Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?

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Abstract

To what extent are recent UN peacekeeping reforms instances of organized hypocrisy? Organization theorists have demonstrated that the formal structures and organizational behavior of bureaucracies are often only loosely coupled. Organizations must often respond to conflicting environmental pressures to both produce efficiently and conform with standards of legitimacy in their field. Formal structures are established to symbolically conform to standards of legitimacy. At the same time, bureaucratic behavior largely disconnected from such structures is driven by the interests of organizational actors and constituencies. This produces inconsistencies between organizational expressions of commitment to norms that are violated in practice. Stephen Krasner has recently argued that organized hypocrisy accounts for the enduring nature of sovereignty norms that are routinely violated in practice. Through a case study of developments in peacekeeping doctrine, this paper explores the extent to which peacekeeping is characterized by organized hypocrisy. The findings, though preliminary, support the organized hypocrisy model.

Introduction

This paper explores whether UN peacekeeping, and specifically peace operations doctrine in the 1990s, can be explained as “organized hypocrisy,” a concept drawn from institutionalist organization theory and recently applied to international relations in an influential analysis of sovereignty.¹ The paper presents a case study conducted as a plausibility probe that supports the hypothesis that organized hypocrisy explains inconsistencies in UN peacekeeping doctrine and practice.

UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s

The UN’s significance as a security organization has waxed and waned since the end of the Cold War. The early post-Cold War period were marked by an expanded set of expectations about the possibility of the UN’s taking on the role originally envisioned for it as the basis of a global collective security system based on a great power concert.² However, hard experience in

¹ Krasner 1999.
Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda led to a period of disillusionment and retrenchment, and exploration of the way regional subcontracting could substitute for UN control of missions. The pendulum swung part way back in 1999 and 2000 with the initiation of new missions in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East Timor, the Congo, and Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The problems experienced in the early and mid-1990s led to efforts to reform both doctrine and organizational structure to enhance the effectiveness of peace operations. Substantial reforms were proposed in 1992 and 1997, and in 2000 the Brahimi Report recommended a series of further reforms, some of which have received Security Council endorsement. In addition, there has been significant reassessment and adaptation of peace operations doctrine among individual member states, regional organizations, and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) itself. This activity has produced a convergence on a new set of doctrinal principles for peace operations, and "gray area" operations in particular.

These doctrinal and organizational reforms are driven by different imperatives. On the one hand, there is a need for greater effectiveness in peacekeeping tasks. Demonstration of such organizational capacity can create greater political support from various constituencies--member states, national parliaments, and the militaries and foreign affairs ministries of troop contributors, with the United States and its Congress and administration preeminent among these. Conversely, lack of confidence in the UN’s capacity to manage peace operations undermines such support.

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4 Two UN missions have been initiated in East Timor since 1999. UNTAET operated from October 1999 to May 2002. UNMISET replaced UNTAET. The UN also authorized the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan in December 2001.
On the other hand, the UN is organizationally highly dependent on legitimacy and peacekeeping is fundamentally shaped by the prevailing normative context.\(^5\) To maintain the support of internal and external institutional constituencies, the UN must appear to be acting in accordance with norms governing peacekeeping.\(^6\)

Thus, the UN is subject to logics of both consequences and appropriateness.\(^7\) In the former, action is driven by calculation of the expected consequences of alternative courses of action, and rational choice of the optimal alternative. In the latter, behavior is determined by cognitive scripts indicating the appropriate action in a given social context. Institutionalist organization theory tells us that logics of consequences and appropriateness can conflict.\(^8\) Compliance with norms in an organization’s environment can require behavior that would tend to interfere with the efficient performance of the organization’s core tasks, and vice versa. Under such conditions, organizations will tend to respond through what is termed “organized hypocrisy.”\(^9\)

**Organized Hypocrisy**

The term is taken from the work of the organization theorist Nils Brunsson, and refers to organizational responses to conflicting logics of consequences and appropriateness, or between

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\(^6\) But see Barnett, “The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda.”

\(^7\) March and Olsen 1989, 1998.

\(^8\) Known by its practitioners as “institutional theory,” institutionalist organization theory is typically termed “sociological institutionalism” in the IR literature. See Finnemore 1996. IR theorists’ attention to institutional theory has focused on one branch of the literature—the world polity institutionalism associated with the work of John Meyer and his associates. However, organizational field theory, as exemplified by DiMaggio and Powell (1991) constitutes a distinct branch of this literature. See Scott 1995 for an overview of institutional theory.

different norms of appropriateness, in which organizations “decouple” structures and processes established to satisfy the different requirements in conflict. As Brunsson puts it,

When institutional norms fail to agree with the requirements for action, organizations will often try to create two sets of structures and processes, one for each type of norm. These sets should not interfere with one another, but should be separated or ‘decoupled.’

According to Brunsson, the establishment of these parallel structures results in dual sets of organizational structures and processes. Organizations develop both a formal organizational structure, typically depicted in organization charts, and an alternate, informal structure through which organizational activity actually takes place. Similarly, organizations will have one set of organizational processes for directing organizational action, and another that “is kept for purposes of demonstration or display to the outside world. These second processes can be defined as rituals.” Thus, an organization can both proclaim and routinely violate or ignore a norm.

**Conditions for Organized Hypocrisy: The Action-Politics Distinction and Organizational Environments**

These sorts of practices are generated by, and should be more common under, certain conditions. Brunsson draws a distinction between two ideal-typical kinds of organizations: the action organization and the political organization. The basic characteristic of the action organization, exemplified by a factory or large corporation, is the efficient production of some product or output, through which the organization obtains the resources necessary for its

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11 Brunsson 1989, 7.
survival. The political organization, by contrast, is defined by, and derives resources based on, the “reflection of inconsistencies.” National parliaments exemplify this ideal-type, in which organizational legitimacy is based solely on reflecting the inconsistent demands of different constituencies of the organization.

These are ideal-types, while in reality all organizations display elements of both types. Organizational hypocrisy, in which an organization’s “talk, decisions, and products” are decoupled, is characteristic of organizations that better typify the political organization. Hypocrisy is dysfunctional in action organizations: “In the action organization talk and decisions are instruments for coordinating action which leads to products. Thus, talk, decisions and products tend to be consistent.” However, in political organizations, decoupling organizational discourse and behavior can facilitate the basic function of reflecting the inconsistencies of the organizational environment. Thus, “hypocrisy is a fundamental type of behavior in the political organization.”

Organizations that are more political and less action-oriented are more prevalent in what are known in the institutional theory literature as institutional (as opposed to technical) environments. In technical environments, organizations are evaluated and draw resources from the environment on the basis of the efficient production of products, or what are called “technical environments.”

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12 Brunsson 1989, 14-19, 32.
15 Brunsson 1989, 27.
16 Brunsson 1989, 27.
17 Brunsson (1989, 6) writes: “In the terminology adopted by Meyer and Scott (1983), we could say that most organizations have both a technical and an institutional environment. The technical environment evaluates and supports an organization in terms of its products and results; the institutional environment judges it on its structures, processes, and ideologies.”
efficiency criteria.”18 In institutional environments, organizations are evaluated in terms of their conformity with standard practices the adoption of which confers organizational legitimacy. According to Steven Weber, institutional environments “are characterized by relationships built on noneconomic and nontechnical standards of legitimacy that have less to do with efficiency than with the structure of extant organizations in the environment.”19 The concepts of technical and institutional environments are also ideal-types, and real world organizational environments exhibit both technical and institutional features. In fact, the literature has more recently conceived of technical and institutional aspects of environments as existing in different configurations so that an organization can face an institutional environment that is simultaneously highly (or only to a low degree) technical and institutional. Organized hypocrisy is an adaptive response to highly institutional environments with technical features. An organization can satisfy conflicting technical and institutional criteria through the development of decoupled structures and processes.

**Krasner: Organized Hypocrisy and Sovereignty**

Stephen Krasner has recently applied the concept of organized hypocrisy to international relations, arguing that sovereignty is organized hypocrisy, enduring as a norm yet frequently violated in practice, as a result of conflicting logics of consequences and appropriateness in domestic and international environments.20 Others, following Krasner, have applied the concept

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to settings such as GATT/WTO bargaining. Krasner suggests that the concept of organized hypocrisy should be widely applicable in international politics.

