Sexual Violence, Process Theories of Negotiations
&
The Evolution of Human Security

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Introduction

In the academic literature on peace negotiations, scholars have touched on issues of justice, but do not go far enough to understanding the interplay between conflict negotiations, human security and sustainable peace. In recent years, the particular issue of widespread systematic or opportunistic sexual violence has emerged as a concern in many conflict settings. What remains unclear is how negotiations processes have contributed to the exclusion of such issues during peace negotiations and how these exclusions impacted on prospects for sustainable peace. Even in international policy circles, in which widespread systematic or opportunistic sexual violence have increasing gained currency, debates have focused largely on prescriptive matters, but have largely ignored why these issues are omitted in the first place. This paper explores two questions:

- Can an analysis of process approaches help us to understand how the negotiations in Sierra Leone began and evolved, and why two agreements failed both to consider sexual violence and end the conflict?
- Can realist and constructivist theories strengthen our understanding of both why these issues were ignored during negotiations in Sierra Leone and how this has changed over time?

This paper begins with a review of the conflict in Sierra Leone. Secondly, I analyze three process-related theories on negotiations: Stein's theory of pre-negotiations; Habeeb's treatment of behavior and tactics; and Putnam's two-level theory. Thirdly, I explore how shifts from a pre-cold war realist perception of security to a more constructivist

conception can help explain how these issues were not considered and why they have gained prominence more recently.

Case Study: Sierra Leone

The conflict in Sierra Leone began in 1991 ostensibly as a challenge to a corrupt and authoritarian government, led by Joseph Saidu Momoh, whose presided over a disintegrating state. During the eighties, radicalized students traveled to Lybia where they were trained in the art of revolution. The conflict began when Forday Sankoh led a rebel group calling themselves the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), into the country whose stated aim was the establishment of 'genuine democracy.' (Gberie, 2000)

Eight months later, Momoh agree to restore multi-party rule after 24 years, and called on the RUF to join the political process, while simultaneously dismissing the RUF as bandits. In April 1992, a coup brought Valentine Strasser to power, who called for an end to conflict, elections and an end to corruption. Despite early progress, including a unilateral RUF ceasefire and an offer of amnesty, Strasser subsequently suspended the constitution and banned political activity.

By December, international pressure began mounting on Strasser to hold elections. The conflict intensified following the RUF's take-over of key mining districts. In 1995, Strasser contracted private military company, Executive Outcomes, from South Africa, to

contain an RUF insurrection. Within one month, EO had cleared the RUF from diamond mines and Freetown.

In January 1996, Julius Maada Bio launched a palace coup and quickly moved to hold elections. A severely weakened RUF declared a unilateral ceasefire and called for unconditional negotiations. Bio agreed and the two met in February 1996. Elections were held days later and were generally considered legitimate despite an RUF campaign of terror aimed at keeping citizen from the polls. Notwithstanding its originally-stated aims and widespread civil society endorsement, the RUF rejected the elections, threatened hostilities if an elected government assumed power and rejected prospects for negotiations with that government.

In March 1996, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah came to power, and despite Sankoh's threats, he agreed to negotiate with Kabbah in April, following Kabbah's unilateral release of 66 RUF members. Unconditional amnesty and support for reintegrating combatants were offered to the RUF, and although Sankoh continued to reject elections, a ceasefire deal was signed shortly thereafter.

The government agreed to major economic, political and social reforms, the transformation of the RUF into a political body, and jobs for RUF combatants in the various government institutions. Negotiations were nearly derailed by two RUF demands: the immediate expulsion of EO, which provided the government's main source of security; and a power-sharing agreement. A breakthrough came when Kabbah agreed to

withdraw EO and Sankoh abandoned its power-sharing demand, and called for the deployment of international monitors. However Sankoh's commitment to peace was questionable, evidenced by repeated use of stall-tactics. Kabbah consequently set a deadline of December 1st and threatened the RUF with sanctions, travel restrictions, and arraignment if an agreement was not reached. The Abidjan agreement was signed on November 30th.

According to Global Security, "the RUF gained most from the peace agreement. It was given an on-going political role and legitimacy, and was absolved of responsibility for its past activities. More importantly, it gained militarily in the sense that the government was left exposed with little reliable security."

