



## Security Council

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### **Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union- United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur**

#### **I. Introduction**

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 2063 (2012), by which the Council requested me to report every 90 days on progress made in implementing the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). It includes an update on the situation in Darfur since my last report, dated 16 July 2012 (S/2012/548), to 30 September 2012. Pursuant to paragraphs 6 and 12 of the same resolution, the report provides an update on the development of an integrated strategic framework for United Nations system-wide support to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur and revised benchmarks and indicators against which the Council may assess progress made in the implementation of the mandate of UNAMID.

#### **II. Political developments**

##### **Implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur**

2. During the reporting period, the signatory parties to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, the Government of the Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), continued to engage in stakeholder consultations, and preparations for a donor conference and the Darfur internal dialogue and consultations. Concrete progress on other provisions continued to lag, however, and, on 18 July, the parties extended the implementation timetable by one year.

3. The Darfur Regional Authority, in conjunction with international development partners, initiated planning in May 2012 for the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission, as provided for in the Doha Document, to assess the economic recovery, development and poverty eradication needs in Darfur. From 29 to 31 August, a delegation led by the Minister for Reconstruction, Development and Infrastructure of the Darfur Regional Authority, and comprising federal Government officials and international partners, met with local government authorities and civil society groups in each of the five Darfur States to solicit their support for the Assessment Mission. On 17 September, specialist technical teams travelled to Darfur to begin gathering, through consultations and workshops, information from State ministries and civil society groups about their needs in 10 cluster areas (agriculture; basic social services; fiscal management; governance; infrastructure development; natural



resources management; peace and security; private sector development; return, reintegration and resettlement; and rule of law). This will form the basis of a framework for peace, development and poverty eradication projects to be presented at a donors' conference to be held in Doha in December 2012.

4. National Intelligence and Security Service and Humanitarian Aid Commission officials pledged to the Assessment Mission delegation that the technical teams will have unrestricted access to carry out their work. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the lead agency for the exercise, while UNAMID is providing logistical support. Other participants include the African Development Bank, the European Union, the Government of Qatar, the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Nations country team members, the United States Agency for International Development and the World Bank.

5. The dissemination of the Doha Document by the signatory parties concluded with the holding of four workshops in Northern and Eastern Darfur between 2 and 5 July for 600 representatives of a wide range of Darfuri stakeholder groups. These final workshops brought the total number of participants in dissemination workshops since October 2011 to approximately 25,000, some 34 per cent of whom were women. UNAMID supported the exercise through the provision of technical advice and logistical assistance. An assessment of participants' responses found that a broad cross-section supports the Doha Document, but has concerns about the slow pace of implementation and the lack of involvement by the non-signatory movements. Participants urged the signatory parties to fully implement the Doha Document, in particular the provisions pertaining to security, justice and wealth-sharing. Some representatives of the displaced called for greater specificity in covering the resolution of land disputes between internally displaced persons and newly settled communities.

6. Despite the activities noted above, during the reporting period, several of the extended Doha Document deadlines were not met, including those related to the ceasefire and final security arrangements. In this regard, the Government and LJM remained unable to agree on the results of the initial verification of LJM soldiers conducted from 5 to 9 March 2012. Government officials insisted that the exercise be repeated with narrower criteria for eligibility as a combatant, while LJM insisted on the maintenance of broader criteria. UNAMID continued to urge the parties to reach an agreement. A meeting of the Joint Commission of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur is scheduled for 15 October to facilitate resolution of the dispute. In addition, extended deadlines remained unmet on provisions related to the transfer of funds to the Darfur Regional Authority, justice and reconciliation, compensation and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees.

7. While the Darfur Regional Authority is making every effort to pursue the implementation of the Doha Document in a difficult economic climate, it is facing significant pressures. In this regard, on 13 August, a group of disaffected LJM combatants aboard five vehicles stormed the Authority headquarters offices in El Fasher to protest at delays in salary payments. They occupied one of the office compounds, temporarily holding its occupants captive. Following an exchange of fire between the group and other LJM elements, the assailants fled. The captives were released unharmed and there were no casualties.

### **Negotiations towards an inclusive peace agreement**

8. The African Union-United Nations joint mediation continued to promote the resumption of talks between the Government of the Sudan and non-signatory movements. On 2 July, in Doha, the Minister of State responsible for the Darfur file, Amin Hassan Omer, reaffirmed to the then Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator ad interim, Ibrahim Gambari, his Government's willingness to hold talks with the non-signatory movements on political appointments and security arrangements.

9. On 26 July, the Joint Chief Mediator ad interim met with representatives of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in the margins of a child protection workshop in Stadtschlaining, Austria. While the JEM representatives restated their commitment to the objectives of the Sudan Revolutionary Front alliance regarding national political and economic reforms, they nevertheless expressed interest in holding talks with the Government on condition that the agenda include all aspects of the Doha Document. The Acting Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator, Aichatou Mindaoudou, met on 16 September in Helsinki with JEM representatives, who reiterated their earlier position. During the reporting period, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)-Abdul Wahid and SLA-Minni Minawi reaffirmed to the Joint Mediation their commitment to the objectives of the Sudan Revolutionary Front. The Joint Mediation continued to urge the parties to exercise flexibility with regard to the scope of talks.

10. In a statement issued on 9 August, the JEM Chairperson, Gibril Ibrahim, announced that the movement's military commander, Bakhit Abdullah Abdul Karim, had been relieved of his duties on suspicion of collaboration with Government security officials. Gibril Ibrahim is to act as the movement's military commander until a replacement commander is selected at a leadership convention for which a date has yet to be set. Citing an objection to the leadership style of Gibril Ibrahim, on 11 September, a group of eight second-tier members of the JEM Executive Council, led by Mohammad Bashar, announced that they had left the movement to form a separate group.

### **Internal Darfur dialogue on the peace process**

11. The Darfur Regional Authority continued to prepare for the Darfur internal dialogue and consultations provided for in the Doha Document. In this regard, it held a preparatory all Darfur people's conference in El Fasher from 10 to 12 July, with the aim of, inter alia, mobilizing support for the Doha Document, promoting peaceful dialogue and creating an environment conducive to reconciliation. Approximately 900 representatives of a cross-section of Darfuri stakeholder groups participated, some 7 per cent of whom were women. UNAMID provided logistics support and monitored the environment within which the conference was held.

12. Among the many views expressed by participants, of particular note were concerns raised about the recent deterioration in the security situation, especially increased banditry and the intermittent closure of main roads in Northern and Southern Darfur. Some attributed the insecurity to the non-signatory armed movements' lack of participation in the peace process, while others highlighted the need for improved security and access to basic social services in areas of potential return. Discussions about land were heated, with nomad representatives stating that reports of their communities having moved to Darfur from neighbouring countries

were exaggerated, while internally displaced persons rejected the proposal made by Government officials that they settle on land adjacent to camps rather than return to their places of origin. Recommendations adopted at the conference, and submitted for the consideration of the Darfur Regional Authority, called for strengthened security and the rule of law, the promotion of reconciliation, a donor conference on development and the expedited construction of a road linking Khartoum to Darfur.

13. As noted above, pursuant to resolution 2063 (2012), UNAMID monitored the conditions in which the conference was held, particularly in regard to security incidents, threats, violations of participants' freedoms or instances of interference. No such incidents or violations were reported in connection with the event. Internally displaced persons from camps throughout Darfur were represented, except those from Wadi Salih, Mukhjar, Bindisi and Um Dukhun (Central Darfur), whose leaders cited insufficient notice as the reason for not attending. Darfuri members of the major opposition political parties participated in their personal capacities. While the representatives of civil society groups who attended were assessed as generally supportive of the Government or LJM, they nevertheless voiced concerns about the lack of progress in the implementation of the Doha Document.

14. Regarding UNAMID support to the Darfur internal dialogue and consultations, the mission initiated discussions with the Darfur Regional Authority, the African Union High-level Panel for the Sudan and the Government of Qatar on the concept of operations for support to the exercise. UNAMID anticipates being requested to provide logistics support, security, technical advice and assistance to the parties and civil society with the selection of participants. The signatory parties to the Doha Document have yet to determine a timetable for the Darfur internal dialogue and consultations.

### **III. Protection of civilians from physical violence**

15. During the reporting period, the risk of physical violence to the civilian population increased owing to intercommunal fighting, the harassment of civilians by militia groups and sporadic clashes between the Government and armed non-signatory movements, particularly in Northern Darfur. A total of 15 incidents of intercommunal fighting, resulting in 86 civilian fatalities, were recorded, as compared with 2 incidents resulting in 4 fatalities between 1 April and 30 June 2012.

16. Late in June, UNAMID received reports that a Sudanese Armed Forces convoy had been ambushed on 26 June, 30 km south of Tawilla (Northern Darfur) by an unidentified armed group. Government security authorities repeatedly denied UNAMID access to verify the report. On 8 July, Sudanese Armed Forces aircraft dropped 24 bombs approximately 20 km south of Tawilla. Eight days later, during clashes between Government and unidentified armed movement forces 29 km south-east of the town, a Sudanese Armed Forces helicopter crashed, killing seven military personnel on board. UNAMID patrolled population centres, confirmed the safety of humanitarian personnel and disposed of unexploded ordnance. While no civilian casualties were reported, a humanitarian assessment mission ascertained that approximately 1,160 civilians had been displaced to camps near Tawilla, most of whom returned to their homes within one week.

17. Fighting between Government and armed movement forces continued on 6 September and spread to Fanga Suk, Jebel Marra (115 km south-east of Sortony, Central Darfur). On 13 September, clashes erupted between Government and movement forces near Dible (10 km west of Sortony). On 19 and 20 September, Government and movement forces again clashed near Thabit (30 km south-east of Tawilla) and, on 23 and 24 September, further west near Fanga Suk. Community sources reported an ambush, on 27 September, of a Sudanese Armed Forces-escorted commercial convoy near Tangarara (15 km north of Shangil Tobaya, Northern Darfur). UNAMID was unable to verify the reports of casualties claimed by the parties, which varied considerably, owing to restrictions imposed by Government authorities on the grounds of insecurity.

18. Regarding intercommunal fighting, in a continuation of the long-standing political rivalry between the Zaghawa and Birgid communities in Dar El Salam locality (50 km south of El Fasher, Northern Darfur), between 10 and 27 July, Zaghawa militia clashed with elements of the Popular Defence Forces, comprising mainly Birgid tribesmen, on at least six occasions. According to community sources, 10 Popular Defence Force soldiers, four Zaghawa militia and two civilians were killed. Humanitarian agencies estimated that 2,400 civilians were displaced to Zam Zam camp (near El Fasher) by the clashes. UNAMID increased patrolling in the areas of potential conflict and urged the groups' leaders to engage each other in dialogue.

19. A dispute over land access triggered clashes on 16 and 18 July between groups of Rezeigat and Misseriya in Um Shagag (140 km south-east of El Daein, Eastern Darfur). Community representatives informed the mission that approximately 41 people were killed and 30 injured in the fighting. On 19 July, UNAMID transported local authorities and tribal leaders to the area to mediate the dispute. Separately, elements of the Sudanese Armed Forces were deployed between the groups. In addition, Government authorities and community leaders revived a local reconciliation committee initially established in October 2009 following previous clashes, after which tensions eased.

20. On 21 and 22 September, an incident of cattle-raiding triggered fighting between groups of Rezeigat and Misseriya in Nagadula (20 km north-east of Zalingei), resulting in 19 fatalities (13 Rezeigat and 6 Misseriya). In the same area, on 30 September, two Rezeigat were killed during an attempted cattle raid by Mahalia tribesmen in Abu Jabra (100 km south-east of El Daein). At the urging of UNAMID, Rezeigat community leaders decided against plans to retaliate and instead engaged in reconciliation talks.

21. On 16 July, a dispute over land use triggered fighting between groups from the Awlad Rashid and Jararha tribes in Hawag Ab Salaba (200 km south of Nyala, Southern Darfur), resulting in the death of seven people and injuries to three others. Tensions eased following locally mediated negotiations. On 13 August, a dispute over access to farmland triggered a clash in Ma'aliah (35 km west of El Daein) between groups of El Besharia nomads and Gimmir internally displaced persons from Neem camp, which resulted in the killing of four internally displaced persons and injuries to four others. UNAMID worked with local authorities and traditional community leaders to promote reconciliation between the groups. There has been no further fighting.

22. For most of July, internally displaced persons in Hamadiya camp (Zalingei, Central Darfur) faced increased security concerns. On 8 July, camp residents killed two armed men of the Ereigat tribe, who had entered the camp in circumstances which remain unclear. The following day, unidentified armed assailants (who camp leaders alleged are from the Ereigat community) surrounded the camp, fired indiscriminately and abducted nine internally displaced persons. Ereigat community leaders then demanded that the internally displaced person community pay compensation for and hand over the perpetrators of the killings on 8 July. Hamadiya camp leaders rejected the demands and refused to allow Government authorities inside the camp to investigate the incidents. Tensions between camp residents, local authorities and surrounding communities escalated, leading internally displaced persons to inform UNAMID that they were afraid to leave the camp for fear of harassment. From 9 July, UNAMID stationed additional peacekeepers around the camp and engaged with State authorities and community leaders to promote a peaceful settlement. Following a series of reconciliation meetings, on 4 August, leaders of the internally displaced persons and the Ereigat community signed an agreement according to which each undertook to pay the other compensation. Subsequently, relations between the communities and between camp leaders and local authorities have improved.

23. In August, security in and around Kutum (Northern Darfur) deteriorated. On 1 August, unidentified assailants killed the Al Waha Locality Commissioner and his driver in the town and carjacked their vehicle. According to the initial findings of a UNAMID investigation, the incident was in retaliation for the killing in Kutum of a commander of the National Intelligence and Security Service (of the Ziyadiah tribe) on 19 July. Later the same day, militia from the Mahamid tribe (to which the Al Waha Commissioner belonged) attacked a Government police post in nearby Kassab camp, close to where the Commissioner's vehicle was found abandoned. One policeman and three internally displaced persons were killed, and another policeman and five internally displaced persons were injured. The following day, the militia attacked Kutum market and police station, killing a policeman, before moving to nearby Fata Borno, where they injured another policeman. On 2 August, the militia looted the World Food Programme office in Kutum. Aid workers present were unharmed. On the same day, the Sudanese Armed Forces engaged the militia and regained control of the town. Continued insecurity in the surrounding area due to the militia's presence resulted in 25,000 residents of the Kassab camp relocating, on 3 and 4 August, mainly to Kutum town.

24. In the light of the above, UNAMID increased patrolling in and around the town and camps for internally displaced persons. On 2 August, the mission deployed additional troops to its community policing centre at Fata Borno camp and established a round-the-clock presence at Kassab camp. UNAMID also secured the evacuation of aid workers from Kutum to El Fasher. The mission twice transported State officials from El Fasher to Kutum for talks with local leaders. Thereafter, the authorities brokered meetings between Mahamid and Ziyadiah community leaders.

25. By 6 August, tensions in and around Kutum had eased. After consultations between UNAMID and camp leaders on protection measures, during which it was agreed that UNAMID would provide security for internally displaced persons leaving the camp for farming activities, displaced persons began, on 12 August, to return to Kassab camp. By 18 August, approximately 95 per cent of the internally displaced persons had returned to the camp. Following an inter-agency humanitarian

assessment mission, which identified health care, emergency shelter and security as the population's main needs, UNAMID transported 1,000 kg of medical supplies to the town.

26. Security in Kutum again deteriorated on 4 September, when unidentified armed assailants attacked a convoy carrying the Kutum Locality Commissioner (from the Berti tribe). While the Commissioner escaped unhurt, six passengers were injured. An exchange of fire left four attackers and two Government policemen dead. The following day, one civilian was killed and eight others were injured in the crossfire of a firefight between armed Arab militia and Government regular forces on the outskirts of the town. In addition to maintaining its strengthened presence in Kutum and nearby camps, UNAMID provided medical assistance to the civilian casualties and protected aid workers who relocated to its team site. State authorities deployed additional forces to secure Kutum town, replaced the Locality Commissioner with a Sudanese Armed Forces Brigadier General and imposed a curfew. On 13 September, UNAMID, responding to sounds of gunfire near Kassab camp, dispersed armed assailants harassing a group of 30 internally displaced persons returning from their farms. The situation in the area remains tense.

27. Hostilities over land between the Ziyadiah and Berti tribes in Mellit (65 km north of El Fasher), which first broke out in May 2012, continued during the reporting period. On 14 August, militia suspected to be of the Ziyadiah tribe killed a Berti tribesman in the town. The following day, Ziyadiah members of the Central Reserve Police and Berti members of the Popular Defence Forces clashed near the town's water point, resulting in the death of six militia (three from each group) and injuries to 12 others. UNAMID strengthened its presence at nearby Abassi camp, reinforced its position at the water point and promoted reconciliation. Government authorities deployed additional forces to secure the town. Reconciliation talks between the communities, brokered by Meidob tribal leaders, led to the signing, on 21 August, of a ceasefire agreement that temporarily eased tensions. However, on 15 September, unidentified assailants fired a rocket-propelled grenade into Abassi camp, killing three civilians (two Zaghawa and one Berti) and seriously injuring one other.

28. According to community sources, on 21 September, a dispute over land use triggered clashes between Arab nomads and Tunjur farmers in Hashaba (56 km north-east of Kutum). The fighting reportedly escalated, on 25 and 26 September, after Government and armed movement forces became involved. Media reports indicated heavy fighting, civilian casualties and the destruction of property. While UNAMID was able to interview casualties taken to a local hospital, the mission was prevented, on 27, 29 and 30 September, from accessing the area to verify the reports owing to restrictions imposed by Government forces on the grounds of insecurity.

29. The increase in intercommunal fighting during the reporting period was triggered mainly by disputes between farmers and pastoralists over land use, as each sought to benefit from the seasonal rains by cultivating crops or grazing livestock on the same tracts of arable land. Tensions escalated when tribal militia aligned to the Government and armed movement forces became involved, particularly in Dar El Salam (Northern Darfur). At the same time, local sources have cited mounting frustration among communities from which the militias are drawn, in particular in Kutum and Mellit, over unfulfilled commitments by the Government that have led to the militia challenging authorities and engaging Government security forces.

#### **IV. Security and freedom of movement**

30. With regard to the freedom of movement of UNAMID personnel, from 1 July to 30 September, the mission's movements by land were restricted on 29 occasions, compared with 27 in the previous reporting period. In the same period, Government authorities denied 108 of 4,928 flight requests, a decrease from 357 of 5,037 in the previous reporting period. The restrictions tended to be imposed by Government security agencies in areas of ongoing or planned operations against non-signatory armed movement forces.

31. From 12 to 30 September, Government authorities intermittently prevented UNAMID patrols from proceeding south or west of El Fasher owing to ongoing military operations near Thabit and southern Tawilla. On 26 September, two Sudanese Armed Forces attack helicopters flew at low altitude over a UNAMID patrol that was returning from an assessment mission near Thabit. The authorities claimed that the aircraft mistook the patrol for an armed movement convoy. The patrol returned to base safely. UNAMID protested to the Government over the incident.

32. Restrictions were also imposed on UNAMID civilian personnel. On 2 July, National Intelligence and Security Service authorities in Mukhjar (110 km south of Zalingei) rejected a UNAMID request for approval to hold a human rights training session for internally displaced persons, insisting that permission must first be obtained from the authorities in Zalingei. On 17 July, despite approval having been obtained from Zalingei, a training session in Mukhjar was interrupted by agents of the Service, who insisted that participants be selected by the Mukhjar Humanitarian Aid Commission (the Mukhjar Humanitarian Aid Commissioner also serves as the Deputy Director of the Service). Following discussions between UNAMID and the authorities, on 18 July, a public human rights forum was held in the town.

33. During the reporting period, aid workers continued to experience access restrictions and bureaucratic impediments. Government authorities declined repeated requests by agencies for access to Rockero and Nertiti localities (with the exception of Nertiti township) in Jebel Marra (Central Darfur). Access to Dar El Salam locality (Northern Darfur) was intermittently restricted. Authorities on occasion restricted access for humanitarian personnel attempting to travel by air from Khartoum to Darfur, including, on 9 September, when agency heads attempted to attend a coordination meeting with UNAMID. Government authorities cited a new requirement for a permit additional to those the aid workers already held. The United Nations Resident Representative and Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sudan urged the Government to facilitate the travel of United Nations officials and to establish and communicate a clear set of procedures for this purpose.

34. Following a three-month delay, on 14 August, Government authorities granted approval for the transportation to Darfur of emergency shelter materials and other non-food items stored by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in El Obeid (Northern Kordofan). As a result of the delay, the pre-rainy season distribution of such materials to vulnerable households throughout Darfur, which commenced early in April, was limited to already pre-positioned stocks. Materials could be delivered to only 52,000 (or 65 per cent) of the 79,000 families targeted by the programme. Furthermore, the delays hindered the ability of agencies to address the emergency shelter needs of communities affected by

flooding and internally displaced persons temporarily displaced from Kassab camp. The clearance was delayed while authorities sought confirmation from within the Government that UNHCR had permission to be present in El Obeid.

35. In mid-July, six months after an initial request by an international non-governmental organization, Government authorities granted approval to transport 1,705 kg of medical supplies from Nyala to the organization's clinics in Mukhjar and Garsila (Central Darfur).

### **Safety and security**

36. The safety and security situation for United Nations and humanitarian personnel in Darfur remains of concern.

37. On 12 August, an officer (Bangladesh) of a UNAMID formed police unit was killed and another injured when unidentified armed assailants opened fire at the Otash Community Policing Centre near Nyala. After an exchange of fire, the assailants fled the scene. The initial findings of a UNAMID investigation indicated that the motive was probably criminal in nature. On 20 August, two UNAMID formed police unit personnel were taken hostage by unidentified assailants while on patrol in Kabkabiya (Northern Darfur). UNAMID and the Government of the Sudan continued to work to secure their release.

38. On 26 August, three UNAMID peacekeepers (United Republic of Tanzania) drowned after the armoured personnel carrier in which they were travelling became stranded while crossing a swollen river.

39. One UNAMID and three United Nations agency vehicles were carjacked during the reporting period (compared with six in the previous period). United Nations or humanitarian personnel were targeted in robberies on nine occasions. There were no injuries in connection with the incidents.

40. On 27 July and 6 August, Government authorities detained two UNAMID national staff in Zalingei in connection with the killing of two individuals in Hamadiya camp (see para. 22 above). The staff members were released without charge on 17 August. On 28 August, a UNAMID national staff member was detained without charge by the National Intelligence and Security Service in Nyala for alleged involvement in the political activities of SLA-Abdul Wahid. On 9 and 30 September, officials of the Service granted UNAMID access to the staff member, who was in good health. A National Intelligence and Security Service investigation is ongoing. The mission is working to secure the staff member's release.

## **V. Humanitarian situation**

41. During the reporting period, heavy seasonal rainfall and flooding caused significant damage to housing throughout Darfur. The homes of an estimated 26,200 people were severely damaged or destroyed and thousands of livestock were killed. Central Darfur was most affected, with substantial damage caused to the houses and shelters of an estimated 14,500 people. The homes of approximately 4,600 people in Southern Darfur, 3,100 in Western Darfur, 2,000 in Northern Darfur and 2,000 in Eastern Darfur were also severely damaged or destroyed.

42. While poor road conditions seriously hampered efforts to assess the damage and deliver assistance, particularly in Malha (Northern Darfur), aid agencies distributed food rations, medical supplies, emergency shelter materials, fodder and vaccinations for livestock where conditions permitted.

43. During the reporting period, the Return and Reintegration Working Group, led by UNHCR, confirmed that a total of 55,404 internally displaced persons and 8,441 refugees voluntarily returned to various locations in Darfur from 1 April to 30 June 2012, in particular in Northern and Western Darfur. The Working Group intends to monitor return sites to assess whether the returns are seasonal or permanent. While approximately 29,020 people were either newly displaced or redisplaced by fighting during the reporting period, all except some 2,400 subsequently returned within one week.

## **VI. Rule of law, governance and human rights**

44. During the reporting period, the overall number of documented human rights violations decreased from 145 cases involving 439 victims in the previous reporting period to 159 cases involving 321 victims in the current period (153 victims of violations of the right to physical integrity, 46 victims of arbitrary arrest and detention, 42 victims of sexual and gender-based violence and 80 violations of the right to life). Of the 159 documented cases, 37 were reported to Government police, 4 of which are under investigation.

45. On 30 July, approximately 300 students took to the streets in Nyala to protest at the lack of public transport, which was in turn the result of a strike by bus drivers over increases in fuel prices. Several hundred more protestors joined the students on 31 July, blocking roads and vandalizing buildings. Government security forces were deployed to quell the unrest. On the second day of protests, Government security forces fired live rounds into the crowd, killing 7 civilians and injuring 16 others. At least two Government police were also seriously injured in the protests. UNAMID called on State authorities to avoid using excessive force and urged local leaders to encourage the protestors to refrain from violence.

46. By 1 August, the demonstrations had subsided. State officials initiated investigations into the cause of the protests and the circumstances surrounding the shooting of the protestors. Following the incident, the responsibility for disbursing fuel in Nyala was transferred from the National Intelligence and Security Service to the Ministry of Finance, fuel prices were lowered and two Government security force personnel were arrested in connection with the shooting. They are awaiting a court hearing.

47. On 6 August, approximately 300 civilians, most of whom were students, took to the streets in Rahaid El Birdi (150 km south-west of Nyala) to protest at increases in basic commodity prices. Government buildings were set alight during the demonstrations. While Government security forces were deployed throughout the town, there were no reported casualties. The protests subsided later in the day. Following an enquiry, the Southern Darfur Wali relieved the Locality Commissioner of his duties.

48. UNAMID-documented violations of the right to physical integrity accounted for 49 incidents involving 153 victims, compared with 49 incidents involving

315 victims in the previous reporting period. Of these, 16 victims (7 of whom were students) sustained injuries caused by gunfire during the demonstrations in Nyala (see para. 45 above). A further 18 victims sustained injuries during attacks by militia on civilians in Kutum in August and September. The remaining incidents mainly involved the assault of civilians engaged in farming, by unidentified assailants.

49. The number of victims of arbitrary arrest and detention recorded by UNAMID during the reporting period was 46. Of these, 15 cases reflected arrests from 20 July to 10 August in connection with the killing, on 8 July, of two men at Hamadiya camp. Six of the detainees, including two UNAMID national staff members, were released on 21 August. A total of 11 people were arrested and detained without charge by the authorities in connection with the Nyala protests. While one of the detainees was released the same day following the intervention of a family member, the others were detained until 29 September. In addition, three lawyers were arrested in Nyala, on 17 August, after leading a protest against the detentions that followed the Nyala demonstrations. They remain in detention. On 16 August, a Southern Darfur State legislator from Katayla (110 km south-east of Nyala) was released by the National Intelligence and Security Service after having been detained for 52 days without charge. Upon release, he was formally notified that his parliamentary immunities had been revoked and that he was to be charged with instigating the Nyala protests. The legislator pointed out as his defence that he had been incarcerated by the Service at the time of the demonstrations. All of those detained were denied legal representation and visits by family members. UNAMID repeatedly visited National Intelligence and Security Service offices and submitted letters requesting access to the detainees, information about the incidents and for the authorities to charge or release them. The authorities refused to grant the mission access to the detainees or to provide information about the reasons behind their detention.

50. UNAMID documented 30 cases of sexual and gender-based violence involving 42 victims, 13 of whom were minors. This represents a slight decrease from 33 cases involving 37 victims, including 23 minors, in the previous reporting period. UNAMID monitored police investigations into the incidents, and court hearings, and facilitated the provision of legal aid and psychosocial assistance.

51. On 16 July, the Nyala General Court convicted a Government policeman for the torture and killing, on 12 May 2011, of a 13-year-old boy in police custody in Mershing (Southern Darfur) for alleged petty crime. The accused was sentenced to four years' imprisonment and ordered to pay 30,000 Sudanese pounds to the victim's family.

52. UNAMID organized 43 human rights capacity-building activities throughout Darfur for 1,139 representatives (271 of whom were women) of local authorities, civil society groups and LJM. In addition, from 29 July to 2 August, UNAMID, in conjunction with UNDP, facilitated prison duties training for 30 prison officers (14 of whom were women) in El Fasher.

### **Child protection**

53. On 30 July, LJM issued a command order prohibiting the recruitment and use of children by its members. On 30 August, the Ministry of Defence approved a Sudanese Armed Forces action plan to end the recruitment and use of child soldiers. Its adoption is pending the approval of the Ministry of the Interior. On

25 September, JEM adopted an action plan and ordered its members to “fully adhere to international and local laws governing the protection of children in armed conflict”.

## **VII. UNAMID deployment and operations**

54. As at 30 September, the strength of UNAMID civilian personnel stood at 85 per cent of the approved strength of 5,277 (1,106 international staff, 2,907 national staff and 453 United Nations Volunteers).

55. The strength of UNAMID military personnel stood at 16,789, including 16,237 troops, 285 staff officers, 199 military observers and 68 liaison officers. The deployment of a medium utility helicopter unit from Rwanda is scheduled for November 2012.

56. The personnel strength of UNAMID police stood at 2,590, comprising 84 per cent men and 16 per cent women. A total of 16 of the authorized 17 formed police units have been deployed (2,231 personnel, or 94 per cent of the authorized strength of 2,380). The deployment of a seventeenth unit is scheduled for mid-November 2012.

57. Pursuant to resolution 2063 (2012), implementation of the recommendations of the review of UNAMID uniformed personnel continued. The repatriation of a transport company, reconnaissance company and tactical helicopter unit was completed. The redistribution of troops and police within Darfur was partially completed. Full implementation is pending the finalization of construction at team sites in Muhajeria, Nertiti, Zam Zam and Zalingei. Standard operating procedures for joint planning and coordination centres intended to enhance coordination between troops and police at team sites were developed. The centres will be fully established once the redistribution of troops and police is complete. Reductions to the mission’s overall troop and police strengths are on track to reach the authorized ceilings set out in resolution 2063 (2012) by 1 July 2013 and 31 January 2014, respectively.

58. To complement the recommendations of that review, and further its objective of ensuring the effective and efficient use of resources to implement the UNAMID mandate, a comprehensive review of UNAMID civilian staffing commenced on 14 August. The first stage of the review, which is ongoing, consists of an assessment of the strategy, objectives and priorities of the mission over the medium term. This will be followed by an evaluation of the Mission structure required to meet the requirements and, thereafter, validation of the review recommendations by a senior African Union, United Nations and UNAMID team.

59. From 1 July to 30 September, UNAMID reported 6,505 military patrols, including 2,718 routine patrols, 859 night patrols, 614 short-range patrols, 532 humanitarian escorts, 192 long-range patrols and 1,590 logistic and administrative patrols. UNAMID police reported a total of 4,291 patrols, including 2,259 inside camps for internally displaced persons, 1,064 in towns and villages, 823 medium-range patrols, 77 long-range patrols and 68 firewood and grass patrols.

60. From 1 July to 30 September, Government authorities issued 925 new entry visas for UNAMID personnel. As at 30 September, 711 visas were pending, 605 of which were for civilian police officers, 52 for military personnel, 21 for civilian

personnel, 21 for official visitors, 11 for United Nations Volunteers and 1 for a consultant. UNAMID continued to urge the authorities to promptly approve all visa requests.

61. Regarding the operational and self-sustainment capabilities of troop and police contingents, only 23 of the 49 units deployed to UNAMID meet the requirements stipulated in the memorandum of understanding. The shortfalls pertain mainly to the serviceability of armoured personnel carriers. Some troop- and police-contributing countries took steps to address the shortfalls by transporting the spare parts required to maintain armoured personnel carriers and by purchasing off-road vehicles and communications equipment. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations continued to engage with troop- and police-contributing countries to ensure that they swiftly redress shortcomings in contingent-owned equipment.

62. The 14th tripartite meeting between the African Union, the Government of the Sudan and the United Nations was held in New York on 29 September. Participants discussed, among other things, the situation regarding the UNAMID contracted rations provider, the composition of the mission's police component, delays in the issuing of visas and the issuance of a radio licence. Participants representing the Government of the Sudan agreed, *inter alia*, to clear the existing backlog of visas in a timely manner, noting the intention of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to increase the representation of women and Arabic-speaking police and the current trend of nationalizing certain posts where appropriate across all peacekeeping operations, and to establish a joint committee comprising UNAMID and Government officials to facilitate the issuance of a radio broadcasting licence.

63. The threat of a disruption by Government authorities to the operations of the mission's sole contracted food rations supplier remained of concern. The authorities had informed UNAMID on 7 May that the supplier must cease operations and leave the country within 48 hours owing to alleged irregularities in its import notices. A new deadline of 30 August was subsequently provided. On 22 July, the United Nations initiated the process of selecting a replacement contractor and informed Government authorities that, while expedited, it would take nine months. On 30 August, the Government notified UNAMID that it had extended from 30 August to 14 September the deadline for the expulsion of the supplier. On 14 September, the Government again extended the deadline, this time by one month. The process of selecting and finalizing a contract with a new vendor is expected to take until mid-January 2013. The new vendor would then be expected to be fully operational in April 2013. During the 14th tripartite meeting, participants reached a common understanding that, during the interim period while the procurement process is being finalized, the current provider would continue to conduct its activities.

64. During the reporting period, a total of 86 quick-impact projects were completed, and 128 more ongoing projects are at various stages of completion.

65. UNAMID continued to reduce the threat posed by unexploded ordnance in Darfur. A total of 29 km<sup>2</sup> of land and 204 km of roads and paths were assessed as clear of unexploded ordnance. In addition, 23 items of unexploded ordnance were destroyed and a total of 2,600 beneficiaries received unexploded ordnance risk-awareness training.

66. UNAMID and local implementing partners commenced the implementation of 17 community-based labour-intensive projects for 2,335 youth in various locations

throughout Darfur. The projects, which provide on-the-job training in construction and agriculture projects over a three-month period, are intended to reduce violence involving youths susceptible to joining armed groups or gangs.

## **VIII. Progress against benchmarks**

67. Pursuant to resolution 2063 (2012), updated benchmarks and indicators developed in consultation with the African Union are set out in the annex to the present report. While the revised benchmarks relate to the same four areas as the previous set (the peace process; security; rule of law, governance and human rights; and the humanitarian situation), they have been revised to reflect the strategic workplan of the mission for the period 2012 to 2014 and the mandated tasks and priorities laid out in resolution 2063 (2012). Similarly, the indicators of progress have been updated to account for the current and projected UNAMID priorities and activities.

68. Pending a review of the updated benchmarks and indicators by the Council, the present report provides an assessment of progress against the benchmarks set out in annex II to my report of 16 November 2009 (S/2009/592).

69. Progress against the first benchmark related to the achievement of a comprehensive political solution to the conflict was modest. Implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur was limited mainly to preparations for the Darfur internal dialogue and consultations and the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission. Action taken by the signatory parties to implement provisions that provide concrete benefits for the people of Darfur, such as those related to justice, reconstruction, security or wealth-sharing, was lacking. Despite efforts by the Joint Mediation to encourage the Government of the Sudan and non-signatory armed movements to resume negotiations, talks were not held, owing to continued disagreement between the parties over their scope.

70. The second benchmark relates to the restoration of a stable and secure environment throughout Darfur. During the reporting period, there was regression against this benchmark resulting mainly from sporadic military clashes, increased intercommunal fighting, tension between militia and civilians and demonstrations in Southern Darfur. For its part, UNAMID contributed to the protection of civilians through the deployment of peacekeepers to trouble spots, support to mediation efforts and the promotion of human rights.

71. The third benchmark pertains to strengthening the rule of law, governance and the protection of human rights. The overall human rights situation in Darfur remained of concern, in particular regarding arbitrary arrests, sexual and gender-based violence and violations of the right to physical integrity. The low proportion of human rights violations documented by UNAMID that were reported to and investigated by police (4 out of 37 cases) provided one indication that the rule of law remained weak. UNAMID continued to provide logistics and capacity-building support to Government authorities, the Darfur Regional Authority and civil society groups to strengthen their ability to protect human rights, uphold the rule of law and govern effectively. However, indications of progress were limited.

72. The fourth benchmark relates to stabilizing the humanitarian situation and facilitating access to populations in need of assistance. The heavy rains and flooding

in Darfur increased the need for humanitarian assistance. While agencies provided relief across a range of areas, the provision of emergency shelter materials was hindered by delays in the issuing of clearances by Government authorities. Restrictions on humanitarian access remained of concern, in particular in Dar El Salam locality and Jebel Marra, where freedom of movement was limited in connection with ongoing military operations. By way of an overall assessment, there was little if any progress against this benchmark owing to the increased need for aid and the impediments, both environmental and bureaucratic, to delivering it.

## **IX. Integrated strategic framework for support to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur**

73. The Security Council, in its resolution 2063 (2012), requested UNAMID and the United Nations country team to develop an integrated strategic framework for United Nations system-wide support to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. Following extensive consultations, UNAMID and the country team developed a joint strategic vision and an implementation matrix for support to the Doha Document. The joint strategic vision sets out a strategy for coordinated assistance to the signatory parties, in particular through support to the Darfur Regional Authority. It identifies priority areas for support across six categories that reflect the first six chapters of the agreement (human rights and justice; governance and institutional capacity-building; early recovery, livelihoods and the environment; voluntary returns and durable solutions; ceasefire and security arrangements; and reconciliation). As cross-cutting issues, gender mainstreaming, child protection and the protection of civilians more generally are reflected across all six areas.

74. The implementation matrix identifies the specific activities that UNAMID and the United Nations country team are undertaking, or plan to undertake, to assist the signatory parties with the implementation of the Doha Document. Organized around the same six categories as the joint strategic vision, the matrix identifies tasks and the mission component or agency responsible for their delivery in support of specific provisions of the Doha Document. In co-locating the activities of UNAMID and the United Nations country team, the matrix highlights opportunities for cooperation and coordination and will serve as a living document. UNAMID and the United Nations country team will continue to refine the implementation matrix through additional consultations.

75. In addition, several mechanisms have been established to ensure the effective implementation of the joint strategic vision and a clear division of labour. These include bimonthly joint UNAMID and United Nations country team meetings to manage the implementation of the matrix and coordinate support to the Darfur Regional Authority, a joint secretariat that monitors and reports progress against the implementation matrix, and six joint working groups responsible for implementing matrix activities and ensuring that there is coherency in engagement with the Authority.

## **X. Financial aspects**

76. The General Assembly, by its resolution 66/279, appropriated the amount of \$1,448.6 million for the maintenance of the Operation for the period from 1 July

2012 to 30 June 2013. As at 5 October 2012, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for UNAMID amounted to \$209.6 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to \$1,546.8 million. Reimbursement to contributing Governments for troop and formed police unit costs, and for contingent-owned equipment costs is being made for the periods up to 31 August 2012 and 30 June 2012, respectively, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

## **XI. Observations**

77. Fifteen months since the adoption of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, the signatory parties have taken some action towards its implementation, particularly in regard to the commencement of the verification of LJM forces, the dissemination of the Doha Document to the civilian population, the holding of conferences of stakeholders and the commencement of the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission process. I am concerned, however, that tangible progress towards the implementation of provisions that bring about more immediate and concrete improvements in the lives of the people of Darfur has been less evident.

78. The economic challenges facing the Sudan have undoubtedly affected the Government's ability to transfer the resources needed to implement the agreement. In addition, the capacity-building needs of the Darfur Regional Authority remain considerable. Nevertheless, the signatory parties cannot rely on donor funding alone to implement the Doha Document. While donor funding is required, there is more that the parties can do themselves to advance the implementation of the agreement. Of particular importance is the work of the Special Court for Darfur; the role of the Darfur Land Commission in resolving intercommunal conflict over land ownership and access; and the implementation of the security provisions, including progress in the verification of LJM forces and the disarmament of armed militia groups. Such concrete demonstration of the parties' determination to implement the agreement would signal to donors their commitment to address sustainably the causes of the conflict. It would also signal to non-signatory movements the Government's true commitment to peacefully resolving the core issues relating to the conflict, and encourage their participation at the negotiating table. I therefore urge the Government and LJM to intensify their efforts to implement the Doha Document, in particular through action that responds to the expectations and aspirations of the people of Darfur.

79. UNAMID and the United Nations country team continue to experience impediments to their work in Darfur, including through delays in the issuance of visas, restrictions on movements by land and air, and delays in approving the transportation of humanitarian assistance. Such impediments undermine the Government's commitment to creating conditions necessary for returns and early recovery. United Nations system agencies can provide an important contribution to such efforts, but require the cooperation of Government authorities to do so. I call on the Government to cooperate fully with UNAMID and the United Nations country team and to lift all operational impediments to enable them to carry out their mandated tasks without restriction.

80. Regarding the inclusiveness of the peace process, if the hopes of Darfuris for a lasting peace are to be realized, engagement by the parties to the conflict and other

Darfuri stakeholders in peaceful dialogue remains critical. Nine years on, I call once again on the Government and non-signatory movements to immediately cease hostilities and engage without preconditions in talks aimed at reaching a peaceful settlement. It is imperative, in this regard, that the Government demonstrates to the non-signatory movements through its commitments under the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur that a negotiated agreement to which it is a party represents a viable means of ending the conflict. For their part, the non-signatory movements, including the Darfur members of the Sudan Revolutionary Front alliance, must renounce the use of violence and present their objectives under a political platform that enables constructive dialogue.

81. The present report clearly indicates that conflict has intensified in Darfur since my last report, particularly in Northern Darfur. The resurgence of attacks on and the harassment of civilians by armed militia in these areas are of particular concern. I call on the Government to exercise fully its responsibility to protect civilians and on the non-signatory armed movements to fulfil their obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law in ensuring that civilians are not harmed by military activities. UNAMID stands ready to provide its full support to the Government in establishing conditions to stem intertribal conflict, including through support to dialogue between the farming and pastoralist communities over access to and the use of land. For its part, the Government must use all peaceful means to address the resurgent threat of armed militia.

82. UNAMID uniformed and civilian personnel are at continued risk in Darfur, not only from lawlessness but from the harsh working conditions. I condemn in the strongest terms those responsible for the shooting incident on 12 August that led to the tragic loss of life of a UNAMID formed police unit officer from Bangladesh. Such acts are cowardly and reprehensible. I strongly urge the Government to fully investigate and hold those responsible criminally accountable. I was also saddened to learn of the deaths of three UNAMID soldiers from the United Republic of Tanzania, on 26 August, from an accident due to flooding while they were on patrol. I send my condolences to the Governments of Bangladesh and the United Republic of Tanzania and the families of the soldiers who died while bravely executing their duties in Darfur.

83. I am deeply concerned about the two UNAMID formed police unit officers who were kidnapped on 20 August. I thank the Government of the Sudan for its commitment to ensuring the safe and speedy release of the hostages. I also call on the Government to release the UNAMID national staff member who is currently in detention without charge in Southern Darfur.

84. In conclusion, I would like to thank the Officer in Charge of UNAMID, Aichatou Mindaoudou, for her leadership of the mission, particularly in these turbulent times in Darfur. I would also like to thank the women and men of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur for their tireless efforts to promote peace and the protection of civilians. Lastly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the many aid workers who work in challenging circumstances to deliver humanitarian assistance to people in need in the Darfur region.

## Annex I

### Updated UNAMID benchmarks and indicators

1. In accordance with the request made by the Security Council in its resolution 2063 (2012), the benchmarks and indicators for UNAMID set out in annex II to my report of 16 November 2009 (S/2009/592) have been updated. The adjustments reflect developments in the Darfur peace process and changes in the political, security and humanitarian situation in Darfur since the benchmarks and indicators were first developed. They provide a basis against which the Council may choose to assess progress made by UNAMID in implementing its mandate; the cooperation of the Government of the Sudan and the armed groups with UNAMID; and all parties' compliance with their international obligations.

2. Without prejudice to the sovereign responsibility of the Government of the Sudan, the four main priority areas against which progress in the establishment of peace and stability in Darfur could be assessed are: (a) support to the achievement of a comprehensive political solution; (b) the achievement of a secure and stable environment in which civilians are protected from imminent threats of physical violence; (c) enhancement of the rule of law, human rights and strengthened governance; and (d) the achievement of a stabilized humanitarian situation, durable solutions for internally displaced persons and refugees and a transition to early recovery. The mission's protection of civilians activities are cross-cutting and therefore reflected across all four benchmarks.

3. It should be noted that progress against the benchmarks is not only contingent on the effective execution of the mission's mandated activities, but also upon several external factors. These include, inter alia, the exercise of the host Government's sovereign responsibilities and its commitments under the Status of Forces Agreement; the full cooperation of the parties to the conflict, in particular regarding freedom for UNAMID, humanitarian and development actors to operate without restriction in carrying out their mandated tasks; the commitment by the parties to the conflict, and Darfuri stakeholders more generally, to achieving a peaceful settlement to the conflict; and sufficient international support for the work of humanitarian and development actors.

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#### I. Peace process

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##### **Benchmark: Achievement of a comprehensive and inclusive settlement to the Darfur conflict through the implementation of the framework for African Union and United Nations facilitation of the Darfur peace process.**

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Requirements for progress would include a commitment on the part of the Government of the Sudan and non-signatory movements to reach a comprehensive negotiated political settlement to the conflict and adhere to its full and timely implementation; willingness on the part of the parties signatory to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur to implement its provisions in a timely and effective manner, including through the allocation of financial resources by the Government for the effective functioning of the Darfur Regional Authority and for reconstruction and development in Darfur; credible Darfur-based internal dialogue and consultations that seek to reflect the views of the civilian population, including women, on Darfur in the peace process; the establishment of good-neighbourly relations between the Sudan and South Sudan to promote peace and stability in Darfur; and sustained and unified support from members of the international community to urge the parties to the conflict to reach a comprehensive and inclusive settlement.

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<b>Year</b>	<b>Indicators of progress</b>
<b>2012-2014</b>	<p>Provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur and any subsequent peace agreements are implemented according to agreed timelines</p> <p>The Government and non-signatory movements enter into meaningful negotiations brokered by the African Union-United Nations Joint Chief Mediator over a comprehensive settlement to the conflict on the basis of the Doha Document</p> <p>The Government and non-signatory movements conclude ceasefire agreements</p> <p>The Government and non-signatory movements conclude agreements for the adoption of the Doha Document</p> <p>Darfur-based internal dialogue and consultations take place in an environment that ensures the proportional representation of Darfurians and respects the human rights of participants, as monitored by UNAMID</p> <p>The outcomes of the Darfur-based internal dialogue and consultations are implemented in a manner that promotes and consolidates peace and stability in Darfur</p> <p>The outcomes of the Darfur peace process are reflected in a national constitutional review process supported by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel for the Sudan, as provided for in the framework for African Union and United Nations facilitation of the Darfur peace process (S/2012/166)</p>

## **II. Security**

**Benchmark: A stable and secure environment throughout Darfur in which civilians, in particular vulnerable groups, are protected and humanitarian and expert agencies are able to deliver assistance and carry out early recovery activities safely and unimpeded.**

Requirements for progress would include the demonstrated commitment of the parties to the conflict, including Government forces, non-signatory movements and other armed groups, to cease hostilities and respect and implement ceasefire and security arrangements.

<b>Year</b>	<b>Indicators of progress</b>
<b>2012-2014</b>	<p>Reduction in the number of military clashes between Government and non-signatory armed movement forces</p> <p>Reduction in the number of incidents of and casualties resulting from intercommunity conflict</p> <p>Reduction in the number of violent crimes against civilians, including related human rights violations and sexual and gender-based violence</p> <p>A comprehensive and inclusive ceasefire is in place, fully implemented and monitored by a functional, inclusive and adequately supported mechanism</p> <p>Progress in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and the implementation of civilian arms control programmes</p>

Reduction in criminal activities, including banditry, hijacking and kidnapping, against UNAMID and humanitarian and expert agencies

### III. Rule of law, governance and human rights

**Benchmark: Ability of the Sudanese authorities to uphold the rule of law and protect human rights is enhanced and national and local government institutions are representative and accountable.**

Requirements for progress would include the implementation of international obligations and the commitment of the Government of the Sudan at the national and local levels to improve the capacity of its security, judicial and penal institutions to promote and protect human rights, as well as the sustained support of the international community in efforts to strengthen state institutions in Darfur.

Year	Indicators of progress
2012-2014	<p>Improved environment for the protection of civil and political rights, including through the development of sustainable foundations for professional, democratic policing and law enforcement</p> <p>Reduction in the number of arbitrary arrests and illegal detentions, as recorded by UNAMID</p> <p>Parties to the conflict honour their commitments and international obligations to combat all acts of sexual violence against women, men and children and put an end to the recruitment and use of child soldiers</p> <p>Confidence among the civilian population in community police is enhanced, as indicated by an increase in the proportion of crimes reported to the police, in particular in internally displaced person camps and return areas</p> <p>National authorities undertake key legislative, judicial and corrections institution reforms in compliance with international human rights standards</p> <p>Security, judicial, legal and correctional systems that respect and uphold international law and human rights standards are operational throughout Darfur</p> <p>Transitional justice mechanisms, including the National Human Rights Commission, the Special Court for Darfur and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, are established and operating in accordance with international human rights standards and best practice</p> <p>Improved access to justice through the adoption of measures aimed at enhancing victims' rights to truth, justice and remedy</p> <p>Proportional representation of the people of Darfur in national and local government institutions, including through the increased participation of women</p> <p>A functioning Darfur Regional Authority that oversees the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, in conjunction with the Government of the Sudan, in particular its provisions related to the National Human Rights Commission and human rights subcommittees for Darfur; the Special Court for Darfur; and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission</p>

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#### **IV. Humanitarian assistance and support to recovery**

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**Benchmark: Stabilized humanitarian situation in which agencies are able to deliver assistance and conduct early recovery and the conditions for development, including durable solutions for internally displaced persons and refugees, are in place.**

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Requirements for progress would include the commitment of the parties to the conflict to allow unrestricted humanitarian access; the willingness of local actors to facilitate the safe, voluntary and sustainable return, reintegration or resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees; and support by the international donor community for humanitarian activities and, where appropriate, early recovery and rehabilitation.

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<b>Year</b>	<b>Indicators of progress</b>
<b>2012-2014</b>	<p>The number of people newly displaced or re-displaced by hostilities or other sources of insecurity is reduced</p> <p>Refugees and internally displaced persons leave camps to return to their places of origin or resettle voluntarily and in dignity</p> <p>Improved access for the civilian population to basic services, infrastructure and livelihoods</p> <p>Improved access for UNAMID, United Nations system agencies and international non-governmental organizations to undertake protection activities and the delivery of humanitarian assistance</p> <p>Unhindered access for United Nations country team members and other expert agencies to undertake early recovery, reconstruction and development</p> <p>Reduction in attacks, kidnappings and robberies targeted against UNAMID or humanitarian agency personnel</p>

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