Brunsson and other organizational theorists who suggest that hypocrisy might be a normal state of affairs, have focused their attention on domestic political settings. The logic of these analyses suggests that organized hypocrisy will be even more prevalent in the international environment. There are more constituencies to manage, because domestic actors are joined by international ones. Norms of appropriateness emanating from the international environment could be inconsistent with those originating from domestic sources. The authoritative decision-making role often assumed by courts in a domestic setting, which can sometimes resolve conflicts between conflicting rules, does not exist in the international environment.

While the fundamentals of the organized hypocrisy concept—organizations cope with inconsistent norms and conflicting pressures by establishing separate, “decoupled” structures and processes to satisfy each—are unchanged in his analysis, Krasner’s adaption of the concept to explain the persistence of sovereignty in the face of routine violations introduces some distinctive elements to the argument that are not inherent in the concept as originally developed in institutional theory. Krasner uses the concept of organized hypocrisy to argue that logics of consequences can always triumph over logics of appropriateness, or, in the concluding sentence of the book: “In a contested environment in which actors, including the rulers of states, embrace different norms, clubs can always be trump.” However, in Brunsson’s formulation, the argument is more about how logics of consequences and appropriateness coexist, with neither establishing supremacy. Krasner’s is, therefore, a distinctively realist conception of organized hypocrisy.

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21 Steinberg 2002.
22 Krasner 1999, 66.
23 Krasner 1999, 238.
24 Similarly, in the institutional theory literature, institutional and technical aspects of organizational environments, which roughly correspond to logics of appropriateness and
**Rulers, States, and Organizations**

However, Krasner’s theory differs from standard realism in abandoning state-centrism.

Krasner writes,

The starting point for this study, the ontological givens, are rulers, specific policy makers, usually but not always the executive head of state. Rulers, not states—and not the international system—make choices about policies, rules, and institutions…The assumption of this study is that rulers want to stay in power and, being in power, they want to promote the security, prosperity, and values of their constituents.  

Further,

Outcomes in the international system are determined by rulers whose violation of, or adherence to, international principles or rules is based on calculations of material or ideational interests, not taken for granted practices derived from some overarching institutional structures or deeply embedded generative grammars. Organized hypocrisy is the normal state of affairs.

This focus on rulers, rather than states, as the key actors is a major revision to standard realist theory. One reviewer has suggested that it constitutes a new “Macchiavellian” form of realism:

 Yet, whereas a realist may find strong systemic pressures that help maintain domestic autonomy for most states (e.g., the balance of power), Krasner makes no such assumptions. This is because his starting point is not ‘states’ but the political elites who rule in the name of the state. Such individuals are primarily motivated by a desire to maintain their authority within the domestic sphere, so they can adopt a ‘logic of consequences’ that is not consistent with either the norms or structural dynamics of the international system. In this sense, Krasner’s world is not a Hobbesian state of nature in which states act according to the necessities produces by international anarchy but, rather, a Machiavellian one, in which leaders act to maintain and expand their own power.”

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27 Cronin 261.
However, this leaves the source of rulers’ preferences unclear. Krasner’s argument can be interpreted in different ways on this point. Do rulers adopt preferences that suit domestic interest groups, thereby maintaining their support to remain in power? Or are rulers relatively autonomous actors whose preferences are somewhat insulated from domestic society? Turan Kayaoglu opts for the former interpretation, identifying as a theoretical problem,

…Krasner’s inability to link his empirical cases with his theoretical argument about rulers’ actions. He argues that rulers act in accordance with domestic political imperatives. If the domestic and international logic of appropriateness coincides, there will be no hypocrisy. The difference between the domestic and international logic of appropriateness determines the level of hypocrisy. The extent to which the domestic logic of appropriateness differs from international norms is an empirical question. However, Krasner’s empirical cases do not address this issue. He frequently refers to the role of constituent pressures on rulers, but he does not offer empirical examples. In other words, his theoretical causal argument is:

**Interest of domestic constituencies ➔ preferences of state rulers ➔ violation of norms of sovereignty**

In the empirical cases, however, Krasner focuses on the second part of the causal argument. He either takes states’ interest [sic] as given, like the neo-realist position that he criticizes, or deduce [sic] state interest from state behavior. In other words, Krasner aims to avoid state centrism, but his empirical arguments take state interest as given. He fails to explain interest formation within powerful states that forces state rulers to violate the norms of Westphalian sovereignty.  

If this interpretation is correct, Krasner’s argument would be a form of liberal intergovernmentalism, in which state (or rulers’) preferences are determined by domestic (and transnational) societal interests, and outcomes (such as whether a state violates an international norm) depend on the distribution and relative intensity of state preferences more than relative power or information asymmetries.  

While Kayaoglu is correct that Krasner is ambiguous on the sources and determinants of rulers’ preferences, I prefer the second interpretation of Krasner’s model: rulers’ and states’

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29 Moravcsik 1993, 1997. Moravcsik’s liberal theory is essentially same as his liberal intergovernmentalist model of regional integration, but generalized to international politics. Compare Kayaoglu’s causal arrow diagram with Figure 1, Moravcsik 1997 p. 545.
preferences are relatively autonomous from domestic economic, political, or bureaucratic interests. This is more consistent with both general principles of the realist tradition within which Krasner is located, and with other Krasner writings. This interpretation also differentiates “Krasnerian” organized hypocrisy from liberal intergovernmentalism.

An interpretation of organized hypocrisy as a product of responses to rational, unitary, and autonomous actors such as Krasner’s rulers is still a modification of the original formulation of the concept. In Brunsson’s conception of organized hypocrisy it is organizations, not rulers, that face the competing demands of inconsistent logics of consequences and action. These organizations, in turn, are not unitary actors in the way that Krasner’s rulers are. In fact, one of the hallmarks of organized hypocrisy is the development in a single organization of decoupled organizational units exhibiting behavior inconsistent with each other. If UN is peacekeeping is examined through the lens of Krasnerian organized hypocrisy, the problem arises of identifying who or what at the UN (Secretary General? Security Council? DPKO? Individual member states?) plays the role of ruler. What is the relevant logic of political consequences? Consequences for whose interests? In Brunsson’s formulation, the focus shifts from identifying an analogue for the ruler to distinguishing the organization from its environment, and identifying inconsistent pressures in the environment.

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30 Morgenthau 1948; Krasner, “Are Bureaucracies Important?”
31 I thank Page Fortna, Margaret Karns, and audience members at the panel on Peacekeeping and its Pitfalls at the 2002 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association for highlighting this issue for me.
32 Brunsson’s work, however, would seem to fit in the “open systems” approach to organizational analysis, which conceives of organizations as defined in terms of their interdependent relationships with their environments. This perspective sees the boundaries of organizations as porous and, to some extent, arbitrary, and regards organizations as non-unitary actors with loosely coupled components. Scott 1998, 82-100. Krasner’s approach is more consistent with a rational systems perspective. Scott 1998, 33-55.
Based on the foregoing discussion, we should expect organized hypocrisy to be most evident in aspects of international relations characterized by organizations facing inconsistent norms and practical requirements, including a need to conform to standards of legitimacy and efficiency demands in conflict with each other. Organizational hypocrisy should be most likely in organizations in the international environment that are highly political in nature, existing largely to represent conflicting perspectives. Organizational hypocrisy is more likely in institutional environments, in which measuring the efficiency of organizational outputs is difficult or impossible. Therefore, it is more likely to be evident in the case of an organization for which no clear or accepted method of evaluating task performance exists.

UN Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?

UN peacekeeping fits these criteria. The United Nations, and UN peace operations in particular, face inconsistent requirements such as the need for both consent and effectiveness, or impartiality and forceful intervention. UN Peace Operations are supposed to uphold the norms of sovereignty and human rights, and of juridical and empirical sovereignty. In addition, UN peacekeeping is defined in terms of norms of consent, impartiality, and limiting the use of force to self-defense. Recent experience, however, has shown that these requirements sometimes conflict with the demands of effectiveness: it is sometimes necessary to take actions that endanger operational consent, to take sides against a party that threatens the mission, and to use force beyond self-defense to protect the mission’s objectives or humanitarian victims.