Despite EO's prompt departure and the commencement of demobilization processes, both parties failed to deliver on commitments. Most importantly, Sankoh blocked the deployment of UN peacekeepers, and by early 1997, the conflict had resumed. In March, Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria on arms charges and the peace agreement collapsed.

In May, another coup led by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) forced Kabbah into exile in Guinea, and led to an RUF/ AFRC coalition. The AFRC again suspended the constitution and banned political activity, prompting ECOWAS to expand it peacekeeping contingent in 1998. Security was restored to the capital enabling Kabbah's return, but left many areas remained unsecured. In 1999, the conflict returned to Freetown, by which time, the RUF's aims were increasingly unclear. (Rashid, 2000)

By 1999, a stalemate developed prompting a second round of negotiations. Despite Sankoh's imprisonment and the depletion of RUF ranks, the RUF position was relatively strong. Kabbah was weak militarily and ECOWAS was threatening to withdrawal. Moreover, the RUF continued to control key mining areas, and maintained strong alliances with the AFRC, Liberia, Cote D'Ivoire and Burkina Faso. Other international actors, although supportive of Kabaah and horrified by the RUF's tactics, "were weary of sinking more resources into an endless conflict." (Rashid, 2000) They pressured Kabbah for negotiations despite well-founded domestic concerns that beginning negotiations in such a weak position could compromise hard-won democratic gains and security.

The RUF recognized that Kabbah enjoyed both popular and constitutional legitimacy. Perceiving the threat this posed to evolving RUF ambitions, Sankoh opted for aggressive negotiating tactics knowing "that if [they] succeeded in wrestling any major concession, […] the government's position would quickly become unsustainable." (Rashid) The result was a call for "blanket amnesty for all AFRC and RUF fighters; the release of all prisoners; a power-sharing arrangement based on a four-year transitional government until the next elections; recognition of AFRC–RUF control over certain areas of the country; participation in a new Sierra Leonean army; the withdrawal of ECOMOG troops; the creation of an independent peacekeeping force," and "the immediate and unconditional release of Sankoh." (Rashid, 2004)

The government rejected these demands, and particularly the notion of power-sharing on the grounds that it violated the constitution, but subsequently counter-offered four ministerial posts, a move that was quickly condemned by civil society groups. (Rashid) The RUF eventually agreed to a compromise, but Sankoh back-tracked and restated earlier demands. "Despite popular disapproval, the RUF fought tenaciously to push through its political proposals deploying adversarial negotiating tactics such as holding up negotiations, reneging on compromises, reintroducing old issues, spectacular public outbursts, threatening pullouts and shifting final authority." (Rashid, 2000)

Negotiations were at risk of collapse over power sharing demands, Sankoh's release and the removal of foreign troops when the President of Togo led a regional intervention aimed at pressuring both parties for a compromise. The Lomé Agreement was three days later on July 7th, and included amnesty for all combatants, a pardon for Sankoh, four ministerial posts, three deputy ministerial positions, the withdrawal of half of the ECOWAS deployment, socio-economic matters, human rights commitments, disarmament and the integration of RUF combatants into the new army. (Rashid, 2000) Sankoh was also named Prime Minister, in violation of the constitution, and Minister of Natural Resources. (Rashid, 2000)

Peace, however, was to prove elusive for several more years. The situation came to a head in May 2000 after the RUF kidnapped over 400 UN personnel, resulting in the collapse of the Lomé Agreement and the deployment of an independent UK military force. Sankoh was subsequently re-arrested, the hostages were freed and by December

2001, the British had successfully deployed to all districts of Sierra Leone, finally ending the war. (Berman & Labonte, 2004)

Over the course of the conflict, between 20,000 and 50,000 Sierra Leonians are believed to have died, and an estimated 1.3 million people are estimated to have been displaced. (Cook & Merrrow). Moreover, up to 64,000 people are believed to have suffered conflict-related sexual violence, while thousands more were brutally maimed. (UN Action Against Sexual Violence)

Process Approaches & Sierra Leone's Negotiations

To examine the issue of the exclusion of sexual violence from the peace processes in Sierra Leone, I draw upon three negotiations theories. I first examine Stein to explore how pre-negotiations set the agenda to the exclusion of issues such as sexual violence in both agreements through the offer of amnesties. Secondly, I look at Habeeb's treatment of tactics and behavior to understand how these further contributed to the exclusion of accountability issues from negotiations. Thirdly, I examine Putnam's two-level theory to understand how factors at both levels influenced important decisions, including Kabbah's decision to start Lomé negotiations despite its weak position.

