

RESPONDING TO THE NEEDS OF WOMEN AND GIRLS IN POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE AND SECURITY

ISSUES & MESSAGES

1. From the peace table to post-conflict recovery:

Research undertaken by UNIFEM reveals that women's needs in early recovery receive only a small proportion of post-conflict funding. This apparent failure to give due priority to women's recovery needs is compounded by the continuing marginalization of women from the peace table. Not only are key decisions for post-conflict planning taken during peace negotiations, but the mobilization of constituencies often spills over from these processes into the institutional arrangements set up to develop recovery plans and allocate funds for them. It becomes much more difficult to engage women in post-conflict planning if they have been excluded from peace talks that, often, make crucial decisions about power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and socioeconomic recovery and development.

A sample of 24 major peace processes since 1992 (see Table 1) indicates that there has been little appreciable increase in the strikingly low numbers of women in formal peace negotiations. Only 2.1% of signatories to the peace agreements in this sample were women, and women's participation in negotiating delegations only averaged 7.1% for the 14 cases for which such information was available (the composition of peace delegations is often fluid and data is difficult to obtain).

As a result, women's issues are neglected and under-financed. For example, sexual violence has been largely omitted from consideration in peace negotiations, even in contexts where it was widespread, systematic, and a prominent feature of the conflict. Since 1989, only 18 out of 300 components of peace agreements –such as ceasefire agreements or implementation sub-agreements- corresponding to ten out of 45 major conflicts reviewed, mention sexual or gender-based violence, and in none of them does sexual violence receive particular attention in relation to economic recovery or post-conflict development.

2. Funding for women's emergency and recovery needs:


Women's exclusion from power-sharing and wealth-sharing deals at the peace table and in national government means that relatively low priority is assigned to women's recovery needs. This view is supported by an analysis of post-conflict planning tools, such as Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs).

UNIFEM analyzed eight Post Conflict Needs Assessments to assess the extent of gender mainstreaming in PCNA situation analyses and in cost estimates for priority actions.¹ The study finds that gender issues are 'front-loaded' in PCNAs – mentioned in sub-sectoral overviews but less often specified in cost estimates for priority spending. About 36% of budgeted sub-sectors contain gender analysis, but on average fewer than 8% of actual budgets specifically mention women's needs.

As shown in Figure 2, economic recovery and infrastructure sub-sectors receive


Figure 1

PCNA total budget, by extent of inclusion of gender issues (US\$ billion and %)



¹ This analysis is based on PCNA documents for seven countries where the process was UN-led: Afghanistan, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Somalia, north Sudan and south Sudan and Timor-Leste. The systematization was done in two steps: identification of the extent of inclusion of gender issues (three different levels considered: narrative, TRF, and budget or costing), and aggregation of sub-sectors addressing women's issues, by adding up associated budgeted costs. Since sectors across countries were not necessarily the same, they were clustered within the major sectors listed in Figure 2. Thus, a note of caution is due. Over-estimation of attention paid to women's issues may occur as the whole budgeted amount associated with a sub-sector was considered to include women's issues even if just one reference to women's needs was found. On the other hand, under-estimation of attention paid to women's issues may occur when the TRF and the budget or estimated costs are not very detailed. This means that women's needs may be incorporated in the implementation, but they were not clearly identified at the budget planning level. Finally, the analysis starts at the sub-sector level; PCNAs with more detailed information and with a higher number of sub-sectors will show a more accurate picture of the extent to which women's issues are considered.

60% of total funding but are weak on gender analysis and fund allocation for women's needs. It is often argued that these sectors are "gender neutral" and that women benefit as much as men from investments in these areas. This is not necessarily the case. For example, if temporary employment programmes do not make specific provisions to make employment accessible for women, addressing constraints on their labor such as childcare, women may not benefit. De-mining programmes that focus primarily on major transport arteries –as in Angola in 1999 in order to speed the return home of combatants- utterly neglect women and children's use of rural roads, fields, and water points, and in consequence neglect the serious harm experienced by women and children. The Social Protection and Human rights sector seems the one paying most attention to women's issues, with about 50% of its budget clearly linked to such needs. However, this sector only attracts about 4% of post-conflict funds.



These numbers are distressingly low. OECD/DAC members have addressed this issue by establishing a gender marker on funds targeting women explicitly and directly or as part of a broader beneficiary group. Overtime, the money allocated to women's needs has increased. At a minimum, it raises the awareness of planners and facilitates the work of women's advocates. Another solution is earmarking funds for women's rights and needs, although this option is resented by planners and carries the risk of becoming a maximum instead of a minimum. Perhaps it is more feasible to strengthen the gender-responsiveness of PCNAs and strongly linking these assessments to financial allocations.

3. Recommendations:

In some countries, as in Uganda, women's groups -many of them having just lobbied for and participated in the peace negotiations- are working to incorporate the findings of their own needs-assessment survey to post-conflict recovery and development plans. But far too often, women are relatively new to national decision-making roles and forums, lack the capacity to navigate them on equal footing, or are simply excluded. Many refuse to endure the physical threats and cultural stigma that frequently accompanies trailblazing women that are trying to bring about change. In order to confront this problem, it is imperative to promote women's engagement from the earliest possible moment in conflict resolution processes. This helps to establish their credibility as participants in post-conflict planning and boost their own capacity. Several actions can be taken in this regard. Given that the UN itself often lacks adequate gender analysis and response capability, a gender advisor – deployed from the earliest moment and with a similar level of priority as a political and aid management advisor- seems the minimum requirement to work with peace mediators and resident coordinators (RCs). In order to gain the trust of the people, UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding personnel should engage in visible and symbolic gestures that encourage women's engagement, such as visiting women's shelters or building new ones for survivors of sexual violence, acknowledging and consulting with women's leaders, fast-tracking judicial treatment of cases of violence against women, and seeking out women's participation in post-conflict planning in a regular process of review. But many more actions can be taken at different stages. These are some suggestions:

- Use crisis financing (CERFs and CAPs) to raise funds for women's needs.
- Undertake gender-responsive assessments of recovery needs.
- Support women's civil society groups, particularly peace coalitions through direct financing for institutional capacity building (leadership, accounting, IT and communications, service provision).
- Ensure the inclusion of gender expertise and qualified women in leadership positions in the security sector and basic services provision.
- Engage women from civil society in national priority-setting and planning.

- Establish performance indicators, benchmarks and monitoring to hold national and international community to account for investing in women's recovery needs.
- Identify and announce high-profile symbolic initiatives to tackle impunity, and earmark funds for basic services to women.
- Consult with women as part of all joint planning and costing exercises, and ensure women's representation at donor conferences.
- Establish and strengthen gender desks in key ministries (Finance, Defense, Interior, Agriculture, Health, Education), and provide them training on financial planning.
- Support women's engagement in constitutional reform and electoral processes.
- Improve data collection on women's status, notably census on numbers of female-headed households, prevalence of sexual violence, women's land use patterns, access to credit, membership of agricultural cooperatives, participation in formal employment, reproductive health and educational status.
- Support women's leadership in reconciliation efforts.
- Fast-track initiatives to engage women in public institutions, such as recruitment drives for women to join the police, or scholarships for high-school girls to get into tertiary education.
- Set up on-the-ground coordination mechanisms among UN agencies to address women's articulated priorities (SGBV, economic security, repatriation, and more).

As the tenth anniversary of SCR 1325 approaches, we must intensify our efforts to address its lagging implementation. This would be helped by establishing monitoring mechanisms, i.e. indicators, that enable the UN to track progress; eliminating access barriers for women in peace negotiations; paying closer attention to women's participation in all aspects of early recovery; and allocating adequate funds to address women's needs in early recovery and reconstruction.

The period of post-conflict transition offers a crucial window of opportunity to ensure the full and effective implementation of SCR 1325. As the Secretary-General points out in his 2009 report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, "the needs of women and girls require more attention, as recovery efforts may prioritize the needs of men... A tendency by outsiders to work with and acknowledge the leadership of men in governance and the economy, however, can mean that women's capacity to engage in decision-making and economic recovery may not receive adequate recognition or financing."²

It is imperative to seize this crucial window of opportunity in post-conflict settings, as ensuring financing for women's needs in early recovery may be one of the strongest tools for actualizing the promises and potential of SCR 1325.

Table 1: Percentages of women's participation in peace negotiations:

² United Nations, (2009) *Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*, para 21.

	Women Signatories	Women Mediators	Women Witnesses	Women in Negotiating Teams
1 El Salvador (1992) – CPA <i>Chapultepec Agreement</i>	12%	0%	—	13%
2 Croatia (1995) – CPA <i>The Erdut Agreement</i>	0%	0%	0%	11%
3 Bosnia (1995) – CPA <i>The Dayton Accords</i>	0%	0%	0%	0%
4 Guatemala (1996) – CPA <i>Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace</i>	11%	0%	—	—
5 Northern Ireland (1998) – Belfast <i>Good Friday Agreement. Multi-Party Agreement</i>	2%	0%	—	2%
6 Indonesia (1999) – CPA <i>Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the Question of Timor</i>	0%	0%	0%	—
7 Sierra Leone (1999) - CPA <i>The Lomé Peace Agreement</i>	0%	0%	25%	0%
8 Burundi (2000) – Arusha COH / CSF / CPA <i>Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi</i>	0%	0%	—	2%
9 Papua New Guinea (2001) - Bougainville PAC <i>Accord Papua New Guinea</i>	7%	0%	—	4%
10 Macedonia (2001) – CPA <i>The Ohrid Peace Agreement</i>	0%	0%	0%	5%
11 Afghanistan (2001) – Bonn CPA <i>Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions</i>	9%	0%	—	9%
12 Somalia (2002) - Eldoret COH / CSF <i>Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities and the Structures and Principles of the Somalia National Reconciliation Process</i>	0%	0%	0%	—
13 Cote d'Ivoire (2003) – CPA <i>Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accords</i>	0%	0%	0%	—
14 DRC (2003) - Sun City CPA <i>The Sun City Agreement ("The Final Act")</i>	5%	0%	0%	12%
15 Liberia (2003) – Accra COH / CSF / CPA <i>Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia and the political parties</i>	0%	0%	17%	—
16 Sudan (2005) - Naivasha CPA <i>The comprehensive peace agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army.</i>	0%	0%	9%	—
17 Darfur (2006) – Abuja CPA <i>Darfur Peace Agreement</i>	0%	0%	7%	8%
18 Nepal (2006) – CPA <i>Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)</i>	0%	—	0%	0%
19 The Philippines (2007) – IAG <i>Communique on the Tripartite Meeting between the GRP, MNLF and OIC</i>	0%	0%	—	—
20 DRC (2008) - Goma - North Kivu CSF <i>Acte D'Engagement</i>	5%	20%	0%	—
21 DRC (2008) - Goma - South Kivu CSF <i>Acte D'Engagement</i>	0%	20%	0%	—
22 Uganda (2008) – Juba COH / CSF / IAG <i>Juba Peace Agreement</i>	0%	0%	20%	9%
23 Kenya (2008) – Nairobi <i>Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government</i>	0%	33%	0%	25%
24 Central African Republic (2008) – CPA <i>Accord de Paix Global</i>	0%	0%	0%	—

Documented presence of women
 No presence of women documented
 Official sources not available