The UN is a highly political organization, and in fact neatly conforms to Brunsson’s example of a legislative body as approximating the ideal-type political organization. As disputes about the makeup of the Security Council, and the increasing role of NGOs in UN conferences and activities make clear, a major purpose of the UN is to represent different interests and constituencies in global politics. As Michael Barnett has expressed it,

A complex and contested feature of the UN is the definition of its constituency, that is, of the “international community.” In the history of the UN, the “international community,” and concomitantly the UN’s constituency, has been defined in three often contradictory, yet often conflated, ways: in terms of individual persons, in terms of collective “peoples” (largely defined according to identity-based categories of nationality, ethnicity, or even gender), and in terms of sovereign states.35

A cursory survey of the recent academic literature on UN peace operations also yields a number of observations that seem to indicate hallmarks of organized hypocrisy. For example, Stuart Gordon notes that various organizational units of the Secretariat face conflicting requirements:

The UN specialised agencies have their work rooted in a humanitarian mandate reflecting humanitarian rather than political imperatives, whereas the work of the DPKO and DPA [Department of Political Affairs] reflects the political realities of the Security Council and the General Assembly to a much greater degree. Consequently, turf battles between the DPKO and the DPA on one side and the DHA on the other have represented something deeper than simply a battle for bureaucratic influence.36

Recalling the decoupling of organizational ideology and action that is central to organized hypocrisy, Michèle Griffin refers to a disjuncture between developments in peace operations doctrine development and actual organizational behavior as a “dichotomy between conceptual progressss and operational paralysis,” having as a possible consequence the decline of the UN as

an international security organization.37 And, referring to recent organizational structuring of the secretariat, Thomas Weiss has written that

In New York, this [vacuum in thinking about security relationships] has been filled by the cosmetic adaptation of UN diplomatic and coordination machinery rather than any serious rethinking or restructuring of humanitarian action…The 1997 ‘Shell Game’ reveals the low priority of adopting appropriate institutional mechanisms--both member states and organizations speak out of two sides of their mouths to reflect politics in the UN goldfish bowl and operational reality in the field.38

The idea of a largely symbolic formal organizational structure existing alongside a more informal arrangement by which things actually get done is suggested by Mats Berdal’s observation that “[T]he management of UN field operations continues to rely on improvisation, ad hoc arrangements, and ‘close working relationships’ among members of the Secretariat and between officers and civilian personnel in the field.”39 Michael Barnett states it more directly in his recent book on his experience as a political adviser at the U.S. Mission to the UN during the Rwandan genocide: “Although it was possible to sit down with paper and pen and draw a coherent organizational chart, what was reproduced on paper bore little resemblance to practice, which itself was an ever-changing reality.”40

These observations suggest that much in the way of structural and procedural reforms in UN peacekeeping may actually be driven by the dynamics of organized hypocrisy. This suggests the following questions: Is UN peacekeeping reform an example of organized hypocrisy? Is organizational restructuring within the Secretariat merely shuffling of organizational charts uncoupled from actual day-to-day practice? Are much-touted recent developments in peace operations doctrine merely symbolic talk or ritualized discourse, decoupled from “real world”

37 Griffin 1999, 1.
39 Berdal 1995, 182.
40 Barnett 2002, 32.
organizational behavior? Given the moral, humanitarian, and political urgency of the crises in which UN peace operations are, increasingly in recent years, involved, the high profile of recent reform initiatives such as the Brahimi Report, and the fragility of American support for the UN and its shaky finances, these questions are urgent and significant.

The remainder of this paper consists of an initial, exploratory investigation of the extent to which recent UN peacekeeping reform is a product of organized hypocrisy. The next section discusses the methodological aims of the paper. I then present a case study through the lens of the organized hypocrisy framework of recent developments in peace operations doctrine among leading Western and Nordic states with significant peacekeeping involvement, and NATO and the UN. Finally, the paper closes with an assessment of further research requirements, and implications of the preliminary findings for theory and policy.

**Methods and Case Selection**

This paper is intended as a preliminary “plausibility probe” of the organized hypocrisy perspective applied to an aspect of UN peacekeeping reform—the development of peacekeeping doctrine. A plausibility probe is a weak form of case study test intended to provide a first-cut indication of whether a hypothesis merits further investigation. According to Odell,

The researcher conducts a single case study only to check the plausibility of a theory, using a case that may not be especially difficult for the theory. One might even select a case whose circumstances are thought to be favorable to the theory, as a pilot study before undertaking a more extensive data gathering effort. If this probe does not confirm the theory’s plausibility, resources can be better directed; if it does, a more comprehensive and costly test can be undertaken with greater confidence. If the case chosen is not especially difficult for the theory, however, then it alone will not support as strong a claim.41

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As a plausibility probe is merely a rough assessment of a theory’s explanatory power, standard rules of case selection criteria are somewhat relaxed. The case of UN peacekeeping doctrine seems appropriate to a preliminary assessment of the organized hypocrisy framework because it involves all of the different aspects of organizational behavior that are the focus of the organized hypocrisy perspective: talk, decisions, and action.

The case selection focuses on peacekeeping reform because Brunsson argues that organized hypocrisy typically generates continual reform efforts as symbolic responses to inconsistent demands on the organization. Because these reforms cannot reconcile the inconsistent demands, they are typically decoupled from organizational action. Thus, organized hypocrisy should be especially evident in organizational reforms.

**Peace Support Operations Doctrine**

*From Traditional Peacekeeping to Multidimensional Peacekeeping*

Peacekeeping has evolved since the end of the Cold War from a relatively modest tool to support consensual truce monitoring to enable negotiations, into exercises in nation-building and social and political transformation. As one observer notes, post-Cold War peacekeeping missions “concern the transition from civil war to civil society.” Peacekeeping originated as an ad hoc adaptation to the Security Council paralysis of the Cold War that prevented the UN from playing the role—as the center of a concert-based collective security system—envisioned by its founders. The UN Charter makes no mention of peacekeeping, which was famously referred to by Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld as falling under “Chapter Six-and-a-Half,” referring to the Charter’s measures for mediation and conflict resolution (chapter six) and enforcement measures (chapter seven). Evolving from observation missions and other precedents set by the League of

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Nations, peacekeeping originated as merely the placement of lightly armed UN troops, drawn from neutral middle powers such as Canada, between the forces of states which had reached a peace agreement and accepted UN oversight of the agreement. Based on early missions, five principles of peacekeeping were developed:

1. Consent of the parties to the dispute for the establishment of the mission;
2. Non-use of force except in self defense;
3. Voluntary contributions of contingents from small, neutral countries to participate in the force;
4. Impartiality;
5. Control of peacekeeping operations by the Secretary General

During the Cold War, UN missions were established in the Suez Canal Sector, Sinai, and Gaza Strip (UNEF I and II), the Congo (ONUC), West New Guinea (UNSF), Cyprus (UNFICYP), Golan Heights (UNDOF), Lebanon (UNIFIL), and Namibia (UNTAG). UNTAG became the first of several missions (UNTAC, ONUMUZ, ONUSAL, Nicaragua and Central America ONUCA) that were seen as distinct from traditional, Cold War, peacekeeping. The UN has described these new, “second generation,” or “complex, multidimensional” missions as follows:

Multidimensional peacekeeping operations tackle a number of challenges concurrently: helping to maintain ceasefires and to disarm and demobilize combatants; assisting the parties to build or strengthen vital institutions and processes and respect for human rights, so that all concerned can pursue their interests through legitimate channels rather than on the battlefield; providing humanitarian assistance to relieve immediate suffering; and laying the groundwork for longer-term economic growth and development on the

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43 On the League of Nations as a precedent for UN peacekeeping, see Arnold and Ruland, Diehl 17-20.
44 http://www.berghof-center.org/handbook/woodhouse/s2.htm

According to William Durch, “These operations often have a mandate not only to facilitate the reduction of tensions between former foes (as in traditional peacekeeping), but also to help implement a peace accord that addresses the causes of the underlying conflict.”\footnote{Durch, “Keeping the Peace,” 1996, 4.} They tend to address intrastate, rather than interstate conflict, are more likely to confront “spoilers” and the lack or withdrawal of consent of parties to the conflict. Such missions are therefore more likely to require the use of force beyond self-defense. Because they confront intrastate disorder and humanitarian disasters, multidimensional missions also include a wider range of tasks related not only to the oversight of a peace agreement, but also the establishment of civil order and the basis for its continuation. This puts a premium on law and order issues, especially civilian police components, and on civilian personnel who can assist in the establishment, for example, of government bureaucracies, a functioning judicial system, and the oversight of elections. The need for such personnel, and the end of the Cold War rivalry, produced a shift in which troops and civilian personnel in second generation missions often came from major powers, rather than the neutral middle powers of classical peacekeeping, thus eroding the third principle of traditional peacekeeping. Furthermore, the principle that missions be controlled by the Secretary General was eroded in Bosnia and Somalia, as the boundaries between NATO, US, and UN missions became blurry. As the 1990s went on, increasing attention was given to the idea of the UN as merely an authorizer or legitimizer of interventions actually commanded by individual member states or regional organizations. Thus, the principles of traditional peacekeeping were
blurred significantly in the initial multidimensional peacekeeping missions of the early 1990s in Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, and Nicaragua. However, this left a need for principles to guide what came to be known as “gray area” peace operations lying between traditional peacekeeping and chapter seven peace enforcement.