Stein's analysis of pre-negotiations examines when, why and how parties get to the negotiating table. She argues that pre-negotiations begin when one or more party communicates its intention to consider negotiations as a policy option. Successful pre-

negotiations can have important consequences for the outcomes of negotiations by helping to "define the boundaries, shape the agenda and affect the outcomes of negotiations." She further argues that "that pre-negotiations may have important consequences even if the participants do not get to the table" because "significant learning can occur" which alters the relationship between the parties. (Stein, 1989) How then might pre-negotiations have define the boundaries in a way that led to the exclusion of sexual violence, among other crimes, from formal negotiations?

Pre-negotiations began several months into the conflict, continued until formal negotiations began in April 1996 and involved two principle parties – the RUF led by Sankoh and the government, which changed leaders six times over the course of the conflict.

This lack of continuity in government representation prolonged pre-negotiations over five years and deepened Sankoh's mistrust of Sierra Leone's various leaders, most of whom harbored power ambitions. Sankoh referred to 'commitments' made by previous leaders on such issues political participation in post-conflict governance, which in effect helped to place these issues onto the pre-negotiations agenda regardless of whether they were true. Each government leader introduced the issue of amnesties early in the process, a pattern likely effectively established amnesty as a foundational assumption of negotiations, making it difficult if not impossible to exclude this matter at later stages.

Once Kabbah came to power, he also responded to Sankoh's rejection of negotiations with an unconditional amnesty. It became apparent that Kabbah would go to great lengths for an agreement, and this observation shaped the dynamic of negotiations by emboldening Sankoh to seek further concessions, effectively rewarding RUF.

Blanket amnesties are problematic for the very reasons that they fail to deter parties from entering into conflict, while other concessions can be viewed as rewards for their behavior. Alternative forms of amnesties that might have effectively constraining subsequent RUF behavior were ignored.

Blanket amnesty may or may not have been necessary to open formal negotiations, but because Kabbah perceived a peace agreement as necessary for domestic and international legitimacy, and viewed amnesty as a means to achieving this end, he may have viewed amnesty as inevitable. According to Neale and Bazerman, "the less the negotiator is willing to assume a particular level of risk, the more he or she must be willing to concede in order to promote the certainty of a negotiated settlement."

On the other hand, the RUF had no consistent political aim. Abdullah and Muana argue that the RUF "defied all available typologies on guerilla movements." They are, "neither a separatist uprising," nor a reformist movement with a radical agenda "nor [did] it possess the kind of leadership necessary to become a warlord insurgency." The RUF has made history as a peculiar guerilla movement without any significant national following

or ethnic support." (Global Security, 1998) Lack of clear objectives made it very difficult for the government to develop an effective negotiating strategy.

Related to this is the question of how the RUF used of aggressive combat and negotiating tactics to affect the government's behavior and ensure the continued exclusion of accountability issues. Habeeb describes the concept of behavioral power as "the process by which [actors] maneuver and use their resources (both aggregate and issue-specific) to achieve preferred outcomes" and that it "is revealed by the actors tactics which are the means by which they exercise power" through various kinds of signals. These means can include "threats, warnings, promises, predictions, rewards, and side-payments" and are used both to communicate intent and to pressure the other side to fulfill these preferences by altering the other party's behavior.

Kabbah's early concession emboldened the RUF to continue using aggressive tactics as a means of extracting further concessions. Recognized Kabbah's need for a settlement to bolster his own legitimacy, Sankoh perceived an opportunity to test Kabbah's limits. He used deliberately aggressive negotiating tactics, including stalling and back-tracking, to extract further concessions from an increasingly exacerbated government. Realizing that this was effective, this continued for months until Kabbah established a deadline, which forced Sankoh to finally sign the Abidjan agreement. However Sankoh's decision weeks later to block the UN deployment, revealed his lack of commitment to peace. (Gberie, 2000)

The RUF did not enjoy a strict asymmetry of military power, however its apparent lack of moral constraint enabled it to use barbaric tactics to strengthen its hand. Ominously named missions such as 'Operation Pay Yourself', 'Operation Burn House' and 'Operation No Living Thing,' (Hawley, 1999) succeeded in terrorizing and controlling civilian populations and made Kabbah more determined to end the conflict to ensure domestic legitimacy.

