Peacekeeping on the Brink

After several years of continuous expansion, reform and resiliency, in 2008 global peacekeeping was pushed to the brink.

This publication warned in 2006 that peacekeeping faced a risk of overstretch. In 2007 it highlighted the mounting pressures on peacekeeping organizations, while stressing that peace operations had shown surprising resilience. By 2008 peacekeeping was spread increasingly thin, in many respects the victim of its own success. Our thematic review that year was by Lakhdhar Brahimi and Salman Ahmed. It cautioned that we risked unlearning the central lesson of the Brahimi Report: that peacekeeping is not a substitute for an effective political process.

That lesson was on vivid display during the past year, as the collapse, failure or stasis of political processes in central Africa, Lebanon/Syria, Sudan, Chad and Haiti placed peacekeeping operations there under severe strain. Most dramatic was the surge of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in late fall 2008 which saw MONUC - already overstretched and under-supported - approach collapse on the ground before last-minute political negotiations led to a tenuous cease fire. The dramatic shift in Rwanda’s position by arresting its alleged ally, General Laurent Nkunda, temporarily alleviated the unfolding crisis.

Overstretch was not limited to the UN. Globally, troop contributors were strained by the combined demands of UN, NATO, AU, EU and UN-authorized multi-national force operations.

The continued erosion of the political and governance situation in Afghanistan prompted new doubts about NATO’s operation there, amidst stymied statebuilding efforts and a deepening insurgency. European institutions were similarly affected by the combination of overstretch in troop levels and strained political processes. While the OSCE was forced to stop working in Georgia as a result of that country’s brief war with Russia in summer 2008, the EU launched a new ob-
server operation there on uncertain political terrain. Meanwhile, the EU’s largest police and rule of law operation, in Kosovo, was frustrated throughout the year by tense political debate that surrounded the question of Kosovo’s legal status. The EU did manage to deploy a new mission to Chad, but not without widespread doubts about the viability of the mission in the absence of a strong political mandate and uncertainty about the realism of a planned UN follow-on mission.

And to conclude the year, the Bush administration used the last days of its tenure to push for a UN operation for Somalia. The US acted in full knowledge that a survey of potential troop contributors had revealed almost no willingness to deploy troops into the lawless vacuum of central Somalia. Other P5 members put the brakes on, and a reluctant Security Council compromised on a resolution authorizing a UN support package to the existing AU mission for Somalia. It expressed its intent to establish a peacekeeping operation six months later, which will add tremendously to the strain on the UN.

Bright spots were few. In Nepal, a medium-sized monitoring and political operation helped that country bring its bloody civil war to an end and served as a handmaiden to inclusive elections. Even there, exit strategies were in question: regional powers kept the mission on a short leash and implementation of commitments necessary to translate the ceasefire and elections into sustained stability lagged badly.

West Africa, once the site of several large peacekeeping operations also made progress toward greater stability. That was especially so of Sierra Leone, where the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL)—a peacebuilding mission that had replaced a full-scale military operation in 2006—was in turn replaced by a far smaller office, the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), and the Peacebuilding Commission continued its work to support the transition to stable development. Liberia entered its third year of post-war stability, albeit faced with daunting social and economic challenges. The peace process in Côte d’Ivoire made modest gains, but the situation remained tense due to difficulties associated with postponed elections. Somalia, ironically, was the site of a significant innovation, where a UN-authorized multinational maritime force was deployed to combat piracy off Somalia’s territorial (but totally ungoverned) waters.

The contrast between 2008 and previous years highlights a simple reality: that when the interests of the relevant regional and international powers align, peacekeeping can serve as a critical facilitator of political progress; when they do not, it is an expensive, unwieldy and usually unsuccessful substitute.

The Path Ahead

Peacekeeping’s troubles in major theaters of operation during 2008 made it abundantly clear that despite their previous successes, contemporary peace operations have proven largely ill-equipped to address a changed peacekeeping environment. That environment is characterized by the negative impacts of tenacious political and violent spoilers, compounded by strained international resources in a dire global financial situation. Tense international relations further exacerbated political crises in the Broader Horn of Africa and the Broader Middle East, the two central foci of global peace operations.

2008’s crises brought back memories of an earlier round of peacekeeping failures in the mid-1990s. Of course, political/peacekeeping failures in Angola, Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda were accompanied by vast, dramatic death tolls. 2008’s failures were less severe in human terms – though the cumulative death toll in the DRC reaches into the millions when non-battle deaths are counted in, and battle deaths in Somalia are rapidly mounting. Nevertheless, the echoes of the mid-1990s, and the subsequent collapse of UN peacekeeping, were being heard in the Council chambers.

The silver lining is that the gravity of the situation appears to have generated focused attention. As the year drew to a close, the Secretariat, permanent and elected members of the Security Council and C-34 members began intensive reviews of UN peacekeeping. All were preoccupied by the multiple realities of overstretch: in terms of troops; in terms
of costs; in terms of unmanageable missions; and in terms of the impact on DPKO and the newly formed Department for Field Support, already straining to support several newly authorized missions.

These initiatives will complement a renewed concern at the UN, and also within the EU, about the ability of peacekeeping providers to deploy suitable civilians rapidly to oversee the political aspects of missions or contribute to key statebuilding functions. The year ahead looks likely to see sustained attention to the civilian question, as well as to the perennial challenge of linking peacekeeping and broader peacebuilding strategies into a coherent whole.

That the UN and its member states are undertaking initiatives aimed at identifying the reason for peacekeeping’s failures and developing a more strategic attitude to mandating missions and a more systemic approach to raising, deploying and renewing peacekeeping forces, is a step in the right direction. Much will hinge on their outcomes. But in the best of all possible scenarios, global peace operations enter 2009 under incredibly difficult circumstances: with western forces tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan; African and South Asian forces overstretched in AU and UN operations; the legacy of bad starts haunting operations in Sudan and Somalia; and tensions at the UN between the Security Council, troop contributors and financial donors. Additionally, the future of the UN missions in Sudan remained uncertain as the prosecutors of the International Criminal Court pursued President al-Bashir.

That being said, in 2009 member states will confront a strategic choice between retrenchment, on the one hand, and on the other, a new level of strategic engagement to boost the performance of peace operations. The arguments for retrenchment will be strong, especially in the context of the financial crisis; but the costs would be high if a scale-back in global peace operations led to a rise in violence and destabilization. In either case, the pathway forward must be driven by a shared strategic assessment of the challenges ahead.

Contours of Peacekeeping in 2008

Throughout 2008 the managerial and logistical maintenance of record high deployment levels of UN and non-UN peacekeeping personnel comprised a significant dimension of the current crisis. The consequence was a substantial slowing of deployments.

After experiencing significant growth for several years at an annual rate of 15–20 percent, during 2008 the global peacekeeping footprint expanded by only 8.7 percent, with roughly 13,000 military personnel added to the roster.

Top Twenty Largest UN Mandated Operations: 31 October 2008

This modest growth was led primarily by a 20 percent jump in personnel deployed in NATO’s Afghanistan mission, ISAF, up to 50,700 troops in 2008 from 41,100 in late 2007. At the end of 2008 ISAF was as large as the next three biggest peace operations combined. NATO commands two-fifths of global peacekeepers and the United States contributions in Afghanistan and Kosovo under NATO make it the largest contributor to peace operations in 2008.
The Purposes of Peace Operations  
*William J. Durch, with Madeline L. England*

Ever since the late 1940s, peacekeepers have been deployed by the UN and regional organizations to act as fair witnesses; as referees of a peace accord; as “police”; as statebuilders; and as state surrogates. Early operations largely adhered to peacekeeping’s founding principles, consent, neutrality and non-use of force. But in the aftermath of the Cold War, and as their usage has increased, these principles have moved from being the central focus and in certain instances contemporary peace operations have come to take on activities that look like war-fighting.

**From Robust Peacekeeping to War Fighting**

Peace operations are most often born and built in crisis, and function in a realm of partial control and competing priorities intrinsic to multinational or multilateral organizations. Their lack of innate organizational coherence reflects their practice-based, case-driven history and the locus of primary political-military power in states rather than in the organizations that most frequently sponsor these operations. Every actor involved in post-conflict reconstruction efforts, large and small, official or not, is both independent and protective of its own turf. When peace operations engage in war-fighting, the diffuse nature of peace operations command structures are accentuated and present a series of challenges.

**Operational Dilemmas**

Peace operations work best when they are not only authorized internationally but also invited to deploy under the terms of a peace agreement, offering both local and international legitimacy. When peacekeepers are asked to identify enemies, the legitimacy of the operation can be called into question.

**Doctrinal Dilemmas**

Doctrine for peace operations is about such specific functions and settings, as well as basic principles and strategic objectives. Although the outcomes of wars are often determined by high-level military decisions and large operations, in peace operations the actions of even small groups of soldiers can have major implications for local stability and the achievement of the mission’s mandate. The recent evolution of major-power doctrines for peace and stability operations suggests that the old walls that initially segregated peace operations from war-fighting are crumbling.

The use of force is a necessary component of most peace operations, to be employed in defense of a mandate or to protect civilians, but this cannot be a “baseline stance.” Where it is, a mission ceases to be a peace operation—regardless of the mandate on paper and the mandating authority. Blurring the line between peacekeeping and war-fighting runs the risk of compromising the entire peacekeeping enterprise. For this reason peace operations should be kept doctrinally and organizationally distinct from combat operations.
Data on UN Operations

Origin of Military Personnel by Region: 31 October 2008

- Africa: 29.8%
- Central and South Asia: 39.1%
- East Asia and the Pacific: 6.7%
- Europe: 13.4%
- Middle East: 2.8%
- North America: 0.1%

Deployment of Military Personnel by Region: 31 October 2008

- Africa: 71.4%
- Central and South America: 9.0%
- East Asia and the Pacific: 0.0%
- Europe: 1.3%
- Middle East: 18.1%
- Central and South Asia: 0.2%

Origin of Military Personnel in the Middle East by Region: 31 October 2008

- Central and South America: 13.8%
- East Asia and the Pacific: 17.4%
- Europe: 61.5%
- Middle East: 0.0%

Origin of Military Personnel in Africa by Region: 31 October 2008

- Central and South America: 47.6%
- East Asia and the Pacific: 4.6%
- Europe: 40.0%
- Middle East: 3.4%
- North America: 0.1%
- Africa: 1.8%
Data on Non-UN Commanded Operations

Contributions of Military Personnel: 30 September 2008

- North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 76%
- African Union: 4%
- Commonwealth of Independent States: 6%
- Coalitions/Ad hoc: 6%
- Economic Community of the Central African States: 1%

Deployment of Military Personnel to Region: 30 September 2008

- Africa: 10%
- Europe: 26%
- East Asia and the Pacific: 1%
- Middle East: 2%
- Central and South Asia: 61%

Who Deploys to Africa: 30 September 2008

- African Union: 35%
- Coalitions/Ad hoc: 21%
- Economic Community of the Central African States: 6%
- European Union: 38%

Who Deploys to Europe: 30 September 2008

- European Union: 11%
- Commonwealth of Independent States: 6%

North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 65%
Patterns of Deployment

Ninety-five percent of troops continue to be deployed in three large clusters of missions: those of the UN and the AU in Africa, alongside smaller AU and EU deployments; those of NATO and the UN in the broader Middle East, drawing primarily on US and European troops; and those of NATO and the UN and EU in Europe.

Africa remained home to 40 percent of global peace operation deployments. The UN remained the largest military deployer on the continent, accounting for approximately 87 percent of all deployments there in 2008. When compared to other organizations, the UN provided more than ten times the number of peacekeepers in Africa. Large-scale UN deployments in DRC, Sudan, Darfur, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire made up the bulk of these troops. Peacekeepers in Africa emanated primarily from two regions: Africa itself (40 percent) and South and Central Asia (42 percent). In 2008 the EU deployed a short-term bridging and humanitarian security operation, the EU Force in the Republic of Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA), whose mandate was set to expire in March 2009, after which the operation would theoretically be replaced by 5,000 UN troops.

Origin of Peacekeepers in Africa: 31 October 2008

The United Nations remains the largest institutional provider of peacekeepers, accounting for about 50 percent of global deployments—with nearly 80,000 military personnel, 12,000 police and thousands of civilian staff in the field. The UN’s forces grew at a rate of about 7 percent in 2008.

The deployment of air assets to peace operations continued to pose a problem in 2008. Most notably for the EU in Chad and the UN in Darfur, difficulties in procuring force enablers such as attack helicopters underscored paltry land-to-forces ratios and had a significant impact on the performance of these operations.
Within Africa, the **Broader Horn** represents a major locus of activity, accounting for 40 percent of deployments on the continent, including operations launched by the AU, EU and UN. When—or if—proposed deployment levels are reached, including those for the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) as well as an estimated 20,000 troops for Somalia, over 60,000 peacekeepers will be operating in the region.

Operations in the **Broader Middle East** accounted for 41 percent of global military deployments during 2008. The 65,000 peacekeepers deployed across the region were largely drawn from Europe and the United States and operated mostly under NATO’s command in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. European contingents continued to compose 62 percent of the expanded UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the largest contribution of Western military personnel under UN command.

**Europe** was host to 14 percent of peace operations deployments during 2008. While the majority of the forces there operated under NATO command in the Kosovo Force (KFOR), both the EU and UN maintained missions in the region.

**Where Peacekeepers Go: 31 October 2008**

Rounding out the final 5 percent of global deployments in 2008 were **regional peacekeeping responses** involving troop deployments from nearby states acting through the UN, regional organizations, or multinational forces. Two examples exemplified this pattern of deployment: Haiti, where roughly 60 percent of troops for the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) were drawn from nearby Latin American countries; and Timor-Leste, where the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) operated alongside the Australian-led International Security Forces (ISF). Similarly, the International Monitoring Team (IMT)—sent to oversee the cease-fire on the Philippine island of Mindanao—was largely drawn from regional actors Malaysia and Brunei.

**Police and Civilian Staff Deployed in UN Peace Operations: 2005-2008**

Police deployments have nearly doubled over the past three years. In 2008 UN deployments grew at a rate of over 33 percent, from 9,000 to 12,000 personnel. The surge in police deployments was also reflected in non-UN missions, particularly the large number of EU police authorized for Kosovo.
The Complications of Counterterrorism

The situation in the Broader Horn was compounded by the impact of US counter-terrorism policy, which underscored inter-state tensions in the region and, ironically, the demand for peacekeeping operations. In Somalia, one of the major actor’s links to terrorist organizations highlighted a critical challenge – not unique to Somalia – in distinguishing groups with terrorist affiliations from other armed groups.

Military Deployments in the Broader Horn of Africa

The five missions deployed across the Broader Horn of Africa in 2008, in Chad and the Central African Republic, Darfur, South Sudan and Somalia, demonstrated a disconnect between the deployment of peacekeepers and political processes on the ground. Collectively, the international community’s efforts aimed at addressing the region’s intricate web of conflicts floundered in the absence of coherent political processes and were exacerbated by the challenges of consent, protection, overstretch and counterterrorism.

Consent, Protection and Overstretch

The lack of viable political frameworks for the peacekeeping efforts throughout the Broader Horn has had serious effects in nearly every operational theater in the region. This is most evident in Somalia and Darfur but true also of Chad. The one partial exception is the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) for Sudan, but even there implementation was difficult.

Problems were most visible in the area of civilian protection across the region, where despite the presence of large number of peacekeepers, the humanitarian situation remained dismal and civilians continued to bear the brunt of the suffering. Given these challenges, troop contributing countries were reluctant to commit personnel, and in certain cases were prevented from deploying.

When operations are deployed without a political process or consent, pre-existing problems of overstretch are reinforced. As demonstrated in the Broader Horn, even with consent overstretch of peacekeepers is a serious problem, given the sheer size of countries like Sudan and Chad and tough logistical conditions.

Looking Ahead

The call for a cohesive regional strategy has largely gone unheeded amidst discussion of UN expansion in the region. Moving past this stalled situation requires a strategic regional framework that can, over time, reconcile national, regional and international interests. Deployment of peacekeepers may be part of that framework, but should not be a substitute for it. Developing an integrated strategy for tackling the conflicts in the Broader Horn, including finding durable solutions to the conflicts between Ethiopia-Eritrea and North-South Sudan would help create a more permissive environment for successful peace operations. The new US administration has a unique opportunity to provide strategic leadership in addressing the conflicts in the region. Regional diplomacy led by the US, perhaps through the creation of a Special Envoy for the Broader Horn, should be complemented by a comprehensive political and peacekeeping configuration for the UN and other actors.
Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2009

The New York University Center on International Cooperation’s (CIC) *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* is the most comprehensive report of its kind, examining more than fifty United Nations (UN) and non-UN peace operations. It aims to inform policy-makers, media outlets, academics and peacekeepers as the international community debates the prominent role of peace operations in conflict management. The report draws on data previously unavailable outside of the UN and other non-UN peacekeeping platforms. CIC prepared the *Annual Review* with the support of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the African Union Peace and Security Department.

Program on Global Peace Operations and Security Sector Reform

CIC’s Program on Global Peace Operations and Security Sector Reform strives to reach an in-depth understanding of the issues surrounding peacekeeping efforts around the world and to develop strategies for their increased success.

During 2009, the program is supporting the following efforts:

- The DPKO and DFS’s “New Horizon Project” on the emerging challenges and opportunities for UN peacekeeping.
- The Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN’s thematic series on “Effective Peace Operations”.

Senior Fellows A. Sarjoh Bah and Richard Gowan are frequent contributors to the academic and public debate on global peacekeeping. During the last year, the program’s work has been featured in *The Economist, The Financial Times, The New York Times, El Pais* and the *European Voice*.

Jean-Marie Guéhenno, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and Senior Fellow at CIC and the Brookings Institution leads research into strategies for peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and serves as a senior advisor to the Swedish-hosted “Challenges Project” on peace operations.

The *Security Sector Reform Project* seeks to assess and strengthen multilateral and bilateral support to SSR, with a particular focus on UN peace operations.

Program Staff

**Associate Director**
Jake Sherman
jake.sherman@nyu.edu

**Senior Fellow**
Dr. A. Sarjoh Bah
sarjoh.bah@nyu.edu

**Research Associate**
Benjamin Tortolani
ben.cic@nyu.edu

**Project Officer**
Victoria DiDomenico
vicki.cic@nyu.edu

Related Project: Special Political Missions

In addition to individual envoys and their teams, the international community is increasingly relying on larger Special Political Missions to address conflict situations. These include long-term field presences responsible for mediation, governance and assisting peacebuilding.

Special Political Missions receive relatively little attention, falling between larger military peace operations and the work of high-profile envoys. CIC is developing a Review of Special Political Missions, modeled on our *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations*, that will catalogue and evaluate current missions around the world.
“As we contemplate the future of global peacekeeping, the need for objective, fact-based analysis is essential. The Review meets this need and I commend CIC and its staff for stimulating and informing this critical debate.”

—ALAIN LE ROY
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

“The Annual Review’s combination of deep analysis and detailed data constitutes a unique resource. International organizations have embarked on more ambitious and complex peace operations in recent years and a reference tool like this one—identifying peacekeeping’s strengths and more importantly, its limitations—is crucial to ensuring that these endeavors continue to bring relief from instability across the world.”

—MARTIN HOWARD
Assistant Secretary-General for Operations, NATO

“The Annual Review of Global Peace Operations continues to be an important pillar of the international peacekeeping system. It is an invaluable tool for policymakers and other actors involved in the maintenance of international peace.”

—RAMTANE LAMAMRA
Commissioner for Peace and Security, African Union

“From Georgia to the Congo, 2008 was a dangerous and difficult year for peacekeepers. Yet the UN and regional organizations remain essential to maintaining stability around the world. This study offers a comprehensive and clear overview of the state of peacekeeping. Policy-makers should read it closely.”

—MARTTI AHTISAARI
Former President of the Republic of Finland, Nobel Laureate 2008