**Doctrine: From Wider Peacekeeping to Impartial Peace Enforcement**

Initially, troop contributors and the UN attempted, for the most part, to transfer traditional peacekeeping doctrine from classical settings into the new, multidimensional missions, with some modifications. In 1992, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland developed a two-volume set of Nordic UN Tactical Manuals. The same year, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali produced *Agenda for Peace*, which called for a much-expanded role for UN peace operations, in the areas of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peace-building. *Agenda for Peace* also suggested a downgrading of the principle of consent, defining peacekeeping as “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.” Thus, the initial approach was to stretch the principles of traditional peacekeeping by sending missions to places where the conditions—a “peace to keep,” consent of the parties—did not hold.

However, as UN missions encountered difficulties and faced the prospect of failure in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda, the inadequacy of this approach was increasingly recognized, and a search for more appropriate doctrine began. The primary issues in the debate over new peace

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48 Wilkinson 1998, p. 3. According to Wilkinson, these manuals placed a greater emphasis on neutrality, as opposed to impartiality, than did the 1998 British Army Field Manual (AFM) Vol. V, Part 1, “Peacekeeping Operations,” but were otherwise very similar.

49 Boutros-Ghali, 1992, para. 20. (Emphasis added.)
operations doctrine were the related roles of consent and force in the conception of peacekeeping operations and their conduct. In a 1995 supplement to *Agenda for Peace*, Boutros-Ghali argued that the principles of consent, impartiality, and force only in self-defense were “particularly important,”50 arguably marking these three as core principles of peacekeeping. Also in this period, according to Peter Viggo Jakobsen,

A heated debate erupted between traditionalists, who regarded the use of force beyond self-defence in gray area operations as a recipe for disaster, and reformists who saw a more muscular approach as a necessary condition for success. This disagreement was reflected in the initial attempts made by Western armies to devise a new doctrine. The British Army took its cue from traditionalists, whereas the French Army took a reformist line emphasizing a credible coercive capacity as a prerequisite for success.51

The first coherent doctrinal response was the British *Wider Peacekeeping* doctrine.52 Developed primarily on the basis of the British Army’s experience in Bosnia as part of UNPROFOR, Wider Peacekeeping placed consent at the center of peacekeeping doctrine. The primary author and exponent of Wider Peacekeeping, Charles Dobbie, argued that peacekeeping had to be clearly distinguished as “two activities that require radically different conceptual approaches,” and that were “separate and mutually exclusive activities that cannot be mixed.”53 Wider peacekeeping thus denies the existence of a spectrum of peace operations, or the idea of a “gray area” between peacekeeping and warfighting. Peacekeeping, according to Dobbie, depends fundamentally on the consent of the parties to the conflict, and when such consent is lacking or withdrawn, if a mission is to take place it must be a peace enforcement mission prepared to fight to defeat one or more parties.

50 Boutros-Ghali 1995, para. 33.
51 Jakobsen 2000, 36-37.
52 Wider Peacekeeping was initially developed late 1993. (Jakobsen 2000, 37) It was released in December 1994 (Thornton 2000, 41) and replaced July 1998 (Jakobsen 2000, 40).
53 Dobbie 1994, 121.
Dobbie distinguished between consent at the operational and tactical levels, however, with important implications for the role of force in wider peacekeeping. As John Gerard Ruggie has summarized the argument: “Through continual negotiations with the appropriate leadership at the theater level, overall consent for an operation must be sought at all times. Accordingly, ‘wider peacekeeping’ ruled out the strategic use of force. At the same time, within a framework of operational consent, the tactical use of force is permitted in defense of the mission as well as in self-defense.”54 In the wider peacekeeping doctrine, there is a critical “consent divide,” or “Rubicon,” which once crossed dooms a peacekeeping mission, leaving the alternatives of peace enforcement or withdrawal.55 This doctrine, then, argued that the traditional peacekeeping principle regarding use of force only in self-defense was less significant than the interpretation of peacekeepers’ use of force by local parties. If the tactical use of force was seen by all parties as impartial and consistent with the term of previously granted operational consent, then it would not undermine the mission’s objectives and could facilitate them. However, if peacekeepers were perceived to be taking sides or using force in a crass, unfocused way that alienated support, the peacekeeping contingent would reduce its status to that of one of the parties to the conflict, prejudicing its abilities to control events and losing its legitimacy and credibility as a trustworthy third party, thereby setting at risk its own security. In effect, the force would join the conflict and become part of the problem it was there to resolve.56

Operational consent, and therefore, the basis for a peacekeeping mission, could be lost either if a party to the agreement simply withdrew or “at the tactical level a series of piecemeal infringements of agreements occurred to such an extent that there was a crumbling effect at the operational level.”57 Thus, peacekeeping missions, whether force was used beyond self-defense

55 Dobbie 1994, 131.
56 Dobbie 1994, 130. Somalia is an example, as the hunt for Aideed made UN forces party to the conflict.
57 Gow and Dandeker 2001, 185.
or not, were defined by and dependent upon operational consent. Wider peacekeeping was merely a particularly challenging species of peacekeeping (as peace enforcement was just a type of warfighting), defined as “operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties but in an environment that may be highly volatile.”

Wider peacekeeping was initially well-received, and influenced doctrine in other states and bodies involved in peacekeeping. However, it was subsequently criticized heavily, on several grounds. Critics argued that the strong emphasis on consent effectively left the initiative to the conflicting parties and prevented peacekeepers from stopping attacks on civilians. They also questioned the logic of basing a doctrine on consent because it is low or fragile in most contemporary conflicts and to a large extent determined by factors that peace forces cannot control.

And it provided no doctrinal basis for action to address conflicts in which operational consent was not forthcoming but were nonetheless judged to warrant intervention on political-strategic or humanitarian grounds. More broadly, the critique of wider peacekeeping reasserted the existence and significance of a “middle ground” or “gray area” on a spectrum between peacekeeping and war. One of the most influential critics, Lt. Col. Philip Wilkinson, was actually a member of the team that wrote *Wider Peacekeeping* under Dobbie. However, he

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58 Dobbie 1994, 122.
59 Farrell (1995, 208-9), argues that WPK influenced the drafting of U.S. Army Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*. Jakobsen (2000, 38) also claims that WPK influenced US Army doctrinal developments after Somalia, and NATO doctrine. Both Farrell and Jakobsen point to the removal of the gray area concept of “aggravated peacekeeping” from drafts of FM 100-23 as due to the influence of WPK. Thornton (2000, 51), however, claims that US doctrine writers were not persuaded by the logic of WPK.
60 Jakobsen 2000, 38.
61 Gow and Dandeker (2001, 185) argue that “According to Dobbie the answer would be [to do] nothing, because the doctrinal basis for doing so would not be present.” However, Dobbie would more likely argue that, if intervention were judged necessary, it should be recognized as, and conducted as, peace enforcement, not confused with peacekeeping or some illusory middle ground type of operation.
62 Dobbie (1994, 143) used the term “middle ground” in an argument that is does not exist.
became the lead writer for the document, Joint Warfare Publication 3-50, *Peace Support Operations*, that supplanted Wider Peacekeeping. JWP 3-50 presents a doctrine for the gray area between traditional peacekeeping and warfighting in terms of “impartial peace enforcement.”

Wilkinson argued that operations in which consent was problematic constituted a middle ground between peacekeeping, whether traditional or wider, and warfighting. Such situations called for a form of peace enforcement, but not one in which the peacekeeping force sought the defeat of one or more parties, as in a warfighting setting. Instead, force used in support of peace enforcement would be used impartially, in support of the mandate. Any party violating the mandate or threatening the peacekeeping force could be met with armed force, however force would be used as part of a larger package of “carrots and sticks” aimed at reestablishing consent and the conditions for negotiations to achieve a settlement and post-conflict order. Impartial peace enforcement calls for military forces to

use a combination of coercion and inducement to create the conditions in which other diplomatic and humanitarian agencies can build peace. This doctrine sanctions the impartial use of force, where actions will be taken against or in support of any party, depending on its compliance with the international mandate and principles enshrined in international humanitarian law.63

This doctrine envisions a force more like IFOR than like UNPROFOR. Wider peacekeeping was largely a rationale for the restrained and limited mandate of UNPROFOR. However, a widespread sense emerged that the unwillingness of UNPROFOR to risk of loss of consent by the Serbs, and the fact that its forces were unequipped for using force even to the level necessary for self-defense doomed the mission. Thus, wider peacekeeping was both developed on the basis of Bosnia, and defeated by it. One of the lessons drawn from the experience of UNPROFOR

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and NATO in Bosnia was that intervention must be supported by forces capable and prepared to use force beyond self-defense in support of the mission’s mandate or for humanitarian purposes. While maintaining or reestablishing consent is an important goal in impartial peace enforcement, it is not seen as essential for the existence of a mission. Wilkinson argues, referring to I/SFOR, that, “From a broader PSO force perspective, there is no ‘rubicon’ of consent. Indeed, the very ambition of a combat-capable PE force should be to lower its operational profile to that of peacekeeping as soon as possible, while retaining its ability to escalate as and when required.”

The basic idea is that deploying a combat-capable force in uncertain situations is more likely to produce consent than is deploying a vulnerable one that invites resistance or defiance, and that a combination of coercion and positive incentives is more likely to produce the desired end-state of compliance with a peace settlement and cooperation with post-conflict peacebuilding efforts than is reliance on either carrots or sticks alone.

This conception of a “gray area” of uncertain consent to be addressed by impartial peace enforcement constitutes the basis of an “emerging consensus” on peace operations doctrine. The peace operations doctrines of states such as England, France, the United States, and Sweden, and the FINABEL countries, and of NATO, all adopt this general approach. Denmark has also implemented changes along these lines. According to Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 

64 Wilkinson 1998, 8.
65 See Jakobsen (2000, 43) for a discussion of evidence in support of these claims.
It is clear that a consensus on the use of force in grey area operations is emerging among the major Western powers. The only remaining disagreement is terminological, whether operations conducted in grey area or civil war environments with limited consent should be referred to as peace restoration or (impartial) peace enforcement—something which is reflected in the fact that the Western power at long last have been able to agree on a NATO doctrine for Peace Support Operations.\(^{69}\)

The Brahimi Report explicitly adopts this thinking while also asserting the continued validity of the what have come to be seen as the core three principles of peacekeeping: consent, impartiality, and force only in self-defense. The inconsistency is not noted or resolved.

Under the heading “Implications for peacekeeping doctrine and strategy,” the report first states that “The Panel concurs that consent of the local parties, impartiality and use of force only in self-defence should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping,”\(^{70}\) However, the report immediately goes on to state that because UN peacekeepers must be able to deal with the manipulation of consent or its withdrawal by local parties,

Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandate professionally and successfully. This means that United Nations military units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate. Rules of engagement should not limit contingents to stroke-for-stroke responses but should allow ripostes sufficient to silence a source of deadly fire that is directed at United Nations troops or at the people they are charged to protect and, in particularly dangerous situations, should not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers.\(^{71}\)

In the next paragraph, the report endorses a concept of impartiality substantially the same as the one that forms the basis of the doctrine of impartial peace enforcement (IPE).

\(^{68}\) Jakobsen 1998.
\(^{69}\) Jakobnisen 2000, 41.
\(^{71}\) Brahimi Report, p. 9, para. 49.
50. Impartiality for such operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles. Such impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement. In some cases, local parties consist not of moral equals but of obvious aggressors and victims, and peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so.\(^7\)

In other words (and in contradiction to the principle of force only in self-defense asserted previously), peacekeepers can and should use force in defense of the mandate or of humanitarian victims, not only in self-defense, but should do so impartially, with impartiality defined in terms of the even-handed enforcement of the mandate’s requirements. This is essentially identical to the principles of impartial peace enforcement, and implies the deployment of combat capable forces appropriate to peace enforcement into situations of uncertain consent. Indeed, in the next paragraph, the report states that this means bigger forces, better equipped and more costly, but able to pose a credible deterrent threat, in contrast to the symbolic and non-threatening presence that characterizes traditional peacekeeping. United Nations forces for complex operations should be sized and configured so as to leave no doubt in the minds of would-be spoilers as to which of the two approaches the Organization has adopted.\(^7\)

A number of questions can be raised about the new consensus peace operation doctrine of impartial peace enforcement. For one thing, it remains to be seen whether it will be implemented in practice, or whether UN peace operations will be provided appropriate mandates and forces to make this possible.\(^7\) For another, a central assumption regarding the effect of impartiality in peace enforcement is somewhat shaky. According to Wilkinson,

\[\text{T]he parties will inevitably see peace support activities as partial at some stage of the operation, and the force will be accused of being so. So long as activities are driven purely be principled and clearly defined impartiality, such accusations can be refuted by a}\]

\(^{72}\) Brahimi Report, 9, para. 50.
\(^{73}\) Brahimi Report, 9, para. 51.
proactive information campaign, and the subsequent damage to consent of the indigenous peoples can eventually be rebuilt.\textsuperscript{75}

This assumes a degree of reasonableness on the part of aggrieved parties that may well not be forthcoming in the course of a civil war or complex humanitarian emergency. Mats Berdal, among others, has argued that the new doctrine fails to adequately appreciate that “In its political and military consequences, enforcement cannot be impartial.”\textsuperscript{76} Similarly, Richard Connaughton has argued that impartial peace enforcement is a warmed over version of Wider Peacekeeping that fails to take into account the lessons of recent conflicts or recognize the “limits of consent and impartiality.”\textsuperscript{77}

In any case, the Report’s recommendations on doctrine display a remarkable inconsistency by asserting traditional peacekeeping principles—consent, impartiality, and force only in self-defense—simultaneously with an argument for the use of force beyond self-defense against one party to the conflict in situations in which consent is lacking.

Does this represent organizational talk and decisions decoupled from action? It is not yet possible to say whether the new doctrine will translate into practice.\textsuperscript{78} The Brahimi Report was released in late August, 2000 and endorsed by Secretary General Annan. On November 13, 2000, Wilkinson 2000, 77-78.\textsuperscript{79} Berdal 2000, 58. Lise Morjé Howard (2002, 41) also argues that the UN’s Lessons Learned Unit’s reports have failed to clarify the peacekeeping-peace enforcement distinction, or the requirements for each, and therefore the UN has not achieved “second-level” learning, or changed understanding of problems and methods of addressing them.\textsuperscript{80} Connaughton 2001, 208-209.\textsuperscript{81} According to one observer, “We have not yet had a new operation since the Brahimi Report came out, so the real test is going to be when we establish the next new operation from scratch. A lot of the words in Resolution 1327 are very positive. The key now will be to follow up on it.” Salman Ahmed of the DPKO, comments from a panel discussion of the Spring 2001 Disarmament Forum on “Implementation of the Brahimi Report,” available at <http://www.igc.org/disarm/T42001BR.html>, Accessed August 6, 2002.
the Security Council largely endorsed the Report in Resolution 1327. Thus, there have been no new missions since the UN arguably adopted the principles of impartial peace enforcement. Of the most recent missions, UNAMSIL clearly didn’t follow the injunction of impartial peace enforcement doctrine to deploy with PE-capable force into a gray area setting. INTERFET and KFOR were more consistent with the new doctrine, but were not UN missions. UNMEE is essentially a traditional peacekeeping mission, not a gray area operation, and MONUC was clearly not envisioned as an impartial peace enforcement mission. However, while we can assess the compatibility of recent operations with IPE doctrine, it is not yet possible to judge whether organizational behavior and norms conflict regarding this doctrine.

It is, however, possible to assess more broadly the extent to which these doctrinal developments fit the conditions that characterize organized hypocrisy: inconsistent norms, a significantly political organization in an institutional environment, and decoupling of organizational structures and processes.

**Inconsistent Norms**

The UN faces an environment of highly inconsistent norms and practical requirements. Perhaps the most widely recognized is the inconsistency between the norms of state sovereignty proclaimed in the Charter, on the one hand, and norms of human rights, democracy, and international peace and security that may require the infringement of sovereignty. However, the inconsistent demands faced by the UN go well beyond this. It is expected to be a representative

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79 Malone and Thakur (2001, 12) point out that the peacekeepers-as-hostages crisis in Sierra Leone took place as the Panel was working.

80 MONUC’s mandate did authorize the use of force to protect threatened civilians but did not call for peace enforcement. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/monuc/monucM.htm. The new doctrine suggests that MONUC’s force and its rules of engagement should have been more robust.
of the international community, above particular national interests, and at the same time to promote the interests of its member states, especially its most powerful members. The UN also exists in an international environment of highly conflictual norms of appropriateness. For example, the UN promotes family planning as a norm, but this costs it funds from the United States due to conservative American opposition to abortion.

UN Peacekeeping faces its own particular set of inconsistent norms and demands. The UN is expected, and its own principles require it, to act in the face of humanitarian disasters such as the famine in Somalia in 1992-3, or the Rwandan genocide. But if member states use emergency sessions of the Security Council as a means of avoiding actions that might require them to commit their own resources or interests, this can severely undermine the organization’s legitimacy and capacity to promote the humanitarian and political principles it is called upon to represent. Indeed, Michael Barnett has argued that the UN’s organizational culture supported inaction in the face of the Rwandan genocide out of a sense that the UN’s interests, and its role as the representative of the international community, would be threatened by another failed peacekeeping mission after Somalia.\(^1\)

Peacekeeping is expected to be effective—to actually resolve conflicts and produce reconstructed societies with stable political systems and viable economies. But it is also expected to conform to the principles of consent, impartiality, and use of force only in self-defense. And peacekeeping is also expected to be administered in a way that does not give undue influence to wealthy and powerful states, which could produce a perception of peacekeeping as a form of imperialism.\(^2\) Yet, it is Western states with advanced industrial economies and strong militaries that are capable of contributing capable troops, and staffing and equipping missions with the

\(^2\) Zisk 2002.
resources to address the challenges of multidimensional operations. These states will be unwilling to provide forces and resources for peacekeeping if they are not given corresponding roles in directing mission selection, mandate drafting, and other aspects of peace operations. The controversy over gratis military officers (GMOs) is a clear instance of this conflict between a logic of appropriateness—the need for the UN to be geographically representative in order to be perceived as legitimate—and a logic of consequences—the need for resources that only wealthier states can provide. The DPKO has until recently relied heavily on military personnel loaned to the UN by member states for military advice. However, developing states feared that this practice gave the GMO’s governments greater influence over UN peacekeeping policy, and successfully lobbied for an end to the loaning of such personnel, denying the DPKO a source of expertise that it cannot easily replace.  

A similar problem arose with the development of a standby high-readiness brigade (Shirbrig) to provide a rapid-deployment capability for UN peacekeeping operations. Shirbrig makes available to the UN a brigade-sized force on 15-30 days notice that can sustain itself for up to two months, and was first deployed as part of UNMEE. Shirbrig was initially organized in 1996 by Austria, Canada, Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden. (Argentina, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, and Spain have since joined or taken steps toward participation). There has been concern on the part of developing nations “that it is a predominantly Western initiative that will be erroneously perceived as a UN project.” Thus, the UN, and DPKO, clearly face the kind of inconsistent organizational environment that gives rise to organized hypocrisy. However, it is

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84 http://www.shirbrig.dk/
85 Griffin 1999, 16.
more likely to do so to the extent that the organization facing these inconsistencies possesses characteristics of a political, as opposed to action organization.

*A Political Organization in an Institutional Environment*

Organizational hypocrisy is more likely to be exhibited by organizations within institutional, as opposed to technical, environments. Organizations within predominantly technical environments will find it more adaptive to exemplify the action type of organization, while those in institutional environments will have a better chance of survival if they take on the characteristics of political organizations. According to Brunsson, “[M]ost organizations have both a technical and an institutional environment. The technical environment evaluates and supports an organization in terms of its products and results; the institutional environment judges it on its structures, processes, and ideologies.” Accordingly, real world organizations are both political and action organizations to varying degrees. The stronger the institutional environment, the more political the organization, and the more likely that institutional norms and technical efficiency requirements will conflict, making organized hypocrisy an adaptive response.

The UN faces a highly institutional environment. Its legitimacy and support from environmental actors depends fundamentally upon its being seen to exemplify and uphold norms of appropriateness in its environment. The UN is the “concrete expression of the hopes and ideals of the international community.” Indeed, collective legitimization has long been recognized as one of its basic functions. Institutional environments are characterized by a focus on having the correct—those collectively viewed as appropriate by other organizations in the

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88 Claude 1966.
environment—structures and processes. Isomorphism, or convergence, across organizations in such environments is driven by the adoption of those structures and processes the adoption of which demonstrates an organization’s compliance with these standards of legitimacy. This is known as institutional isomorphism, as opposed to the competitive isomorphism characteristic of technical environments, in which organizations become more alike because they adopt the most efficient means of production or go out of business.\(^8^9\) Typically, the outputs of organizations in institutional environments are difficult to measure, which partially explains the focus on alternative, legitimacy-based criteria for evaluation. Organizations such as schools and universities, hospitals, and health clinics tend to exist in predominantly institutional environments.\(^9^0\) It is difficult to measure the output of a nonprofit hospital or public school in the way that one uses the stock price or profit statement or market share of a corporation as a bottom line measure of its efficiency. If patients at a hospital die, is that because the hospital is inefficient, or because the patients were very sick? It is similarly difficult to measure the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping, especially in the absence of agreed criteria for defining success or failure in peace operations.\(^9^1\) More generally, the UN’s broader purposes—to “maintain international peace and security…,” “develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples…,” “achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms…,” and “To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the

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\(^{8^9}\) DiMaggio and Powell 1991.

\(^{9^0}\) Scott 1998, 133-139; Brunsson 1989, 4-6.

\(^{9^1}\) See Fortna 2002; Anderson 2001; Bratt 1997; Druckman and Stern 1997; Howard 2002; Paris 1997; Diehl 1994.
attainment of these common ends,” are not easily measured. As Dennis Jett observes, “The effectiveness of the organization is hard to gauge because the tasks it performs usually defy easy measurement.” This is a hallmark of an institutional environment. The United Nations is, therefore, more often evaluated in terms of the extent to which it conforms to the institutional norms of its organizational environment, that of the world polity. The institutional nature of the UN’s environment creates pressure to adopt the characteristics of a political organization, and to the extent that it conflicts with the technical aspects of the environment, to engage in organized hypocrisy.

The UN is a political organization *par excellence*. It is, according to Michael Barnett, “the bureaucratic arm of the world’s transcendental values.” Of course, the world’s transcendental values (such as national self-determination, individual human rights, and peace) are not wholly consistent with each other, different UN members will interpret them differently, and the UN’s legitimacy rests largely on its ability to represent these inconsistencies. Political organizations derive their legitimacy and support from their environments on the basis of their representation of conflicting interests and perspectives. In *The Organization of Hypocrisy*, Brunsson lists defining characteristics of the ideal-typical political organization in terms of organizational structure, processes, and outputs. Summarized briefly, these are:

**Structure:** The “principle of conflict”—actively seeking to reflect inconsistent values—guides organizational recruitment and management, and leads to the promotion of multiple organizational ideologies.

**Processes:** The political organization focuses on discussion and analysis that reflect inconsistent values over action (“intellectuality”), which leads to uncertainty and malaise (“depression”) among personnel.

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95 Barnett 2002, 175.
**Outputs:** The political organization will tend to produce talk, ideology, and decisions more than action that leads to physical products.  

These, of course, nicely describe the United Nations. As an organization that claims to represent the peoples of the world, the basic organizing principle of the UN calls for the representation of conflicting values: “It wins legitimacy and acquires resources not by fighting for a single interest but by associating itself with several interests and demonstrating their incorporation into its own being.” The UN has, of course, fostered competing institutional ideologies throughout its history: some of its bodies have acted as the voice of the developing world, or of the non-aligned movement, the organization was both the creator of the state of Israel and the source of the “Zionism is racism” resolution (and its retraction), and of course the UN proclaims as fundamental principles both sovereignty, and human rights and humanitarian imperatives justifying its violation. The membership of organs such as the Security Council (in its nonpermanent seats), the Human Rights Commission, and various agencies, are determined according to formulas to provide geographic representation.

What the UN primarily does is discuss, debate, and issue resolutions about problems that are largely insoluble. When a problem—such as the transition from colonial status to independent statehood—is actually solved, the survival of the body designated to resolve it (i.e., the trusteeship council) is endangered. Therefore, the UN as a political organization will tend to

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96 See Brunsson 1989, 19-26. According to Brunsson, “Decisions are a form of talk important enough to warrant classification as a separate category. The political organization makes decisions which it is then anxious to demonstrate clearly to the outside world. A parliament or local council does very little other than talk and make decisions.” (Brunsson 1989, 26). UN General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions, then, would count as such decisions, distinct from other forms of “talk” within the institution. Also, while political organizations are not good at generating coordinated action or products that depend on it, “there are other products that require very little coordinated action, for instance when the organization pays money to external groups.” (Brunsson 1989, 25-26.) Political organizations generate these kinds of products.

look for unresolveable problems involving inconsistent values or norms, in the interests of organizational survival. The problems facing UN peacekeeping—the mismatch between political and societal sources of internal conflicts and the political interests of members capable of providing the resources to address them, conflicts between financial constraints and resources necessary for effectiveness, tension between the need to represent the “international community” and to be seen as consistent with U.S. interests, the conflict between the demand for action from the Security Council and the Council’s reluctance to provide the resources to fulfill those demands, and so forth—are not easily resolveable. The problems produced by these conflicts have been endlessly addressed by processes of “intellectuality”—panels and commissions and debates and reports and resolutions—but yield no simple prescription for action. Recognition of these problems at the UN have indeed resulted in a sort of “depression” among its personnel and representatives of member states, which has been described as the “Blue Helmet Blues.” One manifestation is the loss of personnel and difficulty of recruitment.

Finally, while the UN, and DPKO, have produced voluminous quantities of talk, organizational ideology, and decisions relating to peacekeeping—including the Lessons Learned Unit and Brahimi Reports, Reports of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization, Reports of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, and relevant Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions—it has also in the same period produced action in the form

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98 Brunsson 1989, 212.
100 Paris 1997. Michael Barnett considers skeptically the possibility that a “UN syndrome” amongst Secretariat staff resulting from a sense of victimization at being made a pawn and scapegoat of great powers contributed to the DPKO’s failure to inform the Security Council of evidence of genocide occurring in Rwanda. Barnett 2002, 163-166.
of new missions in East Timor, Kosovo, the Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and Sierra Leone. Thus, the UN is not a purely political organization, but also must produce action. According to Brunsson, in mixed (real world) organizations that must both reflect inconsistencies and produce coordinated action, “The basic method for handling these conflicting demands is to separate and isolate politics and action, to ‘decouple’ them, in the terminology of Weick.” While it is too early to conclude that this will remain the case, the new discourse of impartial peace enforcement have been at best loosely coupled to actual UN peacekeeping practice to this point.

Decoupling

UN peacekeeping, then, exhibits the conditions that produce organized decoupling between structures, processes, and organizational discourse. Organized hypocrisy is an effect of such decoupling. The “hypocrisy” results because talk and action are decoupled in order to allow inconsistency between them that helps the organization adapt to inconsistent demands from its environment, as in conflicting logics of consequences and appropriateness. As Krasner puts it, when an organization faces such conflicts, “Behavior is detached from rituals that are used for external display. Actions and norms are decoupled.”

An apparent example of such decoupling is the continued assertion of the norms of consent, impartiality, and force only in self-defense as fundamental principles of peacekeeping

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102 Brunsson 1989, 33.
103 On loose and tight coupling in organizations, see Perrow 1999, 89-100.
104 Krasner 1999, 65. See also Meyer and Rowan 1991 (1977), 57-58. A related example of such decoupling is suggested by Thornton (2000, 42) who argues that Wider Peacekeeping was developed more to address legitimacy than technical efficiency demands. He writes, “WPK was a military doctrine that seemed designed to excuse the military organization for its inaction, rather than being a guide for action itself.”
while at the same time, when push comes to shove, either these principles or the mission itself is abandoned. In Bosnia, when UNPROFOR was unable to stop Serb attacks on safe areas or the Sarajevo market, NATO air strikes authorized by the UN (through the “dual-key” arrangement) were undertaken. UNPROFOR was, at this point, operating in an environment in which Serb consent to the terms of the mission had been, for practical purposes, withdrawn. The mandate could not be implemented without the use of force against one party, on behalf of another. And the use of force, though not by UN forces, was authorized by the UN and went beyond self-defense. In Somalia, first the principles and then the mission were withdrawn. US forces acting as part of UNOSOM II used force beyond self-defense against one party to the conflict (Habr Gidr clan supporters of Mohammed Farah Aideed), and in an environment in which consent of all parties was not forthcoming. When this resulted in politically damaging casualties, the Clinton administration decided to withdraw. In Rwanda, when it became clear that a mission based on consent, impartiality, and limited force was non-viable, it was largely withdrawn. The difference in these cases seems to be whether major power states’ governments considered the success of the mission—completion of its mandate and achievement of a desired political end-state—to be worth the political costs of robust peace enforcement.

Another apparent case of decoupling occurs through what Brunsson calls “separation by organizational units,” in which one part of an organization will act politically, reflecting inconsistent values or symbolizing compliance with norms in the institutional environment, and another will take on the role of an action organization subject to the evaluative criteria of the technical environment. At times, the Security Council on the one hand, and the DPKO and missions on the other, seem to play these respective roles within the UN peacekeeping apparatus.

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During the Rwandan genocide, Security Council emergency session deliberations performed the political function of symbolizing the UN’s concern, consistent with the norms of appropriateness defined by human rights norms, with the ongoing crisis. However, this was disconnected from any real action, and even the May 17, 1994 decision (SC Res. 918) to reinforce UNAMIR was primarily symbolic and was not implemented until after the genocide was over. Meanwhile, action, though ineffectual, was produced by DPKO and UNAMIR, and by the decisions of member states such as France’s *Operation Turquoise*.106

The much-touted concept of regional subcontracting could also be viewed as a form of separation by organizational unit, though in this case it could involve units not formally part of, or ambiguously affiliated with, the United Nations.107 In this case, the UN Security Council would serve a primarily political role as authorizer of the mission, while regional organizations such as NATO would play the role of action organization. The action produced is likely to conflict with the norms espoused by the UN, particularly to the extent that NATO peace operations doctrine calls for actions that violate the core UN peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense. By contracting out actual field

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106 This raises the question of “Who is the UN?” What exactly is the organization subject to inconsistent logics of consequences and appropriateness for this analysis? Is it the UN as a whole, the Security Council, the Secretariat, the DPKO, field missions, etc.? I thank Margaret Karns and audience members at the panel on Peacekeeping and Its Pitfalls at the 2002 annual meeting of APSA for raising this issue. I argue above (p. 10) that this question is somewhat inappropriate to a model such as Brunsson’s that treats organizations as non-unitary actors with ill-defined boundaries and loosely coupled components. It should not be possible to treat the UN as a single coherent actor—to answer the question “Who is the UN?” —if the organization contains loosely coupled components formed to address inconsistent environmental demands. However, I acknowledge that this response is not entirely satisfactory. In particular, clarification of what part or parts of the UN face which environmental demands is called for, and I intend to address this more fully in subsequent drafts of this paper.

operations, the UN, however, would resolve the pressures of inconsistent logics of consequences and appropriateness.

Conclusions

The outcome of the plausibility probe conducted in this paper, then, has been positive. At a first cut, there appears to be empirical support for the proposition that developments in UN peacekeeping are driven by the dynamics of organized hypocrisy.

Two sets of implications emerge from this result. The first has to do with the design of further research necessary to more rigorously test the hypothesis. The second set has to do with the implications for theory and policy if future research produces further support for an organized hypocrisy understanding of multilateral peace operations. I address each in turn.

Further Research

Further research should undertake several tasks. Due to the nature of the research question, which addresses causal mechanisms, a case study approach would seem to be the most appropriate method of research. The most suitable case study method is process-tracing. However, further preliminary investigation will be necessary to ensure that the data required for process tracing is available. Failing that, it may be necessary to develop alternative case study tests, such as controlled comparison or congruence tests.108

Empirically, both a deeper investigation of the case considered in this paper—involving interviews, a wider range of primary documents and secondary sources, and more intensive

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108 See Van Evera 1997, Ch. 2. Care must be taken, however, that high or low values on these variables in the cases selected are not due to the cases being outliers. These cases should fall at the high or low ends of typical variation within the peacekeeping field. I thank Page Fortna for raising this issue.
analysis—and extension to related cases are called for. Related cases could include previous organizational reforms such as those undertaken in the 1997 reform package or the Brahimi Report, and organizations other than the UN involved in peace operations.

Cases should be selected, where possible, for extreme values on either the technical/institutional nature of the environment, the action/political nature of the organization, or the extent of decoupling between talk, decisions, and action.\textsuperscript{109} Also, it will be necessary to bear in mind that organized hypocrisy as a phenomenon can be treated as both an independent (with peacekeeping effectiveness as a dependent variable) and dependent variable, and to be explicit about which is the case in specific instances.

In addition, further research should explicitly consider alternative theoretical explanations. Obvious candidates for this study include the bureaucratic politics model and Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist framework.\textsuperscript{110} These seem appropriate because each focuses on a factor widely thought to be central to the politics of bureaucratic reform in intergovernmental organizations. The bureaucratic politics model focuses on the interests and influence of bureaucratic actors in political settings, while liberal intergovernmentalism focuses on the preferences of member states, and the societal sources of such preferences, in intergovernmental bargaining of the sort that underlies IGO reform. If either bureaucratic position and interest or member state interests and preferences, rather than organizational management of conflicting norms and demands, are the primary forces driving UN peacekeeping

\textsuperscript{109} Van Evera 1997, p. 88.
reform, then the bureaucratic politics model or liberal intergovernmentalist theory, respectively, should be useful tools of analysis.¹¹¹

Implications for Theory and Policy

The most basic implication of the possibility that UN peacekeeping may be characterized by organized hypocrisy is that it suggests that many of the (apparently) dysfunctional aspects of peacekeeping, so extensively remarked upon in recent years, may be inherent in the UN’s organizational environment. Inconsistencies between UN statements and decisions and actual peacekeeping practice may not be due to a failure of the organization’s bureaucracy; they may be an adaptive response on the part of the UN to address an organizational catch-22. The reiteration of traditional principles of peacekeeping while they are ignored in practice, for example, may be a consequence of inconsistent environmental demands on the UN. Theoretically, this challenges perspectives that portray institutions as subject to rational design to achieve more effective cooperation through changing actors’ incentives, reducing transaction costs, reducing information asymmetries, or providing monitoring and enforcement, side payments, and issue-linkages.¹² It also supports research into sources of dysfunction in international institutions.¹³

If it is the case that organizational pathology influences UN peacekeeping activities, it does not bode well for reforms such as those called for in the Brahimi Report. An organized

¹¹¹ There are also reasons, given the need to select among alternatives, not to adopt particular theoretical frameworks. Realism, for example, would generally discount the importance of UN peacekeeping reform in the first place, seeing the UN and peacekeeping as merely instruments of the major powers, and reform as unable to change that or make peacekeeping more effective in the absence of great power interest in an expanded peacekeeping role. Marxism might suggest an analysis of UN peacekeeping as a new form of great power imperialism, however it is not clear that organizational reforms would feature highly in such an analysis. (But see Zisk 2002.) Other approaches—such as constructivism and the English school—have been developed capably by others. See Barnett 1995; Paris, “Peacebuilding and Global Culture.”


hypocrisy perspective suggests that the Brahimi Report is organizational talk, likely to be decoupled from real action. Indeed, reform efforts such as the Brahimi Report are, in the organized hypocrisy framework, a standard response to fundamentally conflicting logics of consequences and appropriateness. Brunsson argues that there is a second degree of organized hypocrisy in which organizations present themselves as action organizations while behaving as political organizations.\(^\text{114}\) This is because, ironically, institutional norms often call for organizations to conform, at least symbolically, to standards of rational decision-making. Confounding the distinction between institutional legitimacy criteria and technical efficiency criteria, organizational environments may judge organizations that appear to adopt standards of rational decision making to be legitimate. This is not because rational decision processes are more efficient—Brunsson argues that the opposite is true for action organizations.\(^\text{115}\) However, the adoption formal structures that represent the “myth” of organizational rationality conform to standards of legitimacy in the world polity.\(^\text{116}\) A political organization presenting itself as an efficient, action organization in order to comply with institutional norms, however, will not be

\(^\text{114}\) Brunsson 1989, 194-203. Thus, reports such as the Brahimi Report or the Secretary General’s Report *No Exit Without Strategy*, (S/2001/94) which acknowledge past failures and call for greater effectiveness through new structures and processes, can be a product of organized hypocrisy. Whether these specific reports will prove to be such depends on the extent to which they are coupled to the sources of actual practice. In both cases, it is not clear whether sufficient political will (a product of the logic of consequences) exists in the Security Council to support implementation of the proposed reforms. I thank Michael Doyle for bringing the latter report to my attention.


able to fit its actual practice to the image it presents. Brunsson argues that this discrepancy produces reform efforts:

The failure that is produced by the discrepancy between presentation and results also encourages explicit promises to do penance. A common answer to criticism is to promise organizational reform. It is natural for leaders convinced of their own good intentions to blame poor results on organizational structures and processes, which they therefore seek to improve. Many organizations live in an almost continual state of reform intended to improve their way of working; and many new organizational managements proclaim their interest in reform. But reform often fails to lead to any great change in the way an organization works; nor is management always interested in its doing so...But by promising reform, by promising to improve in the future, an organization can inspire a little hope even among critics of the present situation; at least the signposts are pointing in the right direction. The reforming zeal results in talk and decisions which compensate for present actions.\textsuperscript{117}

This suggests that various, successive UN reform efforts are no more likely than previous ones to result in substantial change in organizational practice. Nor may that be their actual function. While this will come as depressing news to advocates of UN reform, there is a silver lining: Failure may be adaptive.

Brunsson’s argument suggests that the likely failure of the Brahimi reforms is, paradoxically, functional for the United Nations as an institution representing the nations of the world in all their variety and disagreements. And conversely, if the reforms succeeded, it could produce new and serious problems for the UN: “[A]ction-oriented reforms must not succeed if the organization is to be able to continue to reflect inconsistencies. Hypocrisy—inequality between talk and action, presentation and results—is the source of these paradoxes as well as their solution.”\textsuperscript{118}

However, even if organized hypocrisy is functional for the UN as a whole, if it prevents the translation into practice of lessons learnt from past failures, instead dissipating these hard-

\textsuperscript{117} Brunsson 1989, 203.
\textsuperscript{118} Brunsson 1989, 205.
earned lessons in symbolic reform, it will undermine peacekeeping effectiveness. This would not be the case, however, if a political logic of consequences requiring mandate achievement (or mission success, defined otherwise) trumps a logic of appropriateness expressed in symbolic structures or processes. Thus, if the UN continues to ritually proclaim traditional peacekeeping principles, but disregards them in practice where accomplishing a mandate calls for partiality, force beyond self-defense, or operation without consent, then organized hypocrisy may make possible greater peacekeeping effectiveness while still enabling the UN to satisfy inconsistent pressures to demonstrate a commitment to widely held norms.\footnote{Further research should formulate and test hypotheses about the conditions under which organized hypocrisy would promote or inhibit peacekeeping effectiveness.}

In any case, an organized hypocrisy perspective suggests we adopt a cautious stance regarding expectations of what structural and procedural reforms in an organization such as the United Nations can accomplish. Similarly, it suggests that the reorganization of bureaucracies as in the proposed U.S. Homeland Security Department and Northern Command is unlikely to substantially change the actual coordination of action within the affected institutions.

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