Sankoh's decisions, though appearing erratic and irrational at times, was in part informed by lessons learned during the lead-up to Abidjan. He employed even more aggressive negotiating tactics during Lomé negotiations, aimed at extracting more power, and weakening Kabbah politically and militarily. The number of near-agreements from which Sankoh unexpectedly retreated while demanding further concessions was both a means to more power and deliberately tactic to undermine Kabbah's legitimacy. At some point, it should have become clear to Kabbah that the RUF was stalling and had no real intention of ending the conflict.

Putnam's two-level theory can also indirectly shed light on the exclusion of sexual violence. Kabbah faced pressure from domestic constituencies that desperately wanted an end to war, but not at the expense of hard-fought democratic gains, while the international community pressured Kabbah for a negotiated solution, even though he faced a clearly disadvantageous negotiating position. In fact, given domestic resistance during Lomé, it is difficult to explain Kabbah's decision, unless we consider international influences. Although EO's intervention demonstrated that very little in terms of *effective*

military force was required to nearly defeat the RUF, Kabbah's main international backers, notably the UK and the US, offered only economic and logistical support, but not the military support that it needed to strengthen its bargaining position (Cook, 2008). They prioritized a peaceful settlement through negotiations. Moreover, Nigeria was threatening to withdrawal nearly the entire peacekeeping force, and had in any case not proved to be a consistently effective force. (Rashid, 2000)

For Sankoh, an analysis of Putnam's argument is perhaps less irrelevant. Although he refers to various constituencies, he led an organization comprised mostly of fiercely loyal or forcibly recruited soldiers. His claims to represent the people of Sierra Leone also lack credibility. At the international level, however, Sankoh was supported by Liberia, Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso, but he otherwise faced international and domestic condemnation.

These theories help to explain how amnesty issues became a foundational element of negotiations, how Sankoh exploited Kabbah's desperation to extract further concessions making accountability an impossible consideration, and how international pressure perpetuated this pattern of ignoring accountability.

However, this argument has so far failed to acknowledge the fact that the particular point that sexual violence was also not considered a security issue at the time. The next section explores how more realist notions of state security have given way to constructivist notions of human security that has enabled sexual violence to be framed as a matter of

security, and by extension, a matter of relevance to peace negotiations.

Sexual Violence as a security issue

Conflict-related sexual violence in is probably as old as time, however this issue - and particularly the issue of widespread and systematic sexual violence – has only recently sustained attention in international policy circles. Prior to the end of the Cold War, perhaps the best-documented example is the fall of Berlin in 1945 when, under orders from Stalin, the Red Army used sexual violence to exact revenge against Germany for the invasion of the Soviet Union (Beevor, 2002). In 1949, Geneva Convention IV was adopted specifically situating these acts as violations of international law, but lacked an enforcement mechanism.

This began to change in the 90s following the end of the cold war, after which conflicts were increasingly characterized by domestic struggles between state and non-state actors. Two conflicts, Bosnia and Rwanda, were particularly important in evolving legal interpretations of rape and sexual violence. International criminal tribunals were established following both conflicts, aimed at prosecuting those who bore the greatest responsibility for crimes committed during the conflict, including sexual violence. The leaders of armed groups were prosecuted for acts of rape perpetrated by personnel under their command as crimes against humanity, war crimes and as acts of genocide. These were revolutionary precedents that informed the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Courts and helped to begin framing the discourse on sexual violence as a matter of security. (Weistman, 2008)

A related norm emerging from these conflicts was the notion of human security which focused on victims of conflict and helped to reveal both the protective needs of victims, as well as "social, economic and political factors that promote or engender their security". (Ogata, 2001) In contrast with state security, which focuses on protecting states from external antagonists through border controls, militaries and other means, human security places the focus of security policy on those affected by conflict. By considering state-specific threats in tandem with cross-cutting security issues, such as the protection of civilians and child soldiers, the human security lens theoretically arguably leads to a more complex and robust view of security and criteria for effective responses.

