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Financing for the Implementation of National Action Plans on UNSCR 1325:
Critical for Advancing Women’s Human Rights, Peace and Security


This working paper is a contribution to the Global Review meeting “Building accountability for national and regional implementation of Security Council resolutions on Women, Peace and Security,” held in New York from November 5-7, 2013 by UN Women.

The paper will incorporate the reflections, debates and analyses that emerge from the Global Review and a final version will be published following the Review.

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of UN Women, the United Nations or any of its affiliated organizations. Any boundaries and names shown and designations used on any maps in this report do not imply official endorsement.
This study is coordinated by Cordaid and the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP) in collaboration with UN Women.

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Project Team
Researcher and Lead Writer: Natalie Raaber
Editors: Dewi Suralaga and Mavic Cabrera-Balleza
Contributor: Natalia Zakharova

Case Study Authors
Burundi: Christian Ngendahimana and Seconde Nyanzobe of Fontaine Isoko
Chile: Maria Ines Salamanca
Nepal: Bandana Rana of SAATHI
The Netherlands: WO=MEN
The Philippines: Ma. Lourdes Veneracion-Rallonza, Ph.D.
Sierra Leone: Mariama Fofana

Case Study Editors
Mavic Cabrera-Balleza
Natalie Raaber
Dewi Suralaga

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This paper is a “living document” and we hope to further nuance and enrich it with the discussions, debates, and analyses emerging from the Global Review itself. The final version will be published after the Global Review and will include additional information and analysis as well as the full version of the case studies.
Global Network of Women Peacebuilders

The Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP), an autonomous program of the International Civil society Action Network (ICAN) is a coalition of over 70 women’s groups and other civil society organizations from Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America, Eastern and Western Europe and West Asia—mostly in conflict-affected countries—that are actively involved in advocacy and action for the full and effective implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) resolutions. Formed in 2010, GNWP bridges the gap between policy discussions and implementation on the ground on WPS issues.

GNWP has a strong track record in civil society monitoring of UNSCR 1325 and 1820; revitalizing the implementation of NAPs through its Localization of UNSCR 1325 and 1820 program; supporting UNSCR 1325 National Action Planning processes; advocating for the CEDAW General Recommendation on Women in Conflict Prevention, Conflict and Post-conflict Situations; conducting 1325 Media Outreach; and producing publications and advocacy initiatives on the issue of WPS. For more information, please contact Mavic Cabrera-Balleza at maviccabreraballeza@gmail.com.

Cordaid

Cordaid is the Catholic Organization for Relief and Development Aid, with its headquarters in the Hague and country offices in 11 countries. It has been fighting poverty and exclusion in the world’s most fragile societies and conflict-stricken area’s for almost a century. Cordaid is deeply rooted in the Dutch society with more than 300,000 private donors. Cordaid is a founding member of Caritas and CIDSE.

Cordaid’s program on Women’s Leadership for Peace and Security aims to increase capacities of women’s networks and voice of women at the local level in processes of peace and security. Cordaid assists women to improve their practical situation and that of their communities. This results in improved safety, cooperative relationships and a better access to basic services at the local level. Cordaid mobilizes and strengthens local women’s networks in conflict areas, increases their voice and promotes their agenda in national and global arenas, and influences policies to reflect their concerns and needs. For more see www.cordaid.org or contact Dewi Suralaga at dewi.suralaga@cordaid.nl.
Financing for the Implementation of NAP 1325
Background Paper for Global Review
Working Paper
October 2013

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Key Findings

This report summarizes the findings of a survey sent to the 42 Member States with National Action Plans (as of July 2013) on United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325. The survey lays out the landscape of NAP financing practices and details the diverse range of financing approaches taken by governments as well as their strengths and weaknesses. Key findings, culled from the 25 Member States that replied, include:

1. The majority of governments do not earmark funding for either the development or the implementation of NAP 1325.
2. The origin and sustainability of financing for NAP 1325 implementation varies greatly, with implications for tracking, monitoring, and accountability.
3. Many governments finance NAP 1325 implementation based on (shifting) national priorities and do not fund all pillars equally or adequately.
4. Tracking and monitoring mechanisms for NAP implementation are often inadequate.
5. The majority of governments do not employ gender responsive budgeting and, of those that do, specific funding for NAP 1325 implementation is generally not a result.
6. The critical role of civil society – including particularly women’s human rights organizations, networks, and movements – in NAP development and implementation is neither adequately recognized nor supported.
7. There is significant government interest in the role of the private sector in NAP 1325 implementation.
8. There is an expressed interest in contributing to funding a Multi-Stakeholder Financing Mechanism (similar to a basket fund) for NAP implementation.

Based on the findings above, the paper concludes with recommendations for governments, civil society, the United Nations, and other stakeholders on financing NAP implementation.
“The Culture of Peace cannot survive bloated military budgets that soak up funds for human security, nor the proliferation of weapons – nuclear weapons, unregulated small arms, drones, bombers, and more. To devote $1.7 trillion to preparing for war is indefensible and in conflict with priorities the United Nations has approved.”

“To build peace requires visioning what constitutes peace and security across cultures, nationalities, ethnicities, and genders.”

1 Introduction

1.1 Objective

This report – which builds on a 2011 study on costing and financing 1325 policies – aims to examine the financial resources available for the implementation of National Action Plans on UNSCR 1325. Specifically, the report will examine whether NAP 1325 activities are financed, which financing mechanisms or modalities are utilized, and whether certain activities, pillars, or themes are prioritized in funding. The report also highlights the role of civil society and particularly women’s rights organizations in developing and advancing NAP 1325 implementation as well as the funding landscape in which civil society operates. In so doing, the report underscores the critical role of civil society organizations and particularly women’s rights organizations in advocating for, developing, utilizing, and implementing NAPs.

This paper was presented at the November 2013 Global Review Meeting (organized by UN Women and called for in the 2012 Report of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace and Security (WPS)).

The paper aims to support an action-oriented conversation on financing, galvanizing further momentum and proposing concrete steps stakeholders can take to ensure predictable and sustainable financing for NAP 1325 implementation. We intend to incorporate additional analyses and recommendations emerging from the Global Review itself (and from further substantive discussions with stakeholders) to enrich and strengthen the report. The final version of the report will be published at the beginning of 2014.

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1.2 Methodology

The analysis presented in this report is based on replies to a survey (see Annex III) sent to the 42 Member States with a NAP 1325 as of July 2013. Twenty-five Member States provided replies, although the quality and comprehensiveness of responses varied widely. The analysis is also drawn from the information presented in six case studies (see Annex I), informal discussion with civil society organizations (CSOs) and networks, including The Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP) and Cordaid, and a desk review of literature on financing for development and, more specifically, financing for gender equality and women, peace, and security (WPS).

1.3 Limitations

This report is neither comprehensive nor exhaustive in highlighting the myriad approaches governments have taken to finance NAP 1325 implementation. Indeed, States have unique and incredibly varied experiences of financing NAP 1325 implementation that are shaped by the historical and current contours of the local context.

Twenty-five of the 42 countries with NAPs 1325 responded (in one form or another) to the survey, a nearly 60% response rate. The varying quality and completion of information (i.e. some respondents answered only one or two questions) has led to a geographical imbalance in the examples cited in the report, as we found ourselves constrained to draw on survey responses that provided more information and nuance. We also faced tight timelines and many governments were out of session due, in part, to summer holidays in the Northern hemisphere.

The survey was open-ended and thus faced issues common to this methodology. Though answers are typically richer in open-ended surveys, there are challenges in coding and comparing responses. Moreover, the nuance and meaning of replies were not always clear and thus cross-country comparison was difficult. Conceptual challenges emerged as well: although the survey asked specifically for financing for NAP 1325 implementation, governments often spoke about implementation of UNSCR 1325 or implementation of activities to advance WPS more broadly, which may or may not fall under the focus of a country’s NAP.

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5 Australia, Belgium, Chile, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Nepal, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK provided responses to the survey in time to be included in this analysis. For a list of all Member States with NAPs see: [http://www.peacewomen.org/pages/about-1325/national-action-plans-naps](http://www.peacewomen.org/pages/about-1325/national-action-plans-naps)
2 Financing for Development and Women’s Rights: A Normative Framework

The normative frame is critical: how the debate on financing NAP implementation is framed will shape how both financing challenges as well as the possibilities for addressing gaps are understood.

At the international level, governments have committed to financing women’s rights, gender equality, and women’s empowerment in various processes and spaces. Specific commitments/provisions on financing for development on the one hand and financing for gender equality and women’s on the other have been made – with financing NAP implementation situated squarely at their intersection.⁶

While not exhaustive,⁷ the below processes and outcome documents – outputs of particular processes at the United Nations and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – provide the normative frame in which a discussion on financing NAP implementation is best understood.

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⁶ While there are regional processes and commitments (for example, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women) that address financing for development (and are specifically relevant to financing for women’s rights, peace and security), it is outside the scope of the paper to do a comprehensive regional review.

⁷ See: UN Women (2013) “National and Regional Implementation of Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security,” prepared by Natalie Florea Hudson for the Global Review, October 2013, and Cabrera-Balleza, Mavic and Nicola Popovic (2011) offer a more extensive overview of the normative frame, including both the broader Women, Peace and Security frame as well as financing. Recognising this, the normative frame elaborated here focuses specifically on financing and within that, only the key documents/debates shaping the framework.
2.1 Financing for Gender Equality and Women’s Human Rights

The Beijing Platform for Action affirmed that funds to advance women’s rights and gender equality, and by extension UNSCR 1325, must come from all sources and sectors. Accordingly, at the national level, public budgets are a significant source of funding for gender equality and women’s rights: indeed, in the application of monetary and fiscal policy “society's model of socio-economic development and criteria for redistribution” takes shape. Therefore, understanding how public budgets operate, as well as the implications of international macroeconomic frameworks and ideology, is critical to ensuring financing is directed at advancing women’s human rights.

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) obliges States to eliminate discrimination against women and ensure access to and enjoyment of the full range of human rights to all, including within contexts of conflict. In fact, the recent General Recommendation (GR #30) of the CEDAW Committee notes the specific impact of donors financing on women’s rights in conflict prevention, conflict, and post-conflict processes.

Other international human rights documents have underscored that development cooperation is an obligation of the international community and that aid must support visions of development and peace that are grounded in and advance women’s human rights, justice, and sustainability. For example, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (IECSCR) requires that a State allocate “the maximum of its available resources,” through both domestic means and via international assistance, for the fulfillment of each of the rights found in the Covenant, and, importantly, demands the equal rights of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social, and cultural rights. This is particularly relevant when discussing resource allocation to implement women’s rights policies and programs, including UNSCR 1325.

2.2 Financing for Women, Peace and Security (WPS)

Situated conceptually at the intersection of financing for development and financing for gender equality/women’s rights, financing for NAP implementation specifically and WPS more broadly is called for in numerous documents and processes. In his 2010 report to the Security Council on WPS, for example, the UN Secretary General (SG) Ban Ki-moon underscored the importance of funding...
and political commitment to ensure the full implementation and the ultimate success of NAPs 1325. Concretizing this in a 7-Point Action Plan, the SG called for “at least 15% of UN-managed funds in support of peacebuilding [to be] dedicated to projects whose principal objective is to address women’s specific needs, advance gender equality, and/or empower women.”14 This is further reiterated in the 2013 SG report on WPS, where it is noted that “efforts to address and finance the recovery needs of women and girls...must be accelerated, including through reaching the minimum 15 % spending targets.”15 Most recently, UNSCR 2122 (adopted in October 2013) encourages “Member States to develop dedicated funding mechanisms to support the work and enhance capacities of organizations that support women’s leadership development and full participation in all levels of decision-making...through, inter alia, increasing contributions to local civil society.”16

In addition, the UN Strategic Results Framework on WPS (2011-2020), a framework to guide the UN’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 (and related resolutions) through 2020, calls for all UN entities and Multi-Donor Trust Funds working in conflict and post conflict situations to develop fund-tracking mechanisms to assess attention to gender equality issues and specific targets and indicators for funding for gender equality (including to civil society).17 These frameworks provide clear targets for mobilizing resources and prioritizing a WPS agenda at the international level.

2.3 Financing for Development (FfD)18

The Financing for Development discussions emerged at the culmination of UN world conferences of the 1990s as a way to discuss development finance and, more specifically, the financing needed to implement the agendas that emerged from these conferences.19 The 2008 Doha Declaration on FfD and its predecessor the 2002 Monterrey Consensus of 2002 – both outcome documents of UN FfD conferences – recognize the need for “dedicated resources” for gender equality and the importance of mainstreaming a gender perspective into development policies. While quality, predictable, and transparent development assistance is critical (and indeed an obligation of the international community) the FfD discussions underscored the necessity of a more comprehensive approach to financing development, situating aid discussions within the broader context of global financial flows.20 While acknowledging the critical importance of aid to fragile States,21 foreign direct investment (including in resource extractive industries), trade (and the terms of trade), debt payments,22 the level of illicit capital flows, remittances, and domestic resource mobilization often

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18 The documents framing this section include: the Monterrey Consensus on FfD and the Doha Declaration on FfD.
19 See: http://www.un.org/generinfo/bp/atro.html
22 Debt relief to post-conflict countries to achieve initial reconstruction for economic and social development, particularly for the early recovery period, is also voiced within the Monterrey Consensus and the Doha Declaration.
shape a country’s budget and development possibilities in much more significant ways than aid.\textsuperscript{23} Discussion on financing NAP 1325 and WPS more broadly must therefore take into account the full range of financial flows affecting national public finances and, subsequently, a State’s ability to fulfill its human rights obligations, including through NAP implementation.

2.4 Aid Effectiveness, including Aid for Fragile States\textsuperscript{24}

Despite shortcomings on gender equality and women’s rights widely cited by feminists and others,\textsuperscript{25} the Aid Effectiveness process – housed in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and embodied in the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), and the Busan Partnership on Development Effectiveness (BPDE) – provides an international framework to increase the effectiveness of aid.\textsuperscript{26} The AAA explicitly recognizes “gender equality, respect for human rights, and environmental sustainability as cornerstones for development” and notes that it is “vital that [development cooperation] policies address these issues in a more systematic and coherent way.”\textsuperscript{27} Further, the AAA acknowledges the unique environment faced by fragile States and calls on donors and partners “to help ensure the protection and participation of women” in contexts of fragility, while the BPDE highlights the need to “accelerate efforts to achieve gender equality and the empowerment of women…. including in peace building and state building.”\textsuperscript{28}

Though more an analysis of the normative frame itself, it is important nonetheless to highlight the following here: the ongoing disconnect between donor’s rhetorical commitments to gender equality and resource allocation toward that end is troubling. In 2012, total aid fell by 4% in real terms, following a 2% fall in 2011. Though individually some governments met the commitment, OECD donors on the whole fell significantly short of reaching the 0.7% of GNI target for ODA: net ODA in 2012 was USD 125.6 billion or just 0.29% of their combined gross national incomes.\textsuperscript{29} Total support for gender equality (as measured by the gender equality policy marker of the OECD) accounts for

\textsuperscript{23} See Griffiths, Jessie (2012).

\textsuperscript{24} The documents framing this section include: Paris Declaration (2005), Accra Agenda for Action (2008), Aid in Support of Gender Equality in Fragile and Conflict Affected States, Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (2011), New Deal for Fragile States (2011), Development Cooperation Forum reports, EC/UN Partnership on Gender Equality for Development and Peace.


\textsuperscript{29} OECD, “Aid to poor countries slips further as governments tighten budgets,” accessed 26 October 2013, http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/aidtopoorcountriesslipsfurthergovernmentstightenbudgets.htm
only 16.3% of total ODA. Of the USD 20.5 billion in support of gender equality, only USD 3.2 billion (15.6%) went to projects with gender equality and women’s empowerment as the main objective.\textsuperscript{30}

Donor results in fragile States have been modest as well. While in 2010, 38% of ODA was spent in fragile and conflict affected contexts, half of that went to just seven countries.\textsuperscript{31} The amount spent on gender equality and women’s rights in these contexts is more difficult to discern. Using data from 2007-2008, the OECD found that aid in support of gender equality in fragile States accounted for 34% of total aid to fragile states.\textsuperscript{32} However, only 15% marked gender equality as a principal (main) objective, a similar percentage as with overall ODA.

In order to improve the way in which donors work in fragile states, the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States was launched at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011. Emphasizing country led and owned strategies (developed jointly with civil society), the New Deal identifies five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (including one on revenues and services) to enable better progress toward the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).\textsuperscript{33} Both the SG and women’s right groups have underscored the importance of ensuring women’s human rights and women’s priorities in the New Deal’s implementation.\textsuperscript{34}

2.5 MDGs and Post-2015

As the 2015 deadline for the MDGs approaches, the United Nations, Member States, and civil society are discussing the development framework that will emerge. The report of the High Level Panel on Post-2015\textsuperscript{35} and the SG’s report on accelerating progress in the MDGs and advancing the Post-2015 framework\textsuperscript{36} made efforts to define clear financing targets. Yet, as women’s rights groups have noted, these documents failed to discuss how funding is delivered, obscuring the fact that “financing for gender equality must move away from fragmented, short-term funding to longer term partnerships that are predictable and flexible, and provide multiyear support.”\textsuperscript{37} Like the MDGs, the Post-2015 framework will likely define the funding priorities for most donors for the coming decade (and beyond). As such, it will be critical that Member States “recognize the connections between the WPS agenda and the Post-2015 process, and ensure that [for example] discussions of the Open Working


Group on Sustainable Development Goals and other relevant processes reflect this.\textsuperscript{38}

In short, UN Member States have affirmed the importance of financing gender equality and women’s rights through these and other international conventions, declarations, and agreements. These obligations and processes shape the normative frame in which financing NAP 1325 is embedded and can be used as tools to hold governments to account on their funding commitments.\textsuperscript{39}

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While commitments to financing for gender equality and women’s rights and, therefore, to financing the implementation of NAP 1325 have been made, coherence among policies and processes is often limited or non-existent. There is a critical need to ensure that, for example, the Financing for Development discussions, which are presently picking up, and ongoing Aid Effectiveness talks integrate gender equality and women’s rights in a systematic manner. Similarly, and discussed further below, gender mainstreaming and gender responsive budgeting are often utilized within policy making to translate gender equality commitments into action. It is important to mention at the onset of the paper the need to further examine 1) how these tools are actually used and 2) the impact of their application on generating sustainable financing for women’s rights and, ultimately, advancing gender equality and women’s human rights in a meaningful way.


\textsuperscript{39} While there are regional processes and commitments (for example, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women) that address financing for development (and are specifically relevant to financing for women’s rights, peace and security), it is outside the scope of the paper to do a comprehensive regional review. However, we may refer to particular examples as needed.
3 Findings: How governments finance NAP 1325 implementation

The range of ways in which governments tackle the financing and implementation of NAPs is broad, with some taking a narrow approach to women’s rights and gender equality and others developing more holistic policies. This section summarizes the results of the survey of 42 Member States conducted by GNWP and Cordaid in July 2013. The survey examines whether governments with a NAP 1325 are providing sufficient funding for its implementation and, if so, through which modalities, mechanisms, and sources. The survey also examines which areas of the NAP 1325 are prioritized and aims to capture the funding landscape in which civil society working to advance NAP 1325 implementation operates.

3.1 Financing for NAP 1325 development and implementation is mostly un-earmarked

Earmarking funds (marking funds for a specific use) can improve the effectiveness and outcomes of NAP 1325 development and implementation. Yet, only a minority of governments earmark funds for NAP 1325 development and implementation.

3.1.1 Earmarking for NAP 1325 Development

The majority of governments responding to our survey do not have earmarked funding for the development of a NAP 1325: out of 23 responding governments, eight reported earmarked funds while 15 reported no earmarked funds (see Figure 1).

**Figure 1.** Is there earmarked funding for the development of a National Action Plan (NAP) on SCR 1325 in your country?

A breakdown of the data shows regional disparity, with the majority of European countries in the sample (11 out of 15) reporting no earmarked funding, while the majority of African countries (3 out of 4) reported earmarked funding for (a portion of) NAP 1325 development. Georgia reported no earmarked funds, Nepal reported earmarking and the Philippines did not respond to this question.

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41 Development, while not defined in the survey, can be understood as the process leading up to the adoption of the NAP, including consultation with all stakeholders.
Chile (South America) and Australia (the Pacific) both reported no earmarked funding for NAP 1325 development.

3.1.2 Earmarked Funding for NAP 1325 Implementation

Similarly, the majority of governments responding to our survey did not report earmarked funds for NAP 1325 implementation. Out of 24 responses, 11 governments reported that they had earmarked funds, while 13 reported that they did not (see Figure 2). Of those reporting earmarked funds, Ghana, for example, reported having earmarked funds (GHC 15,524.00 or approximately USD 7,000) for the sensitization of security sector institutions. Another example is the Netherlands, who reported earmarking EURO 4 million (or approximately USD 5.5 million) from their Ministry of Foreign Affairs annually for projects in their group of focus countries. Notably, more governments earmarked funds for implementation than for the development of the NAP, with one country in the sample, Ireland, reporting earmarked funding for the development of the NAP 1325 but not for its implementation.

Figure 2. Is there earmarked funding for the implementation of National Action Plan (NAP) on SCR 1325 in your country?

3.1.3 Implications of lack of earmarking

1. Earmarked funding vs. mainstreaming

Though differences in the way it is utilized, gender mainstreaming, mainstreaming of NAP 1325, and/or mainstreaming UNSCR 1325 into existing offices, activities, and/or budgets is often cited as to why earmarked funds for NAP implementation are not needed. As stated by Australia, for example, “gender equality is mainstreamed [and] for this reason, funds are not specifically earmarked for the implementation of the NAP. [Rather] funding is integrated into existing policies and programs.” Echoing this, Denmark notes “implementation of UNSCR 1325 is mainstreamed in Denmark’s defense, foreign, and security policy.” However, Denmark goes on to note that while “this has led to the implementation of many targeted initiatives... as is often the case with mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues, ensuring consistent consideration of the 1325 throughout all relevant programs has been a challenge.” In the Philippines, the GAD Budget Policy stipulates that all government bodies (at
both national and local level) must allocate at least five percent of their total budget to gender and development and include gender in their plans and budgets. NAP 1325 activities are expected to be mainstreamed into each agency’s national GAD plan and budget, with funds specifically for NAP 1325 implementation – though the extent to which this actually occurs is uncertain. There are, therefore, different ways in which gender and NAP 1325 mainstreaming is being implemented.

While gender mainstreaming can work with high-level leadership and dedicated resources, mainstreaming has, in certain instances, become an exercise in ticking boxes, divorced from its original transformative intent: transformation in power relationships and resource allocation. As Caren Grown et al. has argued, when mainstreaming has been applied, policy initiatives for gender equality and women’s empowerment flounder. Since mainstreaming has not been linked to funding across all sectors, there are often insufficient resources to implement it. Indeed, ensuring that NAP 1325 is prioritized and addressed consistently and systematically throughout all government agencies remains a common challenge. As Lydia Alpizar powerfully notes:

“If we are to transform development cooperation to advance the full range of women’s rights (and not simply a reductionist vision of empowerment), there is a need to move beyond gender mainstreaming conceptually…toward ensuring that women’s rights and gender equality are central development goals in their own right and at the core of development.”

Additionally, mainstreaming has shown to hamper tracking and evaluation efforts as well as the ability to hold governments to account for (financing) commitments to women’s rights and gender equality.

While gender mainstreaming efforts may improve, women’s role in decision-making from the onset remains problematically uncertain: we must ask who developed the policies and programs into which gender is mainstreamed. What is evident is that deep structural and institutional changes must occur in order to ensure that financing and development policies serve to uphold rather than undermine women’s rights.

ii. Earmarked, but insufficiently so

Even those governments with earmarked NAP funding can find themselves struggling. While most African governments report earmarked funding for both NAP 1325 development and implementation, the earmarked amount was not always sufficient for its intended purpose. As Liberia noted, “even when [earmark funding] was given, it was inadequate to effectively implement the activities [for which it was intended], adversely affecting the overall impact [of the activity].” Additionally,

earmarked funding may only be for certain aspects of NAP 1325 implementation, as opposed to its entire implementation, as Switzerland explained: “[the] earmarked budget is available for the work of the gender advisors.” Therefore, costing both the development and implementation of the NAP 1325 at the onset is critical in order to ensure that where funds are dedicated, they are sufficient.

iii. The multiple levels, scope, and stakeholders of earmarking

Earmarking can theoretically occur at various “levels”: during the federal appropriation process, within ministerial budgets, or within sources not directly provided by the State, such as the UN or bilateral governments, indicating that regardless of where funds originate, they can be earmarked for NAP-specific purposes. For example, when asked if there are earmarked funds for NAP 1325 development, Macedonia noted that funds were earmarked through UN Women, under the regional project “Advancing Implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in the Western Balkans (2011-2013)

Moreover, earmarking can vary in scope: for example, funds can be earmarked for NAP implementation specifically, for UNSCR 1325, or for WPS more broadly. While the survey asked about earmarking for NAP implementation specifically, we received responses that spoke to all three areas. Norway, for example, has “chosen to earmark parts of relevant budgets [including within its development cooperation budget] to women, peace and security, rather than earmarking funding for the implementation of the NAP.” As such, further examination of the advantages and disadvantages of the scope selected for earmarking is warranted.

A last point: Though funds can be earmarked, it is important to examine whether funds earmarked for NAP purposes are actually utilized accordingly. In other words, are funds dedicated to NAP implementation being spent on NAP implementation?
3.2 The origin of financing for NAP implementation varies greatly, with implications for tracking, monitoring, and accountability

While funds may not be specifically earmarked, aspects of NAP implementation are funded. Funding for NAP 1325 development and implementation can originate internally through the public budget (via taxes), or externally, through bilateral governments, multilateral (UN) contributions, international/regional NGOs, private foundations, and corporate philanthropy. Identifying the origin of financing can be complicated, however. For example, a local CSO may have reported funds originating from an international CSO, who may, in turn, have received funding from a UN country office, which itself may have been supported through a government’s contribution. Thus the reply to a question of origin (of the same pot of funds) can vary depending upon who is asked.

Those that responded to the question about funding sources mostly reported internal finance, through the public budget. However, this is in large part due to the overrepresentation of European countries in the reporting. Of the 22 responding governments, 13 reported exclusively internal funding sources for NAP 1325 implementation, three reported exclusively external funding, while six reported relying on both internal and external funding sources.

Figure 3. If there are funds dedicated to the implementation of the activities in the NAP, from where do these funds originate (e.g. internally, through domestic resource mobilization, or externally, from bilateral contributions, private foundations, corporate philanthropy, international organizations, regional organizations and/or civil society?)

3.2.1 Implications of financing origins for NAP 1325 implementation

i. Internal Funding Sources

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46 The regional breakdown shows that all but two European countries mobilized funds for NAP implementation exclusively internally, with only Macedonia reporting external funds for implementation, specifically from UN Women, and Estonia reporting implementation funded both internally and externally. Of the four African governments in the sample, two (Liberia and Senegal) cited funding for NAP 1325 implementation from external sources only (bilateral aid and the UN) while two (Côte D’Ivoire and Ghana) pointed to both internal (public budget), and external financing. Nepal, the Philippines, and Georgia, funded implementation with internal and external funds, while Australia and Chile both drew on internal sources.
In most cases, internal funding for NAP implementation comes from lead implementing agencies, which vary according to countries’ policies on peace and security and whether a country is experiencing armed conflict. As noted by Belgium (and echoed by Finland, Cote D’Ivoire, and others) “funding for NAP implementation derives from budgets of responsible ministries; each responsible ministry must find the funds for implementation through their own budget.” Similarly, Georgia shared that each “ministry must allocate their own internal resources from its approved annual budget for implementation without […] prior calculation of the required budget.” And Sweden, for example, stated that “[NAP] funds are allocated through the implementing agencies, funded through the [overall] state budget.”

While many countries explained that several agencies contributed funding, others, like Chile, noted that funding originates solely from the Ministry of Defense. Though it will take more to understand the context-specific implications of channeling funding through different ministries, ensuring that NAP 1325 is prioritized and addressed consistently and systematically throughout the whole of government remains a pervasive challenge.

Importantly, no survey respondents indicated the precise unit or department within the ministry responsible for the implementation of each specific NAP 1325 commitment or whether there is an overarching coordination body overseeing implementation. Yet, as Cote D’Ivoire notes, both of these are critical for action, accountability, and, often, further funding: “because we are lacking an effective coordination mechanism, no strategy for resource mobilization could be implemented.”

ii. Internal Funding Sources: Funding NAP implementation in other countries

Countries not directly affected by armed conflict typically implement the NAP 1325 as an extension of their foreign policy with funds originating from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, via development cooperation budgets, or from the Ministry of Defense, while countries experiencing conflict or in post-conflict periods often fund the implementation of the NAP through a Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Gender, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Justice, and/or the Ministry of the Interior. This marks an important distinction, as the majority of countries with internally funded NAPs are European countries that are not directly affected by conflict. The implementation of NAP 1325 in these countries falls under their foreign policy. Indeed “in such instances the importance of linking diplomacy, defense, and development policies (also known as the three D approach) is increasingly recognized and demanded.”

Indeed, our survey confirms the foreign policy component of European NAP 1325 implementation efforts: While a majority of governments (15 out of 24) in our sample reported providing funding to other countries for NAP development, implementation, and other UNSCR 1325 initiatives, the regional breakdown shows that this is mostly due to the number of European countries in our sample, which make up 14 out of the 15 countries (Australia being the other) reporting providing external funding. Only two European countries (Macedonia and Iceland) reported not providing NAP funding to other countries. None of the African, Latin American, or Asian countries in the survey sample funded NAP implementation in other countries.

47 Cabrera-Ballesea, Mavic and Nicola Popovic, (2011).
iii. External Funding Sources: The importance of local ownership and democratic control of externally funded NAP 1325 implementation

Among external sources, bilateral contributions (through ODA) and the UN system were named most frequently. “International organizations” were also listed – for example by Georgia, Liberia, and Macedonia – however, it was unclear from the responses which type of international organization this was and whether the support/cooperation was specifically financial. Whichever the origin, however, local ownership and democratic control of externally funded NAP 1325 implementation are critical factors by which the legitimacy and efficacy of a NAP implementation process must be assessed.

**Government to Government Funding for NAP Development, Implementation, and other UNSCR 1325 initiatives**

Of the countries that reported external funding sources, few specified the actual source. Of those that did, three noted bilateral contributions – Nepal, Estonia, and Liberia. However, information regarding the quality of the bilateral contribution (were conditions attached? was the funding predictable? did it support local priorities and infrastructure/systems development?) as well as the its destination (to government or civil society or both) was not provided in the replies. Such details, however, are key to gaining a fuller picture of funding. One detailed example provided is that of Nepal, which finances its NAP primarily through the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) led by the government of Nepal and comprising eight donor governments.48 The NPTF funds projects that advance peace and security, including projects that implement Nepal’s NAP 1325.49 Each project clearly outlines the implementing agency (the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, for example), the budget, a goal, and objective – all of which are critical to effective implementation.

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The United Nations

The UN system, especially UN Women (with a mandate to promote and monitor national and regional implementation of UNSCR 1325), is a major source of financing for implementation of UNSCR 1325 broadly, including through NAP 1325 development and implementation, capacity building, and direct support to women’s organizations advancing WPS. Survey respondents mentioned the UN as a source of external financing as well as a destination for finance. For example, Australia, Finland, Norway, and Denmark pointed to their support to WPS through the UN, including specifically UN Women and UNDP. UN managed Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTF) were also mentioned as a source of finance for WPS. For example, 22% of the United Nations Peace Fund for Nepal projects in 2012 addressed gender equality and/or the empowerment of women, representing 9% of total budget allocation.\(^{50}\)

As a source of external financing, UN Women was cited most frequently in replies, with UNDP (Liberia), OHCHR (Senegal), and UNFPA (Ghana and Nepal) also mentioned. However, only two respondents in the survey (Senegal and Macedonia) included specific amounts of funding contributed by the UN. The Burundian and Philippine case studies (Annex I) offered a slightly more robust picture with specific financing figures from the UN.

While the agreed conclusions from the 52\(^{nd}\) session of the Commission on the Status of Women (2008)\(^{51}\) underscored the need to track resources to advance gender equality within the UN System more effectively, including funds that are gender mainstreamed, it has proved significantly challenging to capture the amount spent by the UN system on NAP 1325 development and/or implementation specifically. This is likely due to methodological issues in identifying and marking NAP 1325 specific financing as well as challenges in differentiating NAP 1325 from broader WPS activities. An earmarked budget for NAP development and implementation – at UN headquarters and national and regional offices – would go far in addressing these and other challenges as would ensuring UN system-wide integration of women’s human rights.

Indeed, tracking is incredibly complex and, as the 2013 SG report on WPS states, progress toward meeting the UN goal of allocating a minimum of 15% of post-conflict peacebuilding projects to women’s empowerment remains hard to assess. This is, in part, due to variations in resource tracking mechanisms or gender markers used by different UN entities, with only 22% of UN agencies using a gender marker.\(^{52}\) As with the OECD gender marker, inconsistency/subjectivity in determining that which constitutes a project with a “principal” gender equality focus vs. a “significant” gender equality focus remains a challenge. Therefore, ensuring a standardized, system-wide use of the marker is essential to the mobilization of adequate and sustained resources for WPS (and tracking and monitoring efforts).

Finally, as a strategic entry point, UN Women and others have underscored the importance of national planning frameworks in post-conflict reconstruction and development (such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, UN Development Assistance Frameworks, and Post Conflict Needs Assessments) to

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\(^{52}\) Ibid.
advancing gender equality.\textsuperscript{53} While critical to shaping the reconstruction of a country, a study by UN Women found that, on average, fewer than 8% of actual budgets (for the implementation of, in this case, the PCNA) specifically mention women’s needs.\textsuperscript{54}

The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)

While no survey respondents listed the PBF as a source of financing in their responses, several of the case studies highlighted its role. The PBF operates in a range of countries, several of which have a NAP 1325.\textsuperscript{55} The PBF aims to allocate 15% of its resources to projects that advance women’s rights/gender equality and adopted a gender marker in late 2009 to better track these commitments.

The PBF aligns its priorities with a country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) typically developed jointly by government, the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, and civil society. It is therefore critical to ensure that NAP 1325 is systematically integrated into the PRSP and other post-conflict planning documents; these efforts are encouraged by the PBF. In 2007-2011, the PBF allocated a total of USD 264,862,180 within the countries in which it operates, with UN Women receiving 1.9% or USD 5,150,442.\textsuperscript{56} It is crucial (and indeed an obligation of the UN) that gender equality and women’s rights are integrated coherently and consistently into the plans and budgets of all UN offices operating within a country. This would go far toward supporting financing for NAP 1325.

Understanding the relationship between the PBF and other financing channels for peace and reconstruction critical to better tracking the amount of funding directed towards women’s rights and gender equality issues in a country. In Nepal, for example, the PBF, the NPTF, and the United Nations Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN) all operate and fund activities in support of the peace process. What is the relationship across these institutions? Is there coordination and harmonization in their financing efforts? What are the priorities for funding? How are gender equality and women’s rights taken up? These questions and others are critical to better understanding the financing landscape for peace and security in a country and the role of institutions with similar mandates.

International NGOs/CSOs

Two of the governments that responded to the survey noted that they received funds from international and local NGOs. For example, Georgia notes: “funding for NAP implementation is found within each ministry (not allocated at national budget level) […] at the same time, cooperation with international and local NGOs [support carrying out activities]”.

The case studies also highlight the role of international CSOs in financing NAP development and implementation. International CSOs can play a “re-granting” function: funding local civil society and smaller CSOs with funds they obtain through bilateral funding. In the Dutch case, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs funds four “co-financing” international NGOs, namely Cordaid, Oxfam Novib, Hivos and the Interchurch Cooperative for Development Cooperation (ICCO) – who work with and support local organizations in the priority countries identified within the Dutch NAP. The case studies

\textsuperscript{53} Cueva-Beteta, Hanny, Kuonqui, Christopher and Rodriguez, Limon B. (2008; 2010).
underscored the importance of international CSO aligning priorities with local groups, supporting local ownership and the implementation of local visions.
3.4 The Private sector

There is significant government interest in the role of the private sector in NAP 1325 implementation. When asked whether the private sector should participate in implementing NAP 1325, a majority of governments in our sample replied positively (15 out of 16). Indeed, the general sentiment was that the private sector could be a tool for development and compliment other financing as potential donors to and implementing partners of the NAP. However, some countries, like Germany, were a bit more cautious, noting that private sector involvement could be considered, but that it would need to be further assessed. Notably, Ireland voiced that they did not want the private sector involved, but did not provide further information as to why.

Figure 5. Does your country want the private sector to be involved in NAP 1325 implementation?

Implication of private sector involvement for governments

The private sector is a heterogeneous entity and the analysis of the impact on women’s rights of a corner store, for example, will vary tremendously from that of a transnational corporation (TNCs). That said, private sector actors ultimately face a profit motive,\(^{57}\) with women’s human rights, justice, peace, and sustainability – key goals of NAP implementation – potentially taking a back seat to capital accumulation and economic growth.\(^{58}\)

Furthermore, public-private partnerships (PPPs) within development are seeing an upswing as more traditional sources of development finance dwindle or become more uncertain. As noted by Bhumika Muchhala, “private partnerships, which are being upheld as a central mechanism to carry out infrastructure, development and public services projects, raise several concerns and risks for development, equity, affordability, governance, accountability and the developmental role of the


\(^{58}\) We must recognize the potential contradictions of private sector involvement: the private sector – particularly TNCs – have committed violations of women’s human rights, including labor rights, threats to women human rights defenders (particularly around land rights and use and GMOs), and the right to self-determination.
state."59 In the context of TNCs particularly, it should be noted that despite the discussion and focus on corporate social responsibly (CSR), the developmental and regulatory impacts of CSR remain highly questionable, with recent decades showing how anemic voluntary and self-regulatory mechanisms can be.60 Binding accountability mechanisms, such the recently call for a Peoples Treaty on Binding Obligations on Transnational Corporations, should be considered.61

While the private sector has supported important work related to gender equality – including, for example, programs tackling violence against women and research on reproductive health – further reflection on the role of the private sector in advancing WPS is warranted. Indeed, while the private sector is heterogeneous, its role in advancing peace and women’s rights must be carefully examined.

3.3 Many governments finance NAP 1325 implementation based on (shifting) national priorities and do not fund all pillars equally or adequately

3.3.1 Priority Areas within NAPs 1325

Governments that responded to the question offered a range of replies; however, strengthening women’s participation in decision-making (particularly within peace processes) and the prevention of sexual and gender based violence emerged strongly as priority themes. Other themes included, public awareness campaigns around UNSCR 1325 as well as increasing the capacity of civil society and government on UNSCR 1325 implementation (the latter of which focused particularly on conflict and gender sensitive planning, programming, and budgeting). The provision of social services, including dignified housing for internally displaced persons and education, was also identified as a priority.

Interestingly, Germany, Estonia, and the Netherlands mentioned themes that were not marked as funding for NAP implementation as such, but were development cooperation priorities that would, in theory, theoretically fall under NAP implementation. This included support for victims of sexual violence and female ex-combatants; improving access to justice for women; and improving judicial, health and education sectors. Only Ireland listed security sector reform as a priority.

It should be noted that some NAPs are focused on one or two thematic areas broadly, and, as is the case of the Dutch NAP, do not outline specific activities but rather wider themes and objectives (women’s leadership and political participation, in the Dutch case).62 While intended for flexibility and responsiveness, identifying funding for NAP implementation specifically is a distinctive challenge in these instances, as particular activities are not explicitly identified under broader themes.

62 These are: 1) Equal participation by women and men in peace and reconstruction processes at all decision-making levels. 2) Consistent integration of gender and UNSCR 1325 into all Dutch signatories’ policies and actions on fragile States and countries in transition and or peace building and reconstruction efforts in these States. 3) Increased awareness in the Netherlands, the European Union, the United Nations, and other regional and international bodies and their member States of the importance of gender and conflict and increased public support for UNSCR 1325. 4) Effective and efficient cooperation between NAP signatories and other relevant stakeholders to ensure worldwide implementation of UNSCR.
3.3.2 Implications of prioritization

i. Gaps in NAP implementation

Even well-funded NAPs are unevenly funded across thematic and priority areas and survey respondents detailed a range of gaps and challenges. The most frequently cited gap in funding identified in the sample was for participation and inclusion of women in the security sector and security sector reform broadly, followed by access to justice for survivors of sexual violence. Gaps in the “relief and recovery” pillar generally and lack of funding for awareness-raising on UNSCR 1325 were also mentioned.

There are many causes for gaps in funding for NAP 1325 implementation; frequently, governments cite not one but several intersecting causes for funding gaps that compound the challenges of implementing NAPs.

ii. Causes of Gaps in Funding

Lack of or limited political will

Governments frequently cite political will as a key cause of gaps in NAP 1325 financing and implementation. Both Estonia and Liberia mentioned this as a concern, among a broader set of issues.

Lack or limited capacity

Limited capacity to implement the NAP was noted as a challenge for ensuring financing for NAP implementation. Estonia, for example, shared that “lack of human resources and insufficient topical knowledge” contributed to financing and subsequently implementation shortfalls while Liberia noted that a “lack of technical capacities and ineffective/poor coordination among stakeholders [among other issues]” posed significant challenges.

Prioritization

Some governments explained that funding gaps are simply a consequence of prioritizing some goals over others in a given time period and, in time, those gaps would be closed.

Societal Norms

Some governments argue that the problem sits much deeper in underlying societal attitudes about gender equality and its importance. Senegal’s response, for example, elaborates that “[gaps] are due on the one hand, to gender stereotypes and secondly, the existence of some laws that have long hindered the involvement of women in…peacekeeping.”63 This problem is echoed by the Finnish government, which explains gaps “might be more a question of attitudes than funding as far as peace processes are concerned.” The consequences of this (and similar) attitudes about certain groups of people are illustrated by the Georgian response to the survey, describing that “the IDP community

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63 Original response: “Ces écarts sont dus d’une part, aux stéréotypes sexistes et d’autre part, à l’existence de certaines législations qui ont freiné longtemps l’implication des femmes dans les processus de recherche et de maintien de la paix. Toutefois, avec les récentes réformes, les femmes participent de plus en plus au traitement des questions de paix et de sécurité (par exemple depuis 2004, les corps militaires et paramilitaires sont ouverts aux femmes).”
was seen by donors and by the government as a vulnerable community requiring only assistance, [therefore] no development plans were created, [pertaining to the] necessity…[to] support inclusion into society.” Gaps, therefore, seem to be caused by a political resistance/opposition to women’s rights and gender equality, among others, as critical to a just society, rather than on technical/capacity constraints alone.64

**Budgetary constraints due to crisis**

Implementation gaps were also attributed to an overall funding challenge due to the ongoing fallout of the 2008 financial/economic crisis. Portugal stated “given the current budgetary constraints, there is a general difficulty in funding the NAP’s implementation across [all] thematic areas. Maintaining the current level of funding in the coming years will be particularly challenging.”

Addressing the causes of funding gaps is difficult and many governments report that a multidimensional and inclusive approach is necessary to tackle the underlying issues involved. Denmark, for instance, argued that “a stronger political focus could ensure better mainstreaming of SCR1325,” while the Estonian government added that the “promotion of gender equality [generally], lobbying, and education” would be critical to address funding gaps.

Addressing overarching economic/political challenges in a particular context was also listed as a key avenue to resolve some of the existing gaps. For example, Nepal stated that “overall development in the political situation in the country could benefit gaps. That would also enable stronger coordination between stakeholders. Central as well as local level mapping and monitoring could also be enhanced.” Indeed, on the latter, improving tracking and monitoring mechanisms would go far in ensuring accountability and transparency in NAP 1325 implementation.

Broadening the base of actors working to implement the NAP and, specifically, “encouraging private sector corporate social responsibility support” was noted by Ghana.

Finally, costing implementation and including this in the NAP itself could also address gaps in funding. As Liberia points out: “The LNAP when developed was not costed…this has created a serious challenge and setback in the implementation of the LNAP. A key challenge has been trying to mobilize financial support from donors and partners to implement the NAP.”

**3.4 Tracking and Monitoring mechanisms for NAP implementation are often inadequate**

Twelve out of 25 survey respondents did not reply to this question outright or responded in a way that did not allow a determination of whether monitoring and tracking mechanisms existed and, if so, whether they were, in fact, being used. The majority of governments that replied do not have the ability to track the money allocated and spent on NAP implementation specifically – only three responded that they do have (see Figure 6)

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64 For more information, see Kabeer, Naila (1994), Reversed Realities: Gender Hierarchies in Development Thought, Verso Books, New York, London.
**3.4.1 Implications of inadequate monitoring mechanisms**

**i. Monitoring commitments is a pre-requisite for transparency, accountability, and participation in NAP 1325 implementation**

Governments have an obligation to ensure transparency, accountability, participation, and equity in public policies, yet NAP financing measures often fail to meet these standards. To address this, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) frameworks should be developed at the onset, include indicators and targets for financing, and be detailed within the NAP itself. A clear delineation of which actors are responsible for the various M&E components – as well as NAP implementation activities in general – is crucial.65

While M&E frameworks are in place in some cases, the extent to which they capture financial commitments specifically was not always clear from the survey replies. Indeed, through we asked about the ability to track and monitor financing for NAP implementation, governments often spoke about monitoring NAP implementation generally. Indeed, monitoring and tracking how much is allocated and spent by different ministries for the implementation of NAP 1325 remains a challenge across all countries. Estonia captures this well: “treatment of [NAP financing specifically] is inhibited by the complexity of processing the statistical data…only financial allocations for development assistance and humanitarian aid are clearly measurable. As a consequence, [NAP reporting] focuses on qualitative rather than quantitative indicators for the majority of the activities, which make it difficult to make year-to-year comparisons [on financing].”

As mentioned above, mainstreaming NAP 1325 poses particular challenges for tracking financial commitments. As illustrated by Denmark “while different cross-cutting issues…are rated in Denmark’s internal program and project database for development cooperation, UNSCR 1325 does not constitute a separate issue.” Estonia concurs, noting “there is no uniform monitoring mechanisms

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for money [spent on the NAP]. This is mostly due to the fact that the activities of the NAP are not earmarked in budgets [and] monitoring is carried out [at the] state budget [level].” Clearly, earmarked funding would go a long way to address this, as would a harmonized tracking measure, allowing for proper comparison over time and place.

Some countries are developing an M&E system presently. Germany’s inter-ministerial working group on UNSCR 1325 is in the process of developing a monitoring and evaluation system for the second NAP 2016-2019. Though, from the survey reply, it was unclear if financing commitments will be included in that which is monitored and evaluated.

ii. Utility of current indicators in monitoring and assessing NAP Financing

Though there are indicators to track the implementation of UNSCR 1325, consistent and systematic use remains a challenge. Several indicators developed by the United Nations and the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP) focus on financing specifically:

- The proportion of allocated and disbursed funding to Civil Society Organizations (CSOs).
- The actual allocated and disbursed funding in support of programs that address gender sensitive relief, recovery, peace and security programs in conflict-affected countries.
- The number and percentage of women and girls receiving benefits through reparation programs, and types of benefits received.

A Note on Tracking within the UN Specifically

Accelerating efforts toward a UN system-wide financing for gender equality marker that allows for cross-country comparisons and comparisons across sector levels would be a critical step toward increased transparency and accountability. Encouragingly, the 2012 and 2013 SG Reports on WPS note that gender markers are being used by some within the UN system to track the proportion of funding to advance gender equality (though not NAP implementation specifically). For example, the PBF adopted a gender marker system in 2009 based on the 0-3 scoring system launched by UNDP. A score of 2 indicates gender equality as a “significant” objective of a project while a score of 3 is given to projects with gender equality as a “principal” objective. Though, as noted above, there is a lack of standardization around scoring.

3.5 The majority of governments do not employ gender responsive budgeting and, of those that do, specific funding for NAP 1325 is generally not a result

Gender responsive planning and budgeting is a tool to analyze revenues and expenditures from a gender equality perspective. It reveals the gendered nature of budgets and can illuminate biases in

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resource allocation. This is especially relevant for WPS, as inequality in resource allocation can be severe or exacerbated in conflict and post-conflict countries. As insufficient resources remains a key (if not the main) culprit in the lacuna between policy and implementation, GRB can play a critical role in identifying funds for interventions and thus holding governments to account for their rhetorical commitments. Theoretically, GRB can support conflict and post-conflict financing (including particularly aid/ODA and humanitarian funds) to support gender equality and, specifically, NAP 1325 implementation. Furthermore, in post-conflict contexts, a GRB lens is particularly critical, as “the macroeconomic frameworks set during the post-conflict period are likely to endure for many years.”

It is interesting to note that of the 17 governments that responded to the question of whether they use gender responsive budgeting, 10 reported to use the practice and seven reported that they did not. However, while some governments reported employing GRB, as Cote D’Ivoire and Nepal shared, “it does not necessarily produce funds for NAP implementation.” Both Georgia and Estonia shared that government received training on GRB and, while not presently employed as widely as would be ideal, gender budgeting is occurring.

3.6 The critical role of civil society – including particularly women’s human rights organizations, networks, and movements – in NAP development and implementation should be better recognized and supported

The survey asked about the role of civil society in NAP development and implementation as well as the financing landscape in which they operate. Of the respondents that answered the question, all reported that civil society, including both women’s rights groups, are involved in NAP development and implementation. However, the particular role played and the extent to which civil society shaped the agenda or vision (rather than implemented a vision of government) were not always shared.

The survey responses revealed that civil society organizations were seen as strong advocates for the development of a NAP 1325 and involved in the development process itself through consultations, submissions of substantive papers, membership on national steering committees, as experts to government, and, at times, as lead authors of the NAP 1325 (as was the case in the Philippines). CSOs also play a watchdog or oversight role, holding governments to account for their commitments. For example, Australia shared that “civil society organisations developed annual report cards which comment on the implementation of the NAP and are publically available.” In nearly all of the

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70 Khan, Zara (2009).

countries that replied to the survey, CSOs were listed as implementing partners and critical to the promotion and implementation of the NAP 1325, including at local/community level through, for example, localization efforts or sensitization and awareness raising. The extent to which civil society is able to be critical of government was not discussed, although this remains an important question.

The formation of networks or “working groups” comprised of CSOs working on WPS were, in certain cases, an upshot of the NAP 1325 development process itself. At other times, such networks were formed precisely to lobby governments to develop a NAP, such as Coalicion 1325 in Colombia and Team 1325 in Sri Lanka. The Dutch NGO Working Group 1325, another example of a network, is both a platform for collaboration with government and parliamentarians and a group that lobbies government.

3.6.1 Funding or resources channeled to civil society organizations

Survey respondents are split over funding civil society organizations – including women’s rights organizations – directly to advance the implementation of UNSCR 1325.
Figure 7. Are funding or resources channeled to civil society organizations, including particularly women’s rights organizations, to advance the implementation of SCR 1325? If so, how much (estimates acceptable)?

While 13 governments replied that funding was channeled directly to CSOs, the type of civil society group, including whether women’s groups were included, was not always reported. Given the diversity of civil society actors – and the range of development visions and ideologies they promote – it is important to disaggregate at this level. It was also reported that wider networks and coalitions of CSOs are also directly funded, as in the Philippines with the Women Engaged in Action on 1325 (WE Act 1325).

Funding for civil society organizations working on implementation of UNSCR 1325 (and specifically NAP 1325 implementation) can originate from a country’s own government, bilateral funds, the United Nations, foundations, women’s funds, or other civil society organizations (typically larger international CSOs). While the majority of respondents did not provide the specific source of financing, some did: Sweden, Australia, and Finland, for example, shared that they funded civil society through their international development agencies and Georgia noted that local women’s groups received funding from UN Women. The Netherlands reported that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides Euro 4 million for CSO collaboration in their NAP focus countries and the MENA region. The specific amount of financing, while included in some instances, was often not reported.

Civil society can also be funded by a consortium of governments/donors through a trust fund. In the context of Nepal, for example, the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) is piloting an initiative to fund civil society directly: “Peace fund for Non-government Actors (NGA).” Under the initiative, the NPTF has allocated USD 888,888.90 for NGOs. However, the selection process of NGOs was not transparent, prompting the 1325 Action Group – an alliance of NGOs and networks working on WPS – to raise concerns. As a result, the NPTF expressed its commitment to follow a consultative process for the next phase of the project. Currently, the NPTF is in the process of reviewing the concept notes submitted by eight selected NGOs.
Examining the United Nations’ role in financing civil society, particularly women’s rights groups, directly through country offices and its various multi-donor funds involved in peace and reconstruction, is imperative. Indeed, the range of ways in which UN country offices operate (particularly when it comes to resource allocation/funding civil society) ought to be of critical concern and further scrutinized. The case studies expound this issue further (See Annex I). Indeed, the six case studies provide a shaper picture of the state of financing for CSOs for NAP 1325, highlighting the complex realities of NAP 1325 development, implementation, and financing in the following countries: Burundi, Chile, Nepal, the Netherlands, the Philippines, and Sierra Leone.

3.6.2 Implications for Civil Society

Funding the work of CSOs is crucial to the promotion of UNSCR 1325. It is particularly important to fund women’s group (of all sizes) that work directly with those affected by conflict and support the work of grassroots and community-based initiatives, which, though they often face challenges in accessing funding, are typically the only providers of services and support.  

The landscape of funding for civil society in general and women’s groups in particular is complex, with an increasing array of actors, including governments, international NGOs, private foundations, women’s funds, the private sector, and the UN among those included providing finance. However, despite the multitude of actors funding women’s rights groups, “little information is available on allocation to these organizations…with much of women’s conflict prevention work still unrecognized and [lacking] consistent funding and institutional support.”

According to the OECD-DAC, from 2010-2011, USD 457 million of DAC donors’ funds went to women’s organizations and gender institutions (including national machineries), representing only 2.2% of all DAC screened funds dedicated to gender equality. Moreover, the largest dedicated multilateral agency for gender equality, UN Women, received USD 218 million in total contributions from governments in 2012, equaling roughly 4% of the total UN budget for 2012. This was not even half the target of USD 500 million that feminists and women’s groups expected (and lobbied hard for) UN Women to have in its first year.

While funding for WPS has increased since the passing of UNSCR 1325, most of the funds that have been made available for WPS do not reach smaller women’s groups and activities on the ground, where it is most needed. Furthermore, funding is often project-based rather than “core”,

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undermining the ability of women’s groups to be responsive and flexible and undercutting sustainable organizations and movements.  

As new research from the Association for Women's Rights in Development (AWID) notes, while a sharp spotlight on women and girls has emerged, it seems to have had relatively little impact on improving the funding situation for a large majority of women’s organizations around the world. “The ‘leaves’ – the individual women and girls – are receiving growing attention, without recognizing or supporting ‘the roots’ – the sustained, collective action by feminists and women’s rights activists and organizations that has been at the core of women’s rights advancements throughout history.”

Indeed, data from AWID’s 2011 global survey on funding trends for women’s rights groups reveals that while the median annual income from 2005 – 2010 has increased, the large majority of women’s groups remain small, due to challenges in mobilizing resources needed to fulfill program plans and visions. In fact, it was reported that many organizations reported having to cut activities or staff due to funding limitations. Furthermore, AWID’s survey findings shared that groups “most commonly received funding restricted for direct service provision, although groups themselves prioritized capacity building and women’s empowerment programs. Direct service provision was not even among the top ten strategies used.” This was echoed in our six case studies, as well.

3.7 There is an expressed interest in contributing to funding a Multi-Stakeholder Financing Mechanism for NAP implementation

A basket fund is a type of pooled funding arrangement where multiple donors’ funds are combined into a common pot (not distinguished from one another) to support a specific project or program. The fund is housed in an independent account and transferred directly to a government agency or department; funds do not pass through the national treasury, nor go through the normal budgetary process. Basket funds aim to support harmonization in donor contributions and alignment with country priorities.

In principle, most governments surveyed were open to the emerging idea of contributing to a basket fund (or multi-stakeholder financing mechanism) specifically to support NAP implementation. All European countries that responded to the survey question answered affirmatively; only one out of the two responding African countries would consider contributing funds to a basket fund (Liberia) while Cote D'Ivoire would not. Chile, Georgia, Estonia, and Nepal answered that they would not contribute to a basket fund (or similar modality) in a specific country for NAP implementation.
Figure 8. Would your government contribute to a basket fund (or multi-stakeholder fund) dedicated to financing the implementation of NAP 1325 in a specific country?
4 Conclusion and Recommendations

As of October 2013, there are 43 National Action Plans on UNSCR 1325. Between 2012 and 2013, one third of NAPs will be up for review or renewal and several other countries are in the process of drafting their NAPs. This presents an excellent opportunity to examine the gaps and strengthen NAP 1325 development and implementation, specifically through sustainable financing. In this spirit, the recommendations emerging from this study hope to contribute to the dialogue on financing and the effective implementation of NAPs.

Firstly, the recommendations presented in the Costing and Financing (2011) should be revisited, as they remain acutely relevant. Indeed, the 2011 report emphasizes overarching components that remain consistently important to the success of any NAP 1325: wide-reaching awareness raising campaigns; capacity-building; constituency building; creating political will at national and local levels; promoting and facilitating coordination between different actors involved in implementation; and a robust monitoring and evaluation framework. These components continue to resonate strongly: they were mentioned in both survey responses and case studies.

Both the survey responses and the case studies offered thoughtful recommendations on ways to strengthen NAP implementation and financing specifically. The recommendations below, while relatively general (and thus requiring nuance at the national and local level), aim to offer a springboard for further discussion.

1. Cost the NAP 1325 and earmark specific funding for its implementation.

This is a critical step toward NAP 1325 implementation. Costing implementation and including this figure within the NAP itself provides a clear picture of financing needs. Indeed a “realistic and transparent assessment of existing resources and capacities as well as needs is one of the important components of effective planning and implementation of NAP 1325…and resource mobilization should be based on this assessment.”

Funds should be earmarked for NAP 1325 implementation specifically and a “whole of government” approach should be taken for NAP financing. That is, all government bodies should contribute budget to NAP 1325 implementation. As the report showed, the financial resources to fund implementation at national and international levels are difficult to track; earmarking would go a long way in addressing this and in supporting transparency and accountability for financing for gender equality and women’s rights.

Local ownership and buy-in of key government actors and ministries is critical to generate financing. If the NAP 1325 is politically supported, then government will be more inclined to allocate resources for the implementation and monitoring and evaluation in national budgets.

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82 See recommendations in Cabrera-Balleza, Mavic and Nicola Popovic, (2011).
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
When a dedicated earmarked budget is not created – and instead mainstreaming is relied upon – policy evaporation (with NAP 1325 implementation falling by the wayside) may take place, as priorities of governments may shift. If mainstreaming NAP 1325 thematically is used, ensure that dedicated resources are also committed and funds can be tracked and accounted for. Without this, the ability of civil society and the public at large to hold governments to account for their commitments is undermined.

2. **Establish a transparent and inclusive financial management platform for NAP 1325 implementation.**

The establishment of a dedicated funding mechanism for NAP 1325 implementation – such as a multi-stakeholder financing mechanism (MFM) – can enhance harmonization, coordination, and transparency in financial management. A MFM should be composed of all NAP 1325 stakeholders, including donors, governments, civil society, the UN, and potentially the private sector. A MFM can also offer a space for coordination, knowledge sharing, and political dialogue.85

Attached in Annex II is a generic fund management plan for a MFM, based on and building upon the UN Development Group’s (UNDG) Guidance Note on Establishing, Managing and Closing Multi-Donor Trust Funds. This template can be used as a guide should one wish to set up a MFM.

3. **Budgets should be reviewed from a gender equality perspective; allocations should support gender equality and be guided by human rights and social justice principles.**

Both revenue generation and expenditure should be analyzed from a gender equality perspective and guided by human rights and social justice principles. For example, revenues from extractive industries, such as mining, can be used to support NAP 1325 implementation. Though, this requires, inter alia, international cooperation on taxation. Expenditures, including military and defense budgets in particular, should be scrutinized and revised, shifting funds to support health, education, and infrastructure development in a gender equitable way. Gender responsive planning and budgeting is one tool to examine expenditures and efforts should be made to develop the capacity to implement this tool. The UN can potentially support this capacity building.

4. **Ensure funding for all areas and all pillars of the NAP 1325.**

Recognizing that some pillars or areas of the NAP 1325 may take priority at certain points, funding for full implementation should be the goal. Furthermore, while NAP 1325 implementation often must be sequenced, funding should aim to support a holistic vision (rather than project-based) of implementation, keeping in mind the broader goal of advancing WPS.

5. **Guarantee clear lines of responsibility and accountability for NAP 1325 implementation.**

Include within the NAP 1325 itself an accountability matrix clearly detailing the actions, expectations, and contributions of all stakeholders in NAP 1325 implementation. The specific actor (whether

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85 Menon, Saraswati, 2012.
government, civil society, the UN, or another) responsible for carrying out a particular activity should be explicitly noted and timelines for implementation included.

6. **Improve coordination and promote collaboration among different actors involved in NAP 1325 implementation and financing.**

The landscape is complex and there is a range of actors involved in NAP 1325 implementation in general and in NAP financing specifically. Coordination among NAP 1325 stakeholders – and specifically among financing sources – continues to be a challenge, often ad hoc and opaque. The formation and adequate funding of a national secretariat or forum mandated to ensure effective coordination of all stakeholders ought to be considered. This would, for example, support transparency and avoid duplication of efforts. A mapping of actors financing NAP 1325 implementation in a given context may prove useful toward coordination, as would “broad level strategic planning and a road map clearly identifying stakeholders’ roles, their projects, and deliverables.” 86

The case studies and surveys pointed to power dynamics within governments themselves and the role of the governing/ruling party in shaping the implementation (or lack thereof) of NAPs. Power dynamics within governments themselves must be brought to light and discussed: women, peace and security must not be used as a “bargaining chip,” disregarded or subverted should there be changes in government leadership.

7. **Ensure coherence across government policies for NAP 1325 implementation as well as among funding sources.**

Policies across government should be consistent with the goals and activities of the NAP. As mentioned above, the development of an inter-ministerial forum for coordination and information sharing could advance efforts toward this end. Furthermore, working to clarify the differences among “financing for women, peace and security,” “financing for UNSCR 1325,” “financing for NAP 1325,” and “financing of other national gender equality and women’s rights polices” would support greater conceptual clarity, the lack of which tends to result in financing confusion, overlap, gaps, and unclear lines of responsibility.

It will also be important to ensure coherence among the various financing sources for peace and reconstruction with the NAP 1325 as well as between these sources and NAP specific financing (should it exist). For example, as the New Deal for Fragile States takes hold and financing is committed, funding for implementation must be in line with, and support UNSCR 1325 implementation, in harmony with other financial flows for peace and development, such as those of the PBF and other UN multi-donor funds.

8. **Develop (or utilize existing) monitoring and evaluation mechanism with gender sensitive indicators.**

86 See Nepal case study in Annex I.
Include a monitoring and evaluation framework within the NAP, with gender sensitive indicators, targets, outcomes, and concrete timelines for implementation. Should an existing framework to track progress in financing for gender equality and women’s rights exist these can also be used. Data collection, disaggregated by sex, region, and ethnicity, should be improved, adequately funded, and undertaken on a regular basis.

Monitoring and evaluation should be rigorous and should highlight the areas in which funding gaps exists. An institutional structure to track the progress of NAP 1325 through regular assessment and reviews of implementation should be developed or utilized if already in place. All stakeholders, including particularly women’s groups and CSOs working on women, peace and security, should have meaningful participation in this space. This information should be publicly available and outside/external monitoring and evaluation should be considered.

9. Donors should provide predictable, long-term, and substantial financial and other resources for NAP 1325 implementation, and channel this particularly through women’s rights groups.

Toward this end, donors should finance NAP 1325-specific projects in addition to projects that mainstream gender or UNSCR 1325. Financing must be quality: predictable, timely, without conditions that undermine policy space or the democratic functioning of a government/organization. Funding should genuinely align with national and local priorities. Furthermore, donors should disaggregate and track funding at the level of NAP 1325 implementation or, at minimum, implementation of UNSCR 1325. Earmarked budgets – at ministerial level or within the budgets of embassies, for example – would further ensure that funds are spent on NAP implementation and would, in addition, support planning.

Donors should fund women’s organizations of all sizes as critical knowledge holders and actors in advancing peace, human security, and justice. As noted in recommendation ten, funding should foster movement building through, for example, core rather than project-based funding and funding should support advocacy and longer-term transformational work. Funding applications should be less onerous and adaptive/flexible to the needs of organizations of varying sizes (including women’s organizations with smaller budgets) and attentive to the complexities of capturing social transformation work. Criteria for project approval should be transparent while funding and M&E should be seen as a learning partnership. 87

Funding for specific initiatives – i.e. to increase women's participation in peace mechanisms, support justice and reparations for survivors of SGBV, as well as to support the role of women in media and politics – was highlighted in the case studies as particularly vital.

Finally, donors should also consider supporting a MFM to further ensure coordination and harmonization across funding.

87 See AWID M&E Wiki at http://awidme.pbworks.com/w/page/36050854/FrontPage
10. Respect the rights and strengthen the institutional capacity of women’s human rights defenders, organizations, networks, and movements. They have been and continue to be critical to the advancement of peace and security.

Promote the full participation of women’s rights organizations in all phases of NAP 1325 development and implementation, including in the M&E of the NAP. Civil society and human rights defenders must be supported in their work; to wit, the marginalization of civil society by the state (or a particular government in power) and the suppression or criminalization of dissent or critique in certain contexts/times is a violation of the right to free political expression and undermines democratic practice. Indeed, any attempt to marginalize, discredit, or discriminate against women’s organizations, feminists, or women’s human rights defenders is unacceptable. Civil society and particularly women’s rights groups should be encouraged to operate freely and without fear of recourse.

Networks of civil society organizations – including particularly women’s rights organizations – advancing women, peace, and security should be created at national and local level. This has at times emerged organically from the NAP 1325 development process itself. Women’s organizations should be encouraged to share information with other women’s groups on future work plans and work in progress in order to identify areas of collaboration. Funding should support working together in such a manner, rather than promoting competition among women’s groups, and international CSOs operating in local contexts should be aware of the ways in which their operation can potentially undercut or marginalize local organizations and ensure that ways of working support genuine partnership and local knowledge/ownerships.

Capacity development for women’s rights organizations in various areas, including in advocacy, watchdog roles, and generating and managing their own financial resources dedicated to NAP 1325 implementation should be prioritized. On the latter, innovative fundraisers – such as cookouts, tree planting, yard sales, and merchandise sales – can generate funds to cover recurrent expenditure and other expenses.

Furthermore, several case studies discussed specific work women’s groups ought to continue: women’s groups should continue to lobby for government to ratify and implement international/regional human rights commitments, including CEDAW, ICESCR, the Beijing Platform for Action and the African Union’s women’s protocol.

11. The United Nations should finance NAP 1325 development and implementation, support information exchange, including through South-South cooperation, and fund capacity building, including in Gender Responsive Budgeting.

The UN should create more spaces to share experiences of NAP 1325 development and implementation, leveraging the significant knowledge and expertise of different actors and countries and further support capacity building initiatives.

The UN should also fund more initiatives to strengthen the WPS agenda, including the development and implementation of NAP 1325, Regional Action Plans (RAPs), Local Action Plan development and awareness-raising on UNSCR 1325.

Budgets for WPS (at both international and national level) should include earmarking of NAP specific work, supporting tracking and accountability, and should meet the target of at least 15% of UN-managed funds for peacebuilding for women’s specific needs, the advancement of gender equality, and/or empowerment of women, as outlined in the 7-Point Action Plan. Toward this end, it is critical to ensure that NAP 1325 and, indeed, gender equality are systematically integrated within all development planning documents and the plans of all UN offices operating within a country.

The UN can also play a role in strengthening the capacity of policy-makers in government and civil society organizations to advance gender equality and women’s rights. Training on the concept of gender, on international agreements on gender equality and women’s rights, gender mainstreaming, and gender responsive planning and budgeting and evaluating need to be supported.

12. **Further reflect upon and examine the role of the private sector in NAP 1325 implementation.**

The potential role of the private sector in NAP 1325 implementation should be further analyzed. As noted in the 2011 in Costing and Financing, while the private sector is heterogenous with varying visions and ways of working, the private sector has undermined human rights, threatened human rights defenders and democratic practice. Nuancing this discussion by examining the sector in its diversity and the factors which support a human-rights approach to WPS will be important for determining ways of engaging and cooperating. The UN Global Compact, though currently voluntary, offers a good starting point for developing binding agreements for private sector actors to ensure that human rights are protected.

13. **Coordinate the Formation of a NAP Financing Support Group.**

The UN Peace Building Support Office in partnership with UN Women should coordinate the formation of a NAP Financing Support Group composed of UN agencies with mandates to implement the WPS resolutions, civil society, donor organizations and foundations, donor and recipient countries, and the private sector to stimulate cross-learning on NAP financing and explore different financing mechanisms for sustainable finance.

14. **Organize a Donor Conference and Establish a Global Fund on UNSCR 1325.**

UN Women should consider organizing or support the organization of a Donor Conference to discuss NAP financing challenges in depth and concrete ways forward. A Global Fund on 1325 should be established which, coupled with a dedicated multi-stakeholder financing mechanism at country level, would contribute significantly to sustainable funding for 1325 implementation.

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Annex I: Case Studies

Case Study: BURUNDI
Financing for the Implementation of National Action Plan on UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325
Author: Christian Ngendahimana and Seconde Nyanzobe of Fontaine Isoko

I. Background
Despite the significant impact of conflict and the crucial role women play in peace and reconstruction, women were prevented from participating equally in the Arusha peace negotiations. Through strong advocacy, though, women obtained permanent observer status in the negotiations, advocating for the inclusion of women in peace processes.

While progress on peacebuilding and recovery such as the programs supported by the UN Peacebuilding Commission has been made, challenges in reconciliation, DDR, transitional justice, and women’s rights remain. In order to ensure the equal participation of women in peacebuilding, economic recovery, and development efforts, a NAP 1325 was developed. Adopted in December 2011, the NAP is grounded in and shaped by existing policies, including the national gender policy, the national strategy against GBV, Vision Burundi 2025, and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (CSLP). The NAP’s implementation is led by the National Steering Committee, comprised of government, the UN, and civil society, including women’s rights groups.

The priority areas within the NAP are ) the promotion of the NAP 2) equal participation of women in decision-making 3) the inclusion of women in peace negotiations and peacekeeping operations 4) strengthening the mechanisms that protect women’s rights in conflict and post-conflict contexts and 5) integrating women’s specific needs in post conflict programs. While insufficient funding for the above continues, deeper gaps in other areas remain.

II. Financing the NAP’s implementation
Funds, though insufficient, are available for NAP implementation from both internal and external sources, though the large majority (roughly 85%) originate externally. In the 2013 budget, a budget line (14.418.000 BiF) for NAP implementation was created by the Burundian government, with funds going to the Ministry of National Solidarity, Human Rights and Gender, the ministry in charge of gender equality and NAP implementation. However, it should be noted that the entire budget of the

91 Burundi (together with Sierra Leone) is a pilot country for the Peacebuilding Commission. See: http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/doc_burundi.shtml
92 RDEX (Repatriates, Demobilized and ex- combatants) and the SSD (Security Sector Development) have also served as a foundation to the NAP. The SSD program, in line with the NAP activities, is funded by the Dutch, beginning in 2009 and covering a period of eight years. Estimated cost is 10 million Euros of which 188,000 Euros will be allocated for the integration of women (goal 10%) in the police. The Burundian Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Defense (together with former combatants), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International cooperation agencies are the primary implementers.
93 Namely in 1) legal reforms in favor of gender equality 2) accounting for the rights and needs of women and girls in post conflict justice and 3) a coordination mechanism for the systematic implementation on NAP 1325.
94 Interview and opinion of Goreth NDACAYISABA, CSO Dushirehamwe and member of the Steering Committee, 12 August 2013, emphasizing the point that the majority of funding for NAP implementation originates externally.
Financing for implementing NAP

Ministry is only 0.74% of the national budget overall,95 perhaps reflecting a lack of sensitivity and priority of gender equality and women’s rights overall.

External funding for NAP implementation originates through Official Development Assistance (ODA), such as that from AusAid in Australia; the United Nations and international NGOs including Cordaid, FAS and GNWP) and is directed at both the Burundian government as well as to civil society.

On the UN, for example, both UN Women and UNFPA contributed funds for NAP implementation. More specifically, UNFPA’s funding has focused on gender based violence while UN Women has focused on the promotion of women’s leadership as well as awareness raising on SCR 1325 and NAP implementation. UNFPA allocated an estimated 100,000 USD in 2012 on GBV prevention whereas the total budget spent by UNFPA’s Gender Unit in 2012 was roughly 418,000 USD. In 2013, the estimated budget allocated to UNFPA’s Gender Unit decreased to 356,400 USD. While a source of financing for peace and reconstruction more broadly, the Peacebuilding Fund for Burundi has, as of 2013, allocated a total of USD 49.2 million, of which UN Women received roughly 7%.96 The PBF will align its priorities with Burundi’s CSLP II. As such, it will be critical to examine the extent to which the CSLP II is coherent with UNSCR 1325 and the NAP.97 Toward that end, CSOs advocated for the integration of women’s priorities in CSLP II and some demands such as women’s participation, economic recovery, and the promotion of women’s rights were taken up.98

Financing remains a challenge for several reasons, including a lack of awareness on the NAP itself (due, in part, to its recent adoption), conceptual confusion about that which is funded under the NAP and that which falls under other gender equality promotion programs, and a lack of gender sensitivity among certain Burundian authorities.99 Moreover, while the NAP Steering Committee provides an existing structure for implementation, capacity is lacking and funds need to be raised to operationalize its functioning.

**Basket Fund: A Central Bank Fund In Progress**

A Multi-stakeholder Financing Mechanism (MFM) for the implementation of the NAP held promise for dedicated, coordinated, and transparent NAP financing. Despite much effort, issues of buy-in and continuity have stalled its implementation, due in part to demand that government fundraising be a comprehensive/global endeavor.100 However, in a donor meeting in Bujumbura in July 2013 that focused on the CLSP II, the “gender sector” was on the agenda and the MNSHR&G presented three projects to advance gender equality and peace: 1) women’s economic empowerment 2) women’s

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95 More specifically, the MNSHR&G received 9,694,433,360 BIF in 2012, including 14,418,000 BIF (0.1487% of the full budget allocated to the Ministry) for NAP implementation. See: General Budget Review law adopted on the 30 July 2013.
96 See: http://www.unpbf.org/countries/burundi/
97 The link between the CSLP II and the UNSCR 1325 is mentioned in p. 63-65, particularly paragraph 281, of the CSLPII. See: http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/Burundi_CSLP_II.pdf
98 Interview with Goreth NDACAYISABA, from Dushirehame and member of the NSC 1325.
99 Interview with Clemence BUNUNAGI, Vice President of the NSG, Gender and Governance Program Head, UN Women, on 05 August 2013.
100 Interview with Goreth NDACAYISABA, from Dushirehame and member of the NSC 1325, on 22 August 2013 and comment from Mrs. Victoire Nahimana, Permanent Secretary in the MNSHRG, who states that the Government fundraising approach must be global and the Ministry therefore adhered to the Government’s approach. The consequence is that 1325 NAP is not taken specifically and the recent sectorial conference provided evidences because only 3 projects have been presented to donors instead of presenting the NAP in its entirety.
participation in decision making and 3) sexual and gender based violence. While NAP 1325 was not explicitly on the agenda, the three project areas are based on the priorities of the NAP.

Conceptually similar to the previously proposed MFM, the government has opened a bank account – housed in the central bank – to manage the funds contributed by donor governments and UN agencies toward these three projects. UN Women has contributed USD 740,000 to the economic empowerment project to support microfinance programs for women and a Steering Committee has been created to manage UN Women’s contribution.\textsuperscript{101} Should all three projects be fully funded, a basket fund or MFM set-up is being considered and further arrangements, including the name of the fund, its management and M&E structures will be decided upon by the Ministry, the Central Bank and donors.\textsuperscript{102}

III. Civil Society
From NAP visioning and development onward, CSOs have played a key role. For example, Dushirehamwe (a women’s rights organization) led NAP drafting and civil society organizations, including women’s groups, are involved in the implementation of the NAP. Civil society is also members of the NSC 1325, though questions on the quality of their participation remain (in part due to the fact the NSC itself is not operational).\textsuperscript{103}

Among others, Fountain-ISOKO, BLTP, CAFOB, DUSHIREHAMWE, WAP, AFRABU, and the National Women Forum, have received funding (including multi-year funding) from a range of sources for NAP implementation, including the UN (UN Women),\textsuperscript{104} the Dutch and Swiss governments, and international NGOs, including Cordaid.\textsuperscript{105} See the table below. However, challenges remain: both civil society and the state lack fundraising capacity and a lack of coordination among and transparency on financial flows for 1325 continues, as funds are not well tracked. The Civil Society Working Group on Women, Peace and Security has been created, however, to attempt to address these issues and specifically issues related to fund tracking and impact on beneficiaries (in order, too, to highlight gaps in NAP financing). More broadly, the Working Group hopes to build capacities for NGOs on advocacy, fundraising strategies, intervention coordination, and monitoring and reporting.

Table 1: Funds received by Civil Society for NAP implementation (list is not a full representation – it only captures what was shared by CSOs with the researchers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Funds</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Thematic</th>
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101 The steering committee for this specific fund is comprised of the MNShR&G and the Ministries of Agriculture, Commerce and Finance, Microfinance Institutions Network, two CSOs, UN Women, UNDP and the IIB.
102 Interview with Ms. Victoire Nahimana, Permanent Secretary, MNShR&G.
103 Civil society on the NSC are DUSHIREHAMWE, CAFOB, AFRABU, FAS and BWPD.
104 It is impossible to estimate the amount of funds received by different CSO actors because most are not willing to share such information. However, in 2012, UN Women allocated funds to print 2500 copies of the Burundian NAP and supported the Open Day, an occasion given to stakeholders to advocate for the implementation of the UNSCR 1325. In 2013, UN Women allocated 82,000 USD to promote women’s leadership and 10,000 USD for Open Day 2013. It has also allocated 400,000 USD for the establishment and capacity building of the National Women National Forum. Moreover, UN Women allocated 229,000 USD for institutional capacity building for economic empowerment. For the years 2012 and 2013, UN Women has estimated 500,000 USD on sexual and gender based violence prevention. This information was shared in an Interview with Marie Jose KANDANGA, GBV, Women Rights and HIV Head of Unit, UN Women, Burundi, September 2013.
105 The full list of donors (although not comprehensive) included: the Netherlands Foreign Affairs Ministry, The Swiss Cooperation, UN Women, Cordaid, Award Fund for Women Peace and Security USA, Femmes Africa Solidarité (through the UN DAF), PLUS/CFI CEO, TROCAIRE, and the Burundian Government.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization 1</th>
<th>Organization 2</th>
<th>Organization 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Search for Common Ground- Burundi, AFEPABU, DUSHIREHAMWE and Fontaine-ISOKO</td>
<td>600 000 Euros</td>
<td>Netherlands Foreigner Affairs Ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLTP</td>
<td>160 000 Euros</td>
<td>CORDAID Women participation</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFRABU</td>
<td>90 000 Euros</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAFOB</td>
<td>225 000 USD</td>
<td>FAS/UNDAF UNSCR 1325 promotion and Advocacy for women leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUSHIREHAMWE</td>
<td>50 000 Euros</td>
<td>TROCAIRE Women and Citizenship</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 000 000 BIF</td>
<td>Switzerland Cooperation Women capacities building at local level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>130 000 USD</td>
<td>UN Women Women capacities building at local level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60 000 Canadian Dollars</td>
<td>PLUVIF/ CECI Gender based violence prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fontaine-ISOKO for Good Governance and Integrated Development</td>
<td>150 000 Euros</td>
<td>CORDAID Sexual and Gender based Violence prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>219 309 USD</td>
<td>AF- WPS/USA Promoting Victims’ rights and women effective participation in Truth and Reconciliation Commission for a lasting peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Women Forum</td>
<td>109.993.700 BiF</td>
<td>Republic of Burundi Capacity building</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Financing for implementing NAP

AFRABU: Association des Femmes Rapatriées du Burundi (Burundian Repatriated Women’s Association)

AF-WPS: Award Fund for Women Peace and Security

BLTP: Burundi Leadership Training Program

BWPD: Burundian Women for Peace and Development

CAFOB: Collectif des associations et ONG féminines du BURUNDI / Collective of Women’s Associations and Non-governmental Organizations in Burundi

CECI: Canadian Centre for International Studies and Cooperation

CEDAW: Convention on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women

CSLP: Cadre stratégique de Croissance et de Lutte contre la Pauvreté/Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

CSO: Civil Society Organization

DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

FAS: Femmes Africa Solidarité

GBV: Gender Based Violence

GNWP: Global Network of Women Peacebuilders

ILO: International Labor Organization

M&E: Monitoring and Evaluation

MFM: Multi-stakeholder Financing Mechanism

MNSHR&G: Ministry of National Solidarity, Human Rights, and Gender

MPs: Members of Parliament

NAP: National Action Plan

NGO: Non-governmental Organization (used interchangeably with CSO)

NSC: National Steering Committee

PBF: Peacebuilding Fund

PLUVIF: Projet de lutte contre les Violences faites aux femmes (Project to fight violence against women and girls in the African Great Lakes region)

REDEX: Repatrees, Demobilized and Ex-combatants

SCR: Security Council Resolution

SGBV: Sexual and Gender-based violence

SSD: Security Sector Development

UN: United Nations

UNDAF: United Nations Development Assistance Framework

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNFPA: United Nations Population Fund


UN Women: United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women

USA: United States of America

USD: United States Dollar

WAP: Women and Allies for peace building

WPS: Women, Peace and Security
Case Study: CHILE
Financing for the implementation of the National Action Plan on UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325
Author: Maria Ines Salamanca

I. Background
The first draft of the National Action Plan (NAP) – authored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), the Ministry of Defense (MoD), and the Women’s National Service (SERNAM) – was launched in August 2009. During the drafting process, meetings were held with various stakeholders, including civil society organizations (CSOs), women’s rights organizations and academia. The Ministries of Health, Education, and Planning, contributed further inputs and several countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Spain that were invited to a workshop in Chile also shared recommendations.

The first NAP reflects the Chilean government’s broader commitment to peace, gender equality, and the promotion of women’s political participation. Since the adoption of the NAP, women’s participation (and interest in participating) in the Chilean armed forces has further increased (building upon a 1974 order formally legalizing women’s entry into the armed services). Women’s role in peacekeeping operations has also increased, spurred by both the Policy for Integration and Participation of Women in the Armed Forces and Order and Security – implemented by Michele Bachelet during her role as the first female Minister of Defense in the country and region – and further reinforced by the NAP. Chile has played a key role in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) as troop contributor; this deployment has seen the highest number of women involved to date.\textsuperscript{106} While the role of women in the Chilean armed forces, within peace processes and peace-keeping operations, and within politics are emphasized in the NAP, it is important to note that women’s political participation in Chile remains a tenacious challenge.

With the launch of the first NAP, the Chilean government reaffirmed its commitment to human rights, non-discrimination, and a holistic concept of human security. Existing international and regional agreements including CEDAW, the Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action, the Rome Statute, and the “Convention of Belem do Para”– formed the basis of the NAP and supported the incorporation of human rights obligations into national law bodies.

The second Chilean NAP is currently being developed and will be launched in late 2013.

II. Financing NAP Implementation
Financing for the NAP originates from government resources solely. The responsibility to finance the implementation of the NAP is shared by the MoD, SERNAM, and the MoFA, with the majority of funding coming from the MoD. While all three committed to combine funding, specific figures are not available, underscoring a challenge in accountability. The government does not have a specific budget for the NAP, though this decision may have been, in part, strategic: should the NAP have included a budget up front, its approval process would have been considerably more lengthy.

\textsuperscript{106} One could also argue that the increase in women is in part due to the increase in the overall size of the contribution.
requiring both the National Budget Office (Dirección Nacional de Presupuesto) and Congress to sign off ultimately delaying its adoption.

Six months after the NAP was launched, an earthquake struck Chile, shifting national priorities and resources to the reconstruction process. Allocating adequate resources for the implementation of the NAP became even more difficult, highlighting the importance of earmarking for prioritization.

Though resources shifted and exact financing figures are not available, the government pursued the implementation of the NAP. Activities included a workshop, held in 2011 by the MoD, to evaluate the current NAP, with a consensus emerging among stakeholders to draft a new NAP with specific indicators and activities. A seminar entitled "Women, Peace and Security: Implementation of Resolution 1325 and new challenges" was also held, aiming to promote and support the creation of NAPs in other countries. The Naval Postgraduate School and the Global Peace Operations Initiative of the United States Department of State contributed financially to the cost of the seminar.

The second NAP (2014-2018) is expected be launched in late 2013. Funding for the second NAP’s implementation will continue in 2014 as it has previously: the MoD has submitted its 2013 budget request (for 2014 funding) to the Ministry of Finance and will use funds from its general budget to implement the second NAP. However, in the 2014 budget process (for disbursement in 2015), it is expected that this financing modality will change: the MoD, the MoFA, and SERNAM (comprising the mesa de coordinacion, responsible for overseeing the NAP’s implementation) will request a specific budget for NAP implementation. Though the financing process remains confusing and opaque, the mesa de coordinacion is continuing to work toward a more reliable and transparent financing arrangement. Indeed, the second NAP’s successful implementation depends on sustainable, multi-ministerial funding, with clear lines of responsibility for each responsible ministry.

III. Civil Society’s Involvement with the NAP

A few CSOs and academic institutions participated in the drafting of the first NAP: Corporación Humanas (the only women’s rights organization), Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO-Chile), and two national universities, Universidad de Chile and Universidad Arcis. These organizations raised the importance of the creation of a national monitoring and accountability body for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 but, at present, it has not yet been established. It would be good, therefore, if it were included in the second NAP.

For the drafting of the second NAP, the Chilean government invited CSOs, but only a few participated (Corporación Humanas, Comunidad Mujer, the Institute of Human Rights, and the Human Rights Center of the Universidad de Chile). This is in large part due to a lack of awareness of UNSCR 1325 and the NAP among CSOs (and Chilean society at large) and of their relevance to national/local struggles. Therefore, it is critical to raise awareness among CSOs, including those that do not tend to operate at the international/regional level, of the connections between local work on human rights and the international WPS agenda (as well as Chile’s commitments within this arena). Of the CSOs that did participate, prevention and protection emerged as the main areas in which they will operate.

107 The countries that participated in this international seminar were Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil, Honduras, Guatemala, Peru, El Salvador, and United States.
Human rights defenders organizations led primarily by women, such as Agrupación de Familiaries de Detenidos Desaparecidos, have demanded justice for crimes committed during the dictatorship and since, including torture, sexual and gender based violence, and disappearances. It is critical that these groups – who have historically and continue presently to fight for human security and justice – be included in women, peace, and security discussions. Their contribution is significant.

Many CSOs working in the “traditional” sectors, such as education and health, receive both public funds from the state as well as funds from international organizations. Funding for human rights and advocacy on women, peace, and security is one of the main challenges for Chilean women’s rights organizations and, as a result, there are few CSOs working in this area. There is no specific financing directed at women’s rights organizations to support the implementation of the NAP.
I. Background

Albeit in different ways, both men and women suffered during the period of Maoist insurgency in Nepal. Women in particular faced sexual and gender-based violence, including rape and, together with children, were targeted for abuse and exploitation on the basis of gender, age, and/or status in society alone. In line with the Charter of the UN and the fundamental principles of human rights, Nepal has adopted a range of policies and mechanisms to promote and protect women’s human rights and gender equality, including a National Action Plan (NAP) on UNSCR 1325 and 1820 (adopted in February 2011). Underpinning the NAP, constitutional, legal, and policy provisions on women and peace and security (WPS) are embodied in the Interim Constitution of Nepal, the Gender Equality Act 2006, and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women. Additionally, the Nepal Peace and Development Strategy (PDS) 2010-2015 emphasizes targeting funds to gender-sensitive interventions as part of long-term peace building efforts. All development partners active in Nepal assist in the peace process by funding components of initiatives under the PDS.

The NAP was developed in collaboration with different sectors and in consultation with a range of stakeholders, including networks of women's organizations and women's NGOs such as Sankalpa, Shanti Malika, FWLD, and Saathi, who worked closely with the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) on drafting the NAP. A High Level Steering Committee for 1325 implementation had been formed prior to the development of the NAP, chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and co-chaired by the Minister of Peace and Reconstruction, the lead agency in the NAP implementation. The Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare (MWCSW), the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA), the Ministry of Defense (MoD), the National Planning Commission (NPC), the National Women Commission (NWC), the Ministry of Finance (MoF), and ten women's organizations sit on the committee.

The NAP focuses broadly on five pillars: Participation, Protection & Prevention, Promotion, Relief & Recovery, and Resource Mobilization & Monitoring and Evaluation. While funding covers all pillars, activities that fall under Participation have been prioritized thus far, with a particular emphasis on women’s economic empowerment. The areas of Promotion and Protection & Prevention have faced funding shortfalls while sexual and gender based violence survivors’ recovery (falling under the Relief & Recovery pillar) has been marginalized. Success in NAP implementation is contingent on

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108 10,297 men and 1,013 women were killed, while 2,034 people continue to be unverified. Of the 84,969 people abducted, 2,087 were women, while the identity of 69,403 remains unknown (www.inseconline.org). Thousands of women, deprived of their homes, separated from families, and stripped of protective community structures, have endured gender-based violence.


110 Sectors involved: government, CSOs, and international development partners represented by the Peace Support Working Group (PSWG). Stakeholders involved: conflict affected women and girls, members of local peace committees, local government authorities, civil society, and individuals working for women’s rights and gender equality.

111 The NPTF Board also has the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Peace and Reconstruction as co-chair and chair along with representatives of five major political parties. The High Level Steering Committee has the mandate to provide strategic direction on NAP implementation to concerned agencies, including NAP projects approved by the NPTF’s board.
full awareness by and participation of local authorities and other key local actors and thus NAP localization as a strategy is being emphasized.

II. Financing NAP Implementation

The NAP itself recognizes the need to leverage both national and international resources for “conflict management, transformation and social reintegration” and the importance of gender auditing resources allocated for conflict transformation and establishment of sustainable peace. Situated within this context, the NAP is financed through the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) as well as through other sources, including civil society organizations.

The NPTF is a platform led by the government and funded through both national government resources made available through the MoPR as well as through the contributions of eight other donors. As of 2008, the NPTF has been included in the national budget as a line item, with funds requested therefore to the MoF through the national budget allocation process. Initially established to support cantonment sites for former combatants of the Maoist Army, the mandate of the NPTF has expanded, focusing on four sectoral clusters, with NAP 1325 implementation falling under Cluster 3 (Promotion of Security and Transitional Justice).

As of September 2011, a basket fund (under the NPTF) has been allocated for NAP implementation under the project “Engendering Conflict Transformation and Peace building Process: Implementing National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 and 1820.” The NPTF’s board has approved over USD 6 million for NAP implementation for 10 projects, led by various ministries. In addition to the nine projects listed under the NPTF, the Ministries of Home Affairs, Local Development and Federal Affairs, Industries, and Women Children and Social Development have initiated various projects to advance NAP implementation.

For the last two years, the GoN (through various ministries) has allocated more than USD 40 million for peacebuilding activities, of which some has gone specifically to NAP implementation. Responsible for NAP implementation, MoPR received 2.55% of the government budget in fiscal year 2010/2011 (slightly lower than in previous years) of which NPR 5,000,000 was allocated for and spent on NAP orientation. In 2011/2012 NPR 10,000,00 was allocated for two activities under the NAP – sectoral planning for NAP implementation and NAP orientation. Only the former was completed, due to lack of coordination and other projects focusing on NAP awareness. MoPR had no budget allocation for NAP in the year 2012/13 and for 2013/14 it has NPR 250,000 for the planning of

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112 Nepal’s NAP can be found here: http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/nepal_nap.pdf.
113 The NPTF is meant to 1) coordinate various peace and development initiatives 2) act as a funding mechanism for peace and reconstruction (receiving both internal and external resources) and 3) monitor the peace process via, inter alia, the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Accord. See: www.nptf.gov.np.
114 Denmark, European Union, Finland, Germany, Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States of America.
115 These are 1) Cantonment Management and Integration/Rehabilitation of Maoist Combatants 2) Assistance to Conflict Affected Persons/Communities 3) Promotion of Security and Transitional Justice and 4) Support to Constituent Assembly (CA), Election and Peace Building Initiatives at National and Local Levels. Depending on the peace building assessments carried out by the NPTF, the NPTF board prioritizes the Fund’s working areas. During the prioritization process, consultation with all donors and stakeholders takes place through annual workshops.
116 The NPTF’s Board includes representatives of the five major political parties in the recently dissolved Constituent Assembly. It is chaired by the Minister for Peace and Reconstruction and co-chaired by the Minister of Finance.
117 Refer to Annex I for a list of all funded projects; for the full detail and the lead implementing agency of each project, visit: http://www.nptf.gov.np/index.php?cid=18#Security.
118 NAP implementing ministries have assigned a focal person to look after NAP issues. The focal point is responsible for incorporating the NAP in the planning, process, strategies and programs of the Ministry.
an inter-agency review meeting. Within the MoPR, a Gender Unit has been set up to strengthen NAP implementation at the local level and to monitor NAP projects funded both by the NPTF and through other sources.

In addition to the NPTF (and funds from Ministries), funding for NAP implementation has been provided through CSOs and the UN. The Peace Support Working Group (PSWG) – a consortium of UN Agencies, foreign embassies and major development partners (all donors) in Nepal working collectively for WPS – have also contributed to the development and implementation of the NAP by financing for NAP on a project basis. The private sector, through corporate social responsibility, has the potential to support NAP 1325, but has not done so thus far.

NAP funding is not disaggregated at pillar level and a lack of clarity on achievements at that level remains, a particularly worrying trend for the Relief & Recovery and Resource Mobilization and Monitoring & Evaluation pillars, which currently face significant gaps in implementation. Furthermore, there is a lack of systematic effort to track the expenditure and funding system of the NAP. This is due, in part, to a lack of coordination among the various funding agencies financing NAP implementation individual (outside of the NPTF mechanism).

III. Civil Society’s Involvement with the NAP
CSOs have been critical actors in all aspects of peace building during and after the conflict period. CSOs, including women’s groups, contributed to the drafting of the NAP (particularly through district and regional consultations) and are engaged in its implementation, including through awareness raising, localization, training of trainers, and monitoring (among other areas).119 Indeed a recent mapping revealed a range of NGOs run by women – including Sankalpa, Shanti Malika, and the recently formed 1325 Action Group – whose vision and mission is to work with conflict affected women and girls and reduce gender based violence in the post-conflict phase (a critical component of NAP implementation).120 Community level women’s groups and networks have worked to bridge gaps between community and central level institutions in the on-going peace building process.121

While the NPTF is open only to government agencies at present, several NPTF donors recently launched the “Peace Fund for Non Governmental Actors” which uses NPTF’s mechanisms and procedures to fund NAP implementation projects proposed by CSOs. The efforts of civil society to advance WPS and specifically NAP implementation are funded by UN agencies, and other donor organizations on a project basis either through a request for proposals or through partnerships and integration of WPS issues in ongoing programs.

119 More specifically, Saathi together with the MoPR, developed NAP localization guidelines to support local authorities in integrating the NAP into community development plans.
CSOs have also been involved in monitoring the implementation of the NAP: a joint government and civil society NAP monitoring report was conducted in 2012 with CSO contributing to the drafting, data collection, qualitative assessment and technical advice, as well as providing financial support.
120 Mapping undertaken by Lesley Abdela, Sociologist from the UK.
121 Some of the major civil society organizations engaged in women and girls’ rights include Shantimalika (an alliance of 18 women’s organizations), Jagaran Nepal, Women’s Alliance for Peace, Power, Democracy and the Constituent Assembly (WAPPPCA), Institute for Human Rights Communication Nepal-Media for Human Rights and Democracy (IHRICON), Women Rehabilitation Center (WOREC), Women for Human Rights (WRH), and Saathi.
Financing for implementing NAP

### NAP on UNSCRs 1325 related NPTF Financed Projects as of July 2013

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Programme Area/Project (Cluster)</th>
<th>IA's</th>
<th>Total Project Approved Budget, NRs.</th>
<th>Total Project Approved Budget, $</th>
<th>Fund Released Till Date, NRs.</th>
<th>Fund Released Till Date, $</th>
<th>Accumulated Expenditure till Date, NRs.</th>
<th>Accumulated Expenditure till Date, $</th>
<th>Accumulated Expenditure/Approved Budget %</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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Case Study: THE NETHERLANDS
Financing for the implementation of National Action Plan (2012-2015) on UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325
Author: WO=MEN

I. Background
The current Dutch NAP (2012-2015), like the former, is a collaborative effort among government, research institutions, and civil society organizations (CSOs), including women’s organizations. Building upon the first NAP and integrating recommendations from a 2010 mid-term review, the second NAP features a thematic focus on women’s leadership and political participation, a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mechanism, and a budget made available by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The NAP prioritizes six countries and a region.122

II. Financing for NAP Implementation
Funding for the Dutch NAP originates internally, through ministerial allocations primarily from the MF) as well as through contributions from other NAP signatories. The MFA has committed €4 million for “collective action on 1325,” specifically supporting Dutch and local CSOs working collaboratively to advance women and peace and security (WPS). Of the €4 million, €2 million is earmarked for NAP activities in the six focus countries and another €2 million is reserved for NAP projects in the MENA region.123 While the Ministry of Defense (MoD) is also slated to contribute (€60,000 annually) to NAP-related activities,124 concern remains on the limited, non-existent, or unclear role in financing NAP implementation by the MoD and other ministries. Presently, the MFA provides the only dedicated NAP budget although questions remain on allocation criteria. As such, it would be beneficial to develop a monitoring system that captures the contributions of other ministries; including 1325 expenditure in the government’s annual planning.

Despite the laudable inclusion of financial resources within the second NAP, clear and consistent criteria delineating what constitutes “budget for women, peace and security” or “budget for NAP implementation” remains a conceptual challenge.125 Therefore, caution should be exercised when using the list included in the NAP as it does not reflect the complexities of the funding landscape, nor does it delineate how the amounts are accounted for.

Projects within the scope of the NAP are implemented through country working groups,126 encouraged to apply collectively, demonstrating local ownership by partner organizations. The country working groups are composed of NAP signatories that are active and have partner organizations in the country in question – both from CS and the government. Although the focus up

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122 The priority countries and region are: Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan and South Sudan and, regionally, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).
123 For 2013, the MFA’s total gender budget is €3.35 million. The budget for gender-related projects is divided as follows: €3.37 million has been set aside for the FLOW fund which focuses on safety, economic empowerment, and political participation by women; €6 million has been budgeted for UN WOMEN, of which €2 million is for the UN WOMEN Trust Fund to Eliminate Violence Against Women; and €7.75 million has been allocated to other activities, of which €4 million is for the NAP. See: Parliament, Kamerbrief on Verdeling fondsen voor het genderbeleid (Ref. DOI/EM-130/2013), Den Haag, 11 July 2013.
125 1325 implementation covers both NAP specific projects as well as broader 1325 projects that do not, in practice, fall under the NAP (which, in addition, may not necessarily be earmarked as 1325).
126 Only signatories of the NAP can apply to the MFA’s €4 million NAP funds. Financing for activities advancing SCR 1325 and WPS implemented by those not included in country working groups is carried out under other funding categories, financed by either the government, civil society organizations or a mix of both.
Financing for implementing NAP

to date of the groups has been the collective writing of project proposals, their role can be a broader sense of collaborating on 1325-related issues in the respective country.

Proposals must be “green lighted” by the Dutch Embassy in the focus country or a specific department in the MFA (in cases where an embassy within the focus country does not exist) before official submission to the MFA. From 2012 to present, four projects in four of the six priority countries (Afghanistan, Burundi, DRC and South Sudan) have been approved and are underway. The remaining two countries (Colombia and Sudan) and the MENA region are currently pending approval – with a potential disbursement of €860,000.

In addition to funding CSOs directly, the Dutch government also provides funds through multilateral arrangements, including in South Sudan (a collaboration between the Netherlands, Canada, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and the UK). In Burundi, the Netherlands Embassy and Cordaid are in discussion with the Gender Ministry to support a newly established fund that will in part support the Burundian NAP implementation. The Dutch private sector also provides resources for WPS initiatives through Women on the Frontline, a program of the FLOW Fund by Hivos and Oxfam Novib with PricewaterhouseCoopers as advising partner.

It is important to note that certain activities that fall under the scope of 1325 are placed under the purview of other funds: for example, economic empowerment and access to justice for survivors of sexual violence in conflict are addressed through the FLOW fund. While the Dutch NAP is thematically focused (and thus more narrow in scope than 1325 in general), this raises conceptual challenges (as noted above), with monitoring and accountability lines becoming blurry.

III. The Role of Civil Society

Dutch civil society holds a unique position as joint signatories to the Dutch NAP and, as such, shares responsibility with government for outcomes. Through the MFA, funds are made available directly to civil society (CS) to support collaboration between Dutch CS and local CSOs in partner countries. While theoretically shared, responsibility and accountability can be skewed in practice: for example, while CS is responsible for implementation in joint endeavors, budgetary decisions that deeply affect the ability of projects to advance WPS aims are controlled by the government. Indeed, while both government and CS are committed to the NAP, priorities and visions vary and each approaches the NAP differently.

The WO=MEN NGO working group on UNSCR 1325 (NGO WG 1325) is an independent working group focusing on the wider implementation of UNSCR 1325, including NAP 1325. The working group consists solely of CSOs, both NAP signatories as well as non-signatories engaged in

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127 Total disbursement made equals €886,000.
129 Though gender equality is included as one of the focus points and the Netherlands allocated USD 275,000 over 2011/2012 to the Sudanese Women Empowerment for Peace Programme, it was neither spent nor allocated over the remaining years of the program (2012 to 2014). See: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. 2012. "Republic of South Sudan Donor Book 2012/2013." Accessible at: [Last accessed: 26 August 2013].
130 Cordaid and GNWP in collaboration with the Burundian government, NGOs, UN WOMEN and other stakeholders have been promoting the establishment of a Multi-stakeholder Financing Mechanism for Burundi’s NAP 1325. The Gender Ministry has now established a fund in the Central Bank which contributes resources toward NAP 1325 implementation. For more information, see http://burundi.gov.bi/, the Dutch NAP (2012-2015), and Ruggles, M. Forthcoming November 2013. ""Netherlands" Women Count-Security Council Resolution 1325: Civil Society Monitoring Report 2012."
131 Regarding the FLOW Fund, see footnote 2.
projects related to WPS. This working group provides a safe, self-organizing space for CSOs to strategize and has played a key role in advocating for the creation of a NAP and in drafting both Plans. Members of the NGO WG 1325 also conduct policy advocacy toward the Dutch government and parliament regarding the implementation of UNSCR 1325 more broadly.

Here, it should be noted that despite the fact that ongoing Dutch austerity measures will not affect the government’s focus area ‘women’s rights and sexual and reproductive health and rights’, Dutch civil society is likely to face additional financial insecurity. Dependent on a continually decreasing pot of funding, tension between and/or competition among Dutch-based CSOs may increase, furthering a counterproductive dynamic to building sustainable movements and organizations.

Civil society is heterogeneous and varies in size, operating budget, vision and ideology, and theories of change. Given a lack of capacity by the MFA to process smaller grant requests and a concern about “absorption capacity of NGOs” funding priority has often been given to large CSOs or multilateral organizations including the UN. CSOs with smaller operating budgets – the case for the majority of women’s peace groups – tend not to be able to take the lead in a proposal, resulting in marginalization and obscuring their visions and priorities to larger CSOs. Women’s groups and smaller organizations play a crucial role in the struggle for gender equality and women’s rights in conflict countries and the funding structure must account for this. CSOs from around the world have consistently lobbied for the establishment of a grassroots fund to finance activities of NAP 1325 signatories and their partner organizations with smaller budgets which has the potential to contribute to addressing this gap.

Dutch civil society has the potential to go beyond a watchdog role to be a constructive partner to the government who, in turn, should aim to strengthen its role as a strategic collaborator and learning partner. As CSOs deepen their participation on a range of policy dialogue including on trade and security policy, consistent discussion with other ministries not solely the gender unit of the MFA will be critical.
Case Study: THE PHILIPPINES
Financing for the Implementation of National Action Plan on UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and 1820
Author: Ma. Lourdes Veneracion-Rallonza, Ph.D.

I. Background
Developed in 2009, the Philippine National Action Plan (NAP) on SCR 1325 and 1820 was a collaborative effort between government agencies and civil society organizations (CSOs), including women’s human rights organizations and women in peace groups. Initial work began in 2009 with Sulong CARHRIHL, Center for Peace Education (CPE) and the Gazaton Ortigas Peace Institute (GZO) drafting the proposed text while the Philippine Commission on Women (PCW) crafted the text of an Executive Order (EO) on women, peace and security. These were presented to the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), inviting OPAPP to join the process. People’s consultations (which included government agencies and CSOs) were held and national validation workshops proceeded. Inputs were integrated and, on March 25, 2010, the Philippine NAP was launched. For both government and CSOs, promotion and mainstreaming as well as empowerment and participation of women emerged as priority themes.

II. Financing the Implementation of the Philippine NAP
Funding for the implementation of the NAP by the government originates both internally, through the Gender and Development (GAD) budget of government bodies, as well as externally, through Official Development Assistance (ODA), and the United Nations (UN). The Philippine GAD Budget Policy stipulates that all government bodies must allocate at least five percent (5%) of their total budget to gender and development and include gender in their plans and budgets. NAP activities are – in theory - to be integrated into each agency’s national GAD plan and budget (GBP), with funds allocated for the NAP implementation being drawn from the GPBs of national government agencies (NGAs) and local government units (LGUs) that are specifically involved in conflict and post-conflict work. As a matter of strategy, each member agency of The National Steering Committee on Women, Peace and Security (NSCWPS) – the key implementing body of the NAP – is encouraged to identify one to two NAP related initiatives to implement, financed through their GAD budget. In 2013, for example, the Department for Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) used Php 2,010,469,184.00 (or 11.84% of a Php 16.9B GAD budget) to support implementation of the NAP while OPAPP, in 2012, spent Php1.2M charged against Development (DSWD) used Php 2,010,469,184.00 (or 11.84% of a Php 16.9B GAD budget) to support implementation of the NAP while OPAPP, in 2012, spent Php1.2M charged against OPAPP’s GAD budget on NAP implementation. However, tracking of NAP implementation would be well-served if fully integrated in the GPBs of NGAs and LGUs and projects that support

133 Participants in the consultation included various government agencies such as the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Philippine National Police (PNP), Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), OPAPP, PCW, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), National Commission on Muslim Filipinos (NCFM)133 and the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) as well as peace and women’s human rights NGOs.
134 This policy directive is stipulated in the 1995 General Appropriations Act (GAA), EO 273 or the Philippine Plan for Gender-Responsive Development 1995-2025, Chapter VI (Institutional Mechanisms), Section 36(2) of the Magna Carta on Women, and the PCW-DILG NEDA and Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Joint Memorandum Circular 2013-01 or the Guidelines on the Localization of the Magna Carta on Women.
135 The NSCWPS is chaired by Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) with the Chairperson of the PCW serving as vice-chair. Its members include the Secretaries of the DND, DSWD, DOJ, DFA, the Chairperson of the NCFP and the Head of the NCMP.
136 As part of the model-building strategy in OPAPP’s ‘Payapa at Masaganaang Pamayansan’ (PAMANA) conflict affected areas, the provincial government allocated Php20,000,000.00 from its GAD budget to fund NAP-related activities to fund NAP localization efforts in Maguindanao. In this regard, the project is a concrete example of a local government’s initiative to mainstream NAP in their GBP.
NAP implementation are specifically and explicitly marked as such (not simply included, unmarked, within the GAD PPA). Efforts toward this end are underway.\textsuperscript{137}

Funding for NAP implementation also comes from ODA,\textsuperscript{138} with a substantial portion of ODA to be used by agencies to support programs and activities for women (stipulated in the Women in Nation-Building Act). As a complement to the government’s own GAD funds, between five and thirty percent of ODA is used for GAD activities. Within this mechanism, ODA GAD funded projects, programs and activities (PPAs) are encouraged to integrate NAP-related initiatives. For example, during the 2013 Philippine Development Forum, 15 ODA-GAD Network members,\textsuperscript{139} two government agencies\textsuperscript{140} and two international NGO partners\textsuperscript{141} signed a Statement on Implementing President Aquino’s Social Contract to Achieve Inclusive Growth that affirms their commitment to UNSCRs 1325, 1820 and 1960.

The United Nations (including UNDP and UN Women) finances NAP implementation, as well. For example, through the UNDP’s “Strengthening the National Peace Infrastructure (SNPI)” funds were provided for NAP activities, including a localization project (executed by OPAPP with GZO) for Php 500,000.00.\textsuperscript{142}

To support accountability, the Commission on Audit (COA) assesses whether earmarked GAD allocation was indeed made.\textsuperscript{143} A key informant from OPAPP shared that “the COA extends their gender audit to include NAP in GAD budget and utilization.” Audits are then submitted annually to the PCW and the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA).

While funds are indeed available for NAP implementation (and GAD initiatives more broadly), challenges remain. There are varying levels of understanding of GAD planning, and thus, a range of experiences implementing GAD services and programs. Indeed, there is a lack of standardization around that which constitutes a GAD activity (clearly not unique to the Philippines). Additionally, while funding for the NAP is to be acquired from the GAD budget (among other sources), there continues to be a lack of clarity in moving this forward. The conceptual link between GAD initiatives and the context of armed conflict has posed a challenge for some departments/agencies, underscoring the continued importance of including both gender equality and conflict-sensitivity in

\textsuperscript{137} Currently, the NGAWS as well as NGA and LGU partners in OPAPP’s PAyapa at MAsaganang PamayanAN (PAMANA) conflict affected areas and sites with under the closure track of peace agreements are systematizing efforts to mainstreaming NAP in their GPBs.

\textsuperscript{138} For example, in the case of the Embassy of Spain - Agency for International Cooperation for Development (AECID) - their on-going bilateral cooperation with the Philippine government earmarked a certain percentage of the total project funds to supporting NAP initiatives. For 2013, nine percent (9%) of the total budget of 2,750,000 euros provided to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) for their 2011-2014 “Institutional Strengthening of the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines” was identified to support NAP-related activities; 10 percent (10%) of 1,500,000 euros is set for the NAP components in PCW’s 2011-2014 “Institutional Strengthening of National and Local Governance on Human Rights and Economic Empowerment with Gender Focus: Implementation of Magna Carta of Women”; and thirty percent (30%) of 1,500,000 euros for addressing the NAP in OPAPP’s 2011-2015 “Mainstreaming Peace and Development in Local Governance in the Philippines.


\textsuperscript{140} These are NEDA and PCW.

\textsuperscript{141} These are Oxfam International and Paz y Desarollo.

\textsuperscript{142} For United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), fifteen percent (15%) of total project costs requirement is allotted for gender equality and empowerment projects, including NAP implementation.

planning. The OPAPP recently responded to this challenge through capacity development of PAMANA LGUs on gender and conflict analysis as applied to socio-economic profiling and gender-responsive/conflict sensitive assessment and planning. It is also currently working on the review of the NAP implementation.

III. Civil Society

Civil society, including particularly women’s rights groups, have been integral to peace-building and reconstruction processes and have been intimately involved (presently and historically) in the political project on women, peace and security. CSOs were engaged in developing and further refining the NAP (together with government) and, in November 2012, the Women Engaged in Action on UNSCR 1325 (WE Act 1325) was launched as a key civil society network on women, peace and security, further formalizing civil society’s involvement. WE ACT 1325 works on the localization of women, peace and security and monitors government implementation of the NAP.

Although civil society is not an official member of the NSCWPS, the committee is meant to “partner with civil-society organizations particularly with women and peace groups in the implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of the NAP.” Government (through OPAPP and NSCWPS) and civil society organizations (members of WE Act 1325 as well as others) have implemented women, peace and security initiatives and activities jointly (launching the NAP in 2012, conducting trainings of local officials and strengthening NAP indicators) as well as independently.

Civil society, both members of WE Act 1325 and other women and peace organizations, receive funding through OPAPP as well as other sources, including through bilateral aid and funding from the UN for the implementation of the NAP. For example, UN Women (Philippines) provided USD 18,690 to civil society (women’s group) for capacity building. NAP activities are, at times, implemented collectively by WE ACT 1325 members, but are also done by individual members (and others) independently. Promotion and mainstreaming of gender equality and the empowerment and participation of women are the main thematic focus of We Act 1325 members, with key strategies including localization through capacity development and consultations and discussions. In July 2013, WE Act 1325 completed the CSO research on the NAP implementation and the result of which was validated by various stakeholders. The assessment report will be published by the end of 2013.

Case Study: SIERRA LEONE

145 This money was for Women for Justice in the Bangsamoro to Undertake Capability Building for Bangsamoro Women on Local Implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the Philippine NAP 1325.
146 We Act 1325 Funded Projects for NAP implementation data is provide by We Act 1325. Funding sources include UNDP (Philippines); Conciliation Resources (UK); The Royal Norwegian Embassy (Philippines); AusAid; Agencia Española de Cooperacion Internacional para el Desarrollo (AECID); UN Women
Financing for implementing NAP

Financing for the implementation of National Action Plan on UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 & 1820
Author: Mariama Fofana

1. Background
The daily reports of physical and sexual violence against women and girls which continued after the end of the civil war in Sierra Leone in 2002, and a need for accountability galvanized women and human rights organizations, to translate UNSCRs 1325 and 1820 into practice. A national task force known as WANMAR\(^{147}\) – comprised of line ministries, civil society organizations (CSOs),\(^{148}\) parliamentarians, UN agencies, interfaith groups, tribal leaders, and the media – was tasked to develop a National Action Plan (NAP) for implementation of UNSCRs 1325 and 1820.\(^{149}\)

The Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender, and Children’s Affairs (MSWGCA) in collaboration with the WANMAR Task force conducted the regional consultations which provided inputs on issues of SGBVetc. A national consultative conference was convened to author the NAP and on June 8, 2010 the NAP was launched. The NAP is grounded in international human rights laws and policies to which Sierra Leone is party, as well as national laws on gender equality and women’s rights. These include Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the African Union Protocol on the Rights of Women. At the national level, these are the Policy on the Advancement of Women, the National Gender Mainstreaming Policy, and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), among others.

The NAP is a five-year plan detailing activities, responsibility lines, indicators, and timelines. It is a public document available for donors, government, CSOs, and others wishing to promote women’s empowerment, peace and security issues. The prevention and protection for victims of sexual and gender-based violence are priority areas for government; indeed, on 8th March 2013, International Women’s Day, the President stated: “violence against a woman is violence against the state.”\(^{150}\)

II. Financing for NAP Implementation
In the NAP itself, potential sources of financial and in-kind support for implementation are listed, including from international donors, civil society, the private sector, and households/communities.\(^{151}\) Quasi government agencies like National Telecommunications NATCOM) and Sierra Leone Roads Authority (SLRA) supported a coalition of women civil society organizations for the Women’s Situation Room process that ensured inclusive, fair and peaceful elections. The estimated budget for the full implementation of the NAP is USD 21,301,314 (2010-2013) with a monitoring and evaluation strategy estimated at USD 1,625,750.

There are no funds specifically earmarked for NAP implementation however the government has implemented activities that would theoretically fall under the NAP through the implementation of

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148 The name WANMAR is coined from the acronyms West African Network for Peace building SL (WANEP) and Mano River Women’s Peace Network SL (MARWOPNET).
149 CORDAID provided the much needed funding to kick-start the drafting process, contributing EURO 84,000.00 to the West African Network for Peace building Sierra Leone and the Mano River Women’s Peace Network SL.
150 President Koroma statement on March 8, 2013, International Women’s Day, Freetown, Sierra Leone.
other policies and plans, such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper II & III and the National Gender Strategic Plan (which notes the implementation of 1325 and 1820 as one of its strategies). The MSWGCA received USD 15,000 from government and USD 43,000 from the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) to treat victims of sexual and gender based violence during conflict, to support legislation of the Sexual Offences Act and for training and establishment of community advocacy groups on gender equality and sexual and reproductive health and rights. However, it should be noted that annual budgetary allocation to the MSWGCA is small, comprising roughly 0.44% of the overall government budget. The Gender Director of MSWGCA has requested funds from the Ministry of Finance to coordinate the implementation process of the NAP specifically and is awaiting approval from Parliament. The funding gap could be further narrowed if government allocated a percentage of revenue from mining to the NAP implementation.

A gender equality and women’s empowerment pillar has been included in the PRSP III (Agenda for Prosperity) (2012-2018) and USD 49,000 has been earmarked for implementing activities within the PRSP III aligned with the NAP.

UN agencies (such as UN Women and UNFPA) and international NGOs (such as TROCAIRE, the Global Network of Women Peace Builders (GNWP), and CORDAID) and quasi government agencies like the National Telecommunications (NATCOM) have provided funds, resource support, and in kind contributions to civil society, including specifically women’s groups. For example, the 50/50 group, the National Organization of Women Sierra Leone (NOW SL), Women’s Forum, and the Advocacy Movement Network (AMNET) have received support for NAP 1325 implementation. More specifically, AMNET received EURO 20,000 from Cordaid to work with District authorities in Kailahun to ban child FGM. GNWP’s partner organizations NOW SL, MARWOPNET (SL), Women Peace Justice Project (WPJP) and Women’s Forum received USD 138,034 from Cordaid, Folke Bernadotte in Sweden and the Government of Canada – through GNWP - to conduct Sierra Leone’s in-country monitoring and report on the implementation of UNSCRs 1325 & 1820. Furthermore, with support from the Government of Canada and the Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden, GNWP also contributed USD 190,823 (for 2012 and 2013) for the Localization of UNSCR 1325 and 1820 program in Sierra Leone.

Various stakeholders often focus on areas of the NAP related to their own mission, at times resulting in uncoordinated and duplicated efforts at addressing women, peace and security (WPS) issues and a neglect of some areas within the NAP. The National Steering Committee comprising the WANMAR task force should lead the co-ordination of NAP activities by setting up a ,

The government monitors how funds received from donors are spent by requiring organizations to submit audited reports annually with the Public Expenditure Tracking Survey then used to track the flow of public resources to end-users. This has resulted in improved transparency and accountability of public expenditures and could, theoretically, be used to track financing for NAP implementation. Additionally, there is a monitoring and evaluation component within the PRSP III to monitor implementation and outcomes of the PRSP’s projects, including under Pillar 8 of the PRSP (aligned with NAP activities). The NAP document itself contains a Results Framework, with
indicators and annual targets, including required data collection by the responsible body/stakeholder.

III. Civil Society’s Involvement with the NAP

Women’s groups have worked to bring WPS issues to the public discourse. Civil society organizations, including women’s rights organizations, were involved in the development of the NAP and are members of the National Steering Committee (NSC). Indeed, it was civil society (NOW SL, MARWOPNET and WANE) who wrote the proposal for funds needed for the drafting of the NAP – highlighting a joint effort between government and CS. As members of the NSC, civil society lead concrete actions in the NAP’s implementation, contribute to monitoring, make recommendations on enhancing the NAP’s success, mobilize resources, and complement government’s role in reporting to stakeholders on implementation progress. Civil society is also engaged in advocacy and lobbying decision makers in government to ensure that the plan is fully implemented. More specifically, civil society has worked to implement the NAP through awareness raising campaigns and capacity building on gender laws, SGBV, and women’s economic empowerment. As noted above, CS has also taken a lead in monitoring NAP implementation. In the last two years, CS has also worked closely with the MSWGCA, Ministry of Local Government – Decentralisation Secretariat and GNWP in the Localization of UNSCR 1325 and 1820 that ensures the involvement of local authorities, traditional leaders and grassroots women’s groups in the implementation of the SiLNAP.

Civil society is funded by the UN, international NGOs, the government, and through their own resources. For example, international NGOs such as Cordaid and GNWP provided funding to Advocacy Movement Network to work with District authorities in Kailahun on female genital mutilation. The Campaign for Good Governance received funds from the Open Society Initiative Foundation to raise awareness of the Sexual Offences Laws of 2012. The UN also funds civil society. For example, with funds from UNFPA and UN Women (some of which were committed during the international launch of the NAP), Women’s Forum is conducting a pilot project on teenage pregnancy in several districts. The MSWGCA, using funds received by the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), has helped to build the capacity of the Women’s Forum by providing equipment and furniture.

However, funding for CS remains uncertain, further exacerbated by the continuing global economic crisis. Some donors have scaled funding back and/or narrowed their investments to projects that match their interests – which may not be in line with women’s groups’ work. As a result, women’s groups have, at times, had to reshape their agenda to align with the donor’s program of work, undermining local ownership. Lack of information on available funds, limited proposal writing capacity, onerous funding forms, and bureaucracy related to accessing larger funds pose further challenges to local women’s organizations access to sustainable financing.

Femme Africa Solidarite (FAS) and Women In Peace building and Security Network (WIPSEN) provided resources for NAP development, supporting the working groups crafting the NAP.
5 Annex II: Generic Terms of Reference Template for a MFM

Generic Terms of Reference Template155
Fund Management Plan
Multi-stakeholder Financing Mechanism for the Implementation of NAP SCR 1325

I – Introduction or General Context

This section lays out the background information and context in which the development of the Multi-stakeholder Financing Mechanism (MFM) takes place, including 1) the history and context of the conflict(s) 2) the impact of the conflict(s) on the population, highlighting specifically the impact on women and women’s rights 3) the peace process(es) and 4) the development of the National Action Plan (NAP) on UNSCR 1325.

This section also lays out the key policy documents (such as government policy papers including poverty reduction strategy papers, anti-SGBV policy, national gender policy, peace agreements, and UN documents) that shape the peace and development process, and often offer grounding to the NAP 1325. The role of the MFM as a fund specifically for NAP implementation should be clearly stated.

II - Purpose, Programmatic Scope and Principles of the MFM

This section details the purpose of the MFM, its programmatic scope (the thematic priorities of the NAP) and the principles underlying the MFM.156 On the latter, it will be important to include how the MFM is a unique financing mechanism differing from existing mechanisms, including specifically from traditional multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs). As an example, one might write the following:

The MFM is an innovative and inclusive approach to implementing UNSCR 1325. The MFM is designed to broaden traditional conceptions of multi-donor funds in three main ways. First, the MFM’s decision-making structure expands the circle of those developing, supervising, managing and executing the MFM’s plan to include the private sector (potentially) and civil society organizations, including particularly women’s rights groups. CSOs will be recognized as actors in their own right – not solely as implementing partners – and will be

155 This template is heavily based (and expands upon) the UNDG Guidance Note on Establishing, Managing and Closing Multi-Donor Trust Funds. Note that this is only a template and should be altered to reflect the specific realities/contexts in which a MFM is being considered. Indeed, the decision to establish a MFM must be grounded in and reflective of extensive consultations with the full range of stakeholders locally, including particularly local women’s rights groups and the national gender/women’s rights machinery.
156 Among others, the MFM is based on the principles articulated in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), and is also developed in line with the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States agreed in Busan (December 2011). Additionally, the MFM is grounded in the spirit of and based on the Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development (2002) and its follow-up in Doha (2008); the UN Declaration on the Right to Development; and the Convention to Eliminate all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), among other international, regional and local policies. More specifically, the MFM adheres to the following principles: 1) locally-owned frameworks 2) a comprehensive and accurate assessment of local needs, resources and capacities to plan and mobilize resources 3) full and equal engagement of and access for NGOs 4) transparency and monitoring 5) efficiency in disbursement 6) coordination and collaboration among different actors involved in women, peace and security advocacy and programming 7) partnerships with the private sector 8) earmarked 1325 Funds and 9) recognition and enhancement of civil society’s capacity to generate and manage financial resources dedicated to 1325 implementation.
eligible to apply directly for funding, too, recognizing their intimate and critical knowledge of women, peace and security.

Secondly, aiming to address the disconnect between the large grant size of traditional MDTFs and the financial capacity of most CSOs, including women’s rights groups, the MFM will offer smaller grants and less onerous application and reporting procedures, increasing accessibly and, thus, the range of groups able to apply.

Finally, the MFM offers a potential venue for political dialogue and information sharing, identifying best practices, scaling-up cooperation, facilitating local contributions and promoting accountability.\textsuperscript{157} On the latter point, CSOs will be involved – on equal footing to other stakeholders – in the development and use of an accountability mechanism.

Further, this section can detail the relationship between the MFM and other funds for peace and development operating in a given context, with the aim of increasing complementarity.

III - Basic Description of the MFM’s Administration

This section outlines the basic features of the MFM’s administration, including the following:

1) Administration of the MFM
Identify the Administrative Agent (AA) and describe its functions. The AA, typically a UN agency though, of course, alternative arrangements established\textsuperscript{158}, is responsible for receiving and managing all donor contributions to the MFM and disbursing payments to recipient organizations. Based on progress reports submitted by recipient organizations, the AA is also responsible for producing financial and programmatic narrative reports on the MFM and sharing with all stakeholders.

2) Contributions to the MFM
This section describes how contributions to the MFM can be made and notes those eligible to contribute. It can also include information on the type/quality funding desired or required: multi-year, core, un-earmarked resources, for example. Should earmarking be permitted, the level of any agreed-upon earmarking (i.e. for a specific NAP activity or theme) can be included here.

3) Eligibility to apply for Funding from MFM
This section details which entities/organizations can apply for funding and the application process. For a MFM, this will include, inter alia, civil society organizations and particularly women’s rights organizations.

4) Allocation Decision Making


\textsuperscript{158} For example, the AA could be a government agency or the administration can be jointly shared between the government and the UN or the government.
This section describes the process by which decisions on how to fund and what to fund are made, including enumerating the criteria against which decisions will be made. Criteria for fund allocation may include the following: overall quality of the proposal, relevance in view of the MFM’s strategic priorities, realistic implementation period within MFM end dates, and prioritization of funding to diverse civil society actors with intimate knowledge of women, peace and security. This section should explicitly note that NAP 1325 implementation is the end goal; any resource disbursement must be toward that end.

Specific considerations in allocations that the MFM would like to take into account can be detailed here, as well. For example, one might note that X% of funding must be allocated to civil society, of which Y% should be directed to women’s rights groups. Similarly, if a specific area/theme is to be prioritized in funding decisions (such as supporting the capacity building of women’s rights groups), it can also be detailed here.

This section can also discuss capacity building, should it be needed. To ensure effective functioning of the MFM, the capacity of agencies to implement the MFM should be assessed at the onset. Should gaps in capacity exist, capacity building programs supported, for example, by the UN, should be considered.

IV - Governance Structure

This section describes the governance arrangements of the MFM, with sections on the National Steering Committee (NSC), technical support offices (if applicable), the AA, recipient organizations (called Participating Organizations in MDTFs) and Implementing Partners. This section may also include a diagram illustrating the governance arrangements.

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159 The language here is taken from the UNDG Guidance Note on Establishing, Managing and Closing Multi-Donor Trust Funds.

160 Note that MDTFs usually have five common structural elements: a Steering Committee, an AA, Participating Organizations, Implementing Partners and Donors. The governance structure of the MFM is based off of this model, but can of course be altered to reflect the decision and needs of the local context.
1) The National Steering Committee

The National Steering Committee (NSC) is the decision-making body, governing the MFM. It provides strategic oversight and direction (in line with the goals of the MFM), sets allocation criteria, allocates resources and reviews progress reports (typically developed by the AA – more below). The NSC can also help to raise awareness on SCR 1325 and, specifically, NAP 1325, for which it is ultimately raising funds. The NSC will be composed of representatives from civil society, including particularly women’s rights groups, donors, the UN, and government and should ensure the principles of national/local ownership, inclusiveness and balanced representation.

The NSC should be in regular contact with (perhaps linked to, but distinct from) the coordination/steering group of the NAP 1325 (should one exist) – however, the exact configuration will be decided upon in each context and can be described here.

161 Quoted from the UNDG Guidance Notes on MDTF, the NSC’s specific responsibilities can include i) Reviewing and defining the Fund’s needs and priorities consistent with the objectives and goals of the NAP ii) Ensuring coherence between the various activities funded by the MFM, and other funding sources supporting peace and security iii) Reviewing and approving proposals and resource allocations from the Fund, based on the agreed process of decision-making iv) Reviewing financial flows and performance to facilitate a harmonized approach to monitoring and evaluation of the Fund’s activities v) Reviewing and approving the Fund’s annual reports vi) Recommending improvements to the design and/or implementation of accepted projects to better support the NAP’s goals vii) Reviewing and approving periodic progress reports (programmatic and financial) consolidated by the Administrative Agent based on the progress reports submitted by the Participating Organizations and viii) Commissioning independent evaluation(s) of the Fund.

162 Note that the composition of the NSC must be collectively negotiated at national level and may or may not include donors (to be decided); however, CSOs, including particularly women’s rights organizations, should be included.
Steering Committee Support Office (optional)
The SCSO is optional and, should one be set up, its role is to support the NSC in its work. Responsibilities of the SCSO include ensuring that project/programs submitted to the NSC have fulfilled the required submission and review procedures; supporting the NSC in the review process and undertaking a final review of proposals submitted; initiating program sign off processes; and tracking the operational closure of the Fund.\textsuperscript{163}

Sector & Cluster Groups/Technical Committee (optional)
Technical committees offer policy guidance on specific thematic issues and should be comprised of individuals/groups with extensive knowledge of the particular topic in question. Should a TC exist, civil society and particularly women’s rights groups should be represented, underscoring the critical knowledge held by CSOs. The TC may also play a role in the identification, review and/or development of projects/programmes as well as in the prioritization of allocation of contributions.

2) Participating Organizations
Participating Organizations (POs) (recipient organizations) are organizations deemed eligible to be intermediaries for funding streams to Implementing Partners of the MFM and in traditional MDTFs the PO is typically a UN agency (or another organization of similar international character). An organization can become a PO by concluding a MoU with the Administrative Agent. The MFM can decide if a PO is needed or if funding can go directly to Implementing Partners.

Typically, each Participating Organization operates under its own financial regulations, rules and policies and assumes full financial and programmatic accountability for the funds disbursed to it and for the implementation of the projects/programs through Implementing Organizations.

3) Administrative Agent (AA)
On behalf of the Participating Organizations, the AA performs a full range of administrative functions, including the following:\textsuperscript{164}

i. Receipt of contributions from donors
ii. Administration of funds received
iii. Disburse funds to POs in accordance with instructions from the NSC
iv. Consolidate statements and reports, based on submissions provided to the AA by each PO
v. Provide final narrative and certified financial reporting

4) Implementing Partner
In traditional MDTFs, Participating Organizations implement activities through national authorities and other national, regional or international organizations, including CSOs. These Implementing Partners/Organizations may receive funds through a Participating Organization, however, as noted above, the Participating Organization assumes full financial and programmatic accountability.\textsuperscript{165}

For the MFM, it will be important that diverse women’s rights groups (of varying sizes and visions) are included as implementing partners.

\textsuperscript{163}Language for this section is taken directly from the UNDG Guidance Note on Establishing, Managing and Closing Multi-Donor Trust Funds.
\textsuperscript{164}UNDG Guidance Note on Establishing, Managing and Closing Multi-Donor Trust Funds
\textsuperscript{165}UNDG Guidance Note on Establishing, Managing and Closing Multi-Donor Trust Funds
V. Financial Viability

This section details the anticipated minimum contributions necessary to make the MFM financially viable.

Consideration may be given to the following items:

- The cost of NAP 1325 implementation
- Number years the MFM is operational (start date - end date)
- Anticipated annual contributions from donors
- Volume of transfers to and expenditures of Participating Organizations
- AA fee (1% of total contributions)
- Any direct costs of Steering Committee Support Office /Technical Secretariat (staff and M&E)

If the MFM does not anticipate mobilizing the necessary minimum resources to make the MFM financially viable, but has a political or strategic importance that outweighs concerns regarding the financial viability, provide further information here.

VI. Monitoring and Evaluation

This section describes the arrangements for the MFM’s monitoring and evaluation at both the project/program level and the Fund level. On the former, typically Participating Organizations undertake M&E in accordance with their own regulations, rules, directives and procedures. At the Fund level, the M&E structure of the MFM must be collectively decided upon and clearly outlined in the Terms of Reference of the MFM.

M&E for the MFM should be grounded in and reflect the principles of participation, transparency, and mutual learning and should account for the complexity of capturing social change. The principles below, developed by the Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID), aim to shape more effective M&E systems for those engaged in women’s rights work at the grassroots, national, regional and global level:

i. Make M&E a learning partnership, not a performance test
ii. Approaches that include multiple M&E frameworks / tools / methods are more effective
iii. Balance quantitative and qualitative assessment techniques
iv. Legitimize and value participatory approaches
v. Track & assess reversals and success in “holding the line”
vi. Approaches that assess contribution to change are better than attribution-based frameworks
vii. Make M&E systems flexible and adaptable
viii. Design M&E to suit organizational architecture
ix. Factor in organizational capacity when designing M&E
x. Invest resources in developing M&E capacity

166 ibid.  
167 http://www.awid.org/Media/Files/StrengtheningM-E
xi. Tailor indicators and results to time frames
xii. Invest in the creation of baselines

Adequate indicators as well as practical M&E tools are essential for successful oversight of the MFM. Progress of the MFM can, for example, be measured against the indicators developed by the UN Technical Working group on Indicators (TWGI)\textsuperscript{168} as well as those developed by the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP).\textsuperscript{169} Other indicators and M&E tools can be developed in a participatory manner; yet, existing review mechanisms - such as the annual UN Development Assistance Framework (DAF) review mechanism – may also be (adapted) and used to track fund progress.

Country level CSOs must be in a position to monitor and report on progress of NAP implementation and indeed broader women, peace and security measures. Measures must therefore be put in place that allow for broad and inclusive in-country reviews and monitoring of the inflows and outflows of the MFM.

The reporting modality should be standardized; each donor should receive a standardized report, with specific contributions clearly detailed. This will improve transparency (how the funds have been used) and accountability (of both donors and organizations) in the management of financial resources for the implementation of the NAP 1325.

6 Annex III: Survey Questions

SURVEY QUESTIONS

As noted above, this survey was sent to the 42 Member States with NAP 1325, either through the Permanent Mission to the UN or directly to the relevant Ministry.

1. Is there earmarked funding for the implementation of Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1325 in your country? If so, how much (estimates are acceptable).
   
   a. For the development of a National Action Plan (NAP) on SCR 1325: Yes____ No____
      If yes, how much (estimates are acceptable)
   
   b. For the implementation of the activities outlined in the NAP: Yes ___ No____
      If yes, how much (estimates are acceptable)
   
   c. If there is not (earmarked) funding for the implementation of the NAP, please explain why. What have the challenges been?

2. If there are funds dedicated to the implementation of the activities in the NAP, from where do these funds originate? (e.g. internally, through domestic resource mobilization, or externally, from bilateral contributions, private foundations, corporate philanthropy, international organizations, regional organizations and/or civil society?)

   a. If funding for NAP implementation originates internally, do different ministries or government entities contribute to the funding? If yes, could you please describe how such internal resource mobilization is carried out?

   b. Does your government practice gender budgeting? If yes, does this bring about funding for implementation of the NAP? Please elaborate.

   c. Is there a way that your government monitors or tracks how much money is allocated and spent by different ministries or government agencies for the implementation of NAP1325?

3. What are the priority areas within the NAP to which you will allocate funding?
4. In which area(s) do you see significant gaps or challenges when it comes to funding your NAP’s implementation (e.g. the inclusion of women in the security sector; economic empowerment of vulnerable women and men; security sector reform; addressing sexual and gender based violence; the inclusion of men in gendered security issues; peacebuilding; access to justice for survivors of sexual violence in conflict; or others)?

   a. Why do you think these gaps exist?

   b. How can such funding gaps be addressed?

5. Do you provide funding to other countries – both to the government and to civil society – to support the development and/or implementation of National Action Plans or any other SCR 1325 related initiatives?

   a. If yes, how much (estimates are acceptable)?

   b. Would your government contribute to a basket fund or multi-stakeholder fund (MFM) dedicated to financing the implementation of NAP 1325 in a specific country? If yes, are there key conditions the fund would need to meet in order for your government to contribute?

6. What role does civil society - and particularly women’s rights organizations – have in regard to the implementation of SCR 1325 and particularly the NAP in your country?

   a. Are civil society organizations and particularly women’s rights organization involved in the development of the NAP?

170 The Multistakeholder Financing Mechanism (MFM) for NAP 1325 is a funding modality that aims to support resource generation, coordinate fund management, and broaden the number of actors involved in discussing and making decisions on financing for NAP 1325 implementation. The MFM consists of governments, donors, UN agencies, CSOs and, potentially, private sector actors. The concept of an MFM is grounded in the principles of broad national ownership, expanding upon that which is articulated in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008). The MFM is also in line with the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States agreed in Busan, Korea in December 2011 by the G7 + group of 19 fragile and conflict affected countries, development partners, and international organizations. Specifically, the MFM is guided by the following principles: 1) Locally-owned frameworks 2) Based on a comprehensive and accurate assessment of the local context’s needs, resources, and capacities 3) Resources planned and mobilized in accordance with this assessment 4) Engagement of and access for NGOs 5) Transparency and monitoring 6) Efficiency in disbursement 7) Improve coordination and promote collaboration among different actors involved in women, peace and security advocacy and programming 8) Explore partnerships with the private sector 9) Earmark 1325 funds, review military and other government budgets, and identify windows upon which 1325 implementation could be funded 10) Recognize and further strengthen civil society’s capacity to generate and manage financial resources dedicated to 1325 implementation.
b. Are civil society organizations and particularly women’s rights organization involved in the implementation of the NAP’s activities?

c. Are funding or resources channeled to civil society organizations, including particularly women’s rights organizations, to advance the implementation of SCR 1325? If so, how much (estimates acceptable)?

7. Does your country want the private sector to be involved in NAP 1325 implementation?

   a. If yes, how can the private sector get involved (e.g. as a donor, as an implementing partner)?

   b. If no, please explain why.

8. Please add any other information you would like to share on your context and the state of financing for the implementation of the activities outlined in your NAP.
Financing for implementing NAP

For more information

Cordaid
Visiting address:
Lutherse Burgwal 10, The Hague

Postal address:
P.O. Box 16440
2500 BK, The Hague
Tel : 070 313 63 00
Fax: 070 313 63 01

info@cordaid.org
www.cordaid.org