

CIVIL SOCIETY AND
DISARMAMENT
2012



APPLYING A DISARMAMENT LENS TO
GENDER, HUMAN RIGHTS,
DEVELOPMENT, SECURITY, EDUCATION
AND COMMUNICATION: SIX ESSAYS

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United Nations Office for
Disarmament Affairs

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United Nations

Note

The Office for Disarmament Affairs is publishing this material within the context of General Assembly resolution 65/81 on the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme and General Assembly resolution 65/77 on the United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education. This material is being made available in order to further an informed debate on topical issues of arms limitation, disarmament and security.

This publication contains essays by representatives of civil society organizations. All essays were commissioned by Mr. Robert Zuber and Ms. Katherine Prizeman of *Global Action to Prevent War*. The essays are published as edited by Mr. Zuber and Ms. Prizeman.

The views expressed are those of the authors and/or editors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations.

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Introduction

Dr. Robert Zuber

Global Action to Prevent War and Armed Conflict

The issues and activities presented in this volume represent only a very small slice of global efforts to expand the disarmament agenda beyond weapons and weapon systems. Our concern is to promote broad human security connections that largely define the quality of community life for billions of the world's people. We all recognize that security policies impact much more than levels of military preparedness. Bloated defence budgets compromise social development. Illicit small arms bring many layers of insecurity to diverse communities and directly threaten participation in society by women and ethnic minorities. Nuclear weapons remain a tainted “gold standard” that allow certain countries to feel entitled to dominate security decisions far from their own shores. In a world where disarmament at all levels remains elusive, the implications of weapons for abundant and sustainable community life are both numerous and troubling.

The United Nations disarmament machinery, with which we regularly interact, is currently under considerable strain. Despite this, we are moving steadily towards once distant policy changes including a formal Arms Trade Treaty, new commitments to action in fulfilment of the United Nations Programme of Action on Illicit Small Arms, re-energized commitments to the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zones, and more. At the same time, the implications of disarmament (or lack thereof) are profound for the health of the security sector and, by extension, the ability of women to participate in society, of children to receive an education in schools free of violence, of internally displaced persons to receive desperately needed assistance, or of persons involved in armed conflict to return safely to their homes. These and other impacts are both far-reaching and convey a sense of urgency to both advocates and communities.

What might seem to be merely collateral linkages from the vantage point of United Nations Headquarters are clear, compelling and obvious to persons living in environments lacking both security and abundance. Our world is awash in illicit weapons and their consequence for virtually every segment of social and political life is profound. Thus each of the essays in this volume are calling out to diverse government and civil society actors to do more to help redress the imbalances in our security

and disarmament priorities which contribute to poverty, intimidation and physical misery far from policy centres.

Similar to our expectations for the revised *Disarmament: A Basic Guide* from the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs,¹ our hope with this volume is to stimulate meaningful discussion on disarmament priorities and linkages in diverse global regions. The authors of this publication have already expressed interest in participating in more of these discussions and we have included a helpful article on social media to help facilitate each and every one of them.

We are mindful of the fact that the concerns, constituencies and voices of many civil society organizations worldwide are not directly represented here. This is an oversight that cannot be rectified in a thin volume such as this, but it is one which we can and will do more to correct; for instance, by organizing conversations in diverse regions to help ensure that general reactions, linkages and policy suggestions, inspired or not by this volume, can find a more prominent place in disarmament discussions at the international level.

¹ (www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/AdhocPublications/HTML/BasicGuide.shtml).

Merging Disarmament and Development Priorities

Ray Acheson

Chair, Reaching Critical Will, a project of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)

With barely three years left until the 2015 deadline to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the international community has an excellent opportunity to assess and readjust its spending priorities towards advancing human security, gender equality and sustainable development. However, the *2010 Millennium Development Goals Report*, produced by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), notes that “unmet commitments, inadequate resources, lack of focus and accountability, and insufficient dedication to sustainable development have created shortfalls in many areas”. Some of these shortfalls, the report explains, were aggravated by the global food, climate, economic and financial crises as well as armed conflict. The report estimates that poverty rates will continue to increase throughout the world as a result of the persisting global economic crisis.¹

At the same time, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has noted, “The financial crisis and economic recession that have affected most of the globe appeared to have little effect on levels of military expenditure, arms production or arms transfers.”² SIPRI has calculated that known world military expenditure in 2010 was more than US \$1.6 trillion, which is an increase of 1.3 per cent from 2009.³ This amount is equivalent to over 24 years of the foreign aid required to reach the MDGs by 2015. It is also equivalent to 700 years of the United Nation’s regular budget, or to 2,928 years of the new United Nations women’s agency.⁴

¹ *The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010*, United Nations, at http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/Progress2010/MDG_Report_2010_En.pdf.

² “SIPRI Yearbook 2010—Military Expenditure”, Media Background, 2 June 2010, at http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/pressreleasetranslations/storypackage_milex.

³ “Background paper on SIPRI military expenditure data, 2010”, Press background material, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 11 April 2011, at <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/factsheet2010>.

⁴ *You Get What You Pay For*, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 2010, at <http://www.wilpfinternational.org/PDF/EconomicJustice/YGWYPF.pdf>.

In addition, the global arms trade is valued at more than US \$50 billion per year, while new research has shown that at current spending rates, the nuclear-armed States will spend at least US \$1 trillion on nuclear weapons over the next decade.⁵ This figure will go much higher as States modernize these weapons and related facilities.

These vast sums are being spent on weapons at the same time as the world is struggling to recover from a serious financial crisis and as cut-backs on health, education and social programmes are being made in most countries around the world. This trade-off, to our mind, is only becoming harder to defend.

Militarism up, development down

After the cold war ended, global military expenditure did diminish. The United States and Russia dismantled several thousand of their nuclear weapons and reduced military personnel and other weapon stockpiles.⁶ Since 1998, however, governments once again began increasing expenditure on their militaries, rationalized in part as a response to an increasingly unstable world. This increased military expenditure has propelled the world even further into tension and war. Armed conflict—and the constant threat of war and terrorism—has become both the cause of and response to this growing militarism. A militarized response has only further exacerbated conflict so that it is more difficult to seek more peaceful solutions and sustainable development.

Both inside and outside the domain of organized war, the excess weapons available throughout the world continue to be instruments that enable the killing or maiming of civilians; the violation of human rights; the obstruction of economic and social development, including through the loss of livelihood; the impeding of post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction; the delaying or preventing of the return of refugees and internally displaced persons; the negative impacting of national and international peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance efforts; and other severe consequences that can persist for many years.

⁵ Blair, Bruce, “World Nuke Spending to Top \$1 Trillion Per Decade”, *Time Magazine*, June 2011, at <http://npsglobal.org/eng/component/content/article/13-news/1027-world-nuke-spending-top-1-trillion-decade.html>.

⁶ Gillis, Melissa, *Disarmament: A Basic Guide*, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, August 2009, p. 9, at <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/AdhocPublications/PDF/guide.pdf>.

War and the threat of war destroy lives, infrastructure and well-being, creating a culture of fear, violence and instability. This impedes development by upsetting social programmes, education, transportation, business and tourism, which in turn prevents economic stability, mental well-being and sustainable livelihoods. The manufacture and use of weapons also prevents sustainable ecological development and preservation, creating unequal access to resources and further impeding poverty reduction initiatives.

The so-called military-industrial-academic complex—composed of a State’s armed forces, the government, suppliers of weapon systems and services, and academic institutions that conduct research on weapon systems and designs—absorbs vast amounts of funding that could otherwise be spent on human security, including the achievement of the MDGs. Many elements of the military-industrial-academic complex are private corporations and institutions, and many have lobbyists whose job is to ensure that they receive expensive contracts to produce weapons or provide “security” personnel to the government. Many of these corporations operate with impunity overseas and are not held accountable by their home governments for either their actions or their revenue.

However, weapons cannot address the main threats people all over the world are facing today, such as natural disasters, increased food prices, and lack of adequate health care, education and a clean environment. Yet these threats are aggravating arms races and weapons development. SIPRI has warned that growing competition for natural resources “may lead to increased military spending as a means of protecting resources from internal or external threats, while resource revenues are often a source of funding for arms purchases”.⁷

Excessive military expenditure also sends a signal of hostility to the international community, indicating a reluctance to rely on diplomacy and cooperation to achieve foreign policy goals and domestic security. Beyond posturing, the ever-increasing expansion of military and weapons-procurement budgets also has deep policy implications. For example, as Tim Wright notes, “by extending the useable lifetime of nuclear weapons for several decades, governments are undermining efforts to achieve

⁷ Sam Perlo-Freeman, Olawale Ismail and Carina Solmirano, “Chapter 5. Military expenditure”, *SIPRI Yearbook 2010*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2010, at <http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2010/05>.

nuclear disarmament, and by developing new components for their nuclear warheads and building new missiles, submarines, and bombers to carry them, they are fuelling a potentially catastrophic nuclear arms race”.⁸

Meanwhile, funds reserved for development initiatives are increasingly diverted to emergency relief and rehabilitation operations to clean up after violent conflict. While military expenditure increases every year, investment in conflict resolution, peacebuilding and development lags far behind. SIPRI noted in the release of its *2010 Yearbook*, while the financial crisis did not seem to affect military spending, it “probably did undermine the willingness and ability of major governments and multilateral institutions to invest other, non-military resources to address the challenges and instabilities that threaten societies and individuals around the world”.⁹

As United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warned in 2009, “The world is over-armed and peace is under-funded.”¹⁰

Weapons or well-being?

In 2010, official development assistance—aid from developed countries to developing ones—totalled US \$128.7 billion. Official development assistance to Africa in 2010 was US \$29.3 billion. Tim Wright points out that this is less than one-third of that spent on nuclear weapons. “As millions across the globe go hungry and are denied access to clean water, basic medicines and sanitation, the nuclear-armed nations spend US \$287 million every day—or US \$12 million an hour—on their nuclear forces.”¹¹

In *Disarmament: A Basic Guide*, the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs cites figures researched elsewhere that clarify the cost of reaching each of the MDGs and identifies the percentage of current military expenditure that would be required to achieve them.

⁸ Wright, Tim, “Nuclear weapons spending: a theft of public resources”, Issues Paper, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, September 2011.

⁹ “SIPRI Yearbook 2010—Military Expenditure”, *ibid*.

¹⁰ Ban Ki-moon, “Secretary-General’s opening remarks to the 62nd Annual DPI/NGO Conference—‘For Peace and Development: Disarm Now’”, Mexico City, 9 September 2009, at <http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=4057>.

¹¹ Wright, *ibid*.

GOAL: Halve Extreme Poverty and Hunger

Halve the proportion of people who live on less than \$1 per day and who suffer from hunger

COST: \$39-54 billion

PERCENTAGE OF GLOBAL MILITARY SPENDING: 2.6-3.7%

GOAL: Promote Universal Education and Gender Equality

Achieve universal education and eliminate gender disparity in education

COST: \$10-30 billion

PERCENTAGE OF GLOBAL MILITARY SPENDING: 0.7-2.0%

GOAL: Promote Health

Reduce by 2/3 the under-5 mortality rate, reduce by 3/4 the maternal mortality rate, reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS

COST: \$20-25 billion

PERCENTAGE OF GLOBAL MILITARY SPENDING: 1.4-1.7%

GOAL: Environmental Sustainability

Halve the proportion of people without access to potable water, improve the lives of 100 million slum dwellers

COST: \$5-21 billion

PERCENTAGE OF GLOBAL MILITARY SPENDING: 0.3-1.4%¹²

Continued investment in weapons and war will continue to drain resources, in particular from the world's poor. Over 1.2 billion live in what is known as "extreme poverty", i.e. less than US \$1.25 per day. And 70 per cent of these people are women. According to UN-Women, "Women are more likely than men to be poor and at risk of hunger because of the systematic discrimination they face in education, health care, employment and control of assets. Poverty implications are widespread for women, leaving many without even basic rights such as access to clean drinking water, sanitation, medical care and decent

¹² Gillis, *ibid.*, p. 13.

employment. Being poor generally offers little protection from violence and no role in decision making.”¹³

Adequate resources are critical to the realization of development goals and human rights, including women’s rights. States have already committed to direct funds for these goals, not just by committing to achieve the MDGs by 2015, but through other international agreements. Article 26 of the United Nations Charter mandates the United Nations Security Council to formulate a plan to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion to armaments from the world’s human and economic resources. The Security Council has largely neglected this responsibility and its permanent members are all among the top 10 weapons manufacturers and exporters, with major implications for both security and sustainable development. In addition, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Maastricht Guidelines focused on violations of these rights clearly specify that States must allocate the maximum of its available resources to realizing human rights.

Disarmament and development

The redirection of funds from militaries and weapon stockpiles to development and human rights activities is not the only thing necessary to achieve the MDGs and other development objectives. It is also crucial that international disarmament and arms control obligations are upheld and fulfilled and that new ones are developed.

For example, a comprehensive and robust arms trade treaty (ATT), which would regulate the trade of conventional weapons, would go a long way to helping the international community achieve the MDGs. However, it cannot be treated as an instrument to facilitate arms transfers. To make a difference, it needs to be a strong tool with the primary purpose of preventing the diversion of weapons that lead to violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and that significantly fuel the culture and economy of militarism.

A strong ATT can help build the foundations for not just the regulation but also the eventual *reduction* of the arms trade, along with the curbing of militarism throughout politics and society, the reduction

¹³ UN-Women, “Women, Poverty & Economics”, at http://www.unifem.org/gender_issues/women_poverty_economics/.

of military spending, and the redirection of economic resources. A strong ATT would help realize the mandate of article 26 of the United Nations Charter, which goes beyond the mere regulation of the arms *trade* to the regulation of armaments themselves.

As for existing disarmament obligations, States have a legal obligation under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and as unanimously affirmed by the International Court of Justice in 1996 to commence and conclude “good faith” negotiations towards the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. The complete elimination and total ban on production, possession and use of these weapons of mass destruction is essential for the survival of the human species and many other ecological systems on Earth. Sustainable development will prove elusive without it.

This is due in part to the incredible sums of money that are currently diverted to the production and maintenance of nuclear weapons. All nuclear weapon possessors are currently engaged in or have plans for modernizing their nuclear arsenals and related infrastructure. Many proponents of the military-industrial complex argue that this will bring jobs and economic growth to regions that host nuclear weapon facilities. However, economists “know that merely ‘providing jobs’, while on its face a good thing, isn’t an adequate measure of a facility’s net economic benefit”, argues Greg Mello of the Los Alamos Study Group in New Mexico. “Development economists often prefer to focus not on ‘jobs’ or even ‘total income’ as goals but rather more on the human goals of economic development: improved health and educational outcomes, decreased poverty, and other objective quality of life indices.”¹⁴ The Study Group and others have demonstrated, on a regional basis, that weapon production or maintenance facilities do not necessarily meet these measures of development. Furthermore, the money diverted to creating jobs in nuclear weapon facilities means less money for creating jobs in fields geared toward generating technologies for sustainable development in the future.

Creating jobs in the military-industrial complex *requires* a high military budget—these jobs have opportunity costs that include “massive

¹⁴ Greg Mello, “Does Los Alamos National Lab Help or Hurt the New Mexico Economy?” Los Alamos Study Group Working Paper, July 2006, http://www.lasg.org/LANLecon_impact.pdf.

government debt and ever-increasing pollution”, as well as entrenchment of a militaristic foreign policy. Writing in 1970 about the United States, Seymour Melman noted, “The national purpose is operationally defined by the priorities governing the areas wherein public funds are applied. The fact that two-thirds of the national budget is being applied to military purposes gives an operational definition to the national purpose.”¹⁵ That is, those determining federal budget allocations do not simply divert huge sums of money to military purposes because the country’s foreign policy requires it. Rather, the choice of continuing to divert vast funds to military ends determines the country’s foreign policy.

Military spending and human rights

As shown above, there are direct and indirect links between increasing military expenditure and failure to uphold human rights obligations, especially rights to socioeconomic development and human security. However, governments, United Nations bodies, and even civil society tend to address issues related to militarism and weapons separately from development and human rights.

This false separation condemns much of the international community’s multilateral apparatus to staleness and even paralysis. Some of the deadlock of the multilateral disarmament machinery, for example, can be explained not by its rules of procedure but rather by the increasingly dominant culture of militarism, of seeking global superiority and “defence” through the application of weaponry. This dominant approach to disarmament and arms control reflects a militaristic notion of national security, rather than the principles of human security and the rule of law.

Thus, there is clearly a need to situate military spending and arms stockpiling in a wider context of development and human rights, to integrate these issues at all levels. For example, multilateral disarmament bodies need to start interacting and cooperating with the appropriate bodies for human rights law. This could contribute to more effective monitoring of how States are fulfilling their human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) obligations in light of their disarmament commitments.

¹⁵ Seymour Melman, *Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War*, New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1970.

States could begin to provide specific, disaggregated information on their disarmament and arms control policy commitments and military expenditure to the Human Rights Council and Universal Periodic Review process, as well as the human rights treaty bodies. These could be the ideal fora for examining and evaluating the respective balance of priorities demonstrated by governments in fora such as the Conference on Disarmament, the ATT negotiating process and other multilateral disarmament contexts.

At the same time, all disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations and processes should include a human security aim, drawn from principles in human rights treaties and IHL, in order to truly contribute to a safer world for all. Disarmament and arms control treaty negotiators could also seek commitments to transparency regarding amounts spent on nuclear weapon forces, conventional arms, militaries and the arms trade, which could be compared to the amounts they spend on disarmament activities, development and social programmes and official aid.

Conclusion

Fulfilling disarmament obligations, reducing military expenditure and ensuring strict regulation over the international trade in arms are all necessary undertakings for achieving the MDGs and other development and human rights obligations. This will require making the reduction of militarism and military expenditure a global norm by continuing to reframe the concept of a security with a premium on universal human and ecological security, multilateralism, and a commitment to cooperative, non-violent means of conflict resolution. It will require those working on disarmament and arms control to value a human security approach over a militarist security one, and will require development and human rights activities to incorporate disarmament and arms control initiatives, as well as redirection of military expenditure, as key pillars of their strategies. Especially from NGOs, it will require both hard data and compelling local narrative to cement actionable linkages between military spending and development deficits.

Regardless of the type of weapon in question, a human security approach to disarmament and arms control must be adopted, an approach that is tied to the fulfilment of development priorities, but also to the full participation and empowerment of all citizens. It is particularly

important to ensure the broader inclusion of women as decision makers and policymakers. Women have paid the cost of arms proliferation for too long—economically and physically—and they must be included in developing relevant solutions.

The global reduction of military expenditures in order to more effectively pursue foreign or domestic development objectives or even to respond to conflict will be imperative. As the world's population continues to increase, as climate change affects our weather and geography, as traditional sources of energy become more limited, and as natural resources like fresh water and soil are further depleted, human beings will need new strategies to address and mitigate these potential sources of tension and conflict. Based on trends in arms acquisition, military build-up, and increased expenditure on weapons and war around the world, it is clear that many governments of the world are on a track from which we will need to diverge in order to survive.

Minimizing the impact of illicit small arms and diverted weapons transfers in the commission of atrocity crimes, human rights violations and other violence

Hector Guerra
International Action Network on Small Arms

Robert Zuber
Global Action to Prevent War and Armed Conflict

Introduction

31 January 2010. In Ciudad Juárez, a Mexican city on the border with the United States, once infamous for being the most dangerous city on Earth and for its number of femicides, a group of assassins stormed a house in the neighbourhood of Villas Salvácar. There, young students were having a party. Sixteen were killed, and many more injured as a consequence of gunfire.¹ This is but a token of a growing number of massacres taking place in a country flooded by small arms and light weapons resulting from illicit transfers that have fed a situation of armed violence related to organized crime, that has resulted in nearly 50,000 deaths from 2006 to date.²

These particular attacks are but a token of the reality and potential for mass atrocity crimes and community violence that is ever present and which creates extensive and continuous challenges to the freedom-from-fear objectives of human security. Thus, of the 740,000 people who die each year as a result of armed violence, 500,000 are fatalities related to

¹ “Juárez llora; exigen justicia tras matanza”, El Universal, 2 February 2010, <http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/74615.html>; “Escuadrones de la muerte operan en Juárez: ONG”, El Universal, 2 February 2010, <http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/655721.html>; “Sube a 16 el número de víctimas de la masacre en Ciudad Juárez”, La Jornada, 2 February 2010, <http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2010/02/02/estados/028n1est>; “Conmemorarán un año de la masacre de jóvenes en Villas de Salvácar”, Excelsior, 28 January 2011, http://www.excelsior.com.mx/index.php?m=nota&id_nota=708877.

² “La violencia del ‘narco’ ha causado casi 50,000 víctimas en México desde 2006”, El País, 13 January 2012, http://elpais.com/diario/2012/01/13/internacional/1326409208_850215.html.

situations of violence other than armed conflicts, fatalities largely related to the use of small arms and light weapons.³

Over the past decade the international community has taken steps to tackle the problem of illicit weapons. Most important among them are the 2001 United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA), the related United Nations Firearms Protocol (2005) and the International Tracing Instrument (2005).⁴ More recently we and other NGOs participated in preparations for formal negotiations (Summer 2012) on an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).⁵ Also of importance in addressing the broader issues of weapons-related violence are the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence (2006)⁶ and the Oslo Commitments (2010).⁷ Backed by a series of disarmament, humanitarian and human rights treaties and structures that help ensure transparency and compliance, these agreements and activities represent important platforms from which to address threats to human security ranging from atrocity crimes to school and community violence. Specifically, these agreements address the threat posed by illicit arms, both their proliferation and illegal use: Too many arms are in the wrong hands, and lives, limbs and livelihoods are being needlessly lost.

Not only is our world awash in illicit weapons, but the mere presence of those weapons (and the ammunition that enables guns to kill) inflames hostilities, increases lawlessness, undermines good governance, and sows seeds of fear in children and their parents, teachers and neighbours. Illicit weapons create levels of unpredictability in the security sector that undermine State control, encourage violence in schools and communities,

³ These and related statistics can be found at: http://www.undp.org/cpr/we_do/armed_violence.shtml.

⁴ The full text of the Firearms Protocol can be accessed at: <http://www.unodc.org/newsletter/en/200504/page005.html>. Information on the ITI can be found in multiple languages at: <http://www.poa-iss.org/InternationalTracing/InternationalTracing.aspx>.

⁵ Information on the ATT process can be found from many sources, including The Arms Trade Monitor (<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/att/monitor.html>), through the Control Arms Coalition site (www.controlarms.org) and directly through the United Nations which has recently launched a new resource to track arms transfers by governments (<http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ArmsTradeTreaty/>).

⁶ The Geneva Declaration with full explanation is available at: <http://www.genevadeclaration.org/the-geneva-declaration.html>.

⁷ The Oslo commitments are available at: <http://www.osloconferencearmedviolence.no/pop.cfm?FuseAction=Doc&pAction=View&pDocumentId=24790>.

and increase the likelihood that crimes of all kinds (including gender-based violence) will both spread and go unpunished far too often.

While States have the right to acquire guns and ammunition for legitimate self-defence and for purposes of law enforcement in accordance with prevailing international standards, the irresponsible transfer of weapons and ammunition and the proliferation of illicit small arms have direct implications for our ability to secure our streets, deliver aid to unstable areas, prevent abuses of human rights and the commission of mass atrocities, and create environments conducive to full political and policy participation by women and cultural minorities.

The year 2012 has loomed particularly large for many facets of the United Nation's disarmament and security commitments. During the summer, the negotiating Conference for an ATT took place, and soon after came the Review Conference of the PoA. In addition, the General Assembly convened in early September to discuss the need for "third pillar" prevention and implementation tools to address the threat of mass atrocities under the "responsibility to protect" framework. While a few States are hindering efforts to control illicit weapons and fulfil our responsibility to protect civilian populations from abuse, the majority of United Nations Member States favour robust and comprehensive instruments to prevent the spread of illicit arms, including small arms, light weapons and ammunition, arms that most States recognize can fuel mass atrocities or otherwise contribute to human suffering in our communities.

SALW and Arms Transfers

The PoA is an important, politically relevant document that has resulted in extraordinary activities by State and non-State actors in many parts of the world focused on border control, marking and tracing of weapons, stockpile management, record keeping and more. Basically the concern of the PoA is with the trade and impact of illicit small arms. Meanwhile, an ATT is aimed at regulating transfers of major types of conventional weapons (including, as many hope, small arms and light weapons). It does not aim at the prohibition of arms and their trade; nor will it lead directly to a renunciation or destruction of any weapons already in circulation.

Despite possible limitations in the final treaty, and while some States are clear about the need to distance an ATT from the pursuit of disarmament per se, there is acknowledgment on the part of many diplomats, disarmament educators and policymakers that an ATT would be an especially welcome development, especially if the humanitarian and human rights consequences of the “diverted” trade are explicitly noted and addressed within the final treaty.

It is widely acknowledged that many weapons start their life in the legal sector, but then move through unregulated transfers into the black market and potential use by criminals, terrorists or other non-State actors. In addition, in part through lack of proper national, regional and international controls, weapons are also transferred directly to States that are used to perpetrate human rights abuses. Weapons are even occasionally resold by governments to other State and non-State actors to line the pockets of corrupt officials.

Drawing attention to the problem of diverted transfers is one key to minimizing their potentially insidious consequences. Many States and NGOs are concerned that a treaty that does not establish the capacity to highlight transfers with a high potential for diversion will be insufficient to stem the use of illicit weapons and ammunition that enable abuses of human rights worldwide. The uses of unregulated or diverted conventional weapons (weapons in the “wrong hands”) have numerous detrimental impacts, including the following:

- Illicit arms inflame conflicts that might otherwise be resolvable, including conflicts that have the potential to incite major violations of human rights or even escalate to the level of mass atrocities. Illicit arms are a powerful and pervasive “wildcard” as the international community tries to ascertain levels of risk and assess the need for urgent response as a State draws closer to committing (or permitting) mass violence.
- Illicit arms undermine development (including creating dangers for development professionals) and inhibit the flow of assistance to internally displaced persons and others in acute need. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the International Network on Explosive Weapons and others provide chilling statistics about the impact of weapons on the provision of

assistance.⁸ Illicit weapons can undermine the basic determination of communities and entire nations to respond to post-conflict trauma and other challenges to the common welfare.

- Illicit arms in the hands of State and non-State actors have been used both to violate the human rights of civilian populations and to impede efforts to bring perpetrators to justice. Illicit weapons can dramatically raise the risk level for anyone working in the justice sector, especially those tasked with bringing powerful perpetrators of violence or corruption to account.
- Illicit arms (and ammunition) greatly impact the ability of governments to discharge many of its most important functions, including the primary responsibility to protect civilians from violence by criminals, non-State actors, or even by rogue government elements.
- Illicit arms undermine the integrity of the security sector, creating or exacerbating levels of unacceptable risk for women and others seeking their proper place in society. Such arms in the hands of young people also create needless risk for peers both inside and outside school seeking a stable and secure environment in which to pursue their studies.
- It is important to note here (as highlighted in the 2011 World Development Report and many other sources)⁹ that illicit arms contribute to cycles of violence and criminality that reinforce structures of poverty as women and men continue to expend large amounts of energy on security needs that could more beneficially be spent on pursuing educational and economic opportunity.

The physical and psychological damage done to civilians through access to illicit weapons by criminals, insurgents or other non-State actors is incalculable. In situations where States are complicit in this violence, either by the misuse of legally obtained weapons or by the reselling of legally acquired weapons to non-State actors, the implications for

⁸ UNIDIR's engagement with this issue through its Discourse on Explosive Weapons project can be found at <http://www.unidir.org/pdf/activities/pdf3-act575.pdf>. A description of INEW's involvement can be found at www.inew.org.

⁹ The report can be accessed at http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/WDR2011_Overview.pdf.

community life can be staggering. Trauma is only magnified in situations of grave violence when such violence is sanctioned by officials pledged to protect rather than abuse.

Illicit Weapons, Atrocity Crime Prevention and our Responsibility to Protect

While there are indeed many insidious aspects of the proliferation of illicit weapons, perhaps the most serious is related to the role those weapons play in the commission of mass violence, including the shootings at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado in 1999 and the massacre at Utoya, Norway in 2011. Since its founding, the United Nations has had the prevention of mass violence at the heart of its agenda, both violence in communities and especially within broader international legal frameworks defined by crimes against humanity and genocide. Urgency regarding that agenda escalated in 2005 when the World Summit unanimously endorsed (with greater and lesser levels of enthusiasm) the “Responsibility to Protect” (RtoP) norm. The norm affirms the primary role of States in protecting citizens from mass violence but legitimizes international response in those instances where States cannot or will not offer that protection.¹⁰

The RtoP norm endorses “three pillars” of response, mostly preventative and focused on supporting the primary obligation of States to protect their own citizens from abuse. Through capacity-building within States, early warning systems, robust diplomacy, civilian-based capacities and “last resort” interventions, the international community is attempting to find the right formula that can respond to the “smoke” of mass atrocities before it evolves into fire, and also make it possible to respond rapidly and effectively to the “fire” without the need for costly and controversial military operations.

It seems clear that the illicit trade in conventional weapons and the ammunition that fuels them greatly complicate efforts to build State capacity and otherwise help governments fulfil their primary protective responsibilities with respect to their civilian populations. Fragile

¹⁰ There are many excellent sources of information about RtoP, including the websites of the International Coalition on the Responsibility to Protect (www.responsibilitytoprotect.org) and the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (www.r2pasiapacific.org).

States facing threats to their control from non-State actors with access to plentiful weapons will be hard pressed—even when protection is a stated priority—to provide security for their populations in ways that fully respect human rights and reduce rather than exacerbate the threat of mass atrocities. So long as illicit arms inflame conditions that are beyond full government control, internal conflicts with grave implications will continue to flare and any effort to protect civilians, whether atrocity crimes are present or not, will be severely compromised.

Moreover, across the board, the costs alone to fragile States from mass atrocity and other conflicts fuelled in part by illicit weapons are staggering: As reported in “Africa’s Missing Billions”, the continent loses around \$18 billion per year due to wars, civil wars and insurgencies.¹¹ On average, armed conflict shrinks an African nation’s economy by 15 per cent, and this is probably a conservative estimate. The real costs of armed violence to Africans could be much higher, perhaps even exceeding the value of aid received in the same period. Such costs, alongside the trauma of mass violence, are highly wasteful and damaging to vital human potential.¹²

Encouragingly, many of these same States have also affirmed that the protection of civilians from mass violence is part of our collective responsibility and have in key respects also affirmed the need for tools and capacities—including early warning mechanisms, more dialogue between the Security Council and countries contributing troops to peacekeeping operations, and more inter-agency engagement on mass atrocities—that can capably augment implementation of RtoP. While RtoP represents a limited frame of reference on civilian protection as it is focused solely on mass atrocities, both this norm and the general notion of international responsibility for the protection of civilians (once a controversial matter inside and outside of the peacekeeping community) are now accepted by virtually all States, including those taking part in the influential “C-34” Peacekeeping Group.

¹¹ <http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/africas-missing-billions-international-arms-flows-and-the-cost-of-conflict-123908>.

¹² Anna MacDonald of OXFAM made this reference in a speech “Development and Security” to the second ATT PrepCom, available at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/att/prepcom2/statements/3Mar_CAC.PDF.

Of course, not all of these States are rigorously drawing connections between the presence of large quantities of illicit arms and the increased likelihood of intra-State violence and even the commission of mass atrocities; nor are they always drawing connections between the ubiquitous presence of weapons and the preponderance of gender-based and school-based violence. But we believe these connections have great merit, and as such there is ample cause for civil society and government policymakers worldwide to both discuss and address linkages forthrightly. These are not issues that are likely to achieve rapid and sustainable consensus by diplomats and NGOs gathered around United Nations Headquarters. It is more likely that sustainable progress (and sufficient urgency for remedial action) will come from civil society engaging in careful dialogue about our protection responsibilities with academics, government officials, military leaders and other key stakeholders in their respective subregions.

Solutions to the Impacts of Illicit Weapons

Beyond the importance of sustained regional dialogue, what are some of the other solutions to the many-faceted and highly problematic impacts of illicit weapons? Surely they do not involve throwing more random weapons at more governments. While States have a United Nations Charter-recognized right to legitimate self-defence, the proviso is that such defence must take place at the lowest possible levels of armament. Moreover, extending the military capabilities of fragile States that are already awash in illegal weapons is a dubious proposition at best. As “Africa’s Missing Billions” notes, “many African governments actually feel let down by the international community. They know that the arms trade is globalised, and that national or regional regulations, although absolutely vital, are not enough”.¹³ More collaborative engagement on implementation is needed if all governments are able to participate fully and confidently in the challenges of minimizing the spread of illicit weapons and their impacts.

There is only so much that governments facing limited revenues and well-organized criminal or insurgent elements can do alone to stem the flow of illicit arms. As international civil society insists that States do

¹³ <http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/africas-missing-billions-international-arms-flows-and-the-cost-of-conflict-123908>.

more to protect civilian populations, including and especially from mass atrocities, it must collectively take more responsibility as well. There are many things that governments, civil society organizations and other stakeholders can do more of together:

- Explore local and regional linkages between the presence of illicit arms and the threat of mass violence or severe abuses of human rights.
- Call attention to and address the linkages between legal arms sales diverted to non-State actors and criminal elements, and the commission of human rights abuses, the suppression of access to jobs and services, and the chilling impacts of a compromised security sector on women’s participation in political and social life.
- Assist States, especially fragile States, to guarantee the security of existing weapons stockpiles (or remove them altogether), and help ensure marking, tracing and record keeping of arms that is cost-effective and sufficiently interactive with the highest international standards in this area.
- Restrict the illicit flow (including diversion) of ammunition without which small arms have no viable lethal function. As the Secretary-General noted in 2008, “In contexts of sustained use, such as conflict situations, ammunition stockpiles are rapidly depleted, contrasting with the relative longevity of arms. Preventing their resupply in situations conflicting with the rule of law should be a matter of prime concern.”¹⁴
- Assist States in promoting citizen disarmament, especially in post-conflict situations or where the propensity of unregulated, unlicensed weapons threatens education, participation, health and related options within communities.
- Assist States in implementing important responsibilities stemming from the illicit arms trade—including providing victims’ assistance and “flagging” potentially diverted transfers.

¹⁴ The Secretary-General’s report can be accessed through the IANSA site: <http://iansa.org/system/files/UNSG%20small%20arms%20report%202008.pdf>.

Concluding Remarks

As civil society seeks a greater role in curbing illicit arms, ending diverted transfers, and addressing the many levels of violence that so often accompany such arms, there are many resources that can be consulted to guide policy and action. A number of these resources have been provided by the United Nations itself, including the recently revised *Disarmament: A Basic Guide*¹⁵ which contains links to many civil society organizations around the world to help citizens stay informed and get involved.

Ambassador Moritan of Argentina, former president of the Arms Trade Treaty negotiating conference, is one of many voices calling on all of us—including civil society—to contribute more tangibly to international and regional peace, security and stability. This can be done in part through efforts at local and regional levels to encourage and support States seeking to curb the spread of illicit small arms and prevent diverted transfers of conventional weapons. Such efforts can do much to help alleviate the human suffering, serious violations of human rights and breaches of international humanitarian law that these weapons too often make possible.

As we move from concern to practice, voices from impacted communities can also be a source of inspiration and insight. Citizens who have been threatened by insurgents, intimidated by unregulated weapons, or abused by government and non-government agents have demonstrated with their lives the urgent need to see the linkages between the elimination of illicit weapons and diverted arms transfers, and the prevention of mass violence. We can learn much from these communities, specifically their persistent commitment to peaceful change, their engagement of a broad range of interrelated security concerns, and their willingness to engage whatever insights and capacities are needed to create a more predictable, fair and transparent security sector in which weapons are used by appropriate authorities in an appropriate manner.

Clearly there are many tangible benefits that can accrue to a world no longer awash in illicit weapons. It is past time to do all that we can in all global regions to help make that world possible.

¹⁵ Gillis, Melissa. *Disarmament: A Basic Guide*. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2012. Available online at: http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/AdhocPublications/PDF/Basic_Guide-2011-web.pdf.

The Role of Non-Nuclear Weapon States to Advance the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons

*Rhianna Tyson Kreger**

Introduction

It is often bemoaned that the role of non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) in creating a world without nuclear weapons is limited, as the onus to disarm seems to rely almost exclusively on the nuclear “haves”—the five recognized nuclear-weapon States (NWS) that hold permanent seats on the Security Council. A similar responsibility exists for States that have publicly declared their possession of nuclear weapons including India and Pakistan as well as other States that do not adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) such as Israel and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Yet the elimination of nuclear weapons is a process, not an occurrence, and as such it will require the participation of all States, large and small, including those under a nuclear umbrella and those without such alliances. This process is not only cooperative, but it is multifaceted, requiring collaboration not just among national governments, but also with international institutions, legal and technical experts, legislators and other relevant civil society actors to construct a strong, effective, global security regime.

There are many steps that non-nuclear-weapon States (including relevant civil society) can take to concretely advance nuclear disarmament, including measures that serve to reduce any perceived legitimacy of nuclear weapons, such as establishing or strengthening nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZs) and ensuring the strict application of international humanitarian law (IHL) to nuclear weapon policies. Such States can also advance the process towards abolition considerably through developing other long-standing proposals, such as those to multilateralize the fuel cycle.

Nonetheless, due to the complex and interconnected nature of nuclear weapons security policies and structures, non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) cannot merely through their own disarmament and non-proliferation activities bring about the goal of a world without

* The author is grateful to Michael Dolmatch for his research assistance in the preparation of this article.

nuclear weapons. Therefore, after exploring in greater depth some of the useful measures that these States can take (including a call to action at the beginning of each subsection), this chapter will propose general recommendation for all States, nuclear or not, to help facilitate the collaborative work of identifying and building the architecture to support a nuclear weapons-free world.

Multilateralize the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

- *Advance proposals for the nuclear fuel cycle, such as through convening regional and subregional forums involving political, legal, economic and technical experts*

Ever since the dawn of the atomic age—and with it concerns over the easily blurred line between civilian and military uses for atomic energy—proposals for internationalizing the nuclear fuel cycle (from mining and milling to storage and waste disposal) have been debated. Only by placing civil nuclear activities—all or in part—under cooperative control and direction can countries have confidence that others are not developing nuclear weapons under the alleged auspices of a “civilian” programme. These early proposals, like the 1946 Baruch Plan and United States President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” plan, led to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

India’s nuclear test explosion in 1974, buttressed also by the oil crisis of the mid-1970s, reinvigorated a global debate on the need to place nuclear activities under multilateral control. Over the next 10 years, various regional and international initiatives were studied, but eventually were stymied and put to rest due essentially to a lack of trust among governments and/or a lack of political will.¹

Near the turn of the century, international concerns regarding the nuclear programmes of, inter alia, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran, renewed latent interest in proposals to multilateralize the fuel cycle. Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei, then Director General of the IAEA, convened an Expert Group to conduct a study of best options. The final report of the Expert Group, issued in 2005, recommended a variety of “multilateral nuclear approaches” that

¹ “Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report to the Director-General of the IAEA”, 2005, pp. 29-32: http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/mna-2005_web.pdf.

could be pursued, such as fuel leasing and “take-back offers”, commercial fuel banks, establishing the IAEA as a “guarantor of service supplies”, constructing new facilities for joint or regional ownership, and others.²

The report of the Expert Group recognized that:

Past initiatives for multilateral nuclear cooperation did not result in any tangible results. Proliferation concerns were perceived as not being serious enough. Economic incentives were seldom strong enough.

Concerns about assurances of supply were paramount. National pride also played a role, alongside expectations about the technological and economic spin-offs to be derived from nuclear activities. (IAEA, 2005: 13)

I would argue that in addition to “concerns about assurances” and “national pride”, both of which certainly apply at present, the failure to advance multilateral approaches to nuclear cooperation at the current time is also in part due to many NNWS’s frustration with the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament. If the NPT is a two-sided coin, as we are oft to call it, wherein NNWS are promised nuclear disarmament in exchange for their pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons, NNWS feel that the nuclear-weapon States are not sufficiently living up to their proverbial end of the bargain. The concern is that stricter controls on the fuel cycle might strengthen the non-proliferation side of the coin but without doing anything to advance the disarmament side.

However, we must remind ourselves that the abolition of nuclear weapons is a holistic process, not a game played with a two-dimensional coin with a zero-sum outcome. A world without nuclear weapons will necessarily require a variety of internationally participatory agencies and mechanisms that will ensure against the re-emergence of nuclear weapons. The approaches that are pursued today to multilateralize the fuel cycle will lay the groundwork, if not the actual foundation, for cooperative processes and structures that the new nuclear weapon-free world will require.

There are a multitude of political, economic and technical challenges to effective approaches to multinationalizing the nuclear fuel cycle. We recommend that non-nuclear-weapon States take more of a leadership

² Ibid, p. 15.

role to address these challenges and advance these proposals, and thus make a significant contribution to global security, regional influence and even national prosperity. Moreover, such leadership today demonstrates that NNWS can be leaders for generations to come of a world that has fully eliminated the scourge of nuclear weapons.

Strengthen and Establish Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones

- *Advance talks on creating a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East, such as by identifying and promoting technical, legal and political confidence-building measures towards that end, including verification*

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) have contributed enormously to the delegitimization of nuclear weapons. Established through treaties freely arrived at by all participating countries, a majority of the globe, including the entire Southern Hemisphere, is essentially nuclear weapon-free³ as a collective result of the Antarctica Treaty (1959), the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967) for Latin America, the Treaty of Rarotonga (1985) for the South Pacific, the Treaty of Pelindaba (1996) for Africa, the Treaty of Semipalatinsk (2006) for Central Asia and Mongolia's self-declared NWFZ status (2000).⁴

Various proposals for new zones have emerged, including proposed zones in Northeast Asia,⁵ the Arctic and Central Europe. But perhaps the most widely coveted proposed zone is in the Middle East. Scores

³ A NWFZ is defined as “a specified region in which countries commit themselves not to manufacture, acquire, test, or possess nuclear weapons”. Moreover, NWFZ treaties usually include a protocol against other States from transporting or testing nuclear weapons in or through their territories. For more basic information on NWFZs, see “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) At A Glance” from the Arms Control Association: <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nwzf>.

⁴ “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones Tutorial”, Nuclear Threat Initiative and the James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute for International Studies. Updated December 2009, chapters 5-6: http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/nwzfztutorial/chapter05_06.html.

⁵ A Model Northeast Asia NWFZ has been widely discussed in the parliaments of Japan and South Korea. In 2010, a joint declaration supporting the proposal was signed by a cross-party representation of MPs from Japan and South Korea. For the text of the model NE Asian NWFZ, see: <http://www.gsinststitute.org/pnnd/docs/NEA-NWFZ.pdf>. For the joint declaration, see: http://www.gsinststitute.org/pnnd/docs/02_28_10_Japan-ROK_Statement.pdf.

of General Assembly resolutions supporting a Middle East zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD)⁶ have been adopted. It can be argued that the fate of the NPT itself hinges in large part on the establishment of a Middle East zone; the 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT was agreed upon only after the negotiation and adoption of the Resolution on the Middle East (NPT/CONF.1995/32 [Part I], Annex) which sought to “ensure the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems”. The Middle East was also a central focus of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, where conference consensus included a decision to “Renew [States parties’] resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at [the Middle East zone’s] prompt implementation”. (NPT/CONF.2010/50 [Vol. I])

Clearly, the creation of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East would be a tremendous contribution to the regional and global security regime. Here again, as with global abolition, the *process* of eliminating the weapons from the Middle East is just as—if not more—significant than the end goal of the absence of those weapon systems. The cause of insecurity in the Middle East is not the presence of weapons *per se*. Simply eliminating the weapons would not ease hostilities, bolster trade, enhance cross-cultural understanding or displace mistrust and fear between Arabs, Iranians and Israelis. Indeed, the agreement to initiate a process that leads towards a WMD-free zone would necessarily require cross-regional discussion and establishment of and participation in a

⁶ Typically, the First Committee of the General Assembly adopts two resolutions pertaining to the Middle East, one which is adopted by consensus (A/RES/65/42) and one which undergoes a fractious, line-by-line voting process, with Israel, the United States and several Pacific countries voting against, and others such as Canada and Australia abstaining (A/RES/65/44). For country-by-country voting results on the 2010 versions of the resolution, as well as the resolution text and explanation of votes by States, see: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com10/resolutions.html>.

The goal of a NWFZ in the Middle East has become linked with a broader WMD-free zone, not least because of the past stockpiling and use of WMDs by States in the region, which has the greatest concentration of States that are not party to one or more of the international conventions prohibiting WMDs. See: Datan, Merav, “Nuclear futures for the Middle East: Impact on the goal of a WMD-free zone”, *Disarmament Forum*, No. 2, 2008: http://unidir.org/bdd/fiche-article.php?ref_article=2728.

multitude of confidence-building measures including, but not limited to, the technical, scientific, legal and political verification tools that would ensure the zone's enforcement. These cooperative endeavours can be initiated, led and sustained by NNWS, and would not only build trust among neighbours in a hostile region but could also prove to be a model for a weapons of mass destruction-free planet.

Advance and Strengthen International Humanitarian Law (IHL)

- *Engage national legislators in a dialogue on ways to strengthen the applicability of international humanitarian law to nuclear weapons policies*

The success of past campaigns focused on abolishing a particular class of weapon is due in large part to the emphasis and acceptance of the weapon's incompatibility with IHL. Landmines, cluster munitions, biological and chemical weapons come immediately to mind, though this is not to disregard other weapons such as "dum-dum" or expanding bullets.⁷ While the international community might not yet have succeeded in eliminating every single prohibited weapon from the planet, or even guaranteeing that these weapons will never be deployed in warfare, the acceptance of certain weapons' incompatibility with IHL has contributed to exceptionally strong norms against their use, or even threat of use. Who, for instance, could now imagine a country using or threatening to use weaponized plague germs against a rival?

The efficacy of applying IHL in delegitimizing weapons is leading an increasing number of abolition advocates, including those within governments, to strengthen the application of IHL to nuclear weapons policies. This has been debated since the 1996 International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling, which stated that the use of a nuclear weapon is "generally ... contrary to the principles and rules of international

⁷ The 1899 Hague Convention prohibition against the use of expanding bullets, also known as "dum-dum" or "soft-tipped" bullets, built on the prohibition established by the 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg, which banned the use of exploding projectiles of less than 400 grams in international warfare. In 2010, the Rome Statute Review Conference in Kampala adopted an amendment to Article 8, which defined the use of expanding bullets in any armed conflict as a war crime.

humanitarian law”.⁸ In 2010, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) declared:

*Nuclear weapons are unique in their destructive power, in the unspeakable human suffering they cause, in the impossibility of controlling their effects in space and time, in the risks of escalation they create, and in the threat they pose to the environment, to future generations, and indeed to the survival of humanity. The ICRC therefore appeals today to all States to ensure that such weapons are never used again, regardless of their views on the legality of such use.*⁹

The ICRC’s humanitarian call “to bring the era of nuclear weapons to an end” is a significant position for the world’s foremost, neutral, non-governmental organization to take, and it undoubtedly contributed to the 2010 NPT Review Conference’s (RevCon) acknowledgment of IHL as an important factor in its work. In its consensus-based Final Document, the NPT RevCon “expresses its deep concern at the catastrophic consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and reaffirms the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law” (NPT/CONF.2010/50 [Vol. I]:19).

Legal and political experts continue to build on the momentum generated from the ICRC position and subsequent NPT consensus documents.¹⁰ These efforts should be embraced, promoted and amplified

⁸ “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons”, Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice, 1996: <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=e1&p3=4&case=95>.

⁹ “Bringing the era of nuclear weapons to an end”, Statement by Jakob Kellenberger, President of the ICRC, to the Geneva Diplomatic Corps, Geneva, 20 April 2010: <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/nuclear-weapons-statement-200410.htm>.

¹⁰ See, for instance:

- Moxley, Charles J., Burroughs, John and Granoff, Jonathan, “Nuclear Weapons and Compliance with International Humanitarian Law and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty”, *Fordham International Law Journal*, No. 34, Winter, 2011: <http://www.gsinstitute.org/gsi/docs/IHL5.pdf>.
- “From Aspiration to Reality: Nuclear Disarmament after the NPT Review”, sponsored by the Middle Powers Initiative and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, held in Geneva, 14-15 September 2010: http://www.middlepowers.org/pubs/Geneva_2010.pdf.
- “Humanitarian Law Versus Nuclear Weapons”, report on the round table co-sponsored by the Global Security Institute, the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy and the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the

by all non-nuclear-weapon States serious about disarmament. While the technical aspects of abolition's verification mechanisms are worked out by specialists, the strengthening of IHL helps clarify the legal requirements of governments, thus contributing to the inevitable shift of debate from "whether" to get rid of nuclear weapons to "how". National and regional legislators are key players in this regard.

Withdraw Tactical Nuclear Weapons from Europe

- *Non-nuclear-weapon States, especially those in NATO, should discuss strategies for phasing out nuclear deterrence from the NATO Strategic Concept and to engage the support of NATO countries' legislators in this process*

Perhaps one of the most significant steps that these States can take to advance disarmament concretely and strengthen the non-proliferation regime is to help facilitate the removal of nuclear weapons from Europe, stationed there since 1954 and reauthorized within the NATO Strategic Concept review process.

Originally intended as one of the bulwarks against the threat of a Soviet invasion into Western Europe, there now remains an estimated 200-240 of the United States so-called "tactical" nuclear weapons deployed in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey, down 95 per cent from the cold war heyday. These welcomed reductions have included the complete removal of United States nuclear weapons from the United Kingdom and Greece, though it is believed that they could "probably be redeployed in case of a crisis".¹¹ There are mounting calls from politicians, experts and even military planners¹² for removing these "tactical" nukes—dubbed such due to their relatively modest range and their legacy "Cold War posture" of being intended for battlefield use.

United Nations, 25 October 2010: http://www.gsinstitute.org/mpi/archives/10_25_10.html.

- "Link Nuclear Weapons Convention to Humanitarian Law, MPI Panel Told", Middle Powers Initiative Event Report, 18 October 2010: www.middlepowers.org/archives/10_18_10.html.

¹¹ "The Last U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe", IKV Pax Christi fact sheet, 2010: <http://www.ikvpaxchristi.nl/news/admin/file.aspx?lid=1&id=3732>.

¹² Reif, Kingston and Lecavalier, Emma, "Parting words: Gates and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 14 July 2011: <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/parting-words-gates-and-tactical-nuclear-weapons-europe>.

Some legal experts have long argued against the legality of NATO's nuclear sharing policies, arguing that such policies not only violate the letter of the NPT (i.e. Articles I and II which prohibit the transfer or receiving of nuclear weapons to and by a non-nuclear-weapon State), but also asserting that subsequent Review Conference final documents further undermine the specious arguments asserting the legality of nuclear sharing.¹³

Political leaders in Europe are increasingly uneasy with these cold war relics. Most significantly, in 2010, the prime ministers of Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway called for the removal of all "US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe" which in their view "have lost all military importance", according to their joint statement.¹⁴

The question of withdrawal is now a key discussion point, including at the NATO Defense and Deterrence Posture Review during the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago. Proponents of maintaining the status quo insist that the presence of United States nuclear weapons in Europe remains an integral component of the Alliance's "glue", and a hedge against potential future threats from the east including possible resurgent hostilities with Russia. By contrast, strong leadership from the non-nuclear-weapon States in finally removing these weapons would have far-reaching implications for global security both within and beyond Europe. Their removal would demonstrate that NATO and other trans-Atlantic alliances depend far more on shared values, economies and environments than on antiquated and potentially genocidal weapon systems. Removal would constitute a confidence-building measure with Russia, perhaps acting as a harbinger of greater cooperation on other pressing and shared challenges of the twenty-first century, including but not limited to, greater progress on disarmament and non-proliferation.

¹³ See, for instance, "Visible Intent: NATO's Responsibility to Nuclear Disarmament", Middle Powers Initiative Briefing Paper, January 2008: http://www.middlepowers.org/pubs/NATO_brief_2008.pdf.

¹⁴ Mallet, Pascal, "Allied bid for Obama to remove US European nuclear stockpile", AFP, 19 February 2010: <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hKwgmbMz92w-InsAzjQo0EX-NS0w>.

Conclusion: Prepare for a World Without Nuclear Weapons

- *Commence a process of dialogue, among States and with input from civil society, to identify the cooperative political, technical, military, legal, legislative and other structures needed to create and sustain a world without nuclear weapons*

The existence of nuclear weapons, most agree, is a deeply serious problem. The risk of theft or use by accident or madness is too great to ignore. Their elimination, even their significant quantitative reduction, would constitute a giant leap forward in the security and safety of humanity and the planet on which we reside.

While nuclear weapons are an existential problem, they are also a symptom of an even deeper malady: mistrust and failure of cooperation between States. After all, governments are aware, to some degree, of the problem that the mere existence of these weapons poses, yet they continue to rely on nuclear weapons as a false source of security despite the unquestioned grave threat of theft, accident and/or proliferation.

The steps proposed above (and for which the NNWS can and must play a significant role) will make us safer because they would lead the world towards less reliance on weapons of mass destruction and point the way towards their total elimination. More importantly, however, the *process of taking these steps* will necessarily lead to our addressing the root source(s) of collective insecurity. Effective cooperation breeds trust, which in turn engenders deeper cooperation.

If we could miraculously snap our fingers and eliminate nuclear weapons tomorrow, we would obviously be safer. Terrorists couldn't steal one; a crazed computer hacker couldn't launch one. But the absence of these weapons would, of itself, do little or nothing to address the reason why some feel compelled to have them in the first place.

The task ahead, then, is to articulate the processes and to visualize the institutions and other structures which would actually make us secure. What would a secure world, one where nuclear weapons have no role, look like?

The steps discussed above engage States in some of those collective endeavours and lay the foundations for some of those institutions and processes: strong, legally binding assurances and mechanisms for accessing energy; political alliances built around shared values and

economies; regional exchanges of scientists, legislators and lawyers; and other strategies not touched upon here. What other cooperative political, technical, military, legal, cultural, legislative or civil structures would have to be in place in order for us to feel secure? And how can governments and the civil society within the NNWS maximize their impact as those structures take shape?

Clearly there are challenges and obstacles to imagining and planning such a world. This wary author sometimes wonders if such a process can develop any momentum any time soon. Yet construction of a nuclear weapon-free world can never begin in earnest if the blueprint towards its achievement is not clearly sketched out through a collaborative effort by States and civil society organizations.

This, then, is the task required now: carefully articulating the sources of security in a world without nuclear weapons, and the processes and structures needed to create and sustain these sources. Ironically, while such an undertaking is one of the easiest steps that can be embarked on as it requires no immediate political commitments, this planning process might prove in the end to be the most profound contribution that non-nuclear-weapon States—along with civil society—can make to the oftentimes stalemated field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Incorporating a Women, Peace and Security Lens into Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes and Priorities

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“If you were to come up with one single lesson that we should learn from DDR in both Sierra Leone and Liberia for future DDR processes, what would it be?”

“Ensure wide consultation, good planning, sound coordination and close cooperation amongst the various actors, as well as transparency throughout the programme, and ensure that it is adequately resourced and implemented in a flexible way that can adapt to conditions on the ground.” Conversation with Mr. Raisedon Zenega, Director of the Africa II Division, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), September 2010.

“The central objective of [Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration] is to support parties to a conflict to remove weapons from its political and economic discourse and promote the sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants, and those associated with the armed conflict, so as to make peace irreversible.”

UN DPKO²

Introduction

As one of its primary goals, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) initiatives seek the means by which disarmament can best assist in the healing and reconciliation of communities damaged by armed violence, and which can address “the security problems that arise during the transition from conflict to peace, when ex-combatants are left without livelihoods or support networks”.³ Through efforts to disarm parties to conflict and to provide combatants with a sustainable path back

¹ The author would like to thank Maria Luisa Ortega and Kristina Mader for their background research for this piece, and Deborah Accurso for her content advice.

² Quoted in “DDR in Peace Operations: A Retrospective”, http://unddr.org/docs/DDR_restrospective.PDF.

³ www.unifem.org/gender_issues/women_war_peace/disarmament_demobilization_reintegration.php.

to civilian life, DDR programmes represent an essential step in ensuring that conflict-affected communities are able to establish peaceful and secure futures.

UN-Women lays out basic stages (and some generally recognized key functions) of DDR:⁴

Disarmament—The collection, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons.

Demobilization—The formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups.

Reinsertion—The provision of basic necessities to ex-combatants in the short term, including food, clothes and shelter as well as training.

Reintegration—The long-term social and economic process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income.

As a normative framework for these stages and functions, the final phase of the aforementioned DPKO definition is particularly notable: “so as to make peace irreversible”. It is here that the ultimate challenge is posed to those who must reconcile the concrete work of DDR with the broader goals of peace agreements that set the scene for post-conflict reconciliation: the recognition that an “irreversible” peace promoted through DDR programmes must integrate the skills, needs, concerns and capacities of the entire population—and of women in particular—not just segments of that population.

As Anders Nilsson writes, “While other groups, ranging from refugees, to sex slaves, to high ranking officers, require attention in their own right regarding their own specific security concerns and needs, special attention needs to be paid to women and children, not because they are always passive victims, but because they are the ones who are most likely to become marginalized in post-war societies”.⁵ In other words, irreversible peace must be inclusive of skills and needs. While exclusivity in one form or another may help bring about short-term ceasefires, it will not bring true security, let alone a peace that is enduring.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Nilsson, Anders, *Reintegrating Ex-Combatants in Post-Conflict Societies*, SIDA, May 2005, p. 4.

This paper provides a women, peace and security lens on DDR programmes and initiatives, examining in brief how women's needs and concerns have been excluded from these programmes and then making policy recommendations for bridging this gap. Before beginning that discussion, it would be helpful to provide some examples of DDR processes that do not appear to have been sufficiently inclusive.

DDR: Cases of Limited Inclusion

One of the most instructive examples is the DDR process in **Liberia** as the country was coming out of conflict in 1996 and then again in 2003. The Security Council passed Resolution 1509 (2003), requiring that programmes be established focusing on the reintegration of ex-combatants, in particular women and children.⁶ Nevertheless, the programmes received criticism because of the limited inclusion of women and former combatants in either the planning or in the implementation stages of the programmes, as well as due to the lack of incorporation of lessons learned from past experiences.⁷ In addition, the perception among the local women was that any attempts on their part to become involved in the programmes were rejected because policies addressing women's needs also addressed children's issues as well, two groups which clearly have distinct needs and which the Liberian women were keen to keep separate.⁸ Thus, patterns of exclusion ensued which resulted in a massive underestimation of the number of people who would need to access DDR programmes, including thousands of excluded women.⁹ This exclusivity resulted in tension and outbreaks of violence and also disadvantaged thousands while the DDR programmes were under reassessment.

⁶ <http://unmil.org/documents/resolutions/reso1509.pdf>.

⁷ Amnesty International, "Liberia: A Flawed Post-War Process Discriminates against Women and Girls", 2008 <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR34/004/2008/en/c075ab0f-00cf-11dd-a9d5-b31ac3ea5bcc/af340042008eng.html#5.3.%20The%20DDRR%20process%20in%20Liberia|outline>.

⁸ Amnesty International, 2008.

⁹ Amnesty International, 2008. "By mid-December 2003 UNMIL estimated that between 45,000 and 60,000 combatants would participate in the DDR process. However, by December 2004, when UNMIL closed the last disarmament site, they had processed 103,019 individuals from LURD, MODEL and the GOL forces through the disarmament phase and 101,495 through the demobilization phase. Of those that went through the demobilization phase, only 22,370 were women, 8,532 boys, and 2,440 girls."

Another case is in **Sierra Leone**, where conflict ended in 2001 after an eleven-year civil war between the Government and the Revolution United Front (RUF).¹⁰ The conflict came to an end with the Abuja Protocols, which incorporated DDR initiatives, requiring the disarmament of the RUF combatants and their integration into the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF).¹¹ UN DPKO studies showed in 2002 that women combatants composed 6.5 per cent of the 75,000 mobilized combatants.¹² Yet women were blocked from receiving the benefits of DDR programmes because of their marital status (i.e. the requirement that husbands, who had often forced women to “marry” them, be present for women to receive benefits) or other structural barriers.¹³ This clearly set up a post-conflict scenario in which women were either forced to remain married to obtain DDR benefits, or forgo benefits to avoid a forced marriage. While access to DDR programmes and resources required combatants to have a weapon, such programmes only applied to men either because women were not preferred as weapon holders, or if they did have a weapon, they had to turn it over to male ex-combatants participating in the DDR programmes. In addition to the exclusion faced by the weapons requirement, women also had limited access to DDR programmes and resources because of the societal denial that women had even fought in combat.¹⁴

Likewise, in **El Salvador**, after a peace process which included women negotiators, the DDR process which was codified in 1992 in the Chapultepec Agreement¹⁵ failed to specifically provide for the women who comprised up to one third of the Frente Faribundo Liberacion Nacional guerrilla army. Also a well-documented case, this flawed process resulted in discrimination against these women as it did not

¹⁰ Sesay, Mohamed Gibril and Suma, Mohamed, *Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Sierra Leone*, International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009, p. 5: <http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Sierra-Leone-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf>.

¹¹ Sesay and Suma, pp. 11-12.

¹² Sesay and Suma, p. 13.

¹³ Sesay and Suma.

¹⁴ Sesay and Suma.

¹⁵ Center for International Cooperation and Security, *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Human Security in El Salvador*, July 2008, p. 3: <http://www.ddr-humansecurity.org.uk/images/DDR%20DESK%20REVIEW%20EL%20SALVADOR.pdf>.

contain specific provisions that allowed women to claim equal land rights as part of the reintegration process.¹⁶ Fortunately in this instance, mobilization by women's rights groups eventually redressed most of the ill effects of this exclusion.

For scholars, advocates and policymakers, these examples are often used in reports and activities illustrating DDR policies that are more directly and successfully responsive to women, as well as the potential dangers that can occur when DDR programmes exclude women. This article addresses DDR from a slightly different perspective, asking the question: what can we learn from gender, DDR and disarmament that can help us understand how a more inclusive approach to DDR can result in a more stable and more inclusively peaceful, post-conflict society?

DDR Intersections with other Policy Communities

Disarmament efforts regarding illicit **small arms and light weapons (SALW)**¹⁷ focus on the daily danger posed by the proliferation of such weapons. According to reports of the organization the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, over 740,000 people are killed every year by SALW, the majority of them not in situations defined as conflict or war.¹⁸ Disarmament efforts that focus on SALW point to the widely damaging impacts of handguns and other such conventional weapons, especially weapons in the hands of non-State actors and including weapons involved in domestic violence. SALW are both one of the leading causes of death in some regions and the main tool of war in most modern conflicts.¹⁹ As noted in the revised UNODA publication, *Disarmament: A Basic Guide*, the excessive accumulation of these weapons can aggravate political tensions and lead to more lethal, longer lasting violence.²⁰ In addition, as governments are sometimes

¹⁶ Conaway, C. and Martinez, S., "Adding Value: Women's Contributions to Reintegration and Reconstruction in El Salvador", in *Women Waging Peace*, 2004.

¹⁷ Defined in Gillis, Melissa, *Disarmament: A Basic Guide*, UNODA (2011) as: "small arms (weapons designed for individual use, such as revolvers, self-loading pistols, rifles and machine guns) and light weapons (weapons designed for use by two or three persons serving as a crew)", p. 57: http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/AdhocPublications/PDF/Basic_Guide-2011-web.pdf.

¹⁸ Geneva Declaration, *Global Burden of Armed Conflict*, 2008.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ *Disarmament: A Basic Guide*, p. 67.

painfully aware, the widespread presence of illicit weapons greatly increases the difficulties in implementing sustainable reintegration initiatives, including efforts to stabilize damaged security sectors.

Women and conflict is another key policy linkage that has a particular focus on women's often distinctive experiences of conflict. Work in this field analyses how women have often faced different types of violence during armed conflict, including sexual and gender-based violence and forced displacement, but also how they have simultaneously been excluded from the processes that seek to end these conflicts, even in situations where women were directly involved in the conflict. This agenda argues that specific focus in the areas of prevention of conflict, of women's participation in all aspects of peacemaking and peacebuilding, and of women's crucial role in conflict prevention, are all necessary to achieving a sustainable and comprehensive peace. The primary policy tools to create and maintain a gender lens on international peace and security have been United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, and its subsequent resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889 and 1960. Also important in this context is General Assembly resolution 65/69 focused on promoting women's participation in disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation efforts. These resolutions are directly relevant to DDR as they urge the United Nations and Member States to ensure security processes that are responsive to the specific concerns and rights of women.²¹

Women members of militias and women soldiers often face discrimination when seeking to access DDR resources, and thus are often blocked from gaining access to various financial and other incentives to disarm. Women participate directly as combatants or indirectly as backline supporting agents, more than those implementing DDR strategies expect, with the result that women are too often denied DDR benefits. Large numbers of women—"women associated with fighting forces" as they are often known—have often been forced into relationships with militia members that are characterized by rape and other coercive behaviour, resulting in both trauma and physical pain that require much more in the way of mental and physical health services.

²¹ For analysis of the success of such tools thus far see Butler et al. *Women, Peace and Security Handbook: Compilation and Analysis of United Nations Security Council Resolution Language* and Taylor and Mader, *Mapping Women, Peace and Security in the UN Security Council*.

In addition, women often have jobs in these militias that do not require weapons experience, experience which is often the “test” for receiving financial or other incentives to disarm. Writing for the Council on Foreign Relations, Stephanie Hanson notes, that women can also be reluctant to participate in traditional DDR programmes due to stigma, especially in situations when they return to communities having borne children during their absence.²²

Policy prescriptions for addressing these issues include creating sex-disaggregated data when looking at disarmament policies post-conflict, particularly regarding how small arms impact women and men differently; ensuring that women’s access to services and benefits are not dependent on the recommendation or affidavit of male relatives; and guaranteeing that women are eligible as direct beneficiaries of DDR services and programmes.

Lessons Learned

How then can we use the lessons of women, peace and security and DDR in combination with policies to address illicit small arms to better inform a practical approach to making communities sustainably safe after conflict? On a practical level, there are issue overlaps in all of these areas: the women, peace and security community shares numerous priorities with disarmament advocates, including efforts to prevent violence before it starts. And DDR, in a practical way, is informed by both of these agendas and their efforts to bring about a fundamental shift in thinking about how to create sustainable peace in post-conflict settings.

There is increasing recognition that women have a vital voice to share in peace policy and its implementation, but progress is uneven. As recently minted Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Leymah Gbowee said when discussing the DDR process in Liberia, women were not treated as experts on the issue of disarming their own communities, and were also excluded initially from decisions about how to disarm after

²² Stephanie Hanson, *Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Africa*, Council on Foreign Relations, February 2007, <http://www.cfr.org/africa/disarmament-demobilization-reintegration-ddr-africa/p12650>.

conflict.²³ We can draw from this a general recommendation that insists on **consultation**: there is certainly good practice to be drawn to support consultations with women as an integral part of establishing a wider and more carefully thought-out approach to DDR. If women are not included, what other groups are also being excluded? And what ramifications will that pattern of exclusion have on prospects for future peace?

There must also be recognition of the political reality of both disarmament efforts and DDR processes: **specifically that it takes considerable political will to be inclusive in processes that are so often about who gets to exercise power and who has access to resources in post-conflict rebuilding**. In addition, the flow of SALW in fragile post-conflict States fuels tendencies to violence and instability which are often driven by continuing tensions as former combatants struggle to find a path of future success that is not predicated on the intimidation of guns. Power vacuums, political tensions and lack of economic opportunities are inevitably exacerbated by inadequate disarmament processes.

Returning then to the examples cited at the beginning of this piece, what light do these stories shine on a more inclusive approach to DDR, particularly on disarmament practices, when we look through the so-called gender lens? How can we learn from a “women, peace and security” analysis and draw on the reinforcing agendas and practices of disarmament to frame DDR processes that are, in fact, more responsive to the end goal: creating and sustaining an “irreversible” peace?

The interlinking and reinforcing agendas of women, peace and security and disarmament should be informing efforts at comprehensive peacebuilding and reconstruction after conflict. However, concepts such as inclusivity and gender-sensitivity can sometimes seem out of touch with some of the harsher realities of a DDR process that is so often dictated by political considerations and characterized by high levels of tension in the field.

Utilizing disarmament as a lens, gives us a further way to strengthen the reintegration efforts that DDR is meant to promote. Taking examples of good practice from the broader objectives of disarmament—i.e.

²³ United Nations Development Fund For Women. (2005). Women Building Peace Through Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration—Beijing + 10 Review Conference, http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/Resources/UN/unifem_buildingpeaceDDR_2005.pdf.

security for individuals, creating communities that are safe from the dangers of illicit SALW—gives a conceptual umbrella in which DDR processes can effectively operate. We must keep in mind that the larger goals embodied in these efforts contribute to a more comprehensive and cohesive approach to peacebuilding and recovery.

Recommendations

This paper seeks to stimulate discussion by NGOs and other policymakers on the conditions for fair, inclusive and sustainable disarmament activities and DDR programmes, offering recommendations that are generic to DDR programmes, but also take into account the distinctive needs and skills of the women who have, in some cases, been systematically excluded from the benefits of such programmes. General and gender-specific recommendations for DDR programmes can be gleaned from the United Nations Integrated DDR Standards, from publications such as “Coming Home”²⁴ and from a growing array of other DDR resources. Among the most important from our standpoint are:

- DDR must be planned in an integrated manner which presumes a viable, inclusive reintegration plan before initiating disarmament and demobilization processes.
- Reintegration should be seen as an opportunity to develop entire communities, including local mechanisms for peacebuilding, sustainable livelihoods and the full integration of women’s skills and capacities. In particular, DDR policy should recognize the many family-related challenges faced by ex-combatants, including coping with conflict-related trauma, that can increase levels of family violence.²⁵
- The international community must do more to address stigma in local communities to which ex-female combatants, especially young girls who may be pregnant, seek to return.
- More abundant and accessible services should be available to counteract the trauma that many women (and men) face in situations of armed conflict, but especially geared to those who were forced

²⁴ Gillhespy, Tom and Hayman, Carolyn, “Coming Home”, Peace Direct 2011.

²⁵ “Written Statement submitted to CEDAW on the occasion of the General Discussion on Women in Conflict and Post-conflict Situations.”

into participation and/or suffered sexual or other abuse while present in conflict zones.

- More policy attention must be given to the complications that illicit small arms add to the process of post-conflict reconstruction as well as the need for more direct participation by women in the policies and activities associated with all phases of disarmament, but especially post-conflict, civilian disarmament.
- The international community must commit to regular consultation with women and underrepresented groups, ensuring that the skills, capacities and wisdom of women and others are fully integrated in any efforts to disarm and reintegrate in post-conflict settings.
- Finally, we recommend a more holistic focus that goes beyond female combatants to look at women who assumed positions of community leadership in the absence of men otherwise involved in conflict zones, women who too often are expected to “give way” to men seeking restoration of their places in their communities of origin.

Concluding Remarks

As the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) and others have pointed out, “A culture of militarism intimidates women from asserting their collective and individual rights,²⁶ including the right to vote and participate in political decision-making”. The exclusion of women from DDR processes and related disarmament efforts is one key indicator that peace and reconstruction programmes are failing to meet their goal. But this is not a goal that is set out merely for the sake of having one, or to meet the political needs of government bureaucrats. The goal of a peace that is fundamental and experienced by all community members is both compelling and realistic—an irreversible peace that is available to and can be enabled by all.

²⁶ From Mairin Iwanka Raya, “Indigenous women stand against violence”, FIMI, 2006.

Encouraging Government Efforts to Increase Participation of Women in Disarmament Policy, Education and Advocacy

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Women Engaged in Action on "1325"

According to estimates from Amnesty International, 250,000 people are killed each year in situations of armed conflict and another 490,000 from firearms in non-armed conflict situations.¹ SIPRI reports that the world's annual military spending in 2008 was roughly US \$1.5 trillion. At the same time, the world would require as little as US \$19 billion a year to eliminate starvation and malnutrition.²

Although women are not the principal casualties from armed violence, the Women's Network of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) has reported that 30,000 women are killed by guns annually.³ Furthermore, when men die from armed violence, women bear the brunt of the emotional and socioeconomic consequences. In addition, women are particularly at risk of certain types of criminality because of arms proliferation and because of their sex—crimes of violence in the home and on the streets.⁴ Every year millions of women are traumatized, intimidated, enslaved, robbed and raped, often at gunpoint.

But women are not just passive victims of armed violence. They also participate in violence at times, either directly or by providing indirect assistance to combatants. And, of greatest importance here, they are also survivors, agents of change and builders. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (SCR 1325), adopted in October 2000, recognizes this reality. The resolution specifically addresses the impact of war on women, and women's contributions to conflict prevention,

¹ Amnesty International: *Killer Facts: The Impact of Irresponsible Arms Trade on Lives, Rights and Livelihoods*. Retrieved 1 October 2011 from AI: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT30/005/2010/en/61adda81-047e-4650-874c-5e26df288164/act300052010en.pdf>.

² Castro, L. N. and Nario-Galace, J. (2010). *Peace Education: A Pathway to a Culture of Peace*. QC: Center for Peace Education.

³ *Survivor: Women Affected by Gun Violence Speak Out* (n.d.). IANSA Women's Network.

⁴ *Ibid.*

conflict resolution and peacebuilding. It is a platform to ensure women's participation in decision-making at all levels on peace and security issues. Hence, it is a concrete platform for work towards a fully disarmed world.

Likewise, General Assembly resolution 65/69 (8 December 2010) specifically underlines the need for the effective participation and representation of women in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control at the local, national, regional and subregional levels.

Women's role in disarmament efforts can be traced back almost a century. The International Women's Congress in The Hague on 28 April 1915 saw the gathering of women from 12 countries lobbying for the peaceful end of the First World War. This event led to the establishment of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), an international organization of women peace advocates.⁵ Emily Balch, founder of WILPF, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1946 for her important work.

In the 1950s, the appalling aftermath of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings intensified global calls for nuclear disarmament.⁶ Although peace and environmental organizations are at the forefront of most anti-nuclear campaigns, governments have also started reviewing existing policies and have pursued multilateral discussions to address nuclear disarmament.⁷ A growing roster of female political leaders also joined nuclear discussions with some like Indira Gandhi showing visible support for international disarmament campaigns.⁸

More recently, government efforts on disarmament have expanded to include other weaponry such as anti-personnel landmines, cluster munitions and conventional arms, specifically small arms and light weapons.

⁵ Reaching Critical Will. Women Disarmament Movements: Evolution and Continuity. Women International League for Peace and Freedom. Retrieved 16 September 2011 from <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/social/genderdisarm/womenanddisarm.html>.

⁶ Wittner, L. (2009). *Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of the Nuclear Disarmament Movement*. Stanford University Press: California.

⁷ Bunn, G. (2003). *The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems*. Arms Control Association. Retrieved 24 September 2011 from http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/Bunn#topofpage.

⁸ Aiyar, M. (2008). *Towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free and Non-violent World Order*. Global Security Institute. Retrieved 28 September 2011 from http://www.gsinstitute.org/pnnd/pubs/AIYAR_RajivGandhi.pdf.

governments have also broadened their scope of work linking policymaking to new forms of disarmament education⁹ in which women have increasingly been active participants.

Women and Disarmament Policy

The participation of women in political life and policy development has slowly started to affect the disarmament landscape. In a 2010 study of the implementation of SCR 1325 in 11 countries across regions initiated by the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders, rates of women's participation in parliaments stood at 29.6 per cent.¹⁰ However, the participation of these women in policymaking in regard to disarmament policies and activities is difficult to establish, and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the Inter-Parliamentary Union have maintained that women remain largely excluded from security-related policymaking.¹¹ Even some governments that have initiated laudable arms control initiatives, such as the Force and Arms Management programme of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,¹² failed to integrate a commitment to women's full participation.

At the same time, document reviews and interviews conducted indicate that women's participation in policy development related to disarmament is finally taking root. The Philippines, for example, has seen women appointed to tasks concerning arms control and small arms proliferation. In the Office of the Special Envoy on Transnational Crimes, women are in charge of programmes on small arms and nuclear weapons issues and for developing policies for consideration by other pertinent departments of the government.¹³

In the United States, Ellen O'Kaine Tauscher is the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs.¹⁴ Previously,

⁹ Wittner, L. (2009). *Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of the Nuclear Disarmament Movement*. Stanford University Press: California.

¹⁰ *Women Count: SCR 1325 Civil Society Monitoring Report* (2010). Global Network of Women Peacebuilders.

¹¹ *Missing Pieces: A Guide for Reducing Gun Violence through Parliamentary Action* (2007). Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and Inter-Parliamentary Union.

¹² Hermoso, D. (October 2011). Email interview.

¹³ Gorospe, P. (September 2011). Personal Interview.

¹⁴ United States of America Department of States: Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security. Retrieved 13 September 2011 from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/125660.htm>

Ms. Tauscher was the first female to lead the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.¹⁵ At the same time, the United States negotiating team for the new Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty (START) with Russia is headed by Rose Gottemoeller who also serves as Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance.¹⁶ In June 2008, Susan F. Burk became the Special Representative of the United States President for nuclear non-proliferation. Furthermore, Ambassador Laura Kennedy serves as United States representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

In addition to Laura Kennedy, there are several other women ambassadors to the Conference on Disarmament such as Dell Higginson of New Zealand, Joanne Anderson of the United Kingdom, Alicia Victoria Arango Olmos of Colombia, Sujata Mehta of India and Elissa Golberg of Canada.

New Zealand's Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control (PACDAC) currently has three female representatives out of eight members.¹⁷ The Committee advises the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade on aspects of disarmament and arms control matters.

Parliamentarians concerned about disarmament have also organized themselves in support of this cause. Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (PNND) was established in 2000 to serve as a network strengthening nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in local, regional and international policymaking.¹⁸ Currently, PNND has a good number of female legislator members from different countries who have taken on the issue of disarmament as part of their legislative agendas.

The group Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA) has also urged disarmament for over 30 years, and has played a role in the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as well as the Chemical Weapons Convention. PGA's Peace and Democracy Programme has been actively

¹⁵ United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Retrieved 8 September 2011 from <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/aboutacd/mission.htm>.

¹⁶ United States of America Department of States: Rose Gottemoeller. Retrieved 13 September 2011 from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/121630.htm>.

¹⁷ Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control (PACDAC). Retrieved 12 September 2011 from <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/1-Global-Issues/Disarmament/0--PACDAC/index.php>.

¹⁸ Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Retrieved 15 September 2011 from <http://www.gsinsitute.org/pnnd/about.html>.

advocating for a robust Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) as far back as 2006 when PGA held a workshop on small arms and a proposed Arms Trade Treaty in the House of Representatives of the Philippines. Currently, PGA is women-led: Dr. Ruth Wijdenbosch, Deputy Speaker of the Suriname Parliament, is Acting President and Ms. Shazia Z. Rafi is Secretary-General.¹⁹

Internationally, women's involvement in bilateral and multilateral negotiations on disarmament is also increasing. In March 2012, the United Nations Secretary-General announced that Ms. Angela Kane had been appointed to serve as United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs. In March 2012, the fourth Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects was chaired by Ambassador Joy Ogwu of Nigeria.

At the United Nations Preparatory Committee towards an Arms Trade Treaty in July 2011, there were 116 women out of a total of 523 participants (22%). Estonia, Monaco, Saint Kitts and Nevis had all-women delegations. Jamaica and Luxembourg had 75 per cent women delegates, Guyana, Slovakia, Slovenia and Trinidad and Tobago had 67 per cent while half of the participants from Barbados, Finland, Grenada, Guatemala, Mali, Mongolia, New Zealand, Serbia, Uruguay and Vanuatu were women.²⁰

Also worthy of note is the need expressed by some governments to integrate gender-specific language in international agreements. In Preparatory Committee meetings on the ATT, this need was raised by some countries including Australia, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Norway, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago and the United Kingdom. Because of the hard work of some States and with support from civil society organizations, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which entered into force in 2010, included language on the importance of SCR 1325 in its preamble.²¹

With encouragement from the United Nations, governments have established agencies and ministries specializing in gender equality and

¹⁹ Parliamentarians for Global Action. Retrieved 3 October 2011 from PGA: http://www.pgaction.org/Legislators_and_ATT.html.

²⁰ Nario-Galace, J. *Women's Participation at the ATT PrepCom*, Arms Trade Treaty Monitor 14 July 2011 | Vol. 3, No. 4.

²¹ Arms Trade Treaty Monitor: The ATT, Women and gender. Retrieved 3 October 2011: <http://attmonitor.posterous.com/the-att-women-and-gender>.

women's empowerment. These agencies play a vital role in mainstreaming gender in government policy and providing necessary skills training for female government officials, thereby improving their chances of appointment to senior positions. It is important to note that the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) was the first United Nations department to have a gender action plan. Furthermore, UNODA developed Briefing Notes on SCR 1325 National Action Plans (NAPs) that provide helpful information to assess governments' practical concerns about arms proliferation and their effects on women. Inclusion of disarmament language in NAPs is laudable such as the stricter enforcement of policies regulating the possession of small arms, as seen in the case of the Philippines.²² NAPs are also fertile sources of information for assessing women's participation in disarmament plans and policies. In some NAP provisions, women are identified as full actors in disarmament initiatives. Other NAPs have included a gender component, but have focused more on addressing women's needs and not on promoting women's participation to both improve policy and mitigate victimization.

Some NAPs do not categorically include women's role in disarmament efforts but outline their full participation and equal footing with men at all levels and in all mechanisms and institutions for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, as is the case with Sweden's NAP.²³

Women and Disarmament Education

Disarmament and non-proliferation education had its beginnings after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at a time when the cold war-inspired arms race evolved as a reaction to the threat of nuclear weapons.²⁴ In later years, disarmament education was expanded to cover other weaponry such as biological, chemical and conventional weapons. This volume attests to the ways in which disarmament education continues to expand and deepen its linkages.

Many States are known to provide financial assistance for disarmament education. For example, Japan regularly provides financial support to the

²² Hermoso, D. (October 2011). Email interview.

²³ Sweden's NAP can be found at: http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/NationalActionPlans/swedish_nationalactionplan_october2006.pdf.

²⁴ Castro, L. N. and Nario-Galace, J. (2010). *Peace Education: A Pathway to a Culture of Peace*. QC: Center for Peace Education.

United Nations Program of Fellowships on Disarmament (UNFD).²⁵ The Programme aims at the training of national officials of Member States, particularly those of the developing countries, to enable them to participate more effectively in international deliberating and negotiating fora related to disarmament and arms control. UNFD was launched by the General Assembly in 1978.²⁶ In 2010, 14 of 25 (or 56%) participants were women. Participants are nominated by United Nations Member States and are selected by the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs.

Although there are still many countries that have not established disarmament education priorities, discussions and concrete activities are taking place in many national institutions. For instance, seminars and training on disarmament are being sponsored by Foreign Affairs ministries in countries like Bolivia, Mexico and Spain.²⁷ Poland does not have specific, disarmament-focused modules, but its Ministry on National Education ensures that educational materials do not promote war and related violence.²⁸ Some countries have disarmament education programmes that have explicitly involved women in their conceptualization. In Niger, widows and women's organizations were included on a working committee to plan and implement national peace and disarmament programmes. The working committee also included ex-combatants, police and community leaders.²⁹

In some cultures, disarmament education is a facet of peace education, which is more holistic and multidimensional in its content and processes. In the 11 countries covered by a study initiated by GNWP, 6 of 11 (Afghanistan, Burundi, Canada, Netherlands, Philippines and Sierra Leone) integrate peace

²⁵ Japan's Efforts in Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 25 September 2011 from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/npt/session3-6.pdf>.

²⁶ Domingo, G. (September 2011). Email interview.

²⁷ Ibarra, I. and Bello, M. (2008). Education and Disarmament and Nonproliferation in Latin America, What has been done and what is Left to do. Available at: <http://npsglobal.org/eng/component/content/article/147-articles/644-education-in-disarmament-and-nonproliferation-in-latin-america-what-has-been-done-and-what-is-left-to-do.html>.

²⁸ University of Maryland. (2002). Global Guide to Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education. Retrieved 26 September 2011 from http://www.bsos.umd.edu/pgsd/Global_Guide/Global_Guide.pdf.

²⁹ Hague Appeal for Peace. (2008). Peace and Disarmament Education: Changing Mindsets to Reduce Violence and Sustain Removal of Small Arms. Laurel Marx: New York.

education in formal and informal sectors. In the Philippines, there is an existing executive order (EO570) mandating all public schools and tertiary teacher education programmes to integrate peace education in the curriculum. Japan, Finland and New Zealand have significantly contributed to disarmament and peace education by distributing resource materials, holding international conferences on disarmament issues and providing technical assistance.³⁰ In these and other countries, women are at the forefront of teaching peace and are deeply involved in challenging war as an institution.

Disarmament Advocacy

Campaigns by civil society have resulted in the enactment of disarmament and arms control policies and programmes. A public rally against gun violence in 2000 by a thousand women in South Africa, for example, resulted in the adoption of the country's Firearms Control Act.³¹ Lobbying for gun-free elections led by women-members of the Philippine Action Network to Control Arms helped bring about a declaration of gun-free elections in 2010. Equally important, the number of casualties from election violence in the Philippines dropped from 276 in 2007 to 156 in 2010.³² Paraguay also has included women's organizations as part of their national working group on small arms control policies.³³

Government support for disarmament advocacy can also be seen in funding assistance given to different women's organizations and movements that work on these issues. Canada has provided funding assistance to the Reaching Critical Will project of WILPF for its ongoing activities of

³⁰ University of Maryland. (2002). Global Guide to Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education. Retrieved 26 September 2011 from http://www.bsos.umd.edu/pgsd/Global_Guide/Global_Guide.pdf.

³¹ International Alert: Protection of Civilians: Gender Considerations for Disarmament, Conflict Transformation and the Establishment of Human Security. Retrieved 7 September 2011 from www.gaps-uk.org/docs/ia_protection_of_civilians.doc.

³² For a discussion of recent election violence in the Philippines, see <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/philippines/091123/political-violence-dynasties> and <http://aceproject.org/regions-en/countries-and-territories/PH/case-studies/philippines-understanding-the-election-related>.

³³ United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms. (2006). Mainstreaming gender for the effective implementation of the United Nations PoA. Retrieved 22 September 2011 from <http://www.poa-iss.org/kit/A-Conf192-2006-RC-CRP3-Gender.pdf>.

monitoring and advocacy for disarmament and military spending cuts.³⁴ Japan has provided financial and technical assistance to disarmament programmes of countries such as Afghanistan, Burundi and Liberia that prioritize the protection of women and children.³⁵ IANSA's Women's Network focuses on the connection between gender, women's rights, small arms and armed violence. Since 2006 this project has been supported by the Government of Norway.

More creative ways are now being explored by governments to increase women's participation in peacebuilding, which often embraces practical concerns for community disarmament. A pioneering endeavour started by the Government of India involved sending an all-female peacekeeping contingent to conflict-affected countries.³⁶ This project aims to promote empowerment in areas where sexual violence is rampant by providing counselling and providing a reassuring female presence. Women are often skilled communicators and can offer psychosocial intervention and emotional support to people returning from conflict zones as well as victims of conflict.³⁷ As a result, governments are involving more women in their Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) processes and other post-conflict activities.

Summary

This study does not claim to be either exhaustive or definitive. But in the review of documents available to the authors and gleaned from other conversations, there are clearly some positive initiatives in and out of government to increase women's participation in disarmament policy, education and advocacy.

As noted, there are women who manage arms control desks or programmes in government and United Nations offices. Women

³⁴ Dewes, K. (2011). Nuclear Disarmament and Deterrence Education. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. Retrieved 17 September 2011 from http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/db_article.php?article_id=211.

³⁵ Japan's Efforts on Peacebuilding—Towards Consolidation of Peace and Nation-Building. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 30 September 2011 from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/effort0704.pdf>.

³⁶ United Nations Peacekeeping: Women in Peacekeeping. Retrieved 17 September 2011 from <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/womeninpk.shtml>.

³⁷ United Nations Peacekeeping: Women in Peacekeeping. Retrieved 17 September 2011 from <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/womeninpk.shtml>.

parliamentarians are also taking leadership roles in global disarmament organizations such as PNND and PGA. Members of the IANSA Women's Network have been active in multilateral deliberations on disarmament issues such as in the Preparatory Committee meetings and Negotiating Conference towards an Arms Trade Treaty. Governments and civil society collaborate with the United Nations in implementing DDR programmes and policies. Several National Action Plans on SCR 1325 clearly stipulate women's participation in disarmament work although a few limit language to the importance of disarmament for women's protection.

In disarmament education, some governments have provided financial assistance for training programmes, including for their own female officials. Some governments also support gender-integrated disarmament education—much of it infused with peace education—in both the formal and informal curricula. Women have been tapped by governments to develop disarmament and peace education programmes and modules. International conferences have also been sponsored by governments and civil society to educate Member States on disarmament issues such as the ATT. Finally, some governments have initiated or funded research on gender perspectives in disarmament.

Women's disarmament advocacy work has resulted in the adoption by governments of stronger disarmament policies, including small arms control. Government support for women in disarmament advocacy is most visible through the financial assistance it lends to women's disarmament organizations. These organizations are being tapped by governments to assist with weapons collection and surrender. Finally, governments such as India have been sending more women to peacekeeping missions where they can give emotional and psychological support to victims of armed violence and where they can model arms-free peacekeeping.

Despite these notable efforts to include women in disarmament initiatives, such efforts remain relatively few and scattered. Many of the governments we asked could not give us information on levels of women's participation. The arena of disarmament, we realize, is still largely a man's world. Much remains to be done to persuade governments to make conscious efforts to increase women's participation in these initiatives.

Recommendations

Governments should follow the lead of those States that have designated women for leadership roles in policies and practices linked to controlling arms and ending violence caused by illicit weapons. Women suffer disproportionately from armed violence even if they never obtain or use arms.³⁸ Although the disarmament work of parliamentarians at the global level is laudable, there is a need to include women directly affected by armed violence when developing national legislation and policy.

Developing a NAP on UNSCR 1325 is one of the best venues to enhance policy development on women and disarmament. However, 11 years after the adoption of the resolution, only 32 countries had developed a NAP,³⁹ and not all of those have explicitly highlighted the role women can play in disarmament efforts, some of them limiting the language to women's protection from armed violence. This can and must be changed.

In disarmament education, governments should follow the lead of States that have mandated the integration of disarmament, gender and peace education into the formal curriculum. As UNESCO has put it, if wars begin in the minds of men, it is also in the minds of men that the defence of peace must be constructed.⁴⁰ Women can take the lead in efforts at deconstructing and reconstructing minds. Also, given that government-funded conferences, training and research have bred success in increasing women's participation in disarmament initiatives, it is recommended that more governments fund such initiatives.

In disarmament advocacy, government support for civil society groups working on issues of women and disarmament has produced positive results. Women have helped influence the inclusion of gender language in both national and global policies and are continuing to do so. Government assistance for advocacy groups has also slowly increased women's participation in initiatives such as weapons collection, disarmament

³⁸ Lydoon, L. (May 2011). *Voices of Survivors: The Different Faces of Gun Violence*. IABSA Women's Network.

³⁹ *Peacewomen: National Action Plans*. Retrieved 3 October 2011 from: <http://www.peacewomen.org/pages/about-1325/national-action-plans-naps>.

⁴⁰ *Constitution of the United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organization*. Retrieved 3 October 2011 from http://www.icomos.org/unesco/unesco_constitution.html.

education, advocacy and research. More governments should provide such assistance.

Conclusion

Women have always been identified as victims of armed violence but they can equally be active participants and even prime agents in helping make this world a safer place to live. If more governments would directly include women in disarmament initiatives, gender perspectives not sufficiently heeded might just be able to broaden the policy objectives of disarmament from that of merely saving lives to also making lives better.

A study on the Philippine National Action Plan has been published. More information on the Plan is available at: http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/NationalActionPlans/philippines_nap.pdf.

New Communication Tools in Disarmament Education: Using social media and technologies to enhance cross-cultural movement building

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Introduction

There are few things that have been as revolutionary as the Internet. Connecting individuals from distant corners of the Earth, the Internet has impacted both the volume of discussion and the diversity of discussants, and thus the discussion itself. As such, human security concerns have been redefined through new media and social technology widening the space for public discourse on issues of global concern, including disarmament and other facets of international security. Commonly known as Web 2.0, social media tools and networking technologies have altered the rules of engagement for diplomacy, both official and unofficial. Human security challenges are no longer confined to State officials and United Nations staff, but are open to a growing number of young professionals and avid social networkers worldwide who have the capability to follow and, more importantly, contribute valuable perspectives to these issues.

Social media tools, notably Facebook and Twitter, represent much more than vehicles for banal updates on what movies individuals have seen lately or where they are having dinner. These tools link people with ideas and proposals to share by providing a common platform for discussion in a centralized, easily accessible place. Furthermore, such tools create the opportunity to move beyond information-sharing and the venting of frustrations to action by motivating, inspiring and organizing others. These tools offer greater access to a new generation of leaders seeking to engage in the disarmament debate.

The leap from social networking for solely personal enjoyment to more serious-minded human security discussions is neither wide nor overly ambitious. The dynamic nature of social media technologies allows for security-related discussions to keep up with rapidly changing global circumstances. Social media tools can easily and productively be integrated into a wider strategy of generating new interest in movement building garnering new voices and contributions to the disarmament debate. Our organizational tool, “Disarmament Dialogues”, has been

a successful prototype for this sort of interaction utilizing various tools (including Facebook, Twitter and blogging) to engage new worldwide constituents in disarmament education by commenting on the current debates on disarmament as well as highlighting new aspects of the debates in need of more attention. As disarmament trends become more multifaceted, as evidenced by the other chapters in this volume, the tools used to discuss and educate on these trends must provide for as comprehensive an approach as possible.

Social media tools have already gained a significant following, most notably in the protection of civilians/human rights field, with examples such as Ushahidi. Ushahidi is perhaps the most prominent example of new technologies employed directly by the public for the protection of human rights. Ushahidi, which means “testimony” in Swahili, began as an effort to record acts of violence in the aftermath of Kenya’s disputed elections in 2008. Ushahidi relied on “civilian journalists” and other observers to report violence and peace efforts via mobile phone and website access. Ushahidi continues to be a basic early warning system to prevent violence.

Beyond Kenya, several other tools have emerged including a website called VoteReport.in that was launched in April 2009 in India by which users could report on the elections via SMS message, e-mail, Twitter and an online web forum. Similarly, an Ushahidi-style programme was launched in Zambia in 2009, “Stop Stockouts”, which seeks to ensure access to essential medicines by mapping their availability at public health facilities. Perhaps the most famous of the Ushahidi spin-offs was in Haiti in 2010 when a “Crisis Map” was launched to provide real-time mapping of post-earthquake humanitarian efforts. The project in Haiti sought to organize the vast humanitarian relief efforts in Port-au-Prince and beyond. Reports could be sent through SMS message, e-mail, Twitter and Facebook.

The screenshot displays the Haiti Digital Democracy website interface. At the top, the title "Haiti" is prominent, with the subtitle "The 2010 Earthquake in Haiti". A search bar on the right is labeled "Search Reports Here:". Below the header is a navigation menu with options: HOME, REPORTS, SUBMIT AN INCIDENT, GET ALERTS, CONTACT US, and HOW TO HELP. A secondary menu includes "ABOUT US | A PROPOS DE | ENFOMASYON" and a "SUBMIT AN INCIDENT" button.

The main content area features a "Report Via Mobile Phone" section with instructions: "In Haiti? Text 4636 (International: 447624802524) on Digital with your location and need. Report emergencies and missing persons." Below this is a "FILTERS" section with tabs for REPORTS, NEWS, PICTURES, VIDEO, and TODO. The "REPORTS" tab is active, showing a map of Haiti with numerous black circular markers representing incident reports. The map includes labels for various locations such as Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien, and others.

To the right of the map is a "CATEGORY FILTER" section with a list of categories:


- 1. URGENCES | EMERGENCY
- 2. MENACES | THREATS
- 3. URGENCES LOGISTIQUES | VITAL LINES
- 4. SECOURS | RESPONSE
- 5. AUTRE | OTHER
- 6. NOUVELLES DE PERSONNES | PERSONS NEWS

Below the categories is an "OTHER LAYERS" section.

Source: digital-democracy.org; see also ushahidi.com

Disarmament represents a key component of a broad and interlinked human security whose agenda continues to evolve along with the development of social media tools and technologies. The synergy that exists between small arms and the perpetration of mass atrocity crimes, to highlight but one example, is evidence that utilizing social media tools to provide a platform to facilitate a discussion that is not limited to one topic is vital to propagating a strong, intelligent next generation of policymakers and international stakeholders. In this way, social media tools such as Twitter and Facebook offer users the opportunity to effectively link different components of disarmament, from DDR programmes and the arms trade treaty process to nuclear-weapon-free zones. The benefits of social networking are numerable and are worthy of deeper exploration; but above all, social networking tools allow for users to explore connections between more traditional disarmament concerns and other cross-cutting issues such as social development, gender, atrocity crime prevention and climate change.

Key Components of Social Media and Social Technology



Source: jonwchin.com

Social media tools and technologies offer personal empowerment and ownership of new ideas and information, but also the opportunity to share ideas for global movement building. Sharing can take the form of photos, videos, quotations, blogs or music, to name just a few. Of the many social media tools available, the two most popular and widely used are Twitter and Facebook. Thus it is relevant to highlight these two tools as examples of potential assets for disarmament education.

Facebook already claims well over 750 million active users who interact daily with groups, events and community pages offering varying forms of information exchange. Furthermore, Facebook boasts that more than 70 per cent of its users are located outside of the United States with more than 70 language translations available. Facebook estimates that individual users have access to more than 30 billion pieces of content per month such as weblinks, news stories, blog posts, notes and photo albums.

Twitter, a micro-blogging site that allows users to offer 140-character updates at any given time, boasts 200 million users as of 2011. With Twitter, users can communicate directly with other “tweeters” as well as engage users in conversation (“live tweeting”) and solicit questions, suggestions and commentary. In addition, “followers” of feeds can get a concise overview of what is happening in the world in just a sentence or two. Users can categorize their “tweets” by topic or type by using “hashtags”, which are phrases or words prefixed with the # sign.

There are several characteristics of social media that make it conducive to cross-cultural movement building. First, social networking tools serve as an equalizer allowing all those who have an internet connection or mobile phone to have the same voice and opportunity to comment on contemporary disarmament issues thereby multiplying the voices contributing to the conversation. Geography and time zones are irrelevant. Social media tools often function as an “intellectual multiplier” as well by connecting individuals and, in turn, their ideas at such a rapid and exponential pace that the potential timeline for change is drastically shortened. However, those without an Internet connection do not have the same opportunity, making access to broadband Internet a decisive factor in making successful use of these new communication tools.

Micro-blogging, with Twitter in particular, is spectacularly useful for dispensing commentary and analysis in real-time. The 140-character limit need not sacrifice substance, but rather demands brevity and creativity in such a small space. With millions of users of such blogging services, there is a certain degree of pressure to come up with succinct and provocative posts to attract “followers” and sustain attention. This degree of competition can serve more as a motivator than deterrent to use.

Likewise, the immediacy of this connectivity allows users to change the direction of the conversation as rapidly as the issue themselves can change. A rapidly shifting world deserves communication tools that can keep up with issue movement. Users can respond instantly to current events and political shifts, including those related to disarmament priorities. In addition to commentary, social media provides for a two-sided interface so that an exchange of ideas can easily take place. In this way, it represents a new venue for educating in an interactive and engaging manner. Social media tools can effectively secure a place for

disarmament on the international agenda that is relevant, contemporary and appropriate to a rapidly changing and connected world.

The current impact of social media tools is not difficult to discern. In the last few years, the value and significance of such technologies have been widely debated, although it seems that no matter on which side of the argument one finds himself or herself, the technologies are here to stay. There are strong proponents of social media who identify a causal relationship between media campaigns and societal change. Others are more sceptical and choose to view such technologies as channels of facilitation rather than direct causes. In any case, the power of Web 2.0 is incontestable as seen during the Egyptian revolution of 2011 when it exploded onto Twitter and Facebook as individuals sought a platform for updates and exchanges. Major news events have been broken first on Twitter, including the death of Osama bin Laden (which set what was then a record of 3,000 tweets per second in the hours following the United States military operation).

Social media tools are not necessarily replacing traditional forms of news media and exchanges, but rather provide a digestible and creative way to consume a lot of information at once. They are also a way to engage actively. That is to say, it is a powerful alternative, or at least supplement, to passively reading commentary in a newspaper retroactively. Twitter and Facebook postings, for example, allow an individual to not only read the news, but comment on it, link to other relevant content, share with friends, and follow developments as they happen.

Social Media Challenges

It is important to remember that social media tools are just that—tools. Tools in their own rights are neither positive nor negative, but judged according to their utility and impact. These tools must be part of a coherent process rather than an end in and of themselves.

Perhaps the most significant challenge of effectively using social media tools for movement and coalition building is the potential lack of transparency. The cover of anonymity is always available in the virtual world of the Internet leading to a potential loss of credibility and accountability. Users of social media tools must be aware of this obstacle and be discerning about who they interact with as well as being

as transparent and accountable as possible. That being said, social media tools were not created primarily with policy in mind, but, rather, have been adapted to fit the needs of governments, United Nations representatives and activists. Facebook began as an intercollegiate network for university students on various campuses and was only opened to all Internet users as of 2006. Such users are free to express themselves openly even within some of the most repressive of environments, thereby enabling voices that otherwise may not have been heard. Contrastingly, however, anonymity also invites abuse and requires that users are educated and sufficiently savvy to avoid being taken advantage or victimized by a few spoilers.

Second, some social media sceptics argue that articulation of clear ideas and proposals is not best handled by a sprawling network of casual interactions lacking cohesion and leadership. As a result, some are less inclined to embrace social media tools as a viable instigator of movement building arguing that easier access does not necessarily translate into greater impact. There is merit to this argument that social media tools have limits in their ability to bring about systematic change without the appropriate political support through more official channels. Furthermore, it is important that there is a sense of responsibility that accompanies social media use so that precision of thought does not degenerate into chaotic opinion. These tools should not be converted into endless sound bites devoid of content, but should be employed respectfully for information exchange and linkages giving a voice to a vast public of global citizens concerned about illicit weapons, gender violence and other concerns of this volume of essays.

Fostering a New Leadership in Disarmament

Social media tools do offer a sense of inspiration, which is a necessary ingredient to any societal change and cross-cultural movement. The role of inspiration is of particular importance for embracing the next generation of leaders in disarmament work. Modern diplomacy has been altered by the social media phenomena so that the work of policymakers is not only passed on to the next generation, but can also be sufficiently redefined and adjusted for new stakeholders. This is especially relevant to ongoing and more recent developments in the disarmament field such as the Arms Trade Treaty process and efforts towards a Nuclear Weapons Convention as well as wider peace and security concerns such as the

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security.

With tools such as Twitter and Facebook, including our own “Disarmament Dialogues”, individuals have access to discussions occurring within the United Nations that lead to important, parallel discussions in communities far beyond United Nations Headquarters. Along with more traditional resources such as the publication *Disarmament: A Basic Guide* from the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “insider” information can be communicated by social media tools in the hopes of not only educating, but also seeking to engage a new generation in disarmament policies and practices.

Appendices

I. Sample “Tweets”

To illustrate the dynamic conversation, and immense potential, of social media tools, please refer below to sample “tweets” of both professional and amateur users of Twitter as they engage in a vibrant conversation of human security concerns (from July to August 2011).

RT @UN_Women: RT @el_karama: Article from Hibaaq Osman on Youth, Social Media, and Women in the Egyptian Revolution <http://sns.mx/GJcey6>

Official #UN report post-PrepCom RT @UNMediaLiaison: SG Report: The arms trade treaty <http://bit.ly/r7aq01> #armstreaty

RT @peaceoperations: Link to the winning entry of the WeMustDisarm video competition on nuclear #disarmament:<http://youtu.be/45f1VlgFppA>

RT @GlobalFundWomen: How is your mobile device connected to what’s happening in #Congo? #vaw #fem2 <http://bit.ly/nBm8mcn>

Growing role of #DisarmamentDemobilization and Reintegration #DDR programmes in #peacekeeping mandates <http://bit.ly/nLAqgf>

Preparations for #UN GA Session 66 under way-- re First Com- what do you think are the priorities? #Nukes? #ConventionalWeapons? Structure?

RT @UKUN_NewYork: #UN Security Council now meeting on #Yemen. Economic, security & humanitarian situation worsening #yf#yy

#US #France #UK #Russia agree it’s time to negotiate the #FMCT despite blocks <http://bloom.bg/ndpZ4L>

II. Important Guidelines for Social Media Disarmament Education

There are several important points to reiterate for utilizing new communication tools for disarmament education as well as wider human security concerns.

- *Education is critical for those seeking to engage with social media tools so that the rules of engagement are clearly defined*

Learning to use social media tools is just like acquiring any other new skill. It requires a degree of dedication and perseverance. Individual users will have different levels of comfort and ease when using any social media tool so it is the responsibility of those seeking to utilize them for educational purposes that potential disparities are effectively taken into account.

- *Constant interaction and interfacing is indispensable to any social media tool*

It is imperative that users want to regularly come back to these networks and tools. Continual interaction is important such that it is not a one-sided lecture, but a two-sided conversation as much as possible. Social media tools were created with the intent of interacting and connecting and not purely as a “feed” for news and information.

- *The strength of a social media tool evolves over time, which allows its followers to design and contribute to its trajectory*

It is important that social media platforms are allowed to develop over time so that users themselves can contribute to the design and direction of the conversation. At the beginning, the tool may be heavily biased towards the so-called “producers” of information, but eventually the balance should readjust so that users are also driving the conversation.

- *Content drives any successful tool so that it is not just generating traffic, but is home to substantial interaction that will give a tool longevity and opportunity for genuine mobilization*

Engaging and reliable content keeps users coming back to social media platforms. In a world where there is no dearth of tools to utilize or individuals to “follow”, it is important to remain steadfast in providing reliable, smart and accurate content. Effective content makes use of different media forms (weblinks, photos, videos, news stories, analysis,

discussion questions, etc.) and makes links between different, but related, issues that welcome the most diverse group of users.

III. Influential Social Media Tools

1. *Facebook.com*

Social networking site through which users create a personal profile in addition to common interest groups and pages, while also adding others as “friends” to their network.

2. *Twitter.com*

Micro-blogging site whereby users are permitted to upload 140-character posts for their “followers”.

3. *Tumblr.com*

A micro-blogging site that allows its users to upload text, images, videos, links, quotes and audio to their “tumblelog”.

4. *Wordpress.com*

Free blogging platforms with a focus on aesthetics, usability and common web standards.

5. *YouTube.com*

A video-sharing site where users can upload, share and view video content including movie clips and video blogs.

6. *Flickr.com*

An image and video-hosting website and online community that is often used by bloggers to host photos embedded in other social media and blog posts.

7. *Digg.com*

A social new site that allows user to vote news stories up or down referred to as “digging” and “burying”.

8. *LinkedIn.com*

A business-related social networking site used primarily for professional and organization-affiliated purposes.

9. *FourSquare.com*

A location-based social networking site whereby users with GPS-enabled devices can “check-in” to various venues using a website, text message or other application.

10. *Slideshare.net*

An online slide-hosting website that enables users to upload and share presentations in PowerPoint, PDF, Keynote or OpenOffice form.

11. *Posterous.com*

A simple tool for online blogging that allows for multimedia uploads.

12. *Vimeo.com*

A video-sharing online community that allows users to create their own “channel” and upload videos.

IV. Some Active Twitter Accounts in the Disarmament and Human Security Debate

@ControlArms A global campaign for the adoption of a universal, strong and effective Arms Trade Treaty that protects lives and livelihoods

@DisarmDialogues Real-time reporting from UN-NY Headquarters from NGO Global Action to Prevent War

@VinoThorsen Oistein Thorsen, Humanitarian Campaigner for Oxfam International, NY

@TheIANSA The International Action Network Against Small Arms

@marywareham Arms division of Human Rights Watch, NY

@Desarmate Argentinean anti-gun violence movement

@Armscontrolnow Arms Control Association, Washington, DC

@jduncanMACD Ambassador John Duncan of the UK, Former Ambassador for Arms Control and Disarmament 2006-2011

@UN_spokesperson Official Twitter of the UN Secretary-General's Spokesperson, NY

@UN_Disarmament Official Twitter of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs

@NeilMacFarquhar New York *Times* United Nations Correspondent, NY

@MarkLGoldberg Editor for *UN Dispatch*, NY

@lou_reuters *Reuters* UN Correspondent, NY

@RCW_ Reaching Critical Will for Nuclear Disarmament, NY

@iaeaorg International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna

@secgen Account for UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, NY

@GSInstitute Global Security Institute seeks the elimination of nuclear weapons, NY and Philadelphia

@SmallArmsSurvey Research project based in Geneva

@Viva_Rio Brazilian based organization for peace and disarmament,
Rio de Janeiro

@UNDP UN Development Programme, NY

@HelenClarkUNDP Chief Administrator for UNDP, NY

@UN_Women UN Entity for Women's Equality and Empowerment,
NY

@CFigueres Christiana Figueres, Chief Executive of UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Bonn

@ICRtoP International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, NY

V. Other active tools:

ATT Blog: Independent views and analysis from the Arms Trade Treaty negotiations.

<http://attmonitor.blogspot.com/>

Control Arms Flickr: Collection of photos from Control Arms Coalition members from around the world.

<http://www.flickr.com/groups/armasbajocontrol/>

“Shooting Poverty” on Vimeo: Videos from a competition for young filmmakers to showcase how armed conflict and irresponsible arms trade has affected poverty-stricken communities globally.

<http://vimeo.com/shootingpoverty>