By focusing in on vulnerable populations in security situations, including women and girls, this analysis disturbingly revealed that widespread sexual violence had been used as a tactic of war in many other conflicts including Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Moreover, it revealed the many the consequences of wartime rape and the connection to security issues, including untold numbers of unwanted pregnancies, spread of disease, stigmatization and rejection of victims and dependants, and physical and mental suffering, (Koss, 2001) deprivation of social support. The product was a highly vulnerable and susceptible segment of society. Equally troubling has been evidence showing that in some places, widespread sexual violence may persists even after conflict has ended. (Achuthan & Black, 2009)

A third phenomenon that emerging in the late 90s was a shift away from the use of blanket amnesties, particularly for those who bore the greatest responsibility in conflict.

(Laplante, 2009) In places like South Africa, conditional amnesties were offered in exchange for full disclosure of crimes committed during the conflict through the Truth & Reconciliation Commission (TRC), and have since been regarded as critical steps in the process of national reconciliation. In Rwanda, where an estimated 500,000 women were raped, (UNIFEM) another TRC known as the gacaca complimented the work of the ICTR in prosecuting hundreds of thousands of lower-ranking genocide suspects for murder, sexual violence and many other crimes.

The evolution of these mechanisms and norms has strengthened the understanding of the complex interplay between sexual violence (among other crimes), impunity and security, and the understanding for why justice and accountability mechanisms are needed to strengthen prospects for long-term peace.

These norms, however, were only beginning to emerge at the time of the first peace agreement in Sierra Leone in 1995. And as argued above, pre-negotiations reduced the likelihood of these issues being introduced during Lomé negotiations in 1999.

Until recently, most international policy-makers, notably the Security Council, have failed to perceive sexual violence as a matter of international security. A dramatic shift occurred in June 2008, when the Security Council adopted Resolution 1820, on conflict-related widespread systematic or opportunistic violence. This was followed in September 2009 by a second resolution calling for the appointment of a Special Representative to the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence who is expected to lead a system-wide response to

address these crimes. These resolutions specifically call for the exclusion of sexual violence from amnesty provisions and for the inclusion of women and gender perspectives at all levels of decision-making, including during peace processes.

Whether or not these frames and mechanisms will help to effectively address these issues remains to be seen. A human security perspective suggests that vulnerable groups, in this case victims of sexual violence who are mostly female, are critical stakeholders in the peace process, and should therefore be participants in decision-making. Yet recent studies shows that women remain largely unrepresented in peace processes, constituting only 7.1% of participants and 2.1% of signatories for the last 14 agreements for which such information is available. (UNIFEM) Women represent neither heads-of-states involved in negotiations, nor are they special envoys deployed to negotiations sponsored by the UN or other multilateral organizations, while civil society organization continue to play marginal roles during most formal negotiations. (UNIFEM) Yet these resolutions, backed by policies targeting the recruitment of women into decision-making roles during negotiations, offer encouraging signs that this may be changing.

Perhaps more importantly, accountability and transitional justice issues have become increasingly common features to peacebuilding responses in recent years. Effective and legitimate mechanisms that consider crimes committed and the consequences of theses crimes may be the most important way of deterring future conflicts, and by extension, widespread sexual violence that have become such common characteristics of post-conflict societies.

Conclusion

This paper argues that sexual violence has largely been ignored in negotiations until recently. The offer of amnesties during pre-negotiations in Sierra Leone precluded accountability for sexual violence and other crimes and became a foundational assumption of negotiations. They also informed the RUF's use of aggressive negotiating tactics, enabling Sankoh to extract more concessions. International actors further weakened Kabbah's position by pressuring for a settlement, while providing inadequate support to ensure these would be sustainable.

Process theories do help to explain indirectly how sexual violence has been excluded, but examining realist assumptions of security is also fruitful. Moreover, constructivist theories show how conceptions of security have evolved. State security alone appears unable to cope with the broad array of security issues emerging in contemporary conflicts, yet human security is also problematic. For one, defining the boundaries and develop consensus can be difficult and can result in diffuse commitment. Unrestrained armed actors may also capitalize on human security frames by deliberately using barbaric tactics to achieve political and military goals. This suggests that a proper balance between these two competing notions may be required for the provision of *effective* security.

This paper also exposes the paradox between short-term imperatives for peace agreements, which can lead to the exclusion of accountability issues, and long-term imperatives for *sustainable* peace, which may necessitate accountability. Whether recent policy shifts actually contribute to reducing such violations in conflict situations will be

determined in part by the exercise of effective political will and leadership at the UN and

other international security policy-makers.

Note: Following the British intervention known as Operation Palliser in 2000, the government established in 2001 both a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which aims to promote community-based reconciliation, and the Special Courts of Sierra Leone "set up jointly by the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations" and "mandated to try those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996." Sankoh has since died of natural causes, but all other known leaders have been indicted or are presently standing trial, including Liberia's Charles Taylor.

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Appendix A – Timeline of Conflict & Negotiations

Apr 1961	Independence from Britain
1978	Governing All People's Party institutes single party rule
Mar 1991	Beginning of hostilities led by Forday Sankoh and supported by Liberia's Charles Taylor
Apr 1992	Military coup installs Valentine Strasser as Chair of the National Provisional Ruling Council
Oct 1992	RUF takes control of Kono diamond mining district
Dec 1993	Strasser announces a unilateral ceasefire
Mar 1995	South African militia Executive Outcomes contracted and pushes back RUF lines
Jan 1996	Julius Maada Bio carries out coup, sends Strasser into exile; appeals to Sankoh to negotiate
Feb 1996	Sankoh agrees to negotiations; meeting set for February 25, 1996
	Sierra Leone general elections held
Mar 1996	Sankoh announces 2-month truce, but threatens fighting if elected government assumes power
	Ahmad Tejan Kabbah wins presidential run-off on 15th
	Bio convened meeting with RUF in Abidjan on March 24th
	Kabbah inaugurated on the 29th; expresses willingness to negotiate with RUF
Apr 1996	Kabbah and Sankoh meet in Cote d'Ivoire; Kabbah offers amnesty, demobilization assistance, reintegration of RUF into armed forces; international community begins offering aid
	RUF continues to reject legitimacy of elections; talks are stalled
May 1996	Comprehensive peace talks resume without Kabbah; agreement reached on most areas except on legitimacy of elections;
Nov 1996	Abidjan Peace Accord signed, stipulating the withdrawal of EO and regional forces EO withdraws, but ceasefire never occurs
Jan 1997	Sankoh accused government of waging war against RUF
Mar 1997	Sankoh arrested in Nigeria on weapons charges
May 1997	Army stages coup; Sankoh endorses coup from prison; Government flee to exile in Guinea
Aug 1997	ECOWAS imposes military, economic and diplomatic sanctions on Sierra Leone
Oct 1997	The Conackry Peace Plan is signed
	Security Council imposes arms and oil embargo on Sierra Leone
Nov 1997	Junta and Kabbah agree to peace plan
Feb 1998	ECOMOG response to junta attack leads to collapse of junta
Mar 1998	Kabbah returns to Freetown
Jun 1998	UNOMSIL established by UN; Okelo appointed as Special Representative
Mar 1999	Kabbah consents to consultative 'family meeting' between Sankoh and RUF
Apr 1999	AFRC-RUF consultative meetings begin
May 1999	RUF present demands for peace to Kabbah and mediators
	Kabbah and Sankoh agree to ceasefire; negotiations resume between government in Lome
June 1999	Widespread civil protests regarding concessions to RUF lead to shut-down of Freetown
July 1999	Presidents of Nigeria, Liberia and Burkina Faso meet with Kabbah and Sankoh
	Lome Peace Accord signed
Oct 1999	UNAMSIL deploys with 6,000 military personnel
Feb 2000	Security Council expands UNAMSIL to 11,100 military personnel
May 2000	RUF kidnaps 400 peacekeepers, steals arms
	Operation Palliser, comprising of 4,500 British soldiers, sailors and Marines launched by UK
	Sankoh captured on May 9th, turned over to government
	Security Council expands UNAMSIL to 13,00 military personnel
Aug 2000	British forces arrest leader of AFRC off-shoot, prompting disarmament
Mar 2001	Security Council expands UNAMSIL to 17,500 military personnel; all-out-attack on Freetown
Dec 2001	UNAMSIL deployed to all districts in Sierra Leone, and established control over diamond mines
Jan 2002	War officially declared over
Jan 2002	Establishment of the Special Courts for Sierra Leone
May 2002	Parliamentary elections held; Kabbah re-elected with 70% of vote in first round

Appendix B – Acronyms

AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
APC	All People's Congress
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community Of West African States
EO	Executive Outcomes
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
MHS	Mutually Hurting Stalemate
NPRC	National Provisional Ruling Council
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SLPP	Sierra Leone People's Party
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNIOSIL	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolutions