraged in peacetime (see, for
example, Enloe, 2000). As a result, women experience a much greater
break with civil societys expectations with regard to appropriate
gender behavior than men when they join a military group. Afterwards,
they are challenged in a totally different way, expected to return
to roles very different from their war activities. This certainly
has implications for their reintegration into society.
Funding
Programs assisting with the demobilization and reintegration of
soldiers are funded by numerous sources. When a war ends, the governments
of affected countries negotiate with the aid community for economic
support. Assistance is usually provided by major donor agencies,
like the World Bank, the European Union, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the United Nations. Demobilization and reintegration
assistance are then discussed and negotiated by the parties involved.
The World Bank in particular is involved in demobilization efforts
in Africa.
In the case of Eritrea, for example, Italy and the United States
are Eritreas first and second largest bilateral partners,
while the multilateral partners, the World Bank (demobilization,
economic recovery, health, human capacity development) and the European
Union (energy, roads, education, food) are first and second overall.
UN agencies manage a diverse portfolio of projects largely funded
by other donors. Other major bilateral partners in Eritrea are the
Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, and Germany. All partners
are involved in demobilization and reintegration efforts (World
Bank, 2002).
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[1] Civil society is defined here, and throughout the
report, as unorganized civilian people, not as non governmental
organizations (as is often the case in international politics or
sociology).
Chapter 2 : TARGETING
Introduction
Targeting ex-soldiers eligible for demobilization support is a complex
process. In order to be successful, reintegration programs have
to take into account a number of different considerations. First
and foremost, a general and serious warning should be sounded against
singling out some groups and giving them benefits that are very
different from what is received by the rest of the community. The
social fabric of a community is vulnerable to outside influence,
and programs designed to benefit ex-combatants may work against
the overall goal of integrating that particular group into civil
society. The important question necessary to ask is whether demobilization
assistance will promote integration into the local community or
not.
In spite of this, it is essential to reserve some assistance for
ex-combatants. Ex-combatants need incentives for returning to civil
society. Numerous obstacles pave the way for the demobilized combatant,
and support must be offered. It is necessary, as well, to recognize
the different needs of the various groups of people who have participated
as soldiers. For example, an ex-soldier youth will not have the
same needs as an adult former combatant, male or female (Maslen,
1997). And the situation experienced by women ex-soldiers differs
from that of men. These considerations must always be evaluated,
and the question asked: Will the group in question benefit from
the reintegration program? Are there possible long-term effects?
Will the assistance lead to increased division between the ex-soldiers
and other people in the community?
Soldiers not qualifying for assistance
A number of factors make the targeting of former soldiers eligible
for reintegration programs difficult. Political sensitivity and
factors often not obvious to an outsider influence the process and
the conduct of such programs. Many of the problems of targeting
people eligible for assistance after an armed conflict are the same
for both men and for women. For example, soldiers belonging to a
defeated group in the conflict will not have the same problems as
soldiers belonging to the winning group. Often, some groups are
not recognized by, for example, the government of the country as
equally entitled to demobilization and reintegration benefits. The
government may apply different targeting mechanisms to combatants
from different groups. Both male and female soldiers belonging to
the losing side may have difficulties in being recognized as ex-soldiers
entitled to certain benefits.
Mozambiques two opposing liberation movements, Frelimo and
Renamo, illustrate this point. Mozambique achieved independence
from Portugal in 1975, only to see the start of a violent conflict
between the Frelimo government and the opposition Renamo, which
lasted for 16 years. No one knows exactly how many men and women
participated as soldiers, nor the numbers of those who demobilized
immediately after the war without being registered (Colletta et
al., 1996; Maslen, 1997). The governments decision to only
make pensions available for ex-soldiers who had joined at an age
of 18 or over had a direct effect on many Renamo soldiers, of whom
many, both male and female, were younger when they entered the armed
forces. In addition, children under the age of 15 were excluded
from the official demobilization process. The demobilization of
children in Mozambique was a politically sensitive topic, as it
has been in many other places. No government wants to draw attention
to a practice of including children in the ranks of its armed forces.
As a target group, ex-soldiers under the age of 18 consequently
often fail to receive proper attention. Owing to factors such as
those mentioned above, estimates of the total numbers of soldiers
at the end of the conflict in Mozambique were approximate, to say
the least, ranging from 90,000 to 150,000 (Colletta et al., 1996;
Maslen, 1997).
There are other examples of ex-soldiers that have not been accepted
as being entitled to reintegration programs: insurgents and guerrillas
are frequently not recognized as proper combatants, and are thus
excluded from programs that target ex-combatants. One case, also
from Mozambique, is that of the Naparama, a movement of 20,000 warriors
led by a traditional healer, which was excluded from the demobilization
program in that country (Barron, 1996: 24).
Problems with registration
Frequently, there is no systematic registration of combatants, or
registration lists are not correct. For example, in Mozambique,
reports from the war veterans association AMODEG show that some
soldiers received support from multiple sources while others received
no support at all (Baden, 1997).
Another example comes from Namibia, where an unknown number of both
male and female combatants served during the war. At the time of
demobilization in 1989, there was no systematic collection of socio-economic
data on the combatants. This means that figures can be extremely
inaccurate.However, one estimate is that 40% of ex-combatants have
not benefited from any of the various demobilization programs as
a result of targeting leakages. These leakages occur
at all stages of the demobilization process (Colletta et al., 1996).
Examples of targeting leakages are many. On example is that of the
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), which was founded in 1962 as a
result of Ethiopias violations against the Eritrean population.
In 1970, a small faction of the ELF broke, later establishing itself
as the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) in 1975. From
that point, the two liberation armies were in serious opposition
to each other, and the ELF was later forced to leave Eritrea. The
EPLF liberated Eritrea on 24 May 1991, and the country was declared
an independent sovereign state two years later (Iyob, 1995). These
developments in Eritrea illustrate how some ex-soldiers are not
recognized as soldiers eligible to reintegration programs because
their existence either is not recognized or because they simply
are not around any longer.
Another example of leakage is the case of the Ethiopian Derg[1]
soldiers, of whom some 15% chose not to show up for demobilization
assistance after the war. When they were called to show up for encampment,
none of them did so (Colletta et al., 1996: 38) . This illustrates
that even when soldiers are recognized as eligible for assistance,
they may choose not to receive it, in order to avoid the situation
of confronting other soldiers. In this case, the soldiers may have
refused to come out of fear of reprisals by soldiers from other
sides of the conflict. Here, we see again how different the circumstances
are for soldiers on different sides of a conflict once the war is
over. Soldiers who have fought for the wrong side represent
a very unstable group in a postwar society. They are not accepted
within the establishment and risk becoming a more and more marginalized
group.
There are also cases where less severely disabled combatants who
are qualified for assistance have failed to show up at discharge
centers. The reason for this may be immobility, or it may be because
their homes were too far from the discharge centers. Examples from
Ethiopia show that many less disabled ex-soldiers did not register
and consequently received no support (Colletta et al., 1996: 35).
A last point demonstrating the complexities of targeting ex-soldiers
is data collection on soldiers. Obtaining and storing correct data
on ex-soldiers contains lots of potential for misunderstanding.
Many countries have numerous languages because of different ethnic
groups. The official writing down various data may come from a different
group than the soldiers that he or she is collecting information
from. Confusion because of language problems is not unusual, with
the result that data on a particular soldier are not correct. One
example from Uganda is where a number of veterans had their names
misspelled on their registration cards. The background to this was
that the clerks who filled in the information on the cards spelt
names and addresses differently depending on their own places of
origin. Later, this caused lots of errors and considerable confusion
(Colletta et al., 1996: 235).
In addition, information supplied on discharge is not always correct.
For example, the dates of birth and army numbers of former combatants
are commonly confused (ibid.). From my own fieldwork in Eritrea,
among very poor ex-fighter women, I was struck by the number of
women who could not give me the precise date of their own birth.
Different calendars, chronologies, and ways of reckoning of time
all may increase the likelihood that incorrect information is being
collected.
Veterans families
It has been claimed that reintegration of veterans will not be successful
as long as their families are not also targeted (Watteville 2000).
Demobilization and assistance programs should include families when
these are dependent on the veterans income, but this does
not often happen. Identification of dependents is difficult. Data
are easily falsified, not kept up-to-date, or simply nonexistent
(ibid.). Analyses should be conducted of the household to find out
who has actual control over given benefits. This is obviously a
demanding and time-consuming task, but is nonetheless important.
The families of veterans are in a vulnerable position upon demobilization,
and a program that aims to be successful cannot overlook this fact.
Special Problems with Targeting Female Veterans
The difficulties faced by female soldiers in being recognized as
veterans are manifold and widespread (see, for example, Baden, 1997
or Watteville, 2000). This also leads to a general lack of access
to demobilization benefits after an armed conflict. The roles of
female veterans vary greatly from place to place. In many places,
women have been fighting alongside men on the frontlines. In other
places and at other times, women have only been allowed to do support
work, such as carrying ammunition, cooking, communication, nursing
all auxiliary functions. Often, men have been unwilling to
share veteran status with women, especially where women have been
denied participation in direct combat. Sometimes female veterans
are recognized for their contribution, for example by the government,
and they receive an appropriate appraisal and formal acknowledgment.
Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that the women receive
the same benefits as their male comrades.
Contribution not recognized
Ex-combatants are considered a serious threat to the political stability
of a state. Accordingly, this group is a prioritized target for
reintegration support. While this is true, women combatants are
not perceived as a threat to the same degree as men. As a result,
it is not considered as important to target them (Baden, 1997; Watteville,
200). Here, I would like to point out that it is possible that female
combatants can be a destabilizing factor in ways that do not threaten
in a direct manner, but are threatening all the same, such as through
their rejection of traditions and established patterns of conduct.
More than men, female ex-combatants are a challenge to traditional
society. They are a challenge because, more than men, they resist
returning to old gender relations. In a postwar society, the experiences
of female combatants suggest that even more than men, these
women have become unsuited to their former civilian environment
because the change in their pattern of life was more radical
(Campbell, 1990: 117).
Whether women are perceived as a threat or not, there are several
explanations for why the contribution of female soldiers often goes
unacknowledged. In general, there is an overall reluctance among
higher officers to recognize the importance of the participation
of women for the war effort.
Even though few would argue that male and female combatants do not
qualify for equal treatment after an armed conflict, female combatants
have had a difficult time proving their contribution in a war. Especially
in guerrilla movements, women have had a difficult time actually
verifying their actions. Often, female veterans are not included
in reintegration programs because their role is not recognized as
having been active enough. This is particularly common when women
are not allowed to fight directly against the enemy. Most roles
other than that of direct fighting on the frontline will be considered
secondary to the war effort (Watteville, 2000; Zimbabwe Women Writers,
2000).
Women are frequently dependent on men to speak on their behalf in
order to confirm their veteran status (Watteville, 2000). Men are
the ones responsible for affirming the womens rank as soldiers
and how they have contributed. This places women in a weak position.
Many women have not had their ranks confirmed formally. Their access
to veteran status is dependent upon the goodwill of a superior and
the impulses or inclinations of those involved.
Psychosocial problems
Targeting female soldiers is a problem when women do not want to
be recognized as combatants after a war is over because of the stigma
attached to this. An example comes from Liberia, where many women
wanted to hide the fact that they had been soldiers. Such women
are hard to find You cant find them, its
like they never existed (Bennett, 1995: 43) and consequently
they never received any benefits after the war. This reaction is
understandable in the light of the way in which women who returned
after the war were received: as far as most of the men are
concerned, when you [a female combatant] come back, you are out....
They hardly want you to come near the children (ibid.: 39).
This attitude towards women who have been combatants is not unique
to Liberia. Ex-combatant women are well known to face difficulties
in getting accepted by traditional society, and the consequence
may be that they do not come forward to receive the assistance they
are entitled to, but on the contrary try to hide their past.
Other examples document how women try to be proud of their contribution
as soldiers, but nevertheless are rejected by civil society. In
Zimbabwe, female fighters describe how, upon their return to civil
society, they were pulled between living up to the image of a superwoman
while being looked down upon (Zimbabwe Women Writers, 2000). The
values of civil society and the values of the liberation army are
often in opposition to each other, and women who have been influenced
by their time as soldiers have to repress the soldier part of their
identity in order to be accepted.
Women who do not come forward represent a large problem, and one
that is probably more common than hitherto recognized. Even though
several women are targeted and come forward for assistance, many
women may choose to lie about their past as soldiers in order to
hide this fact. The stigma women receive when they reject traditional
roles and expose themselves to a male environment may be greater
than hiding their past and making the best out of their situation
without any help from assistance programs.
Lack of information
Experience has shown that women have less access to information
on demobilization and reintegration assistance than men (Watteville,
2000). Information about ones rights reaches men more easily
than women. In order to reach women, womens networks, church
groups, health centers, and more informal information channels are
more effective than, say, newspapers and radio.
Demobilization
Upon demobilization, if possible, all soldiers should go to encampment,
as this is the best way of reaching and registering as many former
combatants as possible. Otherwise, groups that risk being marginalized,
like female soldiers, will often not present themselves at a later
stage. The main purpose of encampment is registration and making
sure that all soldiers receive information about the assistance
they are entitled to.
There are many examples of women not showing up for registration
in a postwar situation. Watteville (2000) lists countries like Mozambique,
Zimbabwe, and Nicaragua as examples where women did not show up
for registration. She is unsure whether they were deliberately excluded,
whether they were not informed, or whether they themselves refused
to show up. (This problem was discussed above.)
Watteville also notes that, in Uganda, families were present during
encampment, and this made registration and collection of data on
dependents easier. In Uganda, abducted women stayed together with
female veterans and families in the camps. Information adapted to
the literacy levels of the women concerned was provided.
When it is not possible to gather the soldiers in camps immediately
after a war, many soldiers disappear and take their weapons with
them. This was the case in Ethiopia, where the soldiers of the defeated
side fled to remote areas and neighboring countries before they
were formally demobilized (Colletta et al., 1996).
It is also important to carry out a study of soldiers needs
upon demobilization, and this can most easily be done while the
soldiers are in the camp. Such a survey helps the planning of appropriate
reintegration procedures. The orientations given to soldiers during
encampment have at times been criticized for not giving realistic
information. An example is provided by Ethiopia, where political
topics were focused on, at the expense of socio-economic issues.
This did not prepare the soldiers for the challenges of civilian
life. In fact, thesessions (political orientation) may have contributed
to unrealistic expectations about reintegration (ibid: 46).
The steady income a soldier and his or her dependents receive before
demobilization is of great importance, and losing this is often
very hard for those who have been used to it. Even if the sum that
was received was small, many ex-soldiers describe their situation
as desperate when they no longer receive this income (Pedersen,
1999; personal interviews with female ex-fighters, Eritrea).
Chapter Summary
* Although necessary in most cases, demobilization assistance represents
a danger to cohesion and integration in the soldiers home
community.
* It is very easy for agencies from outside the country in which
assistance is given to overlook groups of soldiers who need assistance.
Soldiers who belong to the losing side in a conflict may be invisible.
* Female ex-soldiers tend to be difficult to notice when a conflict
is over. There is pressure on women to return to more traditional
ways of living as soon as possible. This is a difficult situation
for many women
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[1] The Derg was the name given to the regime of Mengistu Hailemariam,
leader of Ethiopia in 197491.
Chapter 3 : REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS: WOMENS ROLES
Introduction
Within this project, I have decided to devote an entire chapter
to women who participate in revolutionary movements or guerrilla
forces. In recent years, guerrilla warfare has gained increasing
importance in Africa as the institutional infrastructure of African
states has decayed. In contrast to the European understanding of
guerrilla forces in which they are perceived as being totally different
from regular state armies, in Africa this kind of warfare can be
regarded as the normal form of armed conflict (Clapham, 1998). Sometimes
guerrilla forces, like the EPLF, have been transformed into large,
more conventional armies. Other guerrilla forces have not developed
beyond a stage of insurgency.
Insurgencies can be closely related to revolutionary movements.
In Africa, as in the rest of the world, such movements have often
been led by student radicals who have adopted the work of Mao Tse
Tung and his ideal of a peoples war as their organizational
goal and strategy. During the Cold War, insurgencies claiming to
implement this ideal had a status , in addition to international
support, that disappeared in the ideological vacuum of the 1990s
(Clapham, 1998: 8). In Africa, there have been many examples of
such revolutionary movements. In the early 1950s, among the first
insurgencies and liberation movements were those of the Mau Mau
in Kenya and the Algerian war of independence. Later followed movements
in Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique, Angola,
South Africa, Eritrea, and Tigray in Ethiopia, among others.
A viable liberation movement must develop common goals and a strategy
for achieving them. An important factor for many revolutionary liberation
armies is the politicization of all members. Clapham points out
how the African insurgencies, like their equivalents elsewhere,
have taught the members a new outlook on their own history and place
in the world. Members have learned the correct history
of their country. The unity of all members has been fundamental
to the movements feasibility. In this way have the best and
most efficient liberation armies been able to achieve what they
aimed for: to seize power and establish a regular government.
Background to and Extension of Female Involvement
Women have often played important roles in revolutionary socialist
struggles. In many parts of the world, such as Nicaragua and Eritrea,
women have made up more than 30% of the revolutionary armed forces
(Molyneux, 1985; Wilson, 1991). In Sri Lanka at least 30% of the
Tamil Tigres (LTTE) are women (Rajasingham-Senanayake, 2001). In
other revolutions and liberation movements, women have not been
represented in such large numbers, but have nevertheless been considered
important for the outcome of the war.
In Africa, besides Eritrea, we hear women serving as soldiers in
guerrilla armies and liberation movements in Ethiopia (Hammond &
Druce, 1990), Namibia, Zimbabwe (Kriger, 1992; Zimbabwe Women Writers,
2000), Mozambique (Arthur, 1998), Algeria (Coughlin, 2000), Liberia
(Bennett, 1995), Sierra Leone (Ayissi, 2000: 144148), Guinea-Bissau
(Urdang, 1979), and Uganda (Turschen, 1998). Even tiny Djibouti
had female soldiers in its civil war (Milas, 2000).
Ideology
There are many reasons why women enlist as guerrilla soldiers. One
reason is the characteristics of guerrilla warfare itself. A guerrilla
force relies on clandestine activities; its aim may be to topple
a government. For these reasons, it is more separate from civil
society than a state military, though it might also (if the state
is occupied, for example) be based on a secret network rooted in
civil society. Clandestine work demands the involvement of individuals
assumed to be innocent. Within such an organization, women are crucial
in filling various positions and carrying out various roles, for
example associating with the enemy.
When a country is occupied, there is often a high degree of consciousness
in the population and many people want to resist the occupation.
The political aims of liberation movements that wage war against
the occupying enemy appeal equally to both men and women. Women
want to resist and mobilize in ways similar to men. They want to
contribute to the common good and, when possible, they join resistance
movements, as do men. Of course, the specific ideology of a particular
movement may also attract certain groups. If the ideology implies
changes within existing gender roles, this can attract women to
the movement. Women are often found in MarxistLeninist revolutionary
movements, and it therefore seems likely that this ideology plays
an important role in the recruitment of women.
Many liberation movements have included womens rights and
equality for men and women in their programs for political change.
The movement has thus developed an explicit position in support
of revolutionary women. The participation of women has been calculated
to be important for the outcome of the war in question. The cooperation
of all social groups men and women, different social classes,
religions and ethnicities leads to the establishment of a
strong group of people able to achieve more. Unity is crucial for
a movement that intends to achieve its goals.
Such unity can often come at the expense of individuality and the
soldiers earlier identity. In Eritrea, total dedication of
all members to the liberation movement erased all the other identities
of family, region, clan, and class (Wilson, 1991: 132).
Marxist ideology analyzes womens oppression as a consequence
of a class-based society. Movements adopting this ideology have
presented womens rights as a self-evident part of a future
society ruled by them. In this way, women have been mobilized to
join the revolution. Stephanie Urdang documents how women in Guinea-Bissau
were recruited on many occasions before their husbands. Women were
totally absorbed by the ideas of the revolution and by the idea
that they themselves could change their lives. The wives then went
on to recruit their husbands (Urdang, 1979: 121).
The whole foundation of a revolutionary group is to gather
all available sources for the struggle. [1] In order to achieve
this, ideology is a necessary tool.
Any revolutionary vanguard, which struggles to liberate the broad
masses from imperialist oppression, should take the emancipation
of women as one of its prime objectives. The mobilization and politicization
of the broad masses of women is essential for its success. As Lenin
said: The success of a revolution depends on the extent to which
women take part in it. (NUEW, 1980: 6)
According to Marxist theory, autonomous development, which meets
the economic security needs of all people, can be achieved only
by a socialist revolution. For feminists, the Marxist understanding
of knowledge is helpful because it supports their claim that knowledge
has been constructed in such a way that it denies a voice to women.
Nevertheless, feminists criticize Marxist theories for ignoring
women in their reproductive and domestic roles. Marxist theory looks
at class as the basic unit of analysis. Rather than being discussed
as a group with particular needs, women have been subsumed under
this class analysis, and feminists argue that class-based capitalist
oppression is not synonymous with the oppression of women (Tickner,
1992).
An example from Tigray in Ethiopia demonstrates how womens
liberation has been discussed as a class question:
Our aim is class struggle. The reason that class struggle is important
is that it unites everybody, not just women, not just men
they are not separated. Without class struggle, we cant liberate
ourselves.We women fighters came together in 1977 and discussed
whether there was a need for a womans organization inside
the TPLF [Tigray Peoples Liberation Front]. At the beginning
some of the women thought that it was not necessary. They thought
that equality was doing all the same physical activities that the
men were doing. But some of us knew that we did not solve womens
problems by being fighters. We had to face the problems of civil
women. (Hammond & Druce, 1990: 74)
As this example shows, some women have been aware that eliminating
the power of the dominant class would not solve the problems of
the oppression of women. Feminists argue that class-based analysis
ignores two important facts: women are oppressed in specific ways
attributable to patriarchy rather than to capitalism, and class
analysis ignores womens role in the family. Classical Marxism
has omitted womens roles in the family from its analyses.
All the unpaid labor that women perform in the family is left out
of economic analyses. Thus, certain issues that are peculiar to
women regardless of class position are neglected (Tickner, 1992:
87). The close connection between revolutionary movements and womens
participation demands an analysis of this phenomenon.
Some have argued that women are more easily recruited to revolutionary
movements because of their subordinate position in society (see,
for example, Urdang, 1979). Women may see an opportunity to fight
two struggles at the time: one against an occupying force, another
against traditional structures keeping women down. Urdang claims
that this attitude was widespread among women in Guinea-Bissau.
Through the revolution, for the first time in history, they would
be able to count on political institutions to safeguard their interests
(ibid: 124).
In Guinea-Bissau, the famous revolutionary leader Amilcar Cabral
stated in a mass peasant meeting:
Comrades, we are going to place women in high-ranking posts....
We want the women of our country to have guns in their hands....
Comrades, young girls are going to be coming into the villages from
our bases. But dont anybody think that these girls are up
for sale as brides. They will get married if they wish, but there
will be no forced marriages.... These young girls are going to work
in the villages, go to school, be in the militia and the party will
exercise complete control. (ibid: 125)
This link between revolution and womens liberation is very
easy to see. In Eritrea, women pointed to the needs of the liberation
movement when their own wishes clashed with those of their husbands
and with womens more traditional roles. In fact, women who
could not conform in their personal life saw the revolution as an
opportunity to get out of a difficult situation: The movement
drew many rebel women into the revolution ... and so transforming
rebellion into revolution (Wilson, 1991: 80). The liberation
movement had a position of authority that was not challenged.
In Mozambique, women who participated in the liberation movement
were supported and protected by the movement during the war. Women
had a collective strength as a result of this. They could challenge
their earlier gender-based limitations, and the authority of the
movement protected and strengthened women. The liberation movement
treated women as individuals, independent of whether they were married,
single, widowed, or divorced. (Arnfred, 1988: 12).
Lack of male soldiers
Guerrilla warfare and liberation movements trying to outnumber an
enemy force usually appeal for and accept as many soldiers as they
can.[2] The demand for male soldiers may increase over time, and
losses in the number of combatants due to extensive fighting (or
bad morale) must be replaced (Smith, 1994). Here, if the number
of men is limited, women are often welcomed out of necessity. This
was the background for the large number of female recruits in early
modern Europe: a permanent need for new recruits (De Pauw, 1998).
A future lack of men may also sometimes be predicted at the beginning
or at an early stage of the war, and such manpower shortages constitute
one factor that has at times spurred male leaderships to take an
interest in the emancipation of women (Pettman, 1996).
The rules for admitting women into a movement may change according
to relevant circumstances. Even if the rule is that liberation movements
welcome mass mobilization, there may be exceptions to this when
regulation of female recruitment is considered necessary. If the
number of women attracted to a military movement exceeds the needs
of that movement, new rules for admittance may be made. An example
of this took place in Tigray, Ethiopia, where the conscription of
peasant women into the TPLF escalated to such a point that the TPLF
had to limit the number of women allowed to join the movement. When
some Muslim women tried to join the TPLF without their fathers
or husbands approval, their villages reacted very strongly,
and the TPLF was forced to take action to prevent large numbers
of women joining (Hammond & Druce, 1990). Consequently, the
rules of admittance changed, and only fighters with a minimum of
five years of education were admitted. Previously, no such restrictions
existed. The rule barred many women from joining and at first caused
great resentment among women in the villages. Later, they seemed
to accept that educated women could serve the struggle better (ibid.).
This is an example of how the recruitment of soldiers is regulated
according to needs. In Tigray, the number of women eligible to join
decreased, and thus female recruitment was adjusted according to
the needs of the guerrilla forces.
Female soldiers as symbolic power
As mentioned in chapter 1, women may be important not only because
they increase the number of soldiers but also because they add legitimacy
or symbolic power to the war effort. First of all, female soldiers
symbolize a unity in the movement in question. Such symbolic power
is expressed when movements use pictures of female soldiers for
propaganda reasons to convey the message they want to get through.
This message might be that the movements cause must be just,
since even women fight for it. The principles of the ideology are
also further justified by womens participation. In this way,
women are used symbolically, as an argument to the outside world:
this struggle deserves support; obviously, even women sympathize
with it (Stiehm, 1988). As already mentioned in this chapter, Clapham
argues that ideological support from the outside has been important
for the survival of many liberation armies.
The message of the unity of the group is conveyed both to the enemy
as a deterrent and to the outside world in
order to gather sympathy and support. The female fighter as a symbol
has been very important both in Eritrea and in several other guerrilla
wars. In former Yugoslavia, which was one of the most important
models for the EPLF, the woman fighter came to stand as a symbol
of socialist Yugoslavia. As one historian puts it: Indeed,
so noteworthy was womens courage ... that women Partisans
performed more bravely than men (Jancar, 1980: 14).
Stefanie Krug, a German anthropologist, has done fieldwork among
long-term women fighters in Tigray, Ethiopia (Krug, 1999). She describes
how women there were used as a symbol to strengthen the guerrillas.
Female fighters were turned into a shining example for the liberation
of the people from feudal structures and oppression. These women
fighters were also highlighted because they justified the struggle
as representatives of the most downtrodden. In Marxist guerrilla
movements, both men and women have been regarded as oppressed by
a dominant or feudal regime, and the emphasis has been on unity
through class struggle. Still, Stiehm points to what she believes
is the most important reason why pictures of armed women frequently
appear in revolutionary guerrilla movements:
Their purpose is to demonstrate unified commitment. It is to tell
an enemy that it will have to occupy the country and pacify every
citizen before it can claim victory. But, perhaps most importantly,
it is a way of mobilizing young men.... Few men are able to resist
the call to service when women are [already] serving. (Stiehm, 1988:
123)
Even if there is great sympathy towards a guerrilla movement within
a certain population group, many men who are expected to take part
in the war may not be willing to do so. Even though the political
discourse presents the will of the people to go to war as enormously
high, this is not always the whole truth. Different, often contradictory,
views are often also present.
There appears to be a contradiction between the idea of using women
as symbols and making them invisible. While it is correct that womens
participation in a war is often invisible, it is also true that
pictures of female combatants are important elements in a guerrilla
war. What can be presumed is that the importance of the struggle,
the very goal of the war, justifies using whatever means that are
assumed to be efficient in reaching this goal.
In Tigray, we hear that even though female fighters were important
in the strategy of the TPLF, they were prohibited from serving within
sight of their own villages. To fight for the freedom of their country,
just as their male comrades did, was possible for women only within
a context that kept them apart from their traditional society: The
local militia was recruited among men since the continuous presence
of these women with their male appearance would have caused unrest
(Krug, 1999: 9). It appears that accepting female soldiers was not
unproblematic for peasant societies in Tigray, especially when they
were known in the neighborhood. The conclusion may be that female
soldiers were accepted, as long as they were kept out of sight,
because the struggle demanded it. A concrete participation by real
women was more difficult to accept.
Socialization
Womens involvement as combatants in revolutionary movements
represents a break with their earlier socialization represented
by the values and way of life that their family has taught them.
This can be contrasted with the role of males, which continue along
the same lines as before. Mens gender roles are reinforced
by activities associated with being soldiers. Revolutionary groups
offer a different and often an opposite perspective on the world
from that of growing up in a family. The perspective of the revolution
is that women ought to live and act similarly to men. In contrast
to civil society, sameness instead of difference between men and
women is encouraged. When young soldiers learn and live with the
values of the revolution, their primary socialization will be counteracted.
The gender socialization of children in Africa, naturally, contains
a great deal of variation. However, all young people who join a
guerrilla are faced with a new perspective on important matters
such as their own role in society and gender roles. Inside the movement,
they meet a military structure, as well as an ideology, whose whole
purpose is to achieve a goal. In order to achieve this, the movement
has to be well coordinated, and all members have to obey and work
together towards this overall goal.
Socialization into the army
Joining a revolutionary movement implies for young people the loss
of a normal socialization process as they leave their homes and
their earlier lives behind. In Eritrea, many of the fighters were
very young, and their primary socialization was thus interrupted.
Eva Beth Egensteiner, in her thesis about female fighters in Eritrea,
reports that:
Many female children joined quite young, at 8 or 12 years old, for
example. Although they were well aware of the expected behavior
and positions of women in civilian life, and had experienced this
to some degree as girls, they left too early to be completely socialized
into these roles. (Egensteiner, 1995: 28)
Socialization into the EPLF implied the loss of significant others
as reality-confirmators. The fighters were especially
susceptible to a resocialization due to their own vulnerability.
In the EPLF, they met other fighters in the same situation as themselves.
Many of them had left their homes during the night to escape their
parents. In several cases, they were not allowed to see their family
again for years. They were not allowed to identify themselves to
fellow soldiers and thus had to give up their names (interview with
Amanuel, ex-fighter, Asmara, Eritrea). This served two functions:
creating anonymity in terms of Derg intelligence and eroding individual
identity. Personal possessions were not accepted in the liberation
army, and gifts were shared collectively or given to superiors.
Any material identification with civil society was taken away from
the fighters (Young, 1997; Tronvoll, 1998).
There is a special kind of socialization that takes place in a situation
like this, when members total dedication to a system is required
in parallel with a rejection of earlier life. The socialization
into the EPLFs liberation army resembles socialization into
other armies, but the dedication demanded and the break with earlier
life were taken to an extreme degree. Such a process is not gradual,
keeping important elements from earlier life, but involves an abrupt
breaking of family ties and the embrace of a new, all-encompassing
system. This, naturally, is important to remember when the former
soldier is to be reintegrated into society.
Total institutions
Ervin Goffman in his book Asylums (1961) touches upon this situation.
In this work, he defines what characterizes so-called total institutions.
Much of what Goffman claims is typical for such institutions applies
to the fighters in the EPLF, as well as to similar revolutionary
groups. Goffman mentions, inter alia, relief from social and economic
responsibilities as one important characteristic of a total institution.
The ex-fighters in Eritrea frequently mentioned during interviews
that as fighters they did not have to worry about money: everything
they needed was provided for. They did not worry about the economic
situation of a future spouse, or whether such a potential spouse
was affluent enough or too affluent to match themselves. For this
reason, they were able to choose a spouse freely and independently.
There is thus an obvious contrast with civil society, where a future
spouse is thoroughly measured in terms of, among other factors,
the wealth of his or her family.
Another characteristic is the fraternalization process, through
which socially distant persons find themselves developing mutual
support and forced intimacy. This is also illustrative of the existence
of guerrilla fighters. The fighters reported feelings towards fellow
soldiers that resemble those normally reserved for close family
members. Often deep friendships develop across common lines among
persons distant to each other in social terms. An Eritrean female
ex-fighter I interviewed went as far as marrying her cousin while
they were fighters. She claimed that they were both unaware that
they were cousins. While marriage between cousins is common for
some, others with a Christian background, such as this woman, could
not stay in such a marriage, and the marriage was annulled after
the war. This case may not be an example of the forced intimacy
that Goffman discusses; however, on the other hand, it was a result
of living outside ones society and not knowing into which
categories to fit oneself and others. This particular woman seemed
today not to question that a divorce was necessary in such a situation.
Goffman argues that, among inmates in various total institutions,
there is a strong feeling that time spent in the establishment is
time wasted, destroyed, or taken from ones life. The ex-fighters
in Eritrea express great pride in the fact that the country was
freed because of them. They are also proud of being different from
civilians and proud of their knowledge compared to that of civilians.
However, many ex-fighters claim that they have a sense of lost time.
This is a main explanation for why husbands who have been fighters
leave their wives: they say that they have lost so much time during
the war as fighters now they want to reclaim this time. The
female ex-fighters, however, have less authority to do anything
about their own lost time.
In total institutions, harshness alone cannot account for this sense
of life wasted. One must also remember the social disconnection
caused by entering into a totally new existence. This is characteristic
of the situation of the ex-fighters in Eritrea. They describe experiencing
meaning and feeling that their effort was necessary: what they did
was worthwhile, in spite of the extreme hardship. Still, they often
mention their lost time. This leads to bitterness when expectations
about the time of post-liberation fail to materialize.
A final point to which I will direct attention is what Goffman calls
punishment and privileges. Outside total institutions, failure to
maintain required standards typically leads to indirect advantages
and not to specific immediate punishment. However, Goffman compares
what happens inside total institutions to how children and animals
are treated and punished outside such institutions. The correspondence
to experiences while a fighter is again relevant. Guerrilla armies
are based on unquestioned obedience by the members.
Goffmans characterization of total institutions is useful
when trying to understand the socialization of fighters into guerrilla
movements. Goffmans analysis points out how soldiers are influenced
because of the total institutional characteristics. In particular,
the freedom they experience through relief from economic and social
responsibility, and hence the lack of regulations in relation to
marriage, is very important.
Gender equality?
All guerrilla soldiers experience being inside what Goffman calls
a total institution. However, only the female fighters experienced
putting on a new gender role. Rather than describing women as acting
out a new gender role, female fighters in Eritrea say that they
were acting as men. They found it necessary to prove that they were
equal to men. This is constantly brought up, both by the female
fighters themselves and by others. Even today, the Eritrea Profile[3]
points out that everyone should remember that the female fighters
proved that they were equal to men by the way they fought in the
liberation war:
Eritrean women have proved that they are not inferior to men.
They have participated in difficult battles, ran alongside their
brothers and helped dig trenches. (The Eritrean Profile, 7 March
1998)
And:
People, who have not seen it with their own eyes, are not
willing to believe that women are not inferior to men. Such people
are unable to accept the fact that the real worth of the woman had
been proved once and for all in the hills and valleys of Eritrea
during the long war of liberation. (The Eritrean Profile, 14 March
1998)
Within the EPLF, apparently, the idea of equality between men and
women contains the idea that women have to resemble men in order
to gain respect. The two previous examples can be supplemented with
numerous others. If socialization into a fighter existence means
taking on the characteristics of men, this has implications for
how a womans understanding of herself must be affected. All
rules for what a proper girl must be and do have to be unlearned.
The aim becomes to behave in a masculine way.
Sara, an Eritrean ex-fighter of about fifty, explained to me that,
as fighters, both men and women had the same tasks. They also proved
to be equal when needed in combat: The women were just as
aggressive as the men; in fact, the female fighters were more aggressive
than the men were. Sara obviously enjoyed stating this as
a fact: she smiled broadly when saying it. She and her ex-fighter
husband, who was also present, both agreed upon this. I gathered
from the way she presented it that this was contrary to what was
expected of women. Do women really react more violently than men
given the right situation? And if so, why?
Empirical evidence suggests that women are not necessarily less
warlike than men. Still womens attitudes towards force may
differ from mens attitudes because of their subordinate, less-powerful
position in society (Howes & Stevenson, 1993). This structural
approach implies that a difference in behavior can be expected.
When we analyze Saras observations, it seems likely that evidence
of women acting more aggressively than men comes as a surprise to
her and to others in Eritrea. When such behavior occurs, it will
stand out as contrary to traditional gender roles. Thus, women acting
aggressively are more visible, because unusual behavior is more
noticeable than expected behavior. Saras content expression
may indicate that, in her opinion, women proved in this way that
they are equal to men.
Female fighters have traditionally been afraid of not living up
to the standards of men. Often, female fighters mention that they
have to prove themselves (Hammond & Druce, 1990; Bennett, 1995;
Turner, 1998). Demonstrating the capability to be aggressive
enough may be vital in achieving a good reputation as soldiers.
Birgit Brock-Utne claims in her book Educating for Peace (1987)
that womens values are influenced by the systems they relate
to or operate in. If that system reflects male values, the women
will be inclined to take on male values. They will thus resemble
men in their thinking and in their action.
Creating a revolutionary group
A united group of soldiers is of paramount importance for any revolutionary
group. A distinct we-group, a cohesive group with a
common identity, must be created. Equality must be emphasized at
the expense of individuality. It is not important whether one is
a woman or a man, whether one belongs to this or that ethnic or
religious group. What is vital is ones cooperation and ones
loyalty. Each individual must be made into a useful member of the
group. As a step in this direction, uniform dress and appearance
is encouraged and group achievement is rewarded. The dependency
of the members on each other as a soldier, one knows that
ones own life can depend on the others nurtures a collective
identity.
This dependency on other members is a crucial factor for all military
groups and guerrillas. In Stolen Valor: How the Vietnam Generation
Was Robbed of its Heroes and its History (1998), military researchers
B. G. Burkett and Glenna Whitley describe how American soldiers
from the Vietnam War were judged by criteria different from those
by which people in civil society are judged. The sports hero who
is more concerned with his own large ego than the safety of his
fellow soldiers can be a catastrophe for the group. The soldier
who does not put other peoples life at risk, who is loyal,
and who can be trusted one hundred percent is very valuable. Group
solidarity and loyalty are of crucial importance.
Also from the Vietnam War, but from the other side, a Vietnamese
male veteran leader has commented on the collective spirit of women
and consequently their valuable contribution to the military. He
argues that, in Vietnam, women soldiers were very useful to the
military groups because of their willingness to give to the common
good. He further states that women know how to sacrifice and to
endure, and that they are more fit for army discipline than men
because war needs not blazing heroes, but sacrifice, fortitude,
mute and enduring (Turner, 1998: 130).
When a person first joins a guerrilla movement, the affective side
the break of natural ties to parents and others opens
up for new emotional attachments within the soldier group. Also,
because of young age, a natural inclination to bond with other soldiers
appears. Sociology professor Ivar Frønes (1995: 43) explains
in his book Among Peers that, during a formative and developmental
period, the search for models is natural. Thus, the age of guerrilla
fighters is an important factor for their socialization into the
guerrilla forces. In Eritrea, several fighters later in life describe
fellow-fighters as their family: The comrades are like my
family, even today (interview with female ex-fighter, Asmara,
Eritrea).
In order to serve the guerrilla movement and to achieve everyones
common goal, the individual has to commit him- or herself in a comprehensive
way. When a fighter gives him- or herself to the revolution, the
final consequence is that the individual becomes ready to sacrifice
him- or herself. In her thesis on Eritrea, Egensteiner describes
the strength of the female fighters dedication to the cause
and how they labored to be equal to men:
Women really showed that they were equal. They really pushed themselves.
They used to tell me that when somebody was martyred [died], a woman,
it was the happiest day for the women who were there. Because now
they had reached the stage to say that we can even die for the country....
That was very nice. When somebody died, when a woman died, we were
really very happy for them for serving their hearts. As women started
to get martyred, started dying, it became normal. So we believed
that we fought for our equality. It wasnt handed to us. (female
ex-fighter cited in Egensteiner, 1995: 26)
Some people would analyze the gender equality that this women describes
not as an example of equality but as an example of being brainwashed
by nationalistic discourse.
Womens dedication to a cause, and their wish to prove that
they are as beneficial to the guerrillas as men, led in general
to female soldiers working very hard (see, for example, Turner,
1998). In Eritrea, womens efforts are recognized. Today, all
the men and women gathered around the EPLF agree that the presence
of women in the Eritrean struggle was known to inspire men to give
their best: It is embarrassing for a man if a woman sees that
he is a coward. When there are both male and female fighters, the
men do what they can to look strong and brave (interview with
Abeba, ex-fighter). Another woman who had also been a fighter said:
In general, women are more dedicated and more responsible than men,
thats why they were very useful in the struggle. In the field
they were not afraid. Its good for morale to fight with a
woman by your side. A man had to be brave when she was. (interview
with Sara, ex-fighter)
It appears that the presence of female fighters strengthened the
struggle of the EPLF. The all-important goal of the leaders of the
liberation army was to create a united group of soldiers. The great
aim a liberated Eritrea demanded the very best of
all of the fighters.
Joining a revolutionary movement means joining a society that creates
its own rules independently of the demands of civil society. All
the members must have the same, all-important goal as their guiding
star. This is a society separate and distinct from civil society.
The leaders are able to make decisions without having to negotiate
with people expressing opposing views. There may be opposition,
but the leaders are expected to exercise power and lead the group
or the people in the direction of the common goal.
The socialization into a liberation army contains characteristics
similar to a primary socialization: it is far from pure cognitive
learning, and the fighters do not have any significant others close
by to relate to; as a result, they seek new ones. Like primary socialization,
the setting is emotionally charged. Socialization into a closed
revolutionary system represents a break with ones earlier
identity. As mentioned earlier, in Eritrea the fighters were not
allowed to reveal their names to their fellow comrades. Their earlier
identity was thus not confirmed in these new circumstances. Some
had joined together with a friend or relative; it was easier for
these to keep their old identity. For others, the socialization
into the armed struggle must have represented the most fundamental
break with their earlier reality.
Enforcement
How do new fighters in revolutionary movements learn the ideology
they are supposed to fight for? One method that has been frequently
used by revolutionary groups is criticism and self-criticism
sessions. This way of learning is an efficient way of teaching young
soldiers ideology, as well as skills and values central to the movement.
According to Worku Zerai (1994: 22), criticism and self-criticism
were the most important instruments used by the EPLF in Eritrea
to make its policy effective. Every unit in the guerrilla had a
criticism and self-criticism session once a week. Some female fighters
have mentioned to me that this practice was very good for women:
it made their life easier. A man could be criticized for trying
to underestimate what a woman could do in combat, etc. A woman could
be criticized for going to the kitchen too frequently. And a leader
could be criticized for not treating his male and female soldiers
equally. After combat, anyone could be criticized for cowardice.
Worku Zerai was one of three female fighters who were among the
first to join the EPLF. She writes in her masters thesis that,
to her knowledge, no woman was ever criticized for cowardice,
mismanagement or for not trying to defend herself and fight back
at the same time (1994: 23). One female ex-fighter claimed
to me that in the field, women were not afraid. Issayas [the
president] says: In our struggle I have never heard a woman complain
or run away (interview Sara, ex-fighter).
It is impossible to find out whether any woman actually has been
criticized for these things. We know from similar movements that
women did their very best to be good soldiers. The claim that women
were not afraid, however, is not interesting as such (of course
they were afraid), but it is interesting as part of an accepted
discourse about womens role in revolutionary movements. That
women are brave and important as fighters is part of this discourse.
Self-criticism and criticism were something that the fighters in
the EPLF dreaded. If an issue was important to the leaders, the
offender would be isolated and ostracized. To escape being criticized,
the fighters preferred to conform, even if they did not agree. Because
of this way of sanctioning unwanted behavior, the ideology of the
EPLF had absolute respect (Zerai, 1994: 23).
As mentioned earlier, because the goal of equality is crucial
for the unity of a revolutionary movement, women are able to appeal
to higher levels of authority if their rights are violated. In Eritrea,
many women reported during interviews that their lives as soldiers
were made easier thanks to the criticism sessions. Whenever men
tried to oppress them because of their sex, the women could complain
to the leaders and the men were later criticized in these sessions:
women gained rights through this system that they have not had later.
Today, they complain that no one is concerned about their rights.
The ex-fighter women I interviewed in Asmara have little or no education
and come from the poorer segments of society. Their connection with
the earlier liberation movement, now governing the country, has
been broken, and the women no longer have a position within that
movement.
Profile of Combatants
Women and girls who join guerrilla groups are socialized away from
their home community to varying degrees, depending on, among other
factors, the length of their stay, their age, and the degree of
seclusion maintained by the guerrillas. In addition, the ethnic
group the soldiers belong to and the living conditions and class
of their families influence the overall situation.
Peasants
Guerrilla wars have to a large extent been based on rural support:
Most anti-colonial and anti-imperial wars and national development
in the 20th century have involved rural-based guerrilla armies
(Kriger, 1992: 1). Revolutionary organizations seek popular peasant
support as a prerequisite for success. They often do this by manipulating
peasant grievances. Kriger writes about the Zimbabwean war of liberation
and points to structures that explain why peasants in general are
willing to join in revolutions:
Peasants responses suggest that gender, generational, and
other structural inequities within villages may be more powerful
motivating factors than peasant grievances arising from their externally
oriented relationships. (1992: 20)
The majority of the fighters in the TPLF in Ethiopia were recruited
from the peasantry (Krug, 1999). In Eritrea also, the fighters in
the EPLF liberation army were also mainly recruited from rural areas.
Teclemichael (1999) claims that as many as 8085% of the fighters
had a peasant background.
An ideology of equality appeals to young people and offers them
access to a different status. Pressure on land leads to a situation
in which young people in particular seek alternatives to farming
when no other income-generating activities exist. Studies of peasant
revolutions show that younger people are easier to mobilize for
a nationalist cause than older people. The younger ones do not have
the same obligations towards dependents or their loyalties to the
village are not as strong. This is partly the explanation for why
a large proportion of recruits to guerrilla movements have been
young girls and boys with few, if any, rights in their peasant societies.
Youngsters thus constitute an important group for recruitment. War
empowers youth as never before and thus challenges the authority
of the older generations (Kriger, 1998; Tronvoll 1998).
Kriger suggests that one reason why guerrillas have been able to
recruit from the peasant population is that oppressed peasants see
the breakdown of law and order during a war as presenting an unprecedented
opportunity to transform oppressive village structures. Peasants
wartime actions have been more influenced by this than by economic
structures and political conflict at the national level. Kriger
further argues that the hierarchical nature of peasant structures
produces oppressed groups within the peasant population, which are
easy to recruit for revolutionary purposes. It is interesting that
peasants widely held to be conservative have been prominent in several
revolutionary guerrilla movements.
Great numbers of peasants participate in revolutions for various
reasons, but many of these are rooted in the particular situation
of the peasant population. The reintegration of combatants coming
from the peasant population has its own characteristics and problems.
Women, even more than men, often reject returning to a rural community
(see next chapter).
Womens special reasons for joining
In addition to the reasons men have for joining guerilla movements,
women also have specific reasons of their own. In Sweeter than Honey
(Hammond & Druce, 1990), several women discuss their reasons
for leaving their homes and joining up as soldiers in the Ethiopian
province of Tigray. Hammond explains how peasant women in Tigray
saw men cook for women in the revolutionary army. They saw men and
women do the same tasks, something they had never seen before. This
fascinated them and made them curious. These girls and women from
Tigray, coming from rural areas, had even less education than their
male fellow fighters. Several young women joined the TPLF without
the permission of their fathers or husbands.
In Eritrea, the increased need for recruits meant that women did
not join in numbers that were too great for the EPLF to absorb,
and women were not kept out, as in Tigray. On the contrary, women
were first allowed to join in 1973, and were encouraged to do so
from that time onwards and throughout the war.
One specific reason for joining up as a fighter was escaping an
arranged marriage (Silkin, 1989; Zerai, 1994; Legesse, 1994). Asmarom
Legesse, an Eritrean anthropologist, documents in the Zula Plain
(southeast Eritrea) Baseline Study how many women who had difficulties
getting out of bad marriages chose to join the revolution. The fact
that rejected husbands could use force to keep their wives in check
led to an intolerable situation for some wives. Legesse says that
a few uneducated men would go as far as to write a nashuda against
the wife. This meant that she could never marry again; that she,
in fact, was tied to the man for life. An ex-wife in this position
was not allowed ever to have her own house. Facing such a situation,
the only way to become free was through joining the revolution.
Some very young girls left their homes and joined as fighters out
of fear for what their wedding night would bring. They had heard
terrible stories of what they had in store. For this reason, several
young girls, only 1014 years old, ran away from their homes
and signed up as volunteers (Zerai, 1994). Zerai mentions that the
majority of peasant girls marry before they are fifteen years old;
many girls are infibulated,[4] and the wedding night can be a traumatic
experience for them.
Wanting to fight for the liberation of ones country is a respectable
choice. It is important to be aware that war poses a way out both
for suppressed groups of people and for individuals. Often, there
is more than one reason for joining. Private and personal motives
may be more concealed than official ones. The women I have interviewed
have clearly been proud to say that they joined for nationalistic
reasons. The politically correct answer to a question of why someone
chose to join as fighter is that they did it to free their country.
Many women have joined liberation movements in order to try to improve
conditions for their families. Often, the bulk of soldiers come
from poor sections of society. This is an argument for why so many
poor women have joined as soldiers: they try to build a future for
themselves and their children; they respond to a call to build a
better society and give themselves to this common cause (Ibanez,
2001: 118; Bennett, 1995).
From South Africa, we hear that women have joined as soldiers in
the hope that conditions for their families may improve: Im
a guerrilla and Im a mother. Some people have accused me of
being an unnatural mother but I did it for her [her daughter]....
Im very pleased my children will not turn to me and ask: Why
did you do nothing? (Cock, 1992). The woman expressing this
view was called the knitting needles guerrilla because
in her effort to look as ordinary as possible she carried a handbag
from which a pair of knitting needles protruded. She was interviewed
after serving an eight-year sentence because of her underground
operations as a cadre in the formerly illegal African National Congress
(ANC).
Age
Some women who have joined guerrilla movements have been extremely
young when they left their homes and families. Some we would call
children. Our criteria for when adulthood arrives are not necessarily
universal. Still, many girls (and boys) must have the emotional
needs of children. The loss of family ties and normal civilian life
greatly interrupts their socialization.
Few reliable statistics exist on this matter. There is a tendency
to conceal the age of young combatants in guerrilla groups, as the
international community criticizes the use of child soldiers. Often,
children wanting to be recruited will lie about their age in order
to get admitted. Lack of soldiers, and the need for more, can influence
the age of recruits.
Among peasant populations, girls traditionally marry and have children
at a very young age. Girls without children can more easily leave
their home. As a result, peasant fighters, to a larger extent than
students, are young, and are consequently more easily influenced
and thoroughly socialized out of their home settings.
Marie Jose Arthur has conducted research on women in Mozambiques
armed national liberation struggle. Here, the preferred age of the
girl recruits was between 10 and 15 years old. Men were recruited
from older people, as you can see for yourself today from the ex-combatants.
The men are always older than the women ex-combatants (Arthur,
1998: 70, 71). These girls did not at that time have any family
responsibilities and could more easily adapt. They would also
be more receptive to army discipline and new values
(ibid.). Birgit Brock-Utne (1987: 48) claims that girls and women
are considered more obedient and easier to train than men. Menkhaus
(1999), a researcher on child soldiers, explains how very young
soldiers are easier to mold than older ones: they do not question
what they are told to do to the same degree as older soldiers.
Chapter Summary
* A guerrilla struggle usually requires combatants to live in harsh
conditions, with little back-up in terms of food or military and
medical supplies, as opposed to a state military, which has access
to the states economic resources to pay and support its soldiers.
* Demanding conditions and an often marginalized existence have
an effect upon the guerrilla fighters; suspicion and fear of infiltration
influence their psyches.
* Many soldiers are socialized into the guerrillas in a way that
makes their return to civil society difficult.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] The struggle is the expression for the war of independence
in Eritrea, and the term is commonly used to refer to wars of liberation.
[2] This is different from a state military providing jobs for men.
When there is competition for getting accepted into the movement,
women often fail to qualify as soldiers. A surplus of men frequently
prevents women from competing for fighter positions.
[3] An Eritrean newspaper, owned by the government and published
in English.
[4] The most radical kind of female circumcision.
Chapter 4 : FACTORS THAT
INFLUENCE THE REINTEGRATION PROCESS OF FEMALE SOLDIERS
Introduction
The history of many revolutionary struggles suggests a widespread
regression after the war when it comes to womens political
representation. Why is it so difficult for women to translate their
activism in wars and nationalist struggles into citizenship rights
and effective participation after the fighting is over? This raises
a number of questions, including the startling possibility that
armies may be more friendly to women than civilian regimes themselves
are (Pettman, 1996: 137). The participation of female soldiers during
a conflict and their participation in the public arena afterwards
do not necessarily have any connection. Even where large numbers
of women have been carrying arms in revolutionary movements, peace
seems to put enormous pressure on those women to return home,
and to give up both jobs and political representation in favor of
men.
In a war-torn society, opportunities are limited (See, for example,
Colletta et al., 1996). The ex-combatants expectations with
regard to peace are often very high. During a war, these expectations
of a future society are the motivation that keeps the soldiers going.
Immediately after the war, optimism and happiness prevails, but
gradually pessimism and disillusionment take over.
This chapter aims to analyze the situation and the reintegration
of the female ex-fighters from their own perspective, as well as
from the perspective of society.
Socialized out of Society
Ex-combatants who have spent years in the military do not come out
of such a situation unchanged. War offers the soldiers experiences
unlike those of civilian life and provides the most intense and
brutal of human experiences (Funck, 1999). For me, it has been striking
to interview ex-fighter women in Eritrea and hear them express the
view that the years of war were preferable to the time that came
afterwards. Uneducated women and women from minority groups in particular
react in this way. In spite of losses and hardship, they long back
to the time when they were fighters in the Eritrean Peoples
Liberation Army, the EPLF.
This is difficult to understand. Knowing how terrible the war was,
how is it possible to miss it? The answer is not clear, but somehow
the difficult existence of being a female ex-fighter in a war-torn
country is even worse. These women have been socialized out of civil
society. Most have spent many years as fighters. Living as fighters
for years in a closed system like the EPLF did not provide the female
fighters with adequate tools to cope with the demands of everyday
life in a civil society. They have not learned how to cope with
basic problems of being civilian women. The knowledge they now need,
such as how to function as a mother and wife and as an ex-fighter
in a civil society, was not taught to them during the war. When
they look to their mothers, they do not find women combining two
different roles as they have to. In short, role models do not exist:
During the struggle, the fighters did not learn how to function
as a family. The ones married did not live together as man and wife
during the struggle. Many have not learned how to deal with money.
During the struggle they were provided for. All their needs were
met. They did not need to plan for the next day, how to make ends
meet, how to feed yourself and your family, how to stretch little
money (interview with representative from the National Union
of Eritrean Women [NUEW]).
In spite of the fact that many fighters received an education within
the army, the knowledge of former soldiers is apparently not valued
highly in civil society. Many women have learned various skills
apart from those of actually shooting and fighting. In Eritrea,
the female fighters were involved in the following activities: public
administration, industry, transportation, health, construction,
teaching, electronics, and communications at the frontline. These
qualifications remained uncertified due to the egalitarian principles
fostering cohesiveness in the army: Everybody shared the conditions
of war and work and rank (Tewolde, 1998: 22). Afterwards,
the qualifications of ex-fighters who do not have an education outside
of the army have not been accepted by civil society because they
cannot be formally confirmed. Skills acquired during the war, even
if very useful in peacetime, are not recognized. This is rather
striking. Some people are very upset because the increased competition
in a postwar society leads to many mechanisms of exclusion. One
example is that of a resourceful Eritrean ex-fighter man who was
turned down again and again trying to help a very clever ex-fighter
woman who had no papers. No one holding a formal position was willing
to support her, even though she clearly was a very skilful woman.
In addition, even though an ex-fighter helped this woman, the ex-fighters
themselves, both men and women, in many cases hold back other ex-fighters
when they find themselves competing for scarce resources.
Being away from your home for several years naturally has consequences.
Even civil society changed during the fighters absence. When
the ex-fighters in Eritrea started living together again with people
from civil society, they did not understand each other. When they
received demobilization money, some did not invest it wisely. The
demobilization money for long-term fighters was 10,000 Birr (about
10,000 Norwegian kroner, or slightly more than US $1,200). The intention
of the government was that this money should help the ex-fighters
to become established in civil society. However, many became vulnerable
to different kinds of exploitation and manipulation. Some were pressured
by members of their family to spend money in ways not necessarily
profitable to themselves. Others were deceived by men. For some,
this large amount of money simply gave them additional problems:
Some women become involved in relationships that do not make
sense, young men approaching them because of their demobilization
money (Sorensen, 1996: 23).
In Mozambique, several negative effects were traced to the soldiers
receiving demobilizing money. Many spent all their money on beer.
Still, this situation was contrasted with men going to work in the
mines in South Africa and coming back laden with gifts for the household.
The demobilized soldiers deserved a lump sum of money as compensation
this was the general consensus (Maslen, 1997).
There is often a clash between how ex-fighters look at various issues
and how civil society, which has gone through other changes, sees
the same issues. When an ex-fighter woman returns to her family,
she meets the traditions she grew up with. Eritrean Meriem reports:
When I returned, my mother, she would say to me: Dear daughter,
take some oil in your hair. How could I resist her? Meriem
wanted to change her life. She wanted to keep the hairstyle of the
struggle: female fighters wore their hair short and did not oil
it. This hairstyle became a symbol of a woman liberated from traditional
customs. Meriem wanted her life as a fighter to have an impact,
and she did not want everything to be as it had been previously
when she had been a civilian. Even for her, who had an education,
unlike most of the female fighters, it was difficult to keep acting
according to the new ideas that she felt she had acquired. She explains
how society forced the fighters back into traditional positions
and how their points of view were rejected:
The girls who had been fighters suffered very much after the war.
The boys had experienced much of the same, and they respected each
other. But when they came home, the boys wanted back what they had
lost. At first, they did not want to admit it, but after a short
while, they preferred girls who had not been fighters. Im
sorry to say, this tendency is international. Men like to be in
charge. After the war, the fighters (male) had a very high status.
The last thing the men wanted was a demanding wife. In their homes,
their parents told them that they must find a kind and suitable
wife, a wife to fit in with the rest of their family. They were
pressured to live according to traditional society, even though
they should have known better. It is very sad. (interview with ex-fighter
woman living in Norway, November 1999)
When they return to civil society, the female ex-fighters of Eritrea
experience a conflict between themselves and others. They often
feel that they know more than civilians: The ex-fighters feel
advanced. They think they have knowledge that other people dont.
This statement is regularly heard in Eritrea, articulated both by
ex-fighters and civilians. The statement can be analyzed both from
the ex-fighters perspective and from that of others. From
the perspective of the ex-fighters themselves, their fighter identity
gives them a cause to feel superior to civilians. They feel they
know much more than them. Their self-perception and sense of identity
is tied to their fighter status.
From the perspective of civil society, the attitude of the ex-fighters,
that of feeling superior to others, is not conducive to integration.
The fighters have all been away from their homes for quite some
time, most of them for many years. Their families have had to get
along without them. Initially, when they returned, the families
were very proud of their daughters or sisters. This was the case
in Eritrea because almost the whole population voted for independence
and most people supported the liberation movement. Gradually, however,
the difficult postwar times and the ex-fighters attitude of
being advanced, which may be interpreted as arrogance, becomes difficult
for civilians to accept.
The ex-fighters sense of being fundamentally different from
civilians is expressed in numerous ways. Elin Sparre Pedersen (1999:
91) tells in her thesis about a visit to a restaurant in Asmara,
Eritrea, sitting together with a woman ex-fighter, a friend of hers.
The child at the table next to them stares at Pedersen (a white
woman) and starts crying. The woman the author is with declares
that children of non-fighters do not behave like the children of
fighters. Their children are more sophisticated. They know more
and are more intelligent because they have intelligent parents.
She adds that a couple sitting close by are fighters. She says she
can tell from their language: they speak perfect Tigrinya, like
all fighters. She explains that the background to this is that the
fighters learned grammar in the field and spoke Tigrinya, whereas
the civilian population had to speak Amhara (the Ethiopian language)
in public. Now, the result is that non-fighters speakTigrinya (their
mother tongue) like small children. Because of this, it is easy
to discern between fighters and others, she says. The woman is obviously
very proud of her own identity as an ex-fighter.
This, I think, is a good example of how the ex-fighters call attention
to the question of the superiority of ex-fighters in relation to
civilians. Is it probable that civilians speak Tigrinya like children?
Even if the language was suppressed and little formal tutoring took
place, the Tigrinya of civilians in Eritrea probably did not regress
to that of children. The Tigrinya of the fighters was shaped by
extraordinary circumstances: the war itself and the isolation of
the fighters (i.e. the total institution effect discussed earlier)
were determining factors, shaping a distinct fighter language. Socialization
means to become a member of an intersubjective world that shares
a common linguistic structure. Socialization then implies acquiring
linguistic competence in order to share a common culture (Høgmo,
1992: 25,26). These aspects, to a larger degree than grammar lectures,
influenced the language spoken by fighters.
The story above is an example of how someone, through selective
perception, defines a situation. It is also an example of the stereotyped
characterization of fighters versus civilians. The ex-fighters contrast
themselves with non-fighters. They find endless differences between
themselves and others. Their identity is based as much on what and
who they are not, as on what they are: Identity is not just
what I have become, it is also what I want to be and what I do not
want to be (Frønes, 1995: 63). This, Frønes
argues, is a crucial aspect of the formation of a subculture and
the creation of an identity in a subcultural context.
The most terrible and most rewarding time in my life
The sentence above is characteristic of how many ex-fighters in
Eritrea describe their time as fighters. The tendency for the female
ex-fighters to look radiant when talking about the war of independence,
and then look very sad when talking about the present, is so striking
that it must be analyzed. To have lost what one has gained
and tasted. That is the worst. This statement comes from an
ex-fighter woman and describes how she feels about her time as a
fighter. It expresses what many ex-fighter women are trying to communicate.
It is a very powerful statement and seems to sum up their experiences.
What exactly is it that they have lost? While they were fighters,
they say that they felt respected and equal with men. Many say that
they experienced empowerment. They describe what happened afterwards
as losing something that they had gained in the struggle. What they
believed was empowerment was not recognized by civil society.
The women felt themselves to be stronger than they were prior to
becoming fighters. It seems that facing extreme situations and being
active in a war greatly influenced the psyche of many fighters.
Balancing on the edge of life, the great hardship, the loss of fellow
fighters, all of these factors had a major impact. For many, the
experiences strengthened them. For others, the numerous battles
of many years shaped a fighter identity better equipped for war
than for peace.
The comment about losing something one has gained illustrates this
well. What they have tasted can be analyzed as a temporary feeling
of empowerment. They describe their time as fighters as being among
equals and of belonging to a community. Their contribution mattered.
Being in the field it was as if we all came from the
same womb (interview with Lemlem, female ex-fighter, Eritrea,
1998).
It is well known that demobilized fighters represent a factor of
instability in postwar societies (Doornbos, 1999). One of the reasons
for this is that demobilized combatants often lose the power gained
during the struggle. Wars irony is that, besides being the
most brutal of experiences, it also provides the most intense human
experiences in a positive sense. It allows the individual to increase
his or her social status: honor and heroism, comradeship, and feelings
of community are some examples of the attractions of fighting (Funck,
1999). This is especially true for underprivileged groups and individuals.
Roughly speaking, the very young, and many women and marginalized
minorities fall into this category.
Ex-fighter Nighistys face is radiant when she talks of her
wartime experiences. When she starts telling me about the struggle,
her whole body changes. She signals with facial expressions and
body posture how meaningful this time in her life has been. When
I ask what she misses, she says: I miss meaning and purpose.
Even though it was difficult, we all felt that the struggle was
important and necessary. Now this is lacking.
Several ex-fighters emphasize how much the struggle meant to them
on a deeper level. They explain about the self-confidence they gained.
When they talk about the liberation war, their expression changes.
They tell their stories with lots of intensity. This has been rather
remarkable to notice. In spite of terrible experiences, they have
experienced wars irony paralyzing fear along with friendships
and a sense of solidarity across all the usual borders (Bethke Elshtain,
1995). This is what stays with them, the feeling of solidarity and
meaning and of themselves being equal to men.
An Eritrean woman living in Norway who was a fighter at an early
stage in the war describes the importance of music for the liberation
army in Eritrea. Through music, the Eritreans were mobilized to
the liberation army:
At all events, we would use our own songs. For instance, at weddings,
when the food was prepared, the women would sing. Often they hinted
at the liberation of Eritrea. Everybody longed for the day when
they should be able to make their own decisions in a free country.
In the songs they express their longing. Eritreans were not free
to say what they were thinking. They had to hide their opinions,
and in their songs they made up stories that were not for everyone
to understand (interview with female ex-fighter, Norway, November
1999).
This woman describes very well the unity felt during the war and
its absence afterwards. She explains that even civilians felt this
unity, and they also had expectations about a future when their
voices would be heard. This unity has been especially important
for the fighters and is repeatedly mentioned as something they miss
in peacetime. The same woman continues:
A couple of years ago, I was back in Eritrea to attend my cousins
wedding. It was so boring! We danced, but nothing was the same as
before. I missed all the songs that I remembered from before liberation.
There were songs now, as well, but they were not important. Earlier
the songs had important messages. I missed the atmosphere, the intensity,
and the longing the songs used to express. Now, the songs didnt
unite us the way they did before. Something important was missing.
Now there was nothing that all of us cared to sing about. The unity
was gone, and I missed it very much. Even though the war was terrible,
we had something meaningful that we lost when liberation came. For
us, living in a foreign country, the changes were more noticeable.
Several ex-fighters have reported feeling during the war that after
this, I can handle everything, and after this, I will
never be afraid again. It is difficult for an outsider to
fully understand how the struggle can be less demanding than the
time after independence for the female ex-fighters. Egensteiner
writes:
The difficulties they [female fighters] may have experienced with
the transition from traditional women to revolutionaries
may have been a great deal easier than the transition women fighters
experienced in their return to civilian life. (Egensteiner, 1995:
28)
Why is it that so many women who have lived through terrible experiences
as fighters say that they miss this period in their life?
We have seen a lot of things, shared hardship and experiences. I
was illiterate, but completed fourth grade. I stayed in the fighting
section, which was the most important. The first year you learn
how to fight. Then there was the theoretical training. In the training
camp we were expected to discuss. It was very good to come into
the armed struggle. Very satisfying, I dont have the words
for it. I know that I can lead my own life, I had that experience.
(interview with Lemlem, female ex-fighter)
This woman is today divorced with two children. She insists that
the most important thing for her is to be able to make her own decisions.
The problem is to go back. I dont want a man or his
family to decide everything for me, she says. The gap between
gender roles in the guerrilla movement and in civil society is very
wide. This is characteristic: while men and women are encouraged
to act out similar roles in the army, the differences between men
and women are encouraged in traditional society.
Civil Society: A Stratified Society
It is important to focus here on how different the post-liberation
period turns out for the various groups of women. A civil society
is not homogenous, but stratified: people are situated differently
within it. The unity of belonging to a military group is gone. What
I want to discuss here is the possibility for maintaining the new
gender roles acquired as fighters. In Eritrea, there is a huge gap
between the female ex-fighters who found a niche within the EPLFs
circles after the liberation war and all the others. The first group
of women is educated; they are in a different position than the
uneducated women. Their socialization into the EPLF has not been
followed by another socialization back into civil society to the
degree that the others had to go through. The EPLF has created a
society of its own. As it is, a foreigner coming to Eritrea usually
meets women belonging to this category of ex-fighters. Often, these
women work or have worked within the NUEW.
John Young (1997), conducting research on peasant revolutions, reflects
on this, trying to interview women in Tigray, Ethiopia. He admits
that a weakness of his study is that he did not succeed in interviewing
women who did not hold an official position. When women without
official positions and men were in the same group, the women would
usually defer to the men. Peasants of neither gender found it strange
that men answered questions that were specifically addressed to
women and related to their problems. This was contrasted sharply
with the case of women holding official positions. These women were
generally assertive and articulate. But Young argues that the more
dynamic women like this were pushed to the fore, the more difficult
it was to understand the conditions and gauge the attitudes of peasant
women.
These findings suggest a great gap today between an ex-fighter women
working in official jobs and other ex-fighter women. This is important
to keep in mind: female ex-fighters are not one group of people,
all having the same problems. Because society at large has not changed
in the direction earlier visualized by the revolutionary leaders,
the female fighters do not generally find that civilians have attitudes
towards gender roles that are similar to those they themselves were
taught as fighters during the war. In general, behavior that can
be perceived as being influenced by modern ways is likely
to be considered negative, a common counteraction in postwar states.
This counteraction leads to a situation where ex-fighter women without
education have to negotiate hard for a position in society.
Thus, the group of women strategically situated in power positions
talks on behalf of the group that is not situated in such a position.
There is a gap, and what Young points out how the more assertive
and articulate a woman in an official position was, the more difficult
it was to grasp the condition of a peasant woman is rather
striking. My own experiences from interviewing women working in
the NUEW, as well as women formerly working there, is that these
women seem distanced from the peasant woman. However, in their own
opinion, they understand the peasant woman very well: all she needs
is to be educated. Women need to be educated more, to become
like us or more like us (Hale, 2000: 22).
What is interesting is that all the more resourceful ex-fighter
women who gave me information claim that the ex-fighters feel
advanced. They do not say thatthey themselves feel advanced.
They say that the other fighters feel advanced. I interpret this
to be correct in the sense that all fighters do feel advanced, but
only some are able to live this out. No one ever claimed to me that
they themselves felt advanced, or thatthey had knowledge that others
did not have. The poor ex-fighters and to a large degree women are
the ones referred to when ex-fighters mention that ex-fighters feel
advanced. In many cases, these are the ones who do not have much
else besides this feeling of being advanced. Ex-fighters who are
well off frequently claim that other fighters think they are advanced,
and say that this is a serious problem for them. These more affluent
fighters suggest that less privileged ex-fighters ought to feel
less advanced. Several representatives in the NUEW explicitly expressed
this. They understand that some ex-fighters feel this
way, but they indicate that civil society does not understand it
at all, and therefore the ex-fighter ought to compromise, which
is something they themselves have not been required to do.
These questions have not been viewed from the perspective of traditional
society. The clash between traditional values and more modern ones
is very deep in many poor countries. In countries where women have
been soldiers in a revolutionary movement, they have been exposed
to new ideas and knowledge that are foreign to traditional society.
When they return, these two perspectives compete.
The resocialization required of a former peasant woman, in order
for her to return to her family, can hardly be compared with that
of the women working within the circles of the EPLF, namely the
group of female ex-fighters the foreign researcher meets. Thus,
a woman working for the NUEW, for instance, like Nebiat wearing
trousers in a rural area where this is unheard of, is able to say,
I can do that; everyone can tell that Im a fighter.
This ex-fighter is a strong successful woman. What she learned during
the struggle is still valuable and respected by others, whereas
a poor peasant woman cannot determine the premises to the same extent.
To survive, she is forced to compromise.
The ones, who have gone back to their village and try hard to reintegrate
with their families have to compromise. They sometimes leave behind
what they have learned during the struggle. Some of them circumcise
their daughters.[1] (interview with representative from the NUEW)
The poor peasant ex-fighter women cannot live according to their
new knowledge. Peasant women and uneducated women find themselves
to a larger degree than educated women in a difficult situation.
They are not in a position of power to influence their surroundings.
In some families, ex-fighter women are able to negotiate a position
whereby they gain credit from their fighter experiences. However,
other women in the family do not necessarily gain the same privileges:
My mother is not a fighter; all [the other members of my] family
are fighters, so my mother lets us do as we want. But when my brother
got married, she restricted his wife [e.g. from going out to the
city with her]. She said, Now she is my daughter and your
brother also said she should not go out, so I wont let her
go out now that she is married. We argued, but she did not
agree. She knows that we are outside her authority and says we can
do as we want, but not our brothers wife. (Hale, 2000: 8)
One may ask what has happened to the consciousness of the brother?
By conforming to traditional norms, the men gain power over women.
Often, the men are more accepted by their own families, as well
as by friends, when they exercise power of this kind. But we also
see that women exercise power over other women.
This is noticeable in the Eritrean Womens Union, the NUEW.
The women working here are all ex-fighters. Gradually, it emerges
that the women working for the NUEW are not just generalized female
ex-fighters, but fighters who have been able to find a position
in relation to the EPLF, now the government of Eritrea. These female
ex-fighters are not just any ex-fighters, but are first and foremost
women who come from an upper stratum of society. The gap between
the female ex-fighters who managed to find positions close to the
EPLF after independence and those who did not is quite striking.
The gap can be analyzed according to a class perspective, rooted
in degree of closeness to the EPLF. Thus, the ones situated on the
margins of society do not profit from their fighter position.
Stefanie Krug, discussing Ethiopia, writes that ex-fighters refuse
to admit that they have serious problems today when they are in
the public sphere. When they are in the Womens Association,
in an assembly, or talking to government representatives, they insist
on maintaining the image of the woman fighter. They
will not admit to being a weak woman (Krug, 1999: 17).
It appears that taking on a male identity created the empowerment
experienced during the struggle. Krug has done fieldwork among female
ex-fighters in Tigray in Ethiopia. She insists that the Womens
Association in Tigray cannot focus on the problems of the ex-fighters
because they are not aware of them. For this reason, many of the
same women do not want to join the local Womens Association.
They feel that the association does not meet their needs. Krugs
opinion is that the association focuses too much on the women as
fighters who have emancipated themselves, and that this is only
part of their situation.
Krug found that there is a strong tension between the self-image
of being a fighter and the growing awareness of limited capabilities
owing to disablement or war trauma, such as loss of comrades and
grief. In her opinion, the women fighters need to take a critical
and distanced stance towards the TPLF, the movement that recruited
them and that governs in Ethiopia, in order to develop their own
female discourse. This can help them find their own strategy, separate
from the male-dominated one (Krug, 1999).
In Eritrea, the Womens Union stays in close touch with the
EPLF, the countrys ruling party. The situation resembles the
Ethiopian one described by Krug. The female ex-fighters actual
state of affairs is not dealt with satisfactorily by either the
NUEW or the government. The situation is not improved by the fact
that the women hide their real problems, nor by their thinking that
being themselves is the same as being a weak woman.
It appears that the empowerment of the war period was based on grounds
that could not survive in peacetime. Afterwards, the previously
homogenous group of fighters found themselves situated within different
classes in society. A few have found employment, but most have a
hard time taking care of themselves:
Many of the girls who had been fighters, they had such a hard time
after the war. Often it was the ones with no education who had children
during the war. After the war they found themselves alone. They
had experienced independence, the struggle for continued independence
was harder than the armed struggle. (interview with Nighisti, ex-fighter)
An extensive armed conflict always comes with a very high price
tag. First, there is the loss of human lives and serious disability
it causes. In addition, displacement of large groups of the population
is common. In both Eritrea and Mozambique, about one million fled
the country during the respective wars (Mehreteab, 1999; Lundin
et al., 2000: 181). Countries suffer from heavily damaged infrastructure
and dramatic reduction of production. All of this leads to enormous
problems, and governments are unable to counter these to the satisfaction
of the inhabitants.
In Africa, where soldiers return to poor communities, scarce resources
make their reintegration difficult. Traditional support measures
are partly exhausted as a result of the deprivation caused by war.
After perhaps many years of absence, the soldiers have lost their
position in the family and in the community. They are no longer
part of a network that depends on their labor for daily coping and
survival.
Sometimes, the family has received money as dependents of the soldier.
This money stops when the soldier is demobilized. For both male
and female soldiers, new paid employment is difficult to come by,
and the ex-soldier becomes a burden on the family. Unemployment
is very high in a typical postwar society. This is reported in several
countries (Colletta et al., 1996) and leads to increased competition
for the few jobs available. Thus, a frequent complaint made by ex-soldiers
after they are demobilized is that they increasingly become a burden
to their family as they are no longer able to contribute their share
financially (see, for example, Pedersen, 1999 or Zimbabwe Women
Writers, 2000). Thus, from the perspective of the family, they have
lost an employed member and gained a family member who cannot even
take care of her- or himself.
Opposition in civil society also leads to what Pettman (1996: 140)
argues is a need for governments in postwar societies to disarm
soldier men as potential threats to state power by rewarding
them with returned power over women. This is preferred
to risking further discontent. The temporary expansion of womens
public roles may lead to men feeling helpless and vulnerable. Sometimes
a counteraction appears as a way of reestablishing control and power
(Skjelsbæk, 1997: 9). Womens rights and claims may be
given away in return for stronger male support of the state, or
out of fear of antagonizing conservative interests. In a postwar
society, the rise of gender significance draws boundaries that former
fighter women have little experience of.
Revitalization of traditional thinking
A middle-aged ex-fighter woman in Eritrea explained to me about
female ex-fighters and the response of her fellow male fighters
after liberation: Even the comrades wanted us to go back.
The statement sums up a reaction that the female fighters were not
prepared for. The comrades are the only men the fighter women might
hope to have on their side. And they are the only people who have
been thoroughly taught the same ideals about new gender roles and
equality. The fighters have deeply felt experiences that they have
shared and that bind them together. The female fighters describe
civilian women as different from themselves, and insist that they
have a lot in common with their male comrades. The equal exposure
to danger, the extreme situations, the living together outside normal
society, and not least the political conviction these are
all factors that strongly bind the ex-fighters together. The female
ex-fighters express a feeling of being betrayed by civil society
at large and by their male comrades. For them, it may be easier
to accept the reaction of civil society than the reaction of their
comrades.
Male ex-fighters were extremely popular immediately after the war.
Several women mentioned this to me. Unlike the women, the men have
not stepped out of their accepted gender roles. As fighters, they
have merely reinforced the image of a strong and masculine man,
whereas the women have disregarded all accepted rules of feminine
behavior. In order for Eritrea to reach its goal, this was necessary.
At the time, it was seen as a necessary sacrifice. Afterwards, the
women do not fulfill expectations of a proper gender role and have
to bear the consequences.
Female ex-fighters experience a lot of tension in their lives, finding
themselves considered somewhere between, on the one hand, heroines,
and on the other, unclean women (Egensteiner, 1995; Pedersen, 1999).
They have led lives that do not comply with rules for how respectable
women ought to live, and they have to negotiate their identity against
this background.
One result of the existence of different norms during war and in
peacetime are marriages that do not last. In Eritrea, marriage was
not permitted between EPLF fighters until 1977. A strict rule of
celibacy was imposed. After 1977, marriage became legal. Still,
a woman was not supposed to spend much of her time caring for her
child if she had one. Children were the responsibility of everyone
and would be looked after by both male and female fighters in the
EPLF kindergarten. Many mothers would have preferred to stay with
their child, but had to conform to the culture of putting the struggle
first and leave their children behind (Wilson, 1991). Usually, this
separation of the mother and child is described as unproblematic.
The EPLF took good care of the children, and there are no reports
of problems. On the contrary, this system is presented as functioning
well, and the children are presented as having been given opportunities
that other children were not. As there are no descriptions from
the mothers, only EPLF reports and reports by thoroughly impressed
foreign journalists, little is known of the actual experiences of
the fighter mothers and their children.
For all fighters, the struggle came first and foremost. During interviews,
some of my obviously resourceful informants revealed that they themselves
would not have had children if liberation had not come. They acknowledge
that women who gave birth during the war had a difficult time then
and often have a difficult time afterwards. Hopefully, the children
of the fighters did have good experiences during the struggle. After
liberation, on the other hand, the many orphans, as well as other
fighter children, had to face a stratified society, totally unlike
the world in which they had grown up.[2]
The EPLFs marriage law of 1977 banned customs like child betrothal,
polygyny, and dowry. Marriage was now based on the free choice of
both partners. The law is identical in form and content to the 1950
Marriage Law of the Peoples Republic of China, which was used
as a base for drafting the new marriage law (Zerai, 1994: 49). Trish
Silkin, a British anthropologist, describes how the EPLF encouraged
the fighters to marry contrary to traditional custom. She claims
that the EPLF thus tried to undermine the practice of marrying within
ones own group: Breaking down traditional barriers between
people of different ethnic, religious and social groups is intrinsic
to the whole process of building an Eritrean national consciousness
(Silkin, 1989: 54). The fighters chose their own spouses and were
encouraged to get to know each other intimately before marrying.
The intention was that, through this, they would be able to test
their compatibility, whether they fitted together in all ways. The
important idea was to unite the different ethnic groups and thus
assist the national project of building a nation. The EPLFs
marriage law represented a break with traditional marriage as an
alliance between two families.
The fighters break with the norms and customs of civil society,
however, backfires when peace finally comes. Marriages that were
established contrary to the rules of civil society must pass a very
difficult test in order to survive. A similar national project to
the one in Eritrea took place in Guinea-Bissau. Here too, the goal
was to unite all groups of soldiers into one, and earlier discrimination
against various groups of people was not tolerated. Marriage was
to be an institution based on free choice (Urdang, 1979: 150). Urdang
explains how the national project of Guinea-Bissau aimed to encourage
the fighters to marry across ethnic and social groups. However,
the unstable conditions of wartime led to situations where husbands
and wives often lost each other through various causes. Afterwards,
some of the female fighters had several children, often with different
men.
In Eritrea, female ex-fighters are largely married to ex-fighters.
But most male ex-fighters are married to civilian women, while female
ex-fighters are hardly ever married to civilian men. Only 3.2% of
the women fighters are married to a civilian, compared to 96.4%
of the men (GDI, 1995; Mehreteab, 1997). This illustrates a considerable
difference between female and male fighters.
In a postwar situation, from the perspective of the government,
the rights of women are secondary to the many other priorities.
After a war, scarce resources have to be spent in ways that counter
forces which threaten the very existence of the government. In order
to survive, the government has to concentrate on these forces. In
order to stay in power, these forces must be dealt with and negotiated
with. An example can be taken from Eritrea, where the EPLF created
new laws in order to overcome the inequality of women, but where
civil society forcefully pushed women in the direction of more traditional
social and cultural values. More and more, the government has abandoned
earlier promises concerning womens rights (interview with
ex-fighter women, Asmara).
Women are crucial to the building of a nation (Pettman, 1996), and
nationalism seeks the roots of a nation. A war-torn
society needs women to do unpaid work, such work being crucial for
a nation that has been ravaged by war. In Eritrea, for example,
the EPLF adjusted its ideology after the war to the need of
the nation. One young Eritrean woman, who was at the time
in the USA, met the Eritrean president there. The latter declared,
when questioned, that female ex-fighters could not expect to find
a job when they totally lacked education. In addition, he added,
they were needed to care for their children since Eritrea needed
children (Pedersen 1999: 26). The shift in priorities and the changing
rhetoric of the leaders were striking.
While it is never possible to return to pre-war times,[3] neither
in Eritrea nor anywhere else, the tendency to try is nevertheless
a widespread pattern. The post-revolution regression seems to occur
especially at a time of economic crisis. A nation that is going
through a process of healing after fighting a war needs to rebuild
itself. Women are important for reconstruction as biological reproducers,
as cultural carriers, and as individuals responsible for socializing
children.
When a war is over, the reconstruction of the nation is the most
vital issue. The country needs to heal from the war experiences.
The female fighters have been socialized into a kind of life that
is not compatible with raising a family according to traditional
standards. Life in the field did not involve living in a family.
Managing the household and child-raising were never part of the
military training. Thus, the female ex-fighters are not able to
reproduce the Eritrean societys expectations of a proper woman.
They have broken numerous rules and have to negotiate their identity.
Women are often constructed as the cultural symbols of the collectivity,
of its boundaries, as carriers of the collectivitys honor
and as its intergenerational reproducers of culture. Specific codes
and regulations are usually developed, defining who/what is a proper
man and a proper woman, which are central to the
identities of collectivity members. (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 67)
A proper woman in a postwar society is definitely not
an ex-fighter woman heavily marked by warfare. Despite government
efforts to praise female ex-fighters in postwar times, such praise
appears rather hollow, since little action follows.
Peasant soldiers and land scarcity
As mentioned in chapter 3, most wars in Africa recruit from the
peasant population. When peasants are to be reintegrated, a number
of obstacles may make this difficult or impossible. A woman ex-fighter
from Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, describes the situation of
the peasant girls who were fighters:
The peasant girls had an even harder time as peasants than as fighters.
For some, that was the reason why they chose to join. As fighters
they were respected in a new way. They sat together with educated
and non-educated people and they were expected to say something.
Of course, they had changed. (interview with ex-fighter woman)
We can easily find documentation that shows how peasant women in
general face an even more demanding existence than male peasants.
Another example is from the Ethiopian TPLF, where a member acknowledged
that being a fighter is such a liberation for them [peasant
women] (Young 1997: 179). This is important because a future
reintegration has to take into account combatants backgrounds
and reasons for joining the guerrilla army. Women who join to get
away from a difficult situation face their own difficulties when
returning to their home communities.
Peasant women refuse, to a greater degree than men, to return to
their families after they have been combatants in a war (GDI, 1995;
Teclemichael, 1999). Krugs (1999) studies of Ethiopia explain
how, after the war, there was ambivalence between the peasantry
and the fighters. In her study of the reintegration of women fighters
from the TPLF, Krug documents how most of the peasant women recruited
did not return to their home surroundings after demobilization.
Krug argues that reintegration into the peasantry had the most adverse
appeal to many women. Their time in the liberation army had distanced
them from values associated with traditional rural life. These women,
especially long-term fighters, sought to live with their former
comrades with whom they shared family-like ties, bonds of solidarity,
and a collective identity.
Both men and women find it difficult to return, as there are few
opportunities for an alternative existence among the rural population.
The women coming from peasant backgrounds and not returning often
face a difficult existence in urban areas. In Eritrea, the peasant
ex-fighter women are, too a large degree, invisible to the foreign
researcher and have not been focused on sufficiently. Many of these
women face serious problems (interview with representative of the
NUEW).
Not only attitudes, but also more tangible problems make the return
of ex-combatants to rural areas difficult. Often, land scarcity
makes reintegration impossible. Relatives or neighbors have started
cultivating land that otherwise would have belonged to the ex-fighters
had they stayed in the village. Upon their return, the latter become
intruders and threaten the stability of the community.
In Eritrea, an ex-fighter man working for the integration of fighters
into civil society explained to me that, when the fighter came back,
there was no room for him or her. The family had filled the empty
gap while he or she was gone. On return, the fighter needs a space
which is no longer available:
The ex-fighters had been away too long, and they had changed too
much. They were like the last ones to arrive.[4] They
thought they had rights. They had sacrificed everything for the
liberation of Eritrea, but because times were so difficult they
could not get what they thought they had a right to. And they thought
they had a lot to teach the civilians. But the civilians didnt
want to learn.
Often, the government may support ex-soldiers with land upon demobilization
as compensation for their service. If there is a scarcity of land
and housing, this becomes a burden to the community they return
to. The receiving community may view the homecoming combatants as
a threat, since poverty is prevalent in many localities in postwar
Africa (Tewolde, 1998:34, 35).
An example can be seen in the International Labour Organizations
(1995) report from Ethiopia. There, former soldiers wanting to reintegrate
in farming were entitled to one hectare of land. This turned out
to create great unrest in the communities. In a country where 60%
of the rural population is below the poverty line, reintegrating
soldiers in the agricultural sector proved extremely difficult.
The government eventually pushed through an arrangement under which
ex-soldiers were entitled to somewhat smaller plots of land previously
held by the community. The same program failed to target large groups
of female combatants because very few of these came forward and
claimed the benefits to which they were entitled.
Reports of land shortage causing difficulties upon demobilization
have also come from Uganda and Namibia (Colletta et al., 1996;
International Labour Organization (ILO), 1995). In Namibia, although
many ex-combatants had access to land through their families, few
had it in their own right. Some did not find their families upon
demobilization. They felt that the government ought to have helped
them more in this difficult situation.
A Traumatized Population
The kind of mending and care that is needed by many women who have
been combatants during a violent war may take years. Most reintegration
programs last for a short time, and the ones who benefit from them
have often not recovered when the programs are over. In fact, in
her article on women guerrillas in El Salvador, Ana Cristina Ibanez
points to the fact that survivors of a violent conflict often need
lifelong treatment. The consequences of postwar trauma will persist
in generations to come (Ibanez, 2001: 129).
Disabled ex-combatants
After a war, the physical and mental costs for female soldiers are
often very high (Bennett & Warnock, 1995; Enloe, 2000: 249).
This is not least due to the importance of family and marriage in
most societies. In poor African countries, a disabled woman definitely
has considerably reduced possibilities.
There are numerous disabilities in the wake of a war. War-related
disability and mental health problems are direct consequences of
a long-lasting armed conflict. In addition to accidents occurring
during a battle, health problems increase as a consequence of a
lack of satisfactory health services and poor diets. Diseases easily
healed under other conditions may result in serious disabilities
because of lack of adequate treatment or deficient nutrition. Landmines
also add to the range of war-inflicted disabilities.
Those who become disabled in war have a higher status in a war-torn
society than other disabled individuals. In poor countries, disabled
people have traditionally been treated harshly because they are
a burden to the community (Tewolde & Nielsen, 1998). However,
disabled war veterans usually receive respect due to their status
as fighters who sacrificed their health for national independence.
Still, as postwar conditions offer few job opportunities even for
able-bodied men, disabled men and disabled women find themselves
in very difficult situations.
The number of disabled female veterans naturally increases as women
become subject to the same hazards as men. When women participate
alongside men, even at the frontline, large numbers of women are
often disabled.
Disabled women are generally considered to experience more difficulties
than disabled men (Abu-Habib, 1997; Bennett & Warnock, 1995;
Turner, 1998). Since men in most places engage in housework and
childrearing to a lesser degree than women, a strong and fit wife
and mother is considered necessary for the well-being of the household.
A disabled woman is hindered in her ability to perform vital functions.
She will consequently be less attractive as a spouse.
In many countries, a disabled man is able to marry a woman to take
care of him and thus able to lead a normal life with a family of
his own. A disabled woman runs a much greater risk of being abandoned
than a disabled husband. According to the 1995 report of the United
Nations Development Program (cited in Abu-Habib, 1997), disabled
women are twice as likely to be divorced by their husbands as other
women.
In Namibia, 10% of ex-combatants are disabled. In spite of skill-training
programs, the economic prospects of the disabled after the completion
of training are limited (Colletta et al., 1996).
Childless women veterans
The phenomenon of childless women, who have been touched in this
way because of their history as active guerrilla soldiers, is quite
common (Enloe, 2000). The reasons are manifold: extreme life situations
over long periods of time, disease, lack of health services, and
lack of proper nutrition. From Vietnam, we hear that many of the
Vietnamese women who survived as combatants in the war against the
USA became unable to bear children: Contact with death and
blood have robbed these young girls of the very future they sought
to defend when they left home in the first place (Turner,
1998: 4). Further, women in Vietnam were left unmarriageable,
condemned to life on the margins of a society that values family
above all else. Even though men and women have many similar experiences,
some of the experiences of women are unique to women.
The experience from Vietnam has its parallel in Eritrea. The war
has affected the female ex-fighters and influenced their ability
to lead a family life in future. In general, this strikes women
harder than men. Societys expectations of a woman are different
from those placed on a man. In order to be a complete
woman, one is dependent on fulfilling certain criteria. Ones
appearance and age are crucial. Ones reproductive ability
is dependent on age, but is also more vulnerable to diseases and
a harsh life. War makes an imprint on a womans
body, both physically and in the mind of others. To a greater degree
than a man, a woman is measured according to whether or not she
lives up to these standards. In the future home, a woman will need
to take care of her husband and children. It is not the other way
around, neither in Eritrea nor in (most) other places.
In general, very young girls are affected to a greater extent than
older women. Length of military service is also an important factor,
as are individual experiences. Nighisty, an Eritrean ex-fighter,
married with no children and extremely unhappy about this fact,
says:
Im happy that I was in the frontline when liberation came,
because I experienced the victory more intensely than many others.
But at the same time Im very unhappy. The government has tried
to help the fighters, but Eritrea is so very poor. If I had not
been a fighter I would live with a large family today. Now, I dont
have children and that is because I was a fighter.
This woman has not been able to find a position within the circles
of the EPLF. She has no job, lives in a difficult marriage, and
sees no solution to her problems. When she talks about her current
situation, she cries. When she talks of her wartime experiences,
her face radiates.
Quite a few women refuse to give birth during a war. The times are
too uncertain for having a child. In Eritrea, several women have
told me that they would not have had children today if the war had
not ended when it did. One ex-fighter said:
I was prepared not to have a child in my life. I was getting close
to menopause; if liberation had not come at the time it did, I would
not have had children. Luckily I was able to have one child before
it was too late.
Women who wait for peace may be too late to have a child. They may
be too old; they may have lost their husband; or they may not be
able to conceive for numerous reasons when the conflict is finally
over.
In a society where a womans worth too a large degree is measured
by her ability to raise a family, a barren ex-fighter woman is not
a woman like any other woman in the eyes of most people. The great
importance of having children is not only a personal matter, but
also a ticket to acceptance by society as a successful woman. Karen
Turner (2000) describes how women in Vietnam became barren as a
result of their war activities and how their great contribution
to the war can in no way compensate for what they have been reduced
to today. Vietnamese women veterans lost their looks and their fertility
after years of hard living and exposure to disease and chemical
poisons. In the end, the guilty male survivors who admire women
veterans will still prefer younger, healthier women as wives. The
women veterans of today rather serve as a symbol of the disenfranchised
rather than as heroic women who helped win the war.
Training
Most women who have been soldiers in Africas wars do not have
an education. After the war is over, unemployment is often high,
and women have a very hard time finding a paid job.
In Eritrea, several men said to me that they were all for womens
liberation and a new and alternative role for women, which, according
to the ideology of the EPLF, was the right way to go. Interestingly,
their own wives and daughters belonged to a different category.
They could not, for numerous reasons, be exposed to modern ideas.
The ideology of the EPLF has influenced the male fighters, but only
to a certain degree. They express a belief that women ought to learn
skills that belong to masculinized spheres. And though they seem
quite sincere in this, it seems only to apply to other women, not
women close to them.
It is very difficult to see simple solutions to the question of
employment for female ex-fighters. In a postwar climate, women cannot
easily join education programs, even if they are offered them. Women
who do want to receive training and then to find employment need
childcare facilities. This is very difficult, and such facilities
usually do not exist as we know them in the West. It is also difficult
for a woman to leave her house, as the husband can rarely help her
with the household chores.
When women do leave their home and go to work, obviously this will
affect gender relations, and ultimately will also require changes
in men. An alternative male gender role is not on the agenda of
many of the poor postwar states in Africa today. Both men and women
with whom I have discussed the emancipation of women are interested
in expanding womens possibilities. That there is a connection
between this and mens activities and roles is not an issue.
Even prominent ex-fighter women working, for example, in the Womens
Union in Eritrea say that men doing work in the home is out of the
question. Another woman takes care of womens work
in their homes. The well-off urban women who can afford one or two
maids do not need their husbands to do housework. A poor peasant
womannaturally faces a different reality.
In Mozambique, only one out of six demobilized soldiers received
any kind of vocational training after the war. Some soldiers received
support from multiple sources, due to poor coordination between
implementing agencies (Maslen, 1997: 12). In addition, the few women
ex-combatants who were offered training skills were commonly offered
gender-typed activities like sewing and secretarial work. Initially,
women were excluded from vocational training courses altogether.
However, many women were not able to make use of the courses because
there were no possibilities for childcare (ibid: 13).
A criticism voiced against the reintegration programs in Mozambique
was that no needs-assessment was undertaken. According to the ILO,
a survey evaluating the local reintegration prospects should have
been done. Programs were badly tailored to the areas where it was
supposed that the soldiers would return. For example, soldiers who
were trained to be electricians returned to areas without electricity;
others were trained to become car mechanics and then were expected
to return to areas without any cars (ibid: 16).
An interesting survey by UNESCO (1996) suggests that ex-soldiers
should be trained to work with the reintegration of ex-soldiers
themselves. No one knows the problems of soldiers as well as they
do themselves. As the then Director-General of UNESCO Federico Mayor
stated, countries in post-war situations frequently continue
to be characterized by political instability, insecurity and everyday
violence. Reconciliation between the demobilized and society is
thus essential. Few, if any, success stories are reported
on this matter, even when the necessary resources were available
(ibid.). Frustration and resentment are typical reactions when ex-combatants
feel that they are treated as objects and that they themselves have
little say in their own fate. That the soldiers can play a major
role, monitoring integration programs, is a suggestion worth paying
attention to.
Soldiers commonly face a decline in status when they demobilize:
One-time heroes and models held up to society are now troublesome
reminders of the past (ibid: 1). Upon demobilization, the
ex-soldiers are seen as recipients, rarely as resources. Experts
are called in to define the situation, to find the solutions, and
to devise the right programs. Findings from the UNESCO survey indicate
that education is a key link between peace and development. Training
schemes that keep the soldiers busy, but that may not offer jobs
in the end, only add to the frustration and incapacity of the soldiers.
It also increases dependency, segregation, and expectations. Where
trainers are veterans themselves, the positive impact is greater.
Chapter Summary
* The age of the soldiers, the length of their stay in the organization,
and their personal experiences are important for how thoroughly
the soldier has been socialized out of society.
* War experiences offer many soldiers a meaning and purpose in their
lives that peacetime may lack.
* Men and women are often encouraged to have similar roles as soldiers,
while in peacetime they are encouraged to act out different roles.
Thus, the men do not have a break in their gender socialization,
whereas the women do.
* When a war is over, the unity of the soldier group disappears.
* Ex-soldiers are no longer united and equal. They belong to different
segments within a stratified society.
* A war-torn society will, for many reasons, aim to return to a
prewar order. Marriages established during the war that run contrary
to accepted norms run a high risk of falling apart.
* Women from peasant populations have an even more difficult time
returning to their home community.
* Disabilities and other serious war-inflicted mental and physical
wounds will not disappear after a short period with demobilization
assistance. Disabled women and women unable to bear children because
of traumatic war experiences can be additionally marginalized.
* Ex-soldiers are experts on their own situation and can often be
used to train other ex-soldiers.
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[1] In Eritrea, approximately 95% of girls are circumcised. The
EPLF was against female circumcision, and this was taught to the
fighters and in the areas where the EPLF had control. Consequently,
female fighters in Eritrea did not circumcise their daughters during
the war (nor afterwards), though there are signs that some have
started doing this again.
[2] Hale (2000) reports that the children of fighters have a hard
time adjusting to civilian norms, especially girls.
[3] 150,000 Eritreans were reported dead in the liberation war (included
both fighters and civilians); 70,000 suffer from various disabilities;
and 90,000 children were orphaned. In addition, one-third
of the total population was displaced (Bruchhaus & Mehreteab,
2000).
[4] The man showed me a book with this title. It was book in English
about persons who move into an area and the reactions of the ones
who already live there.
Chapter 5 : FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
One goal that is very important for international funding and aid
agencies is that they do not increase inequalities in a community.
This is the background for resisting programs that are exclusively
for demobilized soldiers. Although sometimes necessary, such programs
create barriers between demobilized soldiers and the rest of society.
New social categories are produced as a consequence of armed conflicts,
and the identity and status of these new social groups are negotiated
by society. Female ex-combatants, who have broken rules of traditional
behavior and gender roles, will risk being marginalized during the
rebuilding process. In war-torn societies, traditional support measures
are often exhausted. Social structures can only recover as the development
of the whole community progresses. Programs aimed towards an overall
integration of society are thus preferable to those focused on a
particular group. At the same time, the special problems of ex-combatants
must be addressed to help guide peaceful development and growth.
Targeting
* Because the targeting of female veterans has proved difficult,
women should be able to rely on mixed-gender selection committees
to ensure a more impartial decision when such committees decide
on who have or have not been soldiers.
* Since women lack information of their demobilization rights more
often than men, utmost care has to be taken to inform women of these
rights.
* An overall assessment of the situation at hand is very important.
Without this, marginalized groups that qualify for support may be
invisible to the donors.
* An overall coordination of existing programs is important in order
to avoid situations in which the same people receive double assistance,
while the demobilization programs fail to target others.
* Confusion and complexity around data collection regarding soldiers
should be kept at a minimum. Also, women should be involved in and
follow the process of targeting eligible ex-soldiers.
* The widespread reaction that soldiers belonging to a defeated
group are not considered as deserving assistance is a challenge.
Such groups of soldiers will remain marginalized if not targeted
for assistance.
* Demobilization and reintegration planners have to pay special
attention to disabled women (and girl) veterans.
* In order to reach women, womens networks, church groups,
health centers, and other less formal information channels are more
effective than, for example, newspapers and radio.
Demobilization
* When possible, all soldiers should proceed directly to encampment
upon demobilization. Data on everyone should be collected, and ex-combatants
provided with necessary information. When dependents or abducted
women are included in the encampment phase, questions have to be
adjusted to reflect the specificity of each group.
* Women and men need separate facilities. Also, separate family
units are important if families or couples are present. Health facilities
have to be adapted to womens needs and should also be separated
from mens services.
* Women need to be informed about employment and training possibilities.
They also need information about some of the obstacles they will
meet.
* Information must be given in ways the recipients can understand.
* Transportation to the home community or another place must be
organized.
Reintegration
* In a war-torn society, reintegrating a certain group of people
is not the same as it would be in the case of a well-functioning
society. Naturally, reintegration is the aim, but we have to ask:
reintegration into what? A mainstream society that is weighed down
with social problems? The latter is, after all, usually the case.
* In many cases, reintegration is not in fact possible. Women who
have been soldiers and who have been socialized out of their families
often refuse to return to them. The changes they have gone through
are too great for them, and they need assistance in order to build
a civil existence so that they are able to care for themselves and
their children.
* Women soldiers must be assisted in trying to find an alternative
way of living. Education and training are frequently what they lack,
and these should be offered through assistance programs. A range
of skills should be encouraged, not only typical female skills.
* Some of the knowledge acquired by ex-soldiers through politicization
programs within revolutionary groups should be acknowledged as being
of value. One example is the case of female circumcision, which
has been considered counter-revolutionary by a number of revolutionary
groups. Assistance to demobilized female soldiers must support women
in maintaining such an attitude.
* Childcare opportunities are very important for the employment
prospects of female ex-soldiers. Kindergartens ought to be made
available to female ex-soldiers.
Land Pressure
* Pressure on land is also a reason for constructing programs that
support the whole community. Otherwise, ex-fighters will distance
themselves further from civilians. Social structures that could
be relied on at earlier times must be strengthened, not weakened.
* Because land scarcity is common in many poor countries, ex-combatants
with a peasant background can, as an alternative, be offered further
education. This will not mean reintegration into their original
home surroundings, but for some this can be an option and can lead
to their upward mobility within the country.
Disabled
* Insight into the very difficult situation of disabled women and
girls makes it especially important that reintegration programs
pay extra attention to this group of disabled war veterans. Such
extra attention should include the possibility for these women to
turn to female physicians. One reason why this is important is that
medical doctors must confirm their disability.
* Special programs for disabled female ex-fighters are important
and provide a challenge to funders and aid agencies. Some agencies,
like institutions in the Nordic countries, have considerable expertise
within this field that can be applied.
Chapter Summary
There are few easy solutions to the difficult situation of women
who have been soldiers in wars in Africa. Assistance programs must
first of all be aware that female ex-soldiers usually do exist,
and then must actively seek them out. To help these women on their
way towards reintegration if not within their original community,
then somewhere else of their choosing is a great challenge.
The aim of this report has been to point to the special situation
in which such women find themselves after